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The Architecture of the Extended Mind: Towards a Critical Urban Ecology
Abstract
This thesis is concerned with the difficulties that the discipline of architecture has encountered in 
thinking about and articulating ecological questions in recent years. I argue that it is precisely 
because the problems posed by the environmental question have so many personal, political and 
social dimensions, and are so radically trans-disciplinary, that architectural discourse and its 
metropolitan mediations is well positioned to reflect upon, articulate and stage as a new modern 
project, this multi-disciplinary and socio-ecological complexity.
 The content of this thesis therefore crosses a number of different fields within the arts and 
sciences. I scrutinise a series of contemporary and historical moments in the development of 
systems thinking – or what Alfred North Whitehead described as “the philosophy of organism” – 
with particular reference to a socio-political re-conception of architecture, urbanism and the wider 
environment today. I describe a network of relationships which traces the surprisingly dynamic 
histories of a series of concepts – including nature, matter, organism, ecology, network, mind, 
emergence, system and dialectics – as they unfold across a wide range of disciplines, including 
architecture, cybernetics, Marxist theory, ecology and the cognitive sciences.
 Ultimately, this thesis suggests that critical urban ecology – the architectural investigation of 
ecological aesthetics and urban political ecology – will be a key field of both theoretical 
investigation and practical design activism in the coming years, as the deep contradictions of 
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The Architecture of the Extended Mind: Towards a Critical Urban Ecology
Introduction
The artist is prepared to look anywhere, into any discipline, scientific or spiritual, any view of 
the world – however esoteric or arcane – any culture, immediate or distant in space or time, 
in order to find ideas or processes which might engender creativity. There is no meta-
language or meta-system that places one discipline or world-view automatically above all 
others. Syncretic transdisciplinarity informs artistic research at all levels. This is why we look 
in all directions for inspiration and understanding: to the East as well as the West; the left 
hand path as well as the right; working with both reason and intuition, sense and nonsense, 
subtlety and sensibility.1
[Roy Ascott]
i.1 Process, Consciousness and the Political
This thesis is concerned with the difficulties that the discipline of architecture has 
encountered in thinking about and articulating ecological questions in recent years. To 
some, this might seem a somewhat controversial and unfair statement to make. Surely, it 
might be argued, there has been a great deal of important and useful work developed in 
response to the demand for more sustainable building practices – and to some extent this 
is indeed true. However, there remains a great deal of confusion about how to think and 
talk about these issues. More than that, it is often not clear to what extent these can be 
thought of as properly architectural responses, as opposed to actually being based within 
say building technology at one end of the scale, or social activism at the other. 
Nonetheless, in this thesis I argue that it is precisely because the problems posed by the 
environmental question have so many personal, political and social dimensions, and are 
so radically trans-disciplinary, that architectural discourse and its metropolitan mediations 
is well positioned to reflect upon, articulate and stage as a new modern project, this multi-
disciplinary and socio-ecological complexity.
 The content of this thesis therefore crosses a number of different fields within the 
arts and sciences. In this thesis I will assemble a series of contemporary and historical 
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moments in the development of systems thinking – or what Alfred North Whitehead 
described as “the philosophy of organism” – with particular reference to a socio-political 
re-conception of architecture, urbanism and the wider environment today. I describe a 
network of relationships, as an “ecology of ideas”, which traces the surprisingly dynamic 
histories of a series of concepts – including nature, matter, organism, ecology, network, 
mind, emergence, system and dialectics – as they unfold across a wide range of 
disciplines, including architecture, cybernetics, Marxist theory, ecology and the cognitive 
sciences. Writing in the mid-1980s regarding a different – although similarly trans-
disciplinary project – Manfredo Tafuri asked:
Architecture, language, techniques, institutions, historical space: are we simply 
lining up on a wire stretched over a void a series of problems, each with its own 
intrinsic characteristics, or can we legitimately contest the "terms" used here to trace 
these problems back to an underlying or hidden structure, in which these words can 
find a common meaning on which to rest?2
Whilst throughout this study I make repeated references back to architectural and urban 
themes, I also realise that this thesis speaks more broadly to a series of important and 
emerging contemporary discourses beyond any narrowly conceived study of architecture. 
Notably these would include (in no particular order) the various “new materialism” projects 
based in philosophy/cultural theory, discussions around the politics of the brain, the 
implications of extended and embodied cognition theory across cultural theory and the 
cognitive sciences, and the forms of critical and activist “metabolics” developing around 
urban political ecology.
 In fact, I would say that the broad aim of this thesis, in this its final form, is to help 
situate a contemporary architectural, urban and ecological design and research practice 
within the new trans-disciplinary configurations of knowledge that are emerging from 
contemporary efforts to rethink the contradictions and boundaries between the natural, 
social and political sciences, and the arts and humanities. I have gravitated towards the 
concept of Critical Urban Ecology to describe the particular field of interest that concerns 
me here.3 However, in its broad consideration of the conceptual and ideological histories 
of our conceptions of nature, ecology and complex systems, this thesis also addresses a 
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number of contemporary discussions in philosophy, critical theory and human geography. 
 Notably, this study makes a contribution to various contemporary attempts to 
construct more “vital” models of philosophical materialism. It also speaks to other attempts 
to re-conceive of the living, labouring, metabolically and cognitively embodied and 
extended human “subject”, which are themselves emerging in contemporary biopolitical 
accounts of the cognitive sciences. Lessons from disciplines as diverse as quantum 
mechanics, the cognitive sciences, ecology, and neocybernetics, show us that we really 
need to find very different paradigms for thinking about the unfolding dynamic 
cosmological and ecological reality of material processes, and our dialectical relationship 
to those processes as human beings, and as a key productive participatory part of, that 
reality. The sciences of complexity have all demanded a total revision in how we now 
conceive of matter and life, and what is meant by mind and self, and indeed what it means 
to be human. I argue that architecture, as a distinctively social form of material practice 
and knowledge, can stage a unique social reflection upon these issues as ecological 
questions. 
 Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, whose seminal 1985 book on Order out of 
Chaos has become a landmark text for many neo-materialists, suggested that the new 
materialism calls for a study of “the timing of space”, and
... leads to a new view of matter in which matter is no longer the passive inert 
substance described in the mechanistic world view, but is associated with 
spontaneous activity. This change is so profound that ... we can really speak about a 
new dialogue of man with nature.4
Much of Prigogine and Stengers’ work focused on interpreting the dynamic and proto-
metabolic structures of what they called far-from-equilibrium dissipative systems, 
examples of which pervade all living organisms, ecosystems and many complex “proto-
animate” chemical reactions and physical processes. Reflecting upon their work, John 
Briggs and David Peat note – in language that resonates with neocybernetic and 
dialectical thinking – that a dissipative system “is autonomous (separate); its autonomy 
derives from its interdependence with its surroundings.” They go on to suggest that “the 
key to resolving this paradox is … how we understand words like ‘process’ and 
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‘relationship’. We are so used to thinking of ‘things’ that this may be difficult to grasp at 
first”.5
 In just the last year or two, a series of interesting attempts to confront precisely 
these questions from a broadly critical theory and social science origin have been 
published. These include Timothy Morton’s Ecology without Nature (2010), and other neo-
materialist formulations such as Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter (2010), Diana Coole and 
Samantha Frost’s collection of essays on New Materialisms (2010), and Barbara Bolt and 
Estelle Barrett’s Carnal Knowledge: Towards a New Materialism through the Arts (2011). 
These attempts are often based themselves upon modes of what Morton would broadly 
describe as paradigmatically “ecological thought”, by adopting the various relational 
network conceptions of material, biological and social actors that can be found in the 
recent work of Manuel DeLanda, Bruno Latour and a variety of texts inspired by the 
philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari (and which typically feature more or less substantial 
references to Whitehead, Spinoza, Leibniz and Marx). Most typically in these neo-
materialist models we find attempts to theorise the fact that, far from human cognition 
being the sole source of reason in the world, it is matter itself – in both its most base and 
its various complex organised forms – which seems to require, at the very least, a much 
more sophisticated conception of perfomative agency. 
 There is a great deal that is useful in these writings, and in the attempts to 
articulate non-dualist accounts of the relationship between “nature” and “culture”; as such, 
these discourses echo my concerns here. Equally, however, many of the new materialist 
tendencies can tend to obscure the specific intellectual, political and economic conditions 
that have led to their own emergence today. The very materiality of the discourse, and the 
processes that it wishes to describe, has some difficult relationship with the increasingly 
complex and immaterial condition of contemporary capitalism. The emphasis on the 
“newness” of these new materialist accounts can forget that this is a discourse that has (in 
some versions at least) all kinds of roots in ecological, feminist and social constructivist 
critiques. There is an irreducible embodiment of social relations within any conception of 
materiality, and if traditional bourgeois distinctions such as “nature” and “culture” can 
seem increasingly problematic to us today, it is in no small degree precisely because 
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capital itself has penetrated into the very heart of the non-human world.  As Tafuri again 
asks us, 
Is it still necessary to remember that the totality of the capitalistic means of 
production is a condition for both the cohesion and the diffraction of techniques, that 
the ‘mystical character of the commodity’ breaks up and multiplies the relationships 
that are at the base of its own reproduction?6
In this regard it is interesting to note that on the recent occasions where architectural 
thinkers have attempted to work through aspects of new materialist thinking, many of the 
same problems have remained unresolved and indeed often become amplified. This can 
for example be seen in the curious nexus that is emerging between aspects of new 
materialist thinking, attempts to theorise digital manufacturing technologies within 
construction, and so-called “post-critical” architectural theory, based upon a conception of 
positivist-empiricist-affective performativity, largely stripped of any historical, social and 
political dimensions. 
 Any new materialist project – whether in architecture or more broadly –  must, I 
argue, incorporate our role as socio-political labouring participants, albeit situated within 
an unfolding cosmos of other relational material processes. At a time when the very 
concept of materialism is being so openly revisited by academics in a number of fields, it 
seems opportune to return – as I do in several chapters – to the broad question 
concerning a Marxian “dialectics of nature”, and what John Bellamy Foster has described 
as “Marx’s Ecology”. 
 Importantly, I argue in this thesis that there is much that these projects – in their 
philosophical, architectural and ecological forms – can learn from the history of 
cybernetics. Indeed, as will become clear in the coming chapters, I concur with Bruce 
Clarke and Mark Hansen, when they suggest that:
... technoscientific processes ... are everywhere transforming the material world 
in which we live today ... Better late than never, second-order cybernetics can 
now perhaps finally come through on its promise to provide the ecology of mind 
best fitted to the demands of our intellectual, institutional, and global crises.7
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Following this, I believe that a crucial contribution of this thesis is therefore to help position 
more clearly the relevance of thinkers such as Gregory Bateson, David Bohm and 
Francisco Varela to the development of a modern and more nuanced conception of  
materialism – one based upon an understanding of processes and relations unfolding 
through (and as) space and time, as much as objects. Importantly, by revealing the 
connections between this philosophical project, and an ecological conception of 
architecture and urbanism, it is possible to reveal the necessarily political dimension that 
any such project must take.
i.2: The development of this thesis
When I started this project, I had little anticipation of contributing to these broader 
discussions. The original aim of the thesis was to consider some conceptual models of the 
modern human being, in terms of a relational, networked and embodied self that 
“extended” out from our physical bodies. It was forms of this extended condition which 
seemed to be the “pattern that connected” much of the material that I was reading at the 
time. These sources included the “phenomenology” in the manuscripts of the young Karl 
Marx and the descriptions of “mystical” commodity networks in Marx’s mature work, the 
mediated “extensions of man” described in the ideas of Marshall McLuhan, and the sense 
of a projective “body-space” felt by empathy theorists.8 My interests however developed 
from the early years of this study, and were often mediated through design research 
conducted in practice and through teaching.9 In particular, I became interested in post-war 
media and information theory, as well as more recent theorisations of prosthesis and 
interface – in particular the work of Andy Clark – which focused on understanding the way 
that the body co-opts and incorporates, in complex ways, tools of all kinds. It seemed 
clear that there was an opportunity to extend Clark’s readings, to consider the way that 
buildings and cities acted as prosthetic tools. I had previously written about the way that 
some nineteenth-century German aesthetic philosophy – which had, in the accounts of 
Adrian Forty and others, played an important role in shaping how modern architecture 
thought about form and space – seemed also to speak directly to a contemporary “cyborg” 
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condition which we experience today. Most importantly, I saw this thesis as a vehicle to 
explore whether there might be architectural and urban readings of ideas that are 
developing in the cognitive sciences around extended and embodied minds, in biology 
around the concept of extended phenotype, in artificial intelligence research and 
psychology around the concept of pattern, and in ecology and neocybernetics regarding 
the co-evolutionary feedback networks that couple together organisms and their 
environments.
 Much of my research during the early period felt rather esoteric and obscure at the 
time, and my exploration of how theories that can only be described as modern forms of 
panpsychism (the idea that all matter contains “mind”), pantheism (the idea that “God” is 
present in all matter) and hylozoism (the idea that all matter is alive), resonated with 
attempts to think about “extendedness” in its various forms, no doubt raised some 
eyebrows. Still, the fact remains that these cosmological network ideas can be traced not 
only in recent media theory (notably of course McLuhan), and in all kinds of ecological 
organicist philosophies and “new age” beliefs, but also Marx’s account of commodity 
networks. I hence remain fascinated by the question of where this very specific spatio-
ecological imaginary is coming from.
 During the course of my research, such interests were shaped by a growing 
awareness and interest in the social, political, technical and theoretical aspects of the 
environmental question – both in terms of what is at stake in the demand for so-called 
“Design for Sustainability”, and in ecological theory more broadly. As a result, Gregory 
Bateson – whose work was referenced in the original proposal with regard to media 
ecology and pattern theory – became a much wider influence than I had originally 
anticipated, and indeed, Bateson’s work transformed my understanding of both ecology 
and cybernetics. More importantly, Bateson’s thinking radicalised my appreciation of the 
possibility of developing new forms of science and technology as aesthetic and ecological 
systems of thought – and that this presented a fascinating opportunity for a new kind of 
architectural knowledge and practice.
 It was notable that when I began this project I would generally be met with blank 
stares whenever I mentioned the name of Gregory Bateson. Today the situation is slowly 
changing. Beyond anecdotal stories of colleagues who are now looking again at Bateson’s 
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work, a host of new publications, films and conferences demonstrate that his oeuvre is 
being taken up by theorists across a range of disciplines. This (still embryonic) return to 
Bateson is no doubt mostly characterised as an archival or historical project: recognising 
the scope and importance of Bateson’s contribution across a range of disciplines, and his 
contribution to the development of many ideas that we are all familiar with today. 
 Some contemporary thinkers suggest that – important as it was at the time – much 
of Bateson’s thinking has since been built upon or otherwise transformed by more recent 
research, such that his work per se is no longer so relevant to contemporary debates. 
Whilst of course I clearly see my thesis as a contribution to a broader examination of 
Bateson’s ideas, I reject any purely archival interpretation of this material. Importantly, as I 
will argue, it is precisely some of Bateson’s most difficult, obscure and trans-disciplinary 
ideas that are most valuable to thinkers today. Most notable perhaps, is his argument that 
– in a real and important sense – all material processes themselves are semiotic, in 
particular all highly organised and living material systems. By this he means that complex 
material processes, in so far as they are structured according to a responsiveness to 
relational differences in their surroundings, are language-like. In this regard – and in his 
corresponding call for an ecological aesthetics that is capable of transforming the very 
way in which we think about science and technology, and indeed architecture and design 
– I argue that Bateson’s ecological-semiotic materialism has a vital contribution to make to 
contemporary debate.
 While seemingly unconnected to any recent return of interest in Bateson’s work, it 
is also the case that in recent decades the social geographer, David Harvey, has 
attempted to broker a discussion between Marxists and ecologists, suggesting that there 
is a great deal of common ground between these two bodies of thought. In particular, 
Harvey suggests that ecological organic philosophies – notably he refers to David Bohm, 
Fritjof Capra and Alfred North Whitehead – share much with a Marxian dialectical method 
based upon a philosophy of internal relations. This became an increasingly important 
proposition for me as my research progressed. I position Harvey’s work in relation to 
similar thinkers and colleagues – Bertell Ollman, Neil Smith, John Bellamy Foster and Erik 
Swyngedouw – and consider in some detail the versions of organic and ecological theory 
by Bohm, Capra (and to some extent Whitehead) that Harvey refers to. Above all, my aim 
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is to extend Harvey’s discussion to consider the relation between neocybernetics, 
complexity theory and a renewed dialectical materialism, and to consider what this means 
for thinking about architecture.
 As I neared the completion of my thesis, Harvey himself began to disseminate a 
new, and I believe, highly significant thesis, which he calls “co-revolutionary theory.”10 
Harvey’s term clearly resonates with Bateson’s conception of “co-evolution”, which was 
further elaborated by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, and later on by Niklas 
Luhmann – although Harvey never discusses these connections directly. Notably in his 
co-revolutionary theory, Harvey rejects the classical Marxian notion that class struggle 
alone is the primary motor of human history. Instead he proposes a more dialectical and 
systemic understanding – itself developed from some of Marx’s comments in Capital and 
in the Grundrisse11 – based upon a “method of moments” which involve a complex 
network of “mental conceptions”, “relation to nature”, “processes of production”, 
“technology”, “daily life” and “social relations”. In the terms of neocybernetics, each of 
these moments develops autonomously, even whilst they are structurally coupled to each 
other and dynamically co-evolving as a network. Harvey argues that if you look at the 
conditions through which capitalism emerged, one can see this complex co-revolutionary 
development happening across these six kinds of moments. He goes on to argue that the 
left has failed to properly recognise such realities in its socio-economic theory, the result 
being that whenever it has attempted to affect change in practice – such as in the various 
twentieth century forms of so-called “actually existing communism” – it has worked on just 
one or two moments, and not as a dialectical movement across the whole system. 
i.3: From the Ecological to the Neurological (and back again through architecture)
Over the course of the thesis I will thus move across all six of the co-revolutionary 
moments that Harvey (via Marx) has set out, although my material here speaks in 
particular to the moments of “technology”, “mental conceptions” and “relations to nature”. 
Moving across these three moments, my argument is that architecture today can be re-
imagined – and indeed is increasingly re-defined by capital processes – as a social 
interface which lies between the ecological and the neurological. I argue that 
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developments that are underway in both the cognitive sciences and materialist philosophy, 
whilst still embryonic, have the capacity to transform what we think of as architecture. As 
such, they open a space for an expanded architectural knowledge that is based upon a 
more dialectical understanding of the way that environments – “built” and “natural” – are a 
part of the whole organism, and the way that human spaces become important parts of 
our extended minds and bodies. Developments in thought about matter are constantly 
being defined by what we are able to do with matter, and how we experience it. 
Architecture, which has for so long thematised our historical social relations to nature, 
might therefore today have a renewed task in contributing to thinking space, matter, 
energy and time, as a materialist form of semiotics that encompasses both human and 
natural orders. The city, which on this model is a highly particular form of organised matter 
and organic activity, is recognised as a political metabolic system operating within 
“natural” ecosystems that operate at both local and global scales. Today these natural 
ecosystems are structurally coupled to, and interrelated with, human metabolic flows. 
However, natural ecosystems have existed as processes independent of human 
interrelations before, and it is entirely possible that they might “adapt” to do so again in the 
future. It is the case then, that architecture has a dual relation towards the non-human 
world to articulate, a dialectical relation of both mutual autonomy and radical 
interdependence.
 I will develop these ideas in greater detail through a series of specific analyses. In 
the first chapter on A Relational Theory of Architecture, I suggest that there is an important 
historical relationship between architectural knowledge, systems thinking and the very 
possibility of a “philosophy of organism”. In particular I set out a specific understanding of 
space-time relationality and dialectical methods of thinking. Next, a chapter titled  
Organon and the Production of Nature is concerned with conceptions of the relationship 
between “culture” and ”nature”, and here I will consider the contested ideological and 
intellectual histories associated with such terms. In the third chapter Dialectical Ecology: 
Towards a Critical Metabolic Materialism, I look at ecological thinking more directly, 
bringing together both Marxian and neocybernetic insights in this regard. A fourth chapter, 
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Cybernetics and Systems Theory, reviews the history and legacy of cybernetics and 
systems theory more directly, and in particular I introduce the ideas of Gregory Bateson. 
! In these first four chapters, therefore, I trace the similarities and differences 
between a modern relational dialectics version of Marxism, and the methods of 
neocybernetics, and in so doing I position both in relation to contemporary discussions 
about new materialism. The next three chapters then deal with more specifically 
contemporary developments in the cognitive and ecological sciences. In the fifth chapter,  
Ecologies of Extended Minds, I set out the various forms of extended, embodied and 
ecological mind theory. A sixth chapter, Bodies and the Timing of Space: The Architecture 
of Cognitive Mapping, looks at recent developments within the cognitive sciences in the 
light of previous chapters, with particular attention to how we experience our bodies in 
space and construct our sense of self. In the last chapter, Aesthetics, Technology, and the 
Spirit of Matter, I will turn to consider the role that the concept of empathy has played 
since it was developed as a term in nineteenth-century spatial aesthetics, in thinking about 
our relations to our natural and technological ecological conditions. 
 I started this thesis as an open enquiry into the extended mind and relational 
thinking in its ecological, urban and architectural forms. The aim was to provide a critical 
historical, ideological and political account of terms such as “natural”, “organic”, 
“sustainable” and “ecological” – not of course, out of any climate-sceptic sympathy, but 
precisely because such an analysis shows that whilst these terms are the only concepts 
that we currently have to think through our contemporary environmental crisis, they are in 
many respects inadequate for the size and profundity of the job at hand. Nonetheless, I 
will conclude the study with some specific observations regarding congruences that are 
now emerging between the very different areas of research that I have considered. Most 
notably, I suggest that there is real work to be done to bring together urban political 
ecology, and the radical tendency within neocybernetics to create an ecological 
materialism. Thus in my conclusion I will also set out how I propose to take these issues 
on to future projects. 
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1. A Relational Theory of Architecture
1.1 Architecture and Systems Theory 
Systems thinking in architecture is generally considered to be a twentieth-century 
phenomenon, beginning perhaps with the proposals for the rationalisation of the 
construction industry by Ernst May in Weimar Germany, or with the emergence of the 
French concrete industry as a system of prefabrication. In the post-war period, systems 
approaches to construction were taken up on both sides of the Iron Curtain – but to very 
different aesthetic and ideological ends. Whereas in the Soviet Union systems theory was 
taken on in the sense anticipated by May – that is to say, as a means of implementing 
planning – in the capitalist west it took on an apparently very different role, and was 
concerned with giving form to a society increasingly organised and valorised around 
networks of information. In the Soviet Bloc, systems models dominated construction 
methodology, but typically these were pre-cast concrete panel systems, which were heavy 
in every sense of the word. In the west a very different tradition emerged. In the United 
States, for example, through Eero Saarinen, the Eames, and most notably Buckminster 
Fuller, and in the UK through for example Archigram and Cedric Price, the implementation 
of systems thinking and cybernetics became associated with a particular form of techno-
utopianism, and increasingly gave expression to an immaterialisation of construction.1
 However, in this thesis I argue that all of the above are just a few moments in a 
much more complex relationship between architectural knowledge and systems thinking. 
In fact, the nature of architecture’s engagement with systems thinking has been 
profoundly complex, in the full sense of the term: architecture is itself a system, even 
whilst it mediates other systems. It is complicit within the production of other bigger 
systems – economic, social, infrastructural – and is essential to the reproduction of 
smaller systems, most notably the human organism and human consciousness. In this 
thesis I will therefore link together a series of moments in systems thinking as it has 
developed over the past two centuries in particular. These moments are drawn together 
from across a number of disciplines, but are focused upon situations when practices and 
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Figures 1.1 and 1.2. Leon Battista Alberti (1404-72), Santa Maria Novella, Florence, Italy 
(built from 1456 to 1470). Architecture (here specifically the facade) is theorised by Alberti 
as a concept which emerges as a systemic relationship between whole and parts: “Beauty 
is a form of sympathy and consonance of the parts within a body.” Alberti here suggests that 
beauty is a second-order effect, a self-empathy within an organism, between its parts. In 
fact, I suggest that one definition of architecture is second-order building, in cybernetic 
terms.
 
knowledge associated with architecture have engaged with, contributed to, or transformed 
themselves through, an engagement with systems thinking. 
 In this sense, architecture – which I broadly define here following Bill Hillier as 
human spatial configuration2 – has always been engaged in, and mediated, the production 
and cultural conceptualisation of systems beyond itself. Whilst there was presumably little 
self-conscious reflection upon “architecture” as both an “abstract system”, and a “system 
of abstraction” in the minds of the various builders of Stonehenge, for example, or in the 
collective historical activity of the countless generations who have anonymously 
contributed to human city building, by the time we get to the Renaissance this situation 
has dramatically changed. Here we find the emergence of modern architecture as a self-
conscious professional knowledge and discipline, and we find it self-consciously theorising 
itself as a systems theory. In, for example, Leon Battista Alberti’s theory of concinnitas, as 
set out in De Re Aedificatoria, we find, in the words of Adrian Forty, a “principle of 
harmony that underlies the graceful arrangement of parts in relation to each other and to 
the whole.”3 
 I am suggesting here, in a sense in parallel to Tafuri’s description of architecture’s 
role in the ideological formulation of “the plan”,4 that in some sense systems theory in 
general was first imagined as a possibility, as a conceptual form, in this architectural 
moment.5 Various conceptions of relationships between “parts”, “fragments” and “wholes” 
will drive a lot of the discussion throughout the following chapters, just as it has done in 
modernity more broadly. If we find the part/whole dialectic in general to have been self-
consciously articulated first (in its modern form) in Renaissance architecture, that is 
because – as Tafuri spent much of his career revealing – the Renaissance is “the space 
where the present finds its problems.”6 It is in this period that we find the birth of the 
system of modernity, and the birth of architecture as it is understood today, as both a 
systems discipline and, frequently, as a thoroughly ideological system of spatio-temporal 
projection. 
 Initially the spatio-temporal system that architecture projected was directed 
backwards, into an imagined classical past, and the system image was one of a 
harmonious socio-spatial organisation. However, there were contradictions inherent within 
this projection, not least that this ideal classical homeostatic image embodied in the ideal 
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city could not easily deal with growth as an urban reality or social ideology. As these 
contradictions started to unravel with the growth of capitalism, the temporal projection that 
was played out in architecture flipped, and became future-oriented. This is the moment of 
modernity proper: the conscious attempt to grasp the way that systems operating in the 
present conjure into existence “strange attractors” located in the relational space-time of 
the future. Growth is of course both an ecological and an economic concept. It is hugely 
significant, I suggest, that modern architecture became a site of a political struggle over 
the production and control of space and time, and as a systems discipline grounded in 
resolving an imaginary of whole/parts relations, within a context of growth.
 In fact I would argue that since Alberti – and as William Braham and Jonathan Hale 
have shown, certainly since the Industrial Revolution – there has been a consistent re-
engagement between modern architecture and systems theory, and a consistent attempt 
to define an architectural practice as a form of systems theory, articulated through various 
concepts articulated around nature, technology, organism and ecology. For Braham and 
Hale, the repeated engagements with systems theory in architecture must be 
comprehended within the context of their broader social and economic conditions, in 
which all aspects of architectural production were undergoing constant radical 
transformation. As a result, many architects 
... tried many different formulations to manage and understand [these changes]... 
principal among them were various kinds of organic and biological analogies, which 
gained increasing precision as cybernetics, systems theory, and complexity analysis 
matured.7 
Branham and Hale emphasise that at the same time as architects were attempting to 
understand the technological transformations of modernity, through developments in 
systems theory broadly, and biological thinking specifically, “those same developments 
were changing the understanding of organic life itself. In other words, as new paradigms 
of explanation develop they are applied equally to buildings, bodies and machines.”8
 Some of the earliest examples of what we would recognise as contemporary 
systems thinking can be found surfacing throughout the nineteenth century, being drawn 
from spatial aesthetics, economic theory, and the nascent life sciences. These moments 
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of emergence are both very diverse and different, though often also interconnected – 
historically and conceptually – in sometimes important and surprising ways.
 The twentieth century has been characterised as “the age of systems” by several 
theorists, notably perhaps by Ivan Illich.9 The very apparatus of rational modernisation 
brought into being by the economic processes of capitalism did, through their inherent 
abstracting dialectic, make our reality a systems reality, in all kinds of ways. Inevitably 
perhaps, then, it is possible to trace the development of a series of competing and 
complimentary theories for understanding what systems are and how they work, 
throughout modernity. In the post-war period, cybernetics emerged as an important new 
trans-disciplinary mode of analysis. General systems theory – and more recently chaos, 
emergence and complexity theories – have all complimented this knowledge. Even in the 
humanities more broadly, structuralism and post-structuralism are in many respects based 
upon a systems analysis of language, emphasising that any part (i.e. word, sign or 
symbol) only has meaning through its network of relations with the whole of language. A 
major critical and trans-disciplinary history of the development of systems thinking – which 
would include significant contributions from the disciplinary histories of economics, 
dialectics, ecology, social sciences, aesthetics, cybernetics, general systems theory, 
communications and information theories, urbanism, emergence, chaos and complexity 
theories – has yet to be written.10 Of course, such a history would, in all kinds of ways, 
mirror the development of that most systemic and trans-disciplinary of processes, capital 
itself. This project is not intended to be as broad in scope, but it does aim to make a 
contribution to this more general history of systems thinking.11
1.2 Dialectics and Systems Theory
One of the most important, and in various ways influential, forms of systems theory to 
emerge in the nineteenth century was a new configuration of the old philosophical concept 
of dialectics. This was effectively formulated in its modern form by Hegel and then 
adopted and adapted by Marx as a systems theory capable of grasping the complex 
system of capital. There has been much debate concerning whether dialectical analysis 
was considered by Marx to be broadly applicable as a scientific tool in general, and thus 
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whether he considered that dialectical analysis could be used to describe fundamental 
organisational processes and principles at work in space, time, matter-energy and life 
more broadly (as Engels certainly did). However, suffice it to say here that my general 
position is to consider the tendency of western Marxist theory – which has, since Lucaks’ 
1923 publication History and Class Consciousness, considered dialectics to be a tool of 
solely social analysis – to be mistaken. I broadly agree with recent thinkers including 
David Harvey, John Bellamy Foster, Richard Levins, Richard Lewontin, Bertell Ollman and 
Roy Bhaskar, who have all in different ways defended the possibility of a materialist 
dialectics (albeit no doubt from a minority position in contemporary critical theory.) 
Bhaskar for example notes that “while the evidence strongly indicates that Marx agreed 
with the general thrust of Engels intervention, his own analysis of capitalism neither 
presupposed nor entailed any dialectics of nature.”12 Without considering this issue any 
further here (although I will return to this question at several points in the coming 
chapters), the broader question remains: what is the relationship between dialectical 
thought, materialism and systems theory more generally? 
 Social Ecology anarchists such as Murray Bookchin and Alan Carter have both 
argued that dialectics is no more than a mystified form of systems theory.13 From a 
different position, the biologist John Maynard Smith has argued that the development of 
systems theory has rendered dialectics obsolete, suggesting that Engels’ “interchange of 
cause and effect” is in fact feedback, the transformation of “quantity into quality” is phase 
transition or threshold effect, whilst hierarchy theory covers the concepts of “integrated 
levels” and “overdetermination”. Whilst I will agree that there is much in Engels’ analyses 
of the natural sciences which directly anticipated much twentieth-century systems theory, 
there is more at stake than a question of which came first. As Mary Boger has argued, 
dialectics is distinct from systems theory, much of which can still be “fundamentally 
reductionist and static.”14 There are as we shall see important and large overlaps between 
different systems approaches, but also important methodological differences. Systems 
theory “interconnection” is not the same as dialectical “mediation”, and, more importantly, 
variables in systems theory tend to be obvious, and not the result of abstraction as they 
are in dialectical analysis.15 Perhaps the most interesting distinction to be made, it seems 
to me, is actually that in some sense Marxian dialectical method and cybernetic method 
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move in opposite directions. If Marx’s method famously ascends from the abstract to the 
concrete,16 neo-cybernetic abstracting processes move in the opposite direction. In the 
words of Clark and Hansen, “cybernetic methodologies draw out the virtuality correlated 
with actuality.”17 
 Ultimately I concur with Richard Levins that there is scope and a need for systems 
analysis to be used as a “moment” in a dialectical analysis. Systems theories, as they 
have become increasingly important in natural, social and political sciences, have 
developed all kinds of valuable statistical, quantitative and management and policy-
forming dimensions. Moreover, I think that it can be demonstrated that many aspects of 
complex systems, and in particular those requiring descriptions involving emergence, go 
beyond not only formal philosophical logic, but also recursive cybernetic logic, and can 
actually only be logically grasped without paradox within a dialectical framework (such as 
the debate over strong and weak emergence, which I return to at various points in the 
coming chapters). As Levins suggests: 
... systems theory is best understood as reflecting the dual nature of science: part of  
the generic evolution of humanities understanding of the world, and a product of a 
specific social structure that supports and constrains science and directs it towards 
the goals of its owners. On the one hand it is a ‘moment’ in the investigation of 
complex systems, the place between the formulation of a problem and the 
interpretation of its solution where mathematical modelling can make the obscure 
obvious. On the other hand it is the attempt of a reductionist scientific tradition to 
come to terms with complexity, non-linearity and change through sophisticated 
mathematical and modelling techniques, a groping towards a more dialectical 
understanding that is held back both by its philosophical biases and the institutional 
and economic contexts of its development.18 
1.3 A Dialectical Method: Space, Time and Internal Relations
Over the course of producing this work, one conceptual and methodological approach has 
come to prove particularly useful. This is the dialectical model of relational spacetime 
which David Harvey has outlined over the last thirty years. Whilst based in Marxist theory, 
Harvey’s approach also innovates in some important ways. In the coming chapters I will 
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often attempt to use Harvey’s position as a means of understanding a series of other 
ecological systems philosophies. This is not I think too controversial a move, as Harvey 
himself has noted that there is “a striking parallel between a relational version of dialectics 
(which has always been central to my own interpretation of the Marxian tradition) and 
many other forms of environmental discourses.”19 However, I do suggest that this project 
can be extended further than Harvey himself has had need to do, and that in fact his 
concept of a dynamic and process-based relational spacetime proves to be very useful in 
a number of ways. In fact, for me in this project, relational spacetime provides the core 
conceptual tool or metaphor that unites many different aspects (and chapters). For 
example, I suggest that it can be used to grasp something about the nature of pattern and 
information as it is conceived in cybernetics. I will also use it to structure my approach in 
thinking about the interaction between organisms (including  humans) and their spatial 
environment, and the contribution that architectural-urban knowledge might make to a 
new ecological theory of extended mind.
 “The idea of internal relations”, Harvey states, drawing upon the work of Bertell 
Ollman, “is fundamental to dialectical modes of analysis.”20 This is the method that Marx 
developed from Hegel. According to Ollman, conventional thinking, in most academic 
theory and in the un-reflected experience of normal life, is that “there are things, and there 
are relations, and neither can be subsumed in the other.”21 This view might be called a 
philosophy of external relations.22 
 A philosophy of internal relations, on the other hand, attempts to define a subject 
matter through the relationships that this subject-object partakes in, as an integral 
component of the definition of that subject matter. For example, the conventional view of 
capital would be that capital is a thing (“money”, perhaps) which has relationships with 
other things, and these relations are essentially external to the object. This is not, Ollman 
emphasises, Marx’s account: 
Marx rejects this logical dichotomy and views capital as itself a complex Relation 
composed of its ties to other ... relations ... Moreover, since these relations extend 
backwards and forwards in time, this also makes what capital was, as well as what it 
is likely to become essential parts of what it is now.23 
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In fact, as Ollman goes on to argue, for Marx everything, “not only capital, is grasped as 
the sum of its relations.”24
 A key point to grasp here is that this is not simply a question of shifting how we 
might re-conceive of familiar objects and processes, wholes and parts. The issue, rather, 
is to realise that the first task of any critical enquiry based upon this method is to define its 
subject matter in such a way as to encompass a conceptually (and politically) useful range 
of relations, in both space and time. To this point, Marx’s dialectical method might seem to 
have all kinds of interesting parallels with Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory (ANT). This 
process, of defining a relational set, as a subject matter, is the process of abstraction. It is 
this process that allows the dialectician to see what is obscured behind appearances. For 
Ollman: 
... it is the philosophy of internal relations that gives Marx both the licence and 
opportunity to abstract as freely as he does … to decide how far into its spatial as 
well as its temporal relations any particular will extend.25 
For example, he argues that Marx creates as subjects, and subject matter, “relations of 
production” and “surplus value”, both of which are new subject matters built out of a set of 
relations within the processes of capital.26 
 If a philosophy of internal relations and the process of abstraction are the core 
components of dialectical analysis, there remains the question of how one decides with 
which relations and which abstractions one should work? Ollman has described dialectical 
analysis as a process which is composed of six key moments. 
 The first is the ontological moment. This consists of acknowledging that the world, 
both social and material, is composed of a series of systems and processes. As I shall 
later discuss, this is not quite the same as saying that “nature is dialectical”, but it is 
saying that what is is susceptible to a relational systems and process analysis. Once we 
grasp reality as “an infinite number of mutually dependent processes that coalesce to form 
a structured whole or totality,”27 the second moment then consists of organising our 
thinking in relation to such a world (and as a part of such a world): this is the 
epistemological moment. This requires a philosophy of internal relations, and a process of 
“abstracting out the main patterns in which change and interaction occur.”28
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  The third moment is one of inquiry, and involves developing categories which 
describe the patterns of internal relations as aids to investigation. The fourth and fifth 
moments concern representation and synthesis, presenting the results firstly to oneself as 
a moment of intellectual reconstruction and self-clarification, and then, in a moment of 
exposition, by “taking into account of how others think as well as what they know, one tries 
to explain this dialectical grasp of the ‘facts’ to a particular audience.”29 
 The final moment is one of praxis: based upon the above, “one consciously acts in 
the world, changing it, testing it and deepening one’s understanding of it all at the same 
time.” As a final moment it in fact contains as internal relations all of the preceding 
moments, and as such the process is repeatedly executed. This dialectical process, 
summarised below by Yrjö Engeström, is commonly referred to as: 
... the dialectics of ascending from the abstract to the concrete. This a method of 
grasping the essence of an object by tracing and reproducing theoretically the logic 
of its development, of its historical formation through the emergence and resolution 
of its inner contradictions. A new theoretical idea or concept is initially produced in 
the form of an abstract, simple explanatory relationship, a 'germ cell'. This initial 
abstraction is step-by-step enriched and transformed into a concrete system of 
multiple, constantly developing manifestations ... the initial simple idea is 
transformed into a complex object, into a new form of practice. At the same time, the 
cycle produces new theoretical concepts – theoretically grasped practice – concrete 
in systemic richness and multiplicity of manifestations.30
 There is then a fundamental politics at the core of how we even start to think about 
the world. “Reality doesn’t come with its boundaries already in place,” Ollman reminds us. 
It is, rather, up to us to define our own boundaries in the world, practically and 
conceptually. This is the essence of a dialectical systems approach, and it is this that I will 
attempt to do in this project, at a series of different scales or emergent levels. In 
consequence, I attempt to develop a definition of architecture on the basis of a philosophy 
of internal relations. This means, then, defining architecture as a series of extended 
physical, mental and social relations, in both space and in time.31 The choice of 
boundaries and systems which might define architecture, and on which architecture 
depends, is a political choice. 
20
 
 It is in developing a dialectical conception of space and time as themselves 
relations that David Harvey’s work has been particularly innovative, and important for 
parts of my project here. As Harvey emphasises, it is not simply that relations (for example 
capital) exist in space and time (although that is the case). It is not that space and time 
are just neutral containers or frameworks in which life and matter flow around. It is rather 
that space and time are themselves constituted and produced as relations, as social 
reality through processes such as capital – but equally, at a more fundamental level, 
through (and as) matter. This, then, does not just refer to space and time in a social or 
cultural sense (although this is Harvey’s primary concern), but in the full materialist sense. 
Harvey usefully refers to several non-Marxist systems/process thinkers, notably Alfred 
North Whitehead, who suggested: “the determination of the meaning of nature reduces 
itself principally to the discussion of the character of time and the character of space.”32
1.4 Relational Spacetime
Harvey argues that “if Raymond Williams were contemplating the entries for his 
celebrated text on Keywords today, he would surely have included the word ‘space’.”33 
Harvey first put forward his own conception of space in his 1973 Social Justice and the 
City. He has, however, consistently used and developed it ever since, and he has, it 
seems, returned to it in particular in recent years.34 He introduces his approach as a 
matrix of relationships with two axes or dimensions of spatial analysis.35 The first is taken 
fairly directly (and openly) from the familiar three terms of Henri Lefebvre: Material Space, 
Representations of Space, and Spaces of Representation.36 “Material space” is space as 
we experience it through our sense perceptions. It is “the perceptual space primary 
experience mediated through human practices.”37 The category of “Representations of 
Space” describes the way that we conceptualise sensory experience of material space 
and time, through representations: words, diagrams, pictures and so on. Finally, the 
confusingly named “Spaces of Representation”, or lived space, is the space of meaning 
and imagination in everyday life; it describes the “way we humans live – physically, 
affectively and emotionally – in and through the spaces we encounter.”38 If 
“representations of space” are projections of material space into a human cognitive order, 
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Figures 1.3 and 1.4 Harvey’s expansion of Lefebvre’s terms of spatial of production, taken 
from David Harvey, ‘Space as a Keyword’, in Spaces of Global Capitalism (London: Verso, 
2006)
then “spaces of representation” are projections and constructions of the human subject 
itself.
 In addition to these three categories which are set out along one axis, Harvey sets 
out along the other axis another tripartite division of space (which also owes a significant 
debt to Lefebvre), and which he terms as absolute, relative and relational:
[I]f we regard space as absolute it becomes a ‘thing in itself’ with an existence 
independent of matter. It then possesses a structure which we can use to pigeon-
hole or individuate phenomena. The view of relative space proposes that it be 
understood as a relationship between objects which exist only because objects 
exist and relate to each other. There is another sense in which space can be 
viewed as relative and I choose to call this relational space – space regarded in 
the manner of Leibniz, as being contained in objects in the sense that an object 
can be said to exist only insofar as it contains and represents within itself 
relationships to other objects.39
Absolute space, then, is materially constituted by “objects”: walls, buildings, continents. It 
is conceptually the space of Newton and Descartes, and absolute space is typically 
represented as a fixed and immovable orthogonal grid, and as being geometrically 
Euclidean. It is the space of planning and cadastral mapping: absolute space as a lived 
space might include the sense of security and ownership. “Socially,” Harvey notes, 
“absolute space is the exclusionary space of private property ... space of this sort is 
clearly distinguishable from time”40 
 If absolute space in capitalism is the space of private property, then relative space 
is that of monetary and commodity circulation. Space and time are therefore here 
connected into relative space-time. This is conceptually represented in the geometries 
and topologies of the relativistic space of Einstein and Reimann. It is the spatial form 
required to represent processes and flows, of energy, matter and money. It is important to 
recognise that just as absolute space is fixed, the fact that “processes produce their own 
space and time is fundamental to relative conception”41 Because of this, it is not at all 
obvious how different relative space-times can be connected or compared, and 
recognising the choices in different relative representations highlights political choices. 
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Harvey suggests for example that the relative space-time needed to describe ecosystem 
flows is not currently compatible with the space-time of capital in financial markets. 
 Architects draw through plans, and this is also the space that property rights are 
generally described by. However, as anyone who has worked in construction, or even has 
just owned a house or managed a property knows, there are limits to what can be 
described in absolute space. Whilst a property boundary can be described as a line on a 
drawing, in practice on the ground it often needs to be negotiated through convention. If a 
boundary is in reality defined by a wall, and that wall is inevitably not completely straight, 
then there is already a process of relativisation. Equally, even on massive infrastructural 
projects which require extraordinary precision in surveying  and alignment, such as large 
scale bridges, it is only in recent years with GPS satellite systems that something 
approaching an absolute space has been achieved. Typically, a local region of absolute 
space would be defined in accordance with local surveying. Cities and structures are still 
best understood as defining a series of locally defined absolute spaces, which are still, to 
some extent at least, positioned within a more fluid relative space. 
 However, whilst the “cities and structures” referred to above might be 
comprehended in absolute and relative terms, the metropolis – as not simply a “modern 
city” but rather a concept, a specific historical form of abstraction, that emerges under 
conditions of global capital exchange – can only ever be grasped in relational terms (the 
third term on this axis for Harvey). The metropolis is a new differential configuration of the 
terms of Material Space, Representations of Space, and Spaces of Representation: a 
configurational form with a distinctly immaterial “concreteness”. For David Cunningham, 
If therefore the metropolis presents itself as a form of (real) abstraction, and is only 
‘unified’ as such, it still only attains ‘real existence’, and thus both specific and 
variable ‘form’ and ‘content’ – as, in principle, does any social space – by virtue of 
the spatial production of its open and dispersed totality of specific ‘material’ 
assemblages, its particular ‘bunches or clusters of relationships’, its own multiple 
transactions and contacts, which are in themselves highly differentiated, if always 
related to its general form. Indeed, without these it has no concrete form or 
determinate ‘meaning’ at all. But, by contrast to the earlier forms of what Lefebvre 
terms ‘absolute’ and ‘historical’ space – in which, as in the polis, the 
‘incomparability’ of the intrinsic qualities of certain sites remains essential – ‘specific 
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values’ are no longer, in themselves, definitive of the urban as such, and are 
constitutively mediated by a pure form of exchangeability.42
Harvey’s final category of relational space is then materially the spatial mode of field 
relations, and conceptually the enfolded space and time of Leibniz and Bohm. In this 
conception, “space and time are internalised within matter and process”43 and are hence 
described as spacetime. Most importantly, Harvey suggests that “relational spacetime 
implies … the idea of internal relations, and this … is fundamental to dialectical modes of 
analysis.”44 As an example here, Harvey takes three terms that Marx develops in the first 
chapter of Capital: use value, exchange value and value. Use values are always in 
absolute space and time. Exchange values for Marx “break through” absolute space and 
time, and exist through a relative space-time (i.e. market networks). Value, however, 
Harvey asserts, is an entirely relational concept: it is “immaterial but objective.” In fact, 
Harvey argues that “it is impossible to understand Marxian political economy without 
engaging with relational perspectives.”45
 As spacetime becomes more relational, it becomes less empirical and positivist 
(history is a relative temporal concept, whereas memory is relational; something which 
Harvey makes much of in his reading of Benjamin). Harvey notes that: 
... external influences get internalised in specific processes or things through time 
(much as my mind absorbs all manner of external information and stimuli to yield 
strange patterns of thought including dreams and fantasies as well as attempts at 
rational calculation) ... certain topics, such as the political role of collective memories 
in urban processes ... can only be approached in this way.46 
Clearly, then, for Harvey, “the three spatio-temporal frames must be kept in dialectical 
tension with each other,”47 and (although Harvey is less clear about this) absolute and 
relative space are subsets of relational space (this seems plausible mathematically as well 
as philosophically). Even whilst in any moment of analysis priority might be given to any 
one mode, thought should be “prepared to range freely and dialectically over all the 
moments of the matrix simultaneously.”48 It is not then a question of which mode of space 
is more real (“is space absolute, relative or relational? I simply don’t know whether there is 
an ontological answer to that question”, writes Harvey )49 but is, rather, a recognition of 
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the fact that “the problem of the proper conceptualisation of space is resolved through 
human practice with respect to it ... there are no philosophical answers to the 
philosophical questions that arise over the nature of space – the answer lies in human 
practice.”50
1.5 A Relational Theory of Architecture
Architecture, then, can be seen to have a profound relationship with systems theory. In an 
abstract sense, architecture as a discourse is a systems theory in itself, and in fact I have 
suggested, might arguably be thought of as the foundational systems theory (as in 
Alberti’s De Re Aedificatoria). More than that, architectural discourse has often been 
supplemented by, or expressive of, other systems theories. However, it also has a 
concrete relation with systems theory, in that buildings and cities are systems, and are 
systems moreover which mediate, in concrete ways, other systems. To restate, the 
theories of architecture are in effect all systems theories (although not all are consciously 
so), but also the objects (or are they subjects?) of architectural theory (i.e. buildings, 
cities, spaces etc) are also systems. Given this condition, I suggest that a relational theory 
and definition of architecture, based upon a philosophy of internal relations, constitutes an 
especially interesting proposition. In fact, I would argue that it isn’t possible to coherently 
define architectural knowledge in any other way.
 Architecture as a body of knowledge has a complex relationship with its object. 
Architectural knowledge is, in some professional sense, the consciousness of that part of 
building practice which consciously thinks of itself as “architecture”. However, architecture 
also – quite properly – considers its object to be a whole series of productive practices 
that are either unconscious building activities, or else are simply spatial practices in a 
much broader sense. To consider what architecture (and here I would include urbanism) 
considers to be its object, one need only look at what architects and architectural theorists 
claim this to be. Clearly today architecture ranges from interface design to the emerging 
urbanism and political ecology of developing mega-cities, from environmental 
technologies to the organisational management of corporations and brands, to design 
activism. Leon van Schaik has argued in a memorable phrase that “architecture 
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professionalised around the wrong body of knowledge,” suggesting that rather than basing 
the profession around building construction, architecture should have professionalised 
itself more broadly around claims concerning spatial knowledge and organisation. There 
are of course problems with this formulation too. Nonetheless, van Schaik’s suggestion 
seems to have some validity, especially when one reflects upon, for example, the recent 
moves by Rem Koolhaas and the AMO project in this regard – consider in this regard 
Koolhaas’s statement that “maybe architecture doesn’t have to be stupid after all. 
Liberated from the obligation to construct, it can become a way of thinking about 
anything.”51 
 In the space-time terms that I have set out above following Harvey, buildings are – 
in a straightforward sense – a set of material objects located in an absolute space and 
time. However, buildings as material objects, and their representations, are also 
unavoidably located in a relative space. For example, a domestic house near a good 
school is worth more as a commodity in the marketplace than it would be if it was a bit 
further away. However, when you also consider the “space of representation” that the 
house provides, including the architectural language of the building, or its decoration and 
coding, then it enters a relational space. Equally, when the same house is considered as 
internalising local history, personal memories, local economies, transport links, energy, 
waste and material flows, and so on, in can only be thought of as a relational condition. 
Hence, to view a building as a lone object is only to think of it in absolute terms. 
Alternatively, to view the object as partaking in a series of relationships external to the 
object is to define it relativistically. Both are legitimate, useful and necessary for certain 
purposes. However, the richest – and most coherent – conception of architecture is when 
it is conceived as a complex process, in which the relations, which had been considered 
external to it in the relativistic framework, are now considered as internal to it, as part of 
the definition of this particular process-object: this then becomes a dialectical and 
relational definition. Again, there is a choice as to which relations we might opt to include 
as internal to the definition (physical, economic, ecological etc). Ultimately, of course, the 
entire universe – both now and through all time, past and future – has some kind of 
relation to any object in question, and could potentially be included. But it would clearly be 
futile in most cases to do so. Hence the process of definition of the internal relations of 
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architecture is a process of abstraction which is dependent upon political choices, and is 
thus a situated knowledge. 
 So, what do we need to do to understand and discuss architecture in these terms? 
Firstly, we need to oppose narrow market-driven definitions of architectural practice 
circumscribed by normative capitalist development, and replace these with more holistic 
social definitions of architecture as a fundamentally ecological or cybernetic practice and 
discipline. In this sense, architecture might be thought of as:
• the built stuff that surrounds us
• constantly emitting messages
• shaping and creating social, material and energy flows
• morphology, pattern, and demographics 
• a Batesonian “ecology of mind”, constructed out of organised objects, 
media, signs, technology and people in space
• a cultural artefact that works as a series of systems embedded within 
other systems 
• grounded in the experiencing body of the human subject
• a form of social prosthesis which extends the human mind and body out 
into the world, through processes of projection/empathy (Lipps, 
Schmarsow, Vischer), alienation (Hegel, Marx), technology/media (Marx, 
McLuhan), networks (Castells)
In the coming chapters I will therefore explore ways of conceiving – thinking about, 
through and around – the subject of architecture, in all of the ways listed above. It is not, I 
suggest, a question of whether architecture and design can be ecological; they always 
already are fundamentally ecological, as defined as “the relations of living organisms to 
their surroundings.”52  Architecture and design are always as much to do with process and 
feedback as they are sole objects of production. The question, rather, is in what ways are 
contemporary architecture and design processes performing ecologically, democratically 
and socially, and how consciously and openly do they contribute to and make visible and 
graspable, other bigger planetary and social systems. Beyond that, how can architectural 
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knowledge not simply focus its concerns on the building as an object-commodity, but start 
to define its knowledge as a social exploration of the unfolding relationships between 
humans and their environments?
 More specifically and importantly in the current situation, is the question of how 
can we use architecture and design to problematise and politicise the existing discourse 
around the “environmental question”. As McKee has argued, “the task of new 
environmental art would be to unsettle the self evidence of ‘environment’ itself, addressing 
it as a contingent assemblage of biological, technological, economic and governmental 
concerns whose boundaries and agencies are perpetually exposed to conflict.”53
1.6 The Plan of this Work
I will, throughout this thesis, refer back to these dialectical frameworks that Harvey and 
Ollman have set out. In particular, in my discussions about ecology, cybernetics and 
systems theory, my endeavour is to be attentive to different kinds of spatiality which have 
been developed by, or are implicated within, a range of different cybernetic and systems 
processes. Specifically, I will often argue that these discourses have lacked an explicit 
theory of space and time (although I think that Gregory Bateson went some way to dealing 
with this), and that many of the paradoxes that characterise contemporary discussions 
concerning “strong emergence”, “extended mind” and even “morphic fields” take on a new  
form when theorised in this way. As will hopefully become apparent, such a project is of 
more than academic importance – insofar as, in the words of Harvey, “our whole 
understanding of the socio-ecological dialectic, as well as our understanding of place, is 
directly implicated in how we formulate our understandings of space and time.”54
 This thesis therefore discusses networks, processes, systems and flows as they 
operate in, and produce, space and time. I consider these systems as both as objects of 
study in themselves, and also as modes of enquiry. That is to say, I will explore various 
examples of architectural, urban and material processes and objects, but I also will use 
the models provided by systems theories of various kinds as the means of analysis (even 
whilst attempting to subject those same theories to ideological critique). Through the 
various chapters I will engage with a different historical moments of systems thinking, 
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ranging from the subatomic to the mental to the planetary. If at times the project appears 
to focus on disciplines outside of architecture, that is no more than an attempt to express 
the very relationality of architecture: i.e. what it is that architecture depends upon. At each 
scale, I will argue that systems thinking is fundamental to our understanding of the 
material world, even whilst acknowledging that a particular mode of systemic practice – 
such as capitalism – defines limits as to how we can conceive of the material world. 
Architecture is the mediation of a series of extensions of the individual human organism, 
thereby relating us to all kinds of social, informational, material and energy flows.
 A dialectical approach is crucial to the practice of seeing how many of the 
processes and systems which are under discussion constitute, in complex ways, 
something approaching independent subjectivities – or better, agencies – even whilst they 
constantly extend and transform our specifically (post-) human subjectivity. The processes 
that organise and pattern matter and life, the processes of natural environmental flows, 
the economic and ecological processes of human socio-natural metabolisms, including 
the historical “permanences” which arise within these flows such as cities, regions, 
buildings, and of course the particular processes and flows which constitute the human 
organism – all of these systems can only ultimately be understood in their relationship with 
other processes. We cannot make any sense out of historical and contemporary forms of 
human consciousness without understanding our extended minds, that is to say, the 
broader collective ecology of minds, within which we loop. We cannot understand our 
social formations without understanding our metabolic relationship with other natural 
systems.
 The organisation of the chapters in this thesis can thus be understood, in general, 
through Ollman’s aforementioned description and analysis of Marx’s dialectical method for 
seeing the future in the present, for seeing how “communism lies concealed within 
capitalism.”55 Ollman abstracts out of Marx’s writings a four-stage dialectical process. In 
the first stage, Marx looked for the relationships between the main features of 
contemporary capitalism. Understood as a relational network, the second stage was then 
to trace these processes back into the past, to find their necessary preconditions. In the 
third stage, these processes, abstracted as contradictions, were projected from the past 
through the present, and into a future “sublation”. The final stage in this reading of Marx’s 
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method, is to look back again from a position in a future scenario to the present (and back 
through the present to its real past), in order to trace the preconditions of such a future 
that can be found in the present, in order to use them to develop a political strategy. This 
final step can then be used as the first step in a new cycle of analysis, and so on.
 The deployment of systems theory in architecture, and the concomitant 
development of architecture as a systems theory, has taken a very distinctive turn in 
recent years. This has been in response to the very real demands placed upon the 
discipline by the various imperatives, demands and dilemmas that I will broadly refer to as 
“the environmental question.” In the following two chapters I will work through a critical 
history of a series of terms which, I argue, underlie all contemporary approaches to 
thinking about our condition: nature, organicism, technology, ecology and cybernetics. 
These terms form a network of conceptual relationships, and have all kinds of histories 
and ideologies attached. As T.J. Demos has noted, there is today a need to “denaturalise 
the rhetoric of ‘sustainability’, recognising these buzzwords as deeply political, contentious 
and ideological.”56 I will therefore trace a number of these histories, and note their 
historical moments of interaction with architectural discourse. In several chapters, 
moments from the cycle of dialectic analysis outlined above are examined with a narrower 
focus, including the chapters on spatial empathy and cognitive mapping, or on the 
extended mind.  
 In particular, my aim is to show that there are a series of concepts which have 
developed out of cybernetics and its legacy disciplines in recent decades, many of which 
present opportunities to open up architectural practice in ways that have yet to be fully 
appreciated.  I suggest that many of these concepts can usefully be used in defining the 
conditions of an extended concept of internal relations in architecture (for example 
autopoiesis, operational closure, structural coupling, and co-evolution). Furthermore, 
some of these ideas can help us to reflect upon dialectical materialism’s own history, and 
in particular to discuss the concept of nature in Marx’s thinking. Drawing together insights 
from Maturana and Varela, Luhmann and Marx himself, I  will re-affirm the intellectual 
legitimacy of dialectical modes of naturalist-realist thought – albeit in subtly different 
forms, depending upon where they are deployed in relation to what Felix Guattari has 
termed (following Gregory Bateson) the three ecologies: personal, social, and planetary.57 
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I ultimately suggest that capitalism might be described, in a combination of dialectical and 
second order cybernetic terms, as an autopoietic system which displays degrees of 
operational closure, and which falsely appears from the inside to be a total system, even 
though it is structurally coupled to, and co-evolving with, any number of external 
“natural” (i.e. non-human) systems, which lie outside of it. 
 In the last decade there has been a shift in our understanding of the scale and 
profundity of the environmental crisis that capitalism has initiated. I will suggest that this 
has shifted our very relationship to the future, and for certain definitions of modern 
architecture, which – like modern culture more broadly – are oriented towards the future, 
this could present a major disciplinary and ideological crisis. In the final chapter, I turn to 
review the problems of the natural environment at the largest scale, and consider what 
Marx described as the “metabolic rift” between the forms of capitalism and planetary 
ecologies. There I will explore a series of systems-based design approaches that might 
provide the basis for a new political theory of ecology in architecture based upon an 
expanded view of its internal relations. Ultimately, I suggest that the environmental 
question in architecture (and more broadly) must be framed in such a way as to construct 
relations between economy and ecology, mind and matter.
 By bringing together these very different forms of knowledge, from architecture to 
natural sciences, philosophy and aesthetics, this thesis constitutes a fundamentally 
interdisciplinary body of work. Architecture is of course no stranger to interdisciplinary 
work – the building and the city are after all interdisciplinary productions par excellence. 
Nonetheless, as noted elsewhere, there are potentially profound methodological problems 
associated with any such project.58 To some extent, this thesis attempts to overcome such 
limitations by also reflecting upon its own process as a piece of design research. As well 
as referring to all kinds of built material, I also include elements of design research that I 
have been involved in, ranging from practice to teaching. However, it is not simply in that 
sense that this thesis constitutes design research. It is, rather, because it follows the 
method, as described in the quote by Roy Ascott at the start of this thesis, of a 
fundamentally open-ended design research project. Design research provides us with a 
unique conceptual framework and intellectual context within which material from different 
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disciplines (not simply discrete pieces of “design”) with their own different histories can be 
brought together, and then recombined and placed into new and open-ended relations.
 Although the chapters are organised here as one linear sequence, there is a 
necessary circularity to the material, many cross references between the chapters, and a 
deliberate layering of the material. Design research and other supporting examples are 
inserted in floating boxes around the main text, whilst an extensive use of footnotes often 
creates yet another narrative flowing from the main sequence. The intention is to create a 
highly discursive text that works in effect as a “bootstrapping network”, in the sense of 
group theory. For Fritjof Capra, the act of adopting the bootstrap method of the quantum 
physicist Geoffrey Chew (in whose laboratory he worked for several years) as a technique 
of bringing together thinking from different disciplines in his own research, allowed him to 
draw:
... large non-linear conceptual maps to make sure that all the concepts were 
hanging together consistently ... I had learned from Chew that one can use different 
models to describe different aspects of reality without regarding any one of them as 
fundamental, and that several interlocking models can form a coherent theory.59 
Furthermore, in order to facilitate a reading of a series of interacting feedback systems 
ranging from elementary particles to built environments to biospheres, I have throughout 
the text tried to describe a consistent set of simple self-similar ecologies. These ecologies 
help to explain, in a unified way – as metabolisms – the range of diverse material and 
methods which make up the overall study, and through which:
... space time this takes on, potentially, a fivefold character as: (a) a reference grid, 
(b) a measure, (c) a set of prima facie mutual exclusion relations, (d) a potentially 
emergent property, perhaps with causal powers of its own, and (e) a generally 
entropic process.60
 This thesis, then, is both about systems and processes in the world, human and 
natural, and about systemic modes of thought – of which architecture is one – which then 
allow us to perceive, produce and act in such a world. By outlining a broad survey of 
systems and process-based based theories, my intention is to define a series of concepts 
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that can be used to rethink the nature of our systemic production of space. By making 
visible the complex processes and systems within which we are immersed, architecture 
can create a space for their social and spatial re-imagining. The underlying argument of 
this study is that a more sensitive and ecological reconfiguration of the systems of 
capitalism can only occur when those systems are more visible, and we have adjusted our 
processes of thinking and designing to take account of them. What I am proposing, then, 
is a political theory of architecture and ecology.
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2 Organon and the Production of Nature
2.1 The Ideological Language of Sustainability
In the previous chapter I rehearsed the need for an ideological critique of the rhetoric 
around sustainability as it pertains to the built environment under contemporary conditions 
of global capitalist development. In architecture, increasingly, this critique must consider 
not only sustainability but also its points of convergence with the rhetoric of “systems”, 
“ecology”, “networks”, “parametrics”, and “emergence”. This study is not meant as an 
exercise that will end by revealing in some simplistic way the inadequacies of the current 
theorising of these terms in architecture (although it may at times facilitate that). It is 
argued, rather, that an unpacking of these terms and their relations is a necessary 
precondition for any productive reworking of them. The intention is to open up new areas 
of critical design engagement, not to reprimand existing ones.
 We also need to critique the various histories of systems thinking in order to reveal 
the ideological distortions that the different forms of knowledge embody, even whilst there 
is a practical and political need for ecological systems thinking in its varied forms to 
engage with design education, architectural theory and new forms of practice to an extent 
not previously considered. Furthermore, within architectural humanities research there is 
the potential to reformulate the very project of architectural history – in line with David 
Harvey’s call for a historical geographical materialism – by for example developing case 
studies of buildings and cities as historical-geographical systems and flows.1
 In this chapter the aim is to work through a critical history of three terms: “nature”, 
“organic”, and “ecology”. The next chapter is then focused on cybernetic theory – in 
particular that of Gregory Bateson – and explores the relation of some of these cybernetic 
ideas and concepts to various conceptions of “extended mind”. In the terms of Ollman’s 
dialectical method these two chapters constitute something like a relational network of 
“keywords” and their histories, which between them define some of the main questions 
and contradictions facing contemporary architecture and design.
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The way that the built environment gives form to the metabolic relation to nature of a given 
society is complex. There are often tendencies that can be found within urban relations to 
nature that seems to prefigure socio-economic relations to nature. So, for example, the 
early-medieval walled city anticipates the early-capitalist opposition nature/culture, whilst the 
late medieval Versaille prefigures the late-capitalist network condition. 
    
Fig. 2.1 Carcassonne. The walled city state, which characteristically emerged in the 
medieval and early-capitalist period, clearly encultures the social experience of a nature/
culture opposition. The walled city state is very reminiscent of a cell or organism, with a 
membrane that manages its interface to its environment. The origins of the nature/culture 
dualism that would come to characterise a modern capitalistic relation to nature can be found 
here.
 
Fig. 2.2 The Palace of Versailles. Although not ‘simply’ medieval, the extended body of the 
Sun King is clearly conceptualises a networked Chain of Being, and is not in any simple way 
an oppositional relationship (as the Sun King sees himself as a natural god).
2.2 The Relation to Nature
Technology reveals the active relation of man to nature.
[Karl Marx]
Adrian Forty has argued that “for most of the last five hundred years ‘nature’ has been the 
main, if not the principle category for organising thought about what architecture is or 
might be.”2 This is perhaps no surprise, since throughout this period, and as one of its 
core activities, architecture has mediated the extended metabolic interface – social, 
spatial, economic and symbolic – between the external world and the human world. The 
concept (or shifting historical imaginary) of nature has played an important conceptual and 
ideological role in how we think about our metabolic relationship with the rest of the world, 
and it is certainly the case that our conception of nature has provided a complex source 
for a series of metaphors and ideas, whilst of course the stuff of nature provided sites and 
building materials, in architecture and beyond. In order to approach this complex term, as 
David Pepper notes, we “need to set the changing attitudes to nature within the context of 
what people were actually doing to it.”3
 Nature is, in its most common-sense formulation, the “organic”, non-human world. 
It is thus the opposite of man-made culture. Without too much reflection, though, it is clear 
that the situation is rather more complex than that. It is a commonplace in architectural 
design juries to hear a critic point out to any student who mentions “nature” – especially if 
they use a word like “picturesque” – that, “of course, nature is an entirely cultural 
construct.” Such observations are correct, but only up to a point.4 
 In Keywords, Raymond Williams suggests that nature “is perhaps the most 
complex word in the language.”5 He suggests that there are three primary meanings of 
nature. Firstly, there is the sense of nature as the essential quality of something. The 
second sense is as a “force” that directs the external world, humans or both. The third 
meaning of nature is simply the material world. I would suggest that the third category 
actually breaks down into two distinct though interrelated sets. Firstly, nature can 
specifically refer to that part of the planet that is alive – that is, the organic part of the 
whole. Secondly, it can refer to the entire material universe, space and time, etc (although 
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as we shall see, for some systems thinkers, such as the quantum physicist David Bohm, 
the entire material universe, space and time included, are themselves organic). 
 Williams argues that the concept starts as meaning the essential nature of 
something, but becomes abstracted as “the nature of all things having become singular 
nature or Nature.”6 That is to say, the fact that everything has its own essential quality is a 
shared characteristic: i.e. the second meaning. This too becomes further abstracted, 
Williams argues, into standing in for “everything”.7 
 One might imagine that the natural sciences would have a definition for their 
subject “nature”. However, as Neil Smith has observed, these disciplines have often 
avoided any self-reflexive conception of nature, as “the positivist tradition dominates 
orthodox science, and positivism presupposes (among other things) that nature exists in 
and for itself, external to human activity. Thus we can know nature only by perceiving its 
facts and eventually discovering its laws.”8 Today, Kate Soper argues, nature “has come to 
occupy a central place on the political agenda as a result of ecological crisis, where it 
figures as a general concept through which we are asked to rethink our current use of 
resources, our relations to other forms of life, and our place within, and responsibilities 
towards the eco-system”.9
 Neil Smith also notes that “the social concept of nature has accumulated 
numerous layers of meaning in the course of history.”10 Its “extremely complex and often 
contradictory” aspects include, he suggests: material/spiritual, given/made, order/disorder, 
sublime/secular, dominated/victorious, whole/parts, woman/object, organism/machine, 
and god/evolution.11 Nonetheless, Smith argues that all of these meanings are ultimately 
organised into a dualism which dominates our conception of nature: external/ universal. 
Smith suggests that one of the effects of this dualism is to make capitalism seem natural, 
and make capitalism’s exploitation of nature seem inevitable: 
Sundered apart, nature and society die in reciprocal conceptual torpor … [whilst] the 
positing of an external nature rationalises and justifies the unprecedented 
exploitation of nature ... [which is] the “massive racket” that capitalism, historically 
and geographically, represents.12
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The modern conception of our relation to nature is struggling towards expressing the 
ecological and systemic:
Fig. 2.3 The Blur by Diller and Scofidio, in Lake Neuchatel in Switzerland, at the 2002 Swiss 
Expo.
Fig. 2.4 Rachel Armstrong protocell as a part of the Philip Beasley installation Hylozoic 
Ground at the Venice Architecture Biennale 2010.
Fig. 2.5 Bruno Taut, scene from ‘Dissolution Away of the Cities’ (Auflösung die Städte)
    
External nature is the entire domain of the non-human, “it is the raw material from which 
society is built, the frontier which industrial capitalism continually pushes back.”13 
Universal nature, however, is literally universal – it is everything, including the human 
world. As Smith notes, this dualism does not always take the form of an opposition; 
instead external and universal conceptions of nature are often confused.  
 Within Smith’s dualist definition of nature, culture is what we might call the 
suppressed internalised relation (the difference between universal and external). Forty 
has argued that: 
... the distinction between the world created by man – “culture” – and the world in 
which man exists – “nature” – has been perhaps the single most important mental 
category ever conceived, and there can be few disciplines in whose formation it has 
not been fundamental.14 
The question is, how fundamental is this mental category? Is it effectively a necessary 
part of all human thinking, and/or does it take on specific historical and cultural forms?15 
Whilst as we shall see in cybernetic theory, the full unfolding of this question is necessarily 
recursive and paradoxical, as Harvey notes in his reading of the role of nature in Marx, we 
are facing a specific historical and ideological form of it.16 He reminds us that 
... we have to be careful not to read ... through bourgeois categories. Bourgeois 
categories effectively separate: historically that has been between man and nature, 
nature and society, nature and culture, natural and artificial, but that is a bourgeois 
conception. 17 
 There is something interesting that happens when we think about the question “is 
the human world a part of nature?”, alongside the question within Marxian studies of 
whether the dialectical method is applicable in some way to both “natural science” and 
“social science”.18 Those thinkers who tend to have developed the most dialectical 
conceptions of nature (both external and universal) also tend to operate from a basis that 
makes them very aware of human social metabolic relationships within a broader “web of 
life”. Furthermore they see dialectical method as indispensable for grasping the (living) 
nature and form of this human-nature metabolic interface. They also tend to regard the 
non-human universe of space-time, matter-energy and so on, as being susceptible to 
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relational and dialectical human reasoning (I would include Harvey and Smith in this 
category).19 Such a position is distinct from what is without doubt a more widespread 
tendency to take the distinction between culture and nature as absolute in practice (if not 
always in theory). This broad resistance to the possibility of understand nature (however 
defined) through dialectical analysis is, it seems to me, wholly untenable, and Marx 
himself directly addresses this question in his so-called Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts: 
The universality of man manifests itself in practice in that universality which makes 
the whole of nature his inorganic body, 
  (1) as a direct means of life and 
  (2) as the matter, the object, and the tool of his life activity. 
Nature is man’s inorganic body – that is to say, nature insofar as it is not the human 
body. Man lives from nature – i.e., nature is his body – and he must maintain a 
continuing dialogue with it if he is not to die. To say that man’s physical and mental 
life is linked to nature simply means that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of  
nature.20 
Labour is for Marx ultimately the term that reveals the conceptual unity of nature and 
culture (I will return to this role of labour at several points again). This unity is perceived as 
an opposition, and indeed is in real ways constituted as an opposition – or what Marx 
describes as a “metabolic rift.”21 That is to say, one of the ways that the fundamental 
contradictions of capitalist production are ultimately played out is precisely in its 
destructive relationship to a perceived external (rather than universal) environment. 
Although there has been a consistent strand of modernist art and architecture which has 
engaged with a more ecological and cybernetic conceptions of the nature/culture dialectic, 
on the whole this tendency has been marginal. Indeed one of the most problematic 
aspects of modernism in architecture and in modern culture more broadly, is the extent to 
which it has facilitated an ideological (and indeed real) construction of a nature/culture 
opposition. As Harvey repeatedly emphasises: 
... one of the big problems that has arisen in the bourgeois era has been precisely 
the way in which conceptually, and also through practices, and social institutions, 
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Fig. 2.6 Communal weaverbirds’ nests, in Namibia.
Fig. 2.7 Beehives maintain a steady internal temperature, whatever the external conditions
In The Extended Phenotype, the neo-Darwinian geneticist Richard Dawkins has argued that 
environments built by organisms, such as the webs of spiders, the nests of birds, the dams 
of beavers and so on, might be understood as phenotypic expressions of the genes of the 
organism, in exactly the same way as fingers, hands and wings are understood to be. Whilst 
there is certainly something attractive in this concept, as formulated by Dawkins it is 
problematically reductionist and individualist – and fails to account easily for social 
constructive activity in animals and insects. A more compelling account can be set out 
through a Batesonian-Whiteheadian conception of the organism-environment system as the 
conceptually important unit, rather than the gene: “the boundary of the organism is also the 
boundary of its environment, and thus its movements can be ascribed to the environment as 
well... we gain better understanding by describing this boundary and its movements as 
belonging to both the organism and its environment.” (Alan Watts) Indeed, once we take a 
systemic view, it is much easier to start to ask questions of human “extended 
phenotypes” (within the context of a broader production of nature) – questions which 
Dawkins must necessarily steer clear of. For Dawkins, a termite colony for example is simply 
another layer of machine, designed to propel genes into the future (like the body of the 
termite itself). From a systems biology view, once the termite colony system is extant, it 
makes no more sense to say that than to say the colony is using the genes in each insect to 
propel itself forward: both are autonomous but structurally coupled. In a related sense we 
might also grasp something of the metropolis as an semi-autonomous form.
Human extended phenotypes might include both large collective structures like cities, and 
more basic spatial archetypes, like the megaron, stoa and amphitheatre:
Fig 2.8 Tokyo arial photograph
Fig 2.9 Ancient Greek amphitheatre on Paphos, Greece.
    
we have increasingly seen nature as something over there, and society as 
something over here.22 
 An exposition of the full complexity of the “critical geography” position that Harvey 
and Smith are developing is not the aim of this commentary. Although they owe a debt to 
Lefebvre, their work is genuinely novel, not least in that Lefebvre had relatively little to say 
about nature. That is not the case with Harvey and Smith, who have been particularly 
clear about what they think the term means. They have notably arrived at a dialectical 
conception of nature, primarily through the Marxist theory of “uneven development”, 
concerning the way that capital works as a process in space (and in time).23  Smith 
captures some of the complex relations that define nature and space: 
... the problems of nature, of space, and of uneven development are tied together by 
capital itself. Uneven development is the concrete process and pattern of the 
production of nature under capitalism.24 
The question of “the production of nature” is a complex and apparently paradoxical one, 
and it seems many thinkers have misunderstood this. It is either rejected as absurd (“how 
can humans produce nature?”) or is taken to mean that the human is distinct in the natural 
world, in that the human species alone changes nature. This is not however how we 
should understand the production of nature at all. As Harvey makes clear: 
... we produce nature; things happen there through what we do, in the same way 
that things happen there through what beavers do, and what ants do, and what all 
kinds of organisms do.25 
 Nature then is produced, but it is autopoietically produced, universally, by nature 
itself. The human metabolic relation is but one network of flows in a much broader web of 
life. Indeed, it is this conception of the production of nature which distinguishes Marxian 
ecology from some forms of Deep Ecology,26 or some ecocentric notions which suggest 
that the human being uniquely degrades nature. However, most ecological thinkers would 
agree that it is not straightforwardly obvious how human interventions in natural 
environment are any different from bees pollinating, etc. It is not the fact of our production 
of and in nature that distinguishes the human species. Rather, what for Marx – and in a 
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Fig. 2.10 The largest known beaver’s dam, built by two beaver families. Over 2800 feet long 
and extant for at least ten years. Beavers reorganise water flows over large regions, 
producing entire wetland ecologies.
Fig. 2.11 and 2.12. Termite mounds are socio-economic forms, in which generations of 
termites cultivate fungi-based agricultures. The building activity and socio-economic forms of 
ants are equally if not more complex, although less obvious as they are network structures 
within the soil. The largest single ant colony found to date stretches 4000 miles around the 
north coast of the Mediterranean and across Europe (see http://boingboing.net/2008/12/11/
excavation-of-an-ant.html for an extraordinary excavation of an ant city).
  
different way, for Bateson – distinguishes “the worst of architects from the best of bees”27 
is the extent to which the human has conscious purpose. 
 There is then in no simple sense a “natural” or normal condition of nature. Appeals 
to “nature” have been used to legitimate all kinds of things, and as Pepper states, 
“capitalism’s exploitation of nature supported, and was supported by, exploitative attitudes 
inherent in the scientific world view.”28 Nature is a process of constant change and 
transformation as both a cultural concept and as an external reality. For ecosocialists, 
nature is not the myth of a pure non-human arcadian condition, but is in fact a 
revolutionary state, par excellence – a labouring comrade even! Yet in contemporary 
culture there is still a strong tendency to suggest that the cultural world is entirely separate 
from the natural world. Such a position can take many forms, and has been so pervasive 
for so long that it can today often also be hidden within all kinds of other formulations. It is 
clearly not the aim of this thesis to exhaustively examine all of the formulations of the 
nature-culture opposition within architectural history and contemporary practice, let alone 
in human thought and practice more broadly. However, let us be clear, any absolute 
attempt to bracket off some conception of the “natural” is always ideological, in that it 
generally reproduces bourgeois conceptual divisions. It is quite simply impossible to 
maintain any clear distinction between the natural and the cultural. There is no definitive 
boundary there, but instead a series of metabolic relationships. For Smith,
... when we eventually look back at the intellectual shibboleths of the high capitalist 
period – say the last three centuries – few ingrained assumptions will look so 
wrongheaded or so globally destructive as the common sense separation of society 
and nature. Historically and geographically, most societies have avoided such a 
stark presumption of hubristic folly, but from physicists to sociologists, physicians to 
poets, the brains of the ascendent capitalist west not only embraced but made a 
virtue of society’s separation form nature (and vice versa).29
It is interesting to note that in recent years a number of theorists have turned to consider 
the nature/culture dualism anew. In addition to the Harvey/Smith/Foster/Swyngedouw axis 
within Marxist social theory today, there was a significant attempt by theorists associated 
with the Radical Philosophy journal (notably Ted Benton, Roy Bhaskar and Kate Soper) in 
the first decade of its existence (1990s/2000s) to rethink the nature/culture dualism from a 
40

neo-Marxist position. In the coming chapters I will spend some time considering the non-
dualist position developed by Gregory Bateson in the 1960s and 1970s from a neo-
cybernetic and ecological theory standpoint. However, today undoubtedly the most 
influential discourse to move beyond a dualistic conceptions of both material and social 
worlds, both in the way we produce reality, and the human forms of constructing 
knowledge (humanities/sciences).
 In contemporary architectural practice, I would suggest that one of the key 
relations that needs to be explicitly conceptualised, internalised and embodied, is 
precisely what is the attitude to, and definition of, nature that is brought into the domain of 
social experience through design practice? In order to approach this question, it is 
necessary to review how the complex set of relationships between our mental categories 
of nature and culture are internalised in different ways in a series of terms that nature is 
frequently articulated through. Perhaps the most important of these is the series of 
meanings associated with the term “organic”. Consider for example this statement by 
Pepper:
Marx’s ... concept of the society-nature dialectic appears to be, in reality, deeply 
organic (seeing them both making up one organic body) and monist (physical and 
mental phenomena can be analysed in terms of a common underlying reality).30
It is worth, therefore, scrutinising the term “organic”.
2.3 Organic, Organism, Organisation
There is a whole network of concepts and ideas clustered around the root word, organ, 
which includes organic, organism and organisation. Many of these words and concepts 
have passed through an extraordinary range of ideological uses, which means that for 
some thinkers today they are perhaps too contaminated to even use. However, not only 
are they still used heavily today, in often unreflective or ambiguous ways, but they also 
continue to define important new concepts that do not have any other contemporary 
description. It is, I suggest, inconceivable that a modern ecological materialism can be 




Fig. 2.13. The Chain of Being, from Didacus Valades, Rhetorica Christiana, 1579. Rocks and 
minerals are at the base, followed by plants, animals, humans, various angels, etc and finally 
God.
Fig. 2.14 The Organ of the Duomo di Milano, 1395 (with many additions since). The musical 
organ seems to capture every sense of organon: situated somewhere between a prosthesis 
and a building, it is difficult to imagine a more interactive architecture. For Rykwert in his 
essay Organic and Mechanical (1992), it was the “quasi-magical” organ designed and built 
by the seventeenth-century bagpipe virtuoso Michele Todini, which really “combined the 
attributes of a natural and an artificial object.” Todini’s organ was composed of various wind 
and string instruments and occupied an entire apartment. Only one of the instruments was 
actually played, the rest responded sympathetically (or we might say in empathy). 
Fig. 2.15. The keyboard and valve interface to the 1929 Atlantic City Convention Hall organ, 
which with 33,000 pipes is one of the largest in the world.
consideration of the history of the term, and some of the ways that it has been deployed in 
both general and architectural thought, is required. 
 Organ originally came to us via Latin, from the Greek organon, meaning tool, 
instrument or sense organ. At the root of the word, then, is a conception of technology, in 
both the man-made and “naturally grown” sense.31 According to Raymond Williams, the 
first use of organ in English was in the thirteenth century, in reference to the musical 
instrument, and by the fifteenth century it was widely used to describe bodily organs, as in 
the eye being an instrument of sight. In Keywords, Williams also notes that although the 
organic and the technic came to be conventionally understood as contrasting terms, they 
started as synonyms, and he quotes a sixteenth-century translation of Plutarch: “to frame 
instruments and Engines (which are called mechanicall or organicall).”32 In the eighteenth 
century it was organ in the sense of  “instrument or agency” that would come to be the 
organiser of organisations. However, by the nineteenth century, Williams notes, the 
concept of “organic” could be opposed to “organised” in that organic came to imply a 
natural or similar growth process, whereas simply to be organised implied a human plan. 
It is largely in this sense of organic that Harvey argues that: 
Marx grows his argument organically, it is not building block by building block, or 
causal bit by causal bit ... it grows .., [I]t is a very distinctive method, partially 
descriptive of its subject matter ... you don’t understand it as a causality ... you 
understand it as a unity … Marx says in various places, ‘you have to understand it 
as an organic system’.”33
The definition of the organism as a self-organised entity is characteristic of the cybernetic 
and ecological discourses of the twentieth century, but it is to be found in a form 
remarkably close to the modern sense in Kant’s proto-theory of organism found in Critique 
of Judgement: “we must think of each part as an organ that produces the other parts (so 




2.4 Socio-Political conceptions of the Organic
 The idea that the concept “organic” can in some way describe aspects of human 
society has had a productive life. According to Joseph Rykwert,35 the first use of organic in 
this sense is found in the thought of the German scholar Johann Gottfried Herder. As I will 
discuss in Chapter Six, Herder was also the first person to use the term Einfühlung 
(empathy), which was a key part of his conception of organic. 
 The term “organic society” has come to be deployed by a wide variety of thinkers 
on both the left and right. It is however most often used to describe a general pre-capitalist 
condition, in the sense that the anarchist Murray Bookchin uses it when he claims “the 
notion that man must dominate nature emerges directly from the domination of man by 
man … But it was not until organic community relations … dissolved into market 
relationships that the planet itself was reduced to a resource for exploitation.”36 
 Exactly what is meant by “organic community relations” is always the question to 
ask. Whilst the metaphor of society as a hierarchical body – with the peasants forming the 
labouring body, the clergy the heart, and the aristocracy the head – predates the use of 
the term organic, the two became joined in one of the most important conservative uses of 
the term organic society, specifically when it was originally used in opposition to 
revolutionary societies which were seen as “artificial and against the natural order of 
things.”37 The hierarchical structure of feudal society was reproduced in an ideological 
reading of the vernacular cosmology of “natural magic” – through for example certain 
versions of the Chain of Being – which was then itself reflected back and used to 
legitimate the “natural organic order” of said society. 
 This sense of the organic has since come to be widely used to describe the 
pantheistic, alchemical and natural magic cosmologies that characterised pre-modern 
European thought in general. Thus Pepper states that:
... the organic view permeating mediaeval and Renaissance cosmologies is 
essentially animistic. If the cosmos is an organism stemming from the immanence of  
the One – the Absolute Being which is everything – then it is but a small step to 
have nature and natural objects endowed with the attributes of organisms, 
especially humans. This was done not merely by giving, for example, ‘brows’, 
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‘shoulders’ and ‘feet’ to mountains, or ‘heads’, ‘gorges’ and ‘mouths’ to rivers, or a 
circulatory system to the whole earth, it also went on to give each part of nature 
some soul – some universal spirit which had flowed down into them.38 
It is this conception of organic which later resurfaced in Romanticism, via Herder, Goethe 
and the Schlegel brothers.39 Schelling captured the semi-modern, semi-mystical romantic 
sense of the term when he stated that: 
Organism is the principle of things. It is not the property of any single object ... 
[because there] are separate modes of apprehending universal organism – and 
universal organism is the precondition of the mechanical working of the whole 
physical world.40 
Schelling goes on to say – in a paradoxical formulation that, as we shall see, anticipates 
modern process philosophers and scientists such as Alfred North Whitehead, David Bohm 
and Ilya Prigogine – that “since this life is the precondition of all things, even those things 
in nature that seem dead are in fact only extinct of life.”41  
 Pepper notes that ever since Romanticism, modernity has been constantly fed by 
streams of pre-modern thinking such as “holism, Gaianism and nature worship.”42 He 
suggests that although these ideas did not directly constitute the most important roots of 
modern environmentalism, “they persisted as minor, counter-cultural strands into the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and formed the basis of movements and ideas 
that can be directly traced into modern environmentalism.”43 It is important to note that 
such movements are not at all restricted to sentimental and reactionary forms (although 
as we shall see there are certainly plenty of these), but would notably include early proto-
socialist and anarchist groups such as the Diggers and the Ranters,44 and even arguably 
nineteenth-century thinkers such as John Ruskin and William Morris.45 In fact, whilst 
organicist conceptions were co-opted in support of existing social hierarchies, they lent 
arguably as much support to radical thought. Organicism “pre-empted notions of 
dialectics” and “challenged the hierarchical view of the cosmos by emphasising unity, 
acknowledging that the whole was greater than the sum of the parts, and regarding the 
parts as of equal value.”46
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 More generally, Pepper notes that the complex mix of ideas present in the early-
modern period, and the emergence of modern science out of alchemical experimental 
practices, were grounded in a natural magic cosmology which conceived of “the universe 
as an organism, fully alive and active ... permeated with influences, forces and 
correspondences that linked everything in nature, people included, to everything else, 
forming a multidimensional network that was not only material, but also mystical and 
spiritual.”47 The basic “web of life” network structure of such a cosmology has not only 
persisted in opposition to modernity, but has been repeatedly reproduced throughout 
modernity. This is most obviously the case in the process-based and systems-based 
attempts to synthesise a modern holistic science, but is equally present in much more 
subtle forms, such as for example in contemporary attempts to theorise modern media, 
financial and informational networks (as I will argue in Chapter Seven). In this regard, the 
metaphor of the rhizome in the work of Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari has clear if 
complex relations to this nexus of concepts.
 A specifically Marxian formulation of an organic Gemeinshaft was developed by 
György Lukács, for whom “organic” primarily referred to the relationship between 
“consciousness” in a society and that society’s broader formations (production, etc.). 
Lukács thus states: 
Marxist philosophy of history analyses man as a whole, and contemplates the 
history of human evolution as a whole ... It strives to unearth the hidden laws 
governing all human relationships. Thus the object of proletarian humanism is to 
reconstruct the complete human personality and free it from the distortion and 
dismemberment to which it has been subjected in class society ... [T]he point in 
question is the organic, indissoluble connection between man as a private individual 
and man as a social being, a member of the community.48
The use to which Lukács puts this conception to seems to shift over the course of his 
work, but in general there is a sense that in certain pre-capitalist societies there was an 
organic relationship between personal, cultural and social forms, and that whilst it is not 
possible, or even desirable, given the “closed” nature of these earlier relationships, to 
restore these forms,49 it is possible to move forward into an “open” modern organic form. 
As Michael Löwy notes: 
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Haeckel
    
Fig. 2.16. A comparative embryology morphogenesis chart, illustration by Ernst Haeckel from 
his 1874 book on Anthropogenie, who used this to argue for a ‘ontogeny recapitulates 
phylogeny’ position. This has since been challenged as a theory, as has the scientific validity 
of this drawing. It is very “rhetorical”.
Fig. 2.17 and 2.18 Nonetheless Haeckel’s images of plants and organisms are extraordinary. 
Typical botanical and anatomical drawings by Ernst Haecke's 1904 book on Art Forms in 
Nature.
     
Lukács perceives socialist revolution as a cultural restoration: organic culture again 
becomes possible. In a typically romantic-revolutionary way, Lukács understands 
socialism as the re-establishment of the cultural continuity disrupted by the advance 
of capitalism; the utopian future (the ‘new culture’) provides a bridge towards the 
pre-capitalist past (the ‘old culture’) above the void of the capitalist present 
(‘nonculture’).50 
 Without doubt, both the most innovative and the most problematic and reactionary 
use of the term organic is to be found in the work of the German biologist Ernst Haeckel. 
He was one of the most important scientists of the late-nineteenth century, a leading 
proponent of Charles Darwin’s theory in Germany, and is well known still today on account 
of his extraordinary drawings of plants. Haeckel’s position has left a particularly difficult 
legacy, and is complex to unpick as it draws upon several of the senses of organic 
outlined above. He coined the term “ecology” in his Generelle Morphologie of 1866, which 
he formulated as the “the science of relations between an organism and the surrounding 
outer world, to which we can include all its conditions of existence in a wider sense.”51 
Haeckel was also an early (holistic-organic) systems thinker in biology, and with Jakob 
von Uexküll developed the concept of an environment.52 Marx and Engels considered his 
early scientific work favourably, and Engels refers to him in Anti-Dühring53   
 Later in his career, Hackael, like some Darwinists in England, began to adopt 
Social Darwinian positions.54 However, whereas Social Darwinism expressed an 
individualist libertarianism (for example Spencer’s “survival of the fittest”) in England, 
Haeckel’s took a decidedly nationalist-collectivist turn (needless to say, Marx and Engels 
position on Haeckel shifted as his nationalist-organic political views, and their increasing 
effects upon his science, became clear).
 Haeckel established the Monist League in 1904, which was initially based upon 
atheism and republicanism, and even contained leftish factions. However, it became 
increasingly nationalistic, and developed a right-wing völkisch philosophy, combining 
vernacular holist beliefs with an ideologically distorted science. His “organicist” position 
took the form of a monism which not only did not see humanity as distinct from nature, but 
actually denied the validity of the concept of humanity altogether – claiming that it was a 
internationalising socialist fiction and that actually so-called humanity was a mix of distinct 
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species (some closer to other animals species), and that these were further determined by 
their environmental regions into national races.55 It was the combination of race plus 
region that defined the nation as an organism competing for Lebensraum.56  
 Needless to say, Haeckel’s version of organicism proved all too useful to fascist 
ideologues, and this particular political legacy explains the uncomfortable reaction of 
many contemporary academics to the use of the word. 
2.5 Organicism, Wholeness, Process and Systems 
 The organic as a concept today then, has complex roots. There is an aspect of the 
concept that makes a direct appeal to a medieval holistic cosmology. This appeal is itself 
complex: part nostalgic, part reactionary, part radical. To the extent that this notion of a 
medieval cosmology has any historical accuracy, it can be understood, in the terms 
defined earlier in this chapter, as a distinct historical relation to, and production of, nature. 
Such a cosmology also has philosophical roots in medieval readings of the animated 
cosmology found in Artistotelian philosophy in particular. Equally, it is no doubt in part an 
imaged cosmology, a constructed projection that is actually as “modern” as the steam 
engine. 
 Despite these variously complex and problematic associations, a general 
conception of the organic prefigured, and indeed contributes to, many of the later insights 
of modern systems theory. Organicism in this sense is one component of what have been 
a growing number of relational, systemic or process philosophies that have been 
articulated over the last century in particular. Whilst these have come out of all kinds of 
traditions, and have been put to all kinds of intellectual, social and political tasks, it is 
reasonable to note that organicist and holistic ideas might be understood in opposition to 
the mechanistic, and as a supplement to the reductivist paradigms that formed the 
conceptual basis of enlightenment science and technology. Equally importantly, the 
unfolding of this history is inseparable from the specific historical forms of, relations to, 
and production of, nature during the growth of the capitalist mode of production. 
 Whilst it is of course beyond the scope of this chapter to consider all of the ideas 
that contributed to enlightenment science, it will be useful to understand something of the 
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mechanistic principle if we are then to grasp the importance of the formation of post-
mechanistic organicism.57  
 For Isaac Newton, who formalised the various insights and observations of 
Copernicus, Kepler and Brahe, in particular, into the basic universal laws of motion 
(describing things such as planets and apples), the universe was conceived as an 
absolute and fixed empty space, filled with particles of solid, dead matter. Newton 
described his conception in the following way: 
It seems probable to me that God in the beginning formed matter in solid, massy, 
hard, impenetrable, movable particles, of such sizes and figures, and with such 
other properties, and in such proportions to space, as most conducted to the end 
for which he formed them; and that these primitive particles being solids, are 
incomparably harder than any porous bodies compounded of them; even so very 
hard, as never to wear or break in pieces; no ordinary power being able to divide 
what God himself made one in the first creation.58
Time passed in this God-created space, which was conceived through the metaphor of a 
new piece of technology contemporary with Newton’s period: the clock. This metaphor 
provided a compelling overall image of a linear cause and effect world of deterministic 
mechanical matter – a clockwork universe. It was imagined that if it were possible for one 
to know at a given moment where all of the atoms of the universe are, and where they are 
moving, then it would be possible in principle to extrapolate all of the future development 
of the universe. This conception of the universe as a machine was suggested by the 
eighteenth-century French astronomer/mathematician Pierre Simon Laplace:
We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the 
cause of its future. An intellect which at a given instant knew all the forces acting 
in nature, and the position of all things of which the world consists – supposing 
the said intellect were vast enough to subject these data to analysis – would 
embrace in the same formula the motions of the greatest bodies in the universe 
and those of the slightest atoms; nothing would be uncertain for it, and the future, 
like the past, would be present to its eyes.59
Of course, for Isaac Newton, there was such an intellect – God – which is why Newton 
famously defined space as the sensorium of God.60 
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 There were however problems with this mechanistic model from the start. Plants 
and animals were considered as automatons: practically lifeless and certainly non-thinking 
machines, which moved deterministically according to the movement of atoms in their 
bodies and brains. The human mind presented an even bigger problem for such a 
conception of the universe. For René Descartes, the result was a dualistic position: a 
dead clockwork universe of matter, and a separate realm of mind. For Descartes, whose 
dualism is more accurately understood as a form of interactionism, the human mind and 
body were joined through the pineal gland in the brain (I will return to consider some of the 
other legacies of this conception of matter and mind in later chapters).
 A version of Descartes dualistic model was effectively extended to cover all life 
forms in the various strands of vitalism in the nineteenth century. For vitalists, it seemed 
clear that whilst the mechanistic approach might work for inert dead matter, the living 
organic world could not be explained on the basis of Cartesian clockwork principles. 
Instead, vitalism essentially extended Descartes’ interactionist dualism to cover all of life, 
by proposing that there is some kind of force or field which animates living matter. Vitalism 
in this form was first proposed by Hans Driesch, a German embryologist (and former 
student of Haeckel’s, although they were later bitter rivals) who outlined an important 
modern conception of organicism in his 1929 book, Science and Philosophy of the 
Organism. Driesch experimented on sea urchin eggs by damaging the growing embryos 
at an early stage through removing cells or splitting embryos. These experiments did not 
produce the results that might be expected mechanistically, in that the various remains 
were able to regenerate wholes. For Driesch, these and other experiments showed that 
some kind of information about wholeness was acting upon the material of the organism, 
even when not apparently materially a part of it. Driesch explained this as a form of 
vitalism, which he called entelechy, following Aristotle. Yet for Aristotle, entelechy was the 
process by which form was immanent in matter. For Aristotle form and matter are 
completed through each other, and entelechy was in fact formulated in opposition to the 
dualism of the Platonic model, which describes a separation between form or idea and 
matter. Indeed, whilst there are some formulations of vitalism (such as Bergson’s concept 




 The often controversial biologist Rupert Sheldrake has argued (I think in this 
instance correctly) that many of the concepts of neo-Darwinist biologists, such as the 
selfish gene and the genetic programme as the store of all knowledge regarding the 
organism, are in fact just new forms of vitalism. He states that “the central paradigm of 
modern biology has in effect become a kind of genetic vitalism.”62 Indeed, Sheldrake 
argues that the mechanistic model proved so insufficient for the life sciences that there is 
no form of modern materialism that has not ended up needing to be supplemented by 
some form of disguised vitalism. Paradoxically, though, for Capra, the concept of 
morphogenetic fields that was developed by Sheldrake is itself just “a sophisticated form 
of vitalism.”63
 Vitalist dualism in its various forms also speculated about the additional ingredients 
that might explain life. However, the most radical concept to emerge from – and transcend 
– vitalistic thinking, organismic or systems biology, argued that rather than some elan vital 
that needed to be added to matter to bring it alive, “the additional ingredient is the 
understanding of ‘organisation’, or ‘organising relations’.”64 
 Understanding organising relations was key to the move beyond vitalism and 
towards the concept of emergence (to which I will return in Chapter Five), which had been 
suggested via dialectics by Engels in the late-nineteenth century, and was further 
elaborated by C.D. Broad in the 1920s, when coining the term “emergent properties” in his 
book, Emergent Evolution (1926). Ross Harrison was amongst the first to identify the 
concept of pattern as a key means of grasping “configuration” and “relationship” as 
aspects of organisation. His work, and that of the students and researchers around him, 
explored in particular the formation of morphogenetic fields, through embryological 
experiments.65 Lawrence Henderson was an early-twentieth-century biological chemist 
whose work expanded to consider the shared organisational principles in biology, 
sociology and cosmology, and who uses the term “system” to describe both biological and 
social organisations.66 William Bateson considered how symmetry breaking in 
morphogenesis related to information. Joseph Woodger’s Biological Principles (1936) 
emphasised the importance of  “plus organising relations”, and noted how life tends to 
produce hierarchies of nested systems within systems: cells, tissues, organs, organisms, 
and might be summarised as referring to a “process”, “form” or “structure” – often 
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David Bohm: Wholeness and the Implicate Order: 
                             “more like quantum organism than quantum mechanics”
    
Fig. 2.19 The enfolding of drops of ink into glycerine held between two cylinders. As the 
cylinders are turned the ink disappears, and appears to be lost. However, if the cylinders are 
rotated in the opposite direction then the drop of ink will slowly unfold back out as a 
suspended droplet. If this is done with a series of drops of ink at different times, the ink drop 
might appear to come pulse in and out of existence along a path. Bohm liked this as an 
analogical model of implication and explication. 
Fig. 2.20 Close up of a holographic plate. Bohm frequently used holograms to discuss 
dialectical whole/part enfoldment. In a hologram, the whole image is present even in a 
fragment, although at ‘low resolution’.
 Bohm proposed a distinct and subtle re-interpretation of the formalism of quantum 
mechanics, a process based approach which was both more organic and in some sense 
more realist. Bohm’s “Ontological Interpretation” provided an understanding of the nature of 
many of the paradoxes of the standard interpretation (non-locality, wave/particle duality, 
indeterminacy) but by effectively re-considering what in the standard interpretation are 
probability fields as real fields. In the simplest account of Bohm’s theory, associated with 
every particle is a quantum potential, which he describes as an informational field. As Ted 
Grant and Alan Woods describe it: 
David Bohm was one of the few to provide a worked-out theoretical alternative to the subjectivist 
‘Copenhagen interpretation’ of quantum mechanics. Bohm’s analysis, which is clearly influenced by 
the dialectical method, advocates a radical re-thinking of quantum mechanics and a new way of 
looking at the relationship between whole and parts.⁸!
One of the more startling implications of David Bohm’s interpretation, is that it suggests the 
entire space-time field enfolds in an informational way, a whole global field of pattern that is – 
that informs or unfolds with – local matter. He called this dynamic process the 
holomovement. I discuss some of Bohm’s ideas on what he called a rheomode performance 
of language in regard to ecological aesthetics in the concluding chapter.
 In the ultimate Bohmian interpretation, there are a series of underlying fields (which he 
calls the implicate and super-implicate order), out of which unfolds what he calls the 
explicate orders, which themselves fold back in.. It suggests that all of the “matter” in the 
explicate universe is in some important sense in constant processes of non-localised cross 
communication at other levels of order. This approach represents a distinct form of theorising 
emergence.
exhibiting growth – in which the parts are networked together to produce a whole (whether 
a plant or society) which is more than the sum of the parts.67
 These organic or holistic conceptions of organised whole/part relations 
represented a radical new stage in the development of modern systems thinking. They 
emerged first in the life sciences, given that both the mechanistic and reductive paradigms 
had such clear shortcomings in grasping the totality of living metabolic systems. The 
processes involved were circular and networked, not linear, and a reductive method that 
focused upon breaking things into parts, had by definition a limited ability to understand 
the whole, or the relations between parts. 
 However, the need for new forms of relational process and holistic thinking would 
independently arise in the physical sciences too, and were in fact built into both relativity 
and quantum theories in a variety of ways.68 In formulating what became known as the 
standard or Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, Niels Bohr insisted that it 
made absolutely no sense to even talk about fundamental elements as independent 
“objects”. It was necessary to always describe and conceive of the system as a whole: the 
elementary particles could not be understood independently of the apparatus and 
observer. Thus Bohr would state that “isolated material particles are abstractions, their 
properties being definable and observable only through their interaction with other 
systems,”69 and Henry Stapp later added that “an elementary particle is not an 
independently existing unanalysable entity. It is, in essence, a set of relationships that 
reach outwards to other things.”70 Reviewing the new patterns of matter that emerged 
from quantum and relativity theory, Fritjof Capra has suggested that: 
... in modern physics, the image of the universe as a machine has been replaced 
by that of an interconnected dynamic whole whose parts are essentially 
interdependent and have to be understood as patterns of a cosmic process. In 
order to define an object in this interconnected web of relationships, we cut 
through some of the interconnections – conceptually, as well as physically with our 
instruments of observation – and in doing so we isolate certain patterns and 
interpret them as objects.71
 Contemporary with these emerging insights from the study of biological, quantum 
and relativistic systems into the organisational patterns of matter and life, the philosopher 
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Fig. 2.21 Bohm used the above model of two different elevations of a fishtank as a metaphor 
for describing non-locality and implicate/explicate relations. The rabbit here sees what 
appear to be two different though correlated 2D fish, and not the higher dimension He noted 
that “any form of relative autonomy (and heteronomy) is ultimately limited by holonomy, so 
that in a broad enough context such forms are seen to be merely aspects, relevated in the 
holomovement, rather than disjoint and separately existent things in interaction."⁸⁴
 Bohm’s practical research work tended to focus on highly organised forms of matter, 
where quantum coherence effects are evident a classical scales – such as in lasers and 
super-conductors. Bohm’s collaborators have continued to explore his ideas. Notably, Basil 
Hiley has recently completed a new mathematical formalism which is currently under peer 
review prior to publication. 
Fig. 2.22 and 2.23 A visualisation of an electron in Standing Wave Theory, which is closely 
related to Bohm’s description (these are a still taken from an animation). Bohm noted that 
“the electron itself can never be separated from the whole of space, which is its ground.”⁸⁵
  
Alfred North Whitehead proposed a process-based philosophy – a quite new metaphysical 
“concept of nature” and the human relationship to it. Whitehead emphasises what he 
called the “misplaced concreteness” of matter, and the “fallacy of simple location” of 
objects. Directly anticipating Bohm’s internal relations theory outlined as in Wholeness 
and the Implicate Order,, Whitehead stated that:
… my theory involves the entire abandonment of the notion that simple location is 
the primary way in which things are involved in space-time. In a certain sense, 
everything is everywhere at all times. For every location involves an aspect of itself 
in every other location. Thus every spatio-temporal standpoint mirrors the world.72
Anticipating the potential of modern dynamic systems theories, Whitehead suggested that 
organisation might provide a unified model for both physics and biology. For Whitehead, 
organisms can be defined as “structures of activity,” and for him this process-based 
definition of organism holds true at all scales, such that he is able to state: "biology is the 
study of large organisms, whereas physics is the study of small organisms."73 In fact, as 
Isabelle Stengers notes, Whitehead consistently defined his entire project as a philosophy 
of organism, even whilst in his later work, the term itself drops away.74
 The idea that the most basic organisms of atoms and molecules are in some 
sense proto-lifeforms is a powerful concept, recalling Schelling’s romantic conceptions of 
living matter. If, as the story is often told, enlightenment rationalism combined with 
capitalist exploitation and alienation stripped the world of Geist, or spirit, then for a series 
of contemporary thinkers the understanding of systemic organicity announced by 
Whitehead has provided the opening for another, more modern “re-enchantment” of 
matter. In fact, with growing momentum through the second half of the twentieth century, a 
series of new approaches emerged that combined organicist thinking with non-linear 
mathematics and recursive systems approaches to define an entirely novel process-based 
conception of “nature”. For the most interesting scientists of this period, once again 
performing as natural philosophers, the process thinking of Whitehead offered a particular 
resonance. As a quantum physicist, David Bohm, drew heavily on Whitehead, and even 
more so on Hegel, creating an extremely subtle interpretation (a “naturalist” outline of a 
grand unification theory) that was “more like quantum organism than quantum 
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Self Organising Patterns of Matter: Far from Equilibrium Systems and the Timing 
of Space
    
Fig. 2.24 and 2.25. The Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction is an autocatalysing reaction (i.e. a 
feedback system) that oscillates between states, never reaching equilibrium.
 Terrence McKenna once described classical linear mechanistic science as the study of 
phenomena so simple, that whenever experimental conditions were re-initiated, the same 
thing repeated itself! Such phenomena are in fact, when we look at the world around us, in 
many ways the exception, and McKenna’s description of course does not apply to the self-
organising patterns of matter that have characterised the research of Ilya Prigogine and the 
non-linear and recursive sciences of chaos, complexity and life (and which McKenna, often 
in collaboration with chaos mathematician Ralph Abraham, spoke so wonderfully about). 
 Prigogine’s work has been characterised by research into the behaviour of material 
systems (technically “dissipative systems”: systems that dissipate entropy into their external 
environment, whilst increasing order in their internal milieu) in environments that are defined 
as “far from equilibrium”. If an equilibrium system is homogenous and stable, and generally 
closed, a far-from-equilibrium system contains dynamic differences: flows of energy and 
matter. Dissipative systems “live” off of the flows of a far from equilibrium environment. As 
Maturana and Varela would show, this is necessarily the case for the autopoietic dissipative 
systems that we call organisms – but as Prigogine demonstrated, this is also true for simpler 
dissipative systems like whirlpool vortexes (eg. Fig. 2.26). As the cybernetician Norbert 
Weiner anticipated, “we are but whirlpools in a river of ever-flowing water. We are not stuff 
that abides, but patterns that perpetuate themselves.”⁸⁶ For Prigogine and Stengers, these 
insights: 
... leads to a new view of matter in which matter is no longer the passive inert substance described in 
the mechanistic world view, but is associated with spontaneous activity. This change is so profound 
that ... we can really speak about a new dialogue of man with nature.⁸⁷ 
mechanics.”75 Like Bohm, Ilya Prigogine has redefined what we understand by order and 
structure, or more accurately, the dynamic relational processes of ordering and 
structuring, in his work on dissipative and far-from-equilibrium systems that lie at the edge 
of chaos and life. Prigogine’s collaborator, Isabelle Stengers, would go on to become a 
prominent Whitehead scholar. A series of cybernetic and ecological theorists, notably 
Gregory Bateson, Erich Jantsch, Humberto Maturana, Francisco Varela and Ricardo 
Uribe, shared these interests in self-organising systems, which were further developed by 
Stuart Kauffman and the Santa Fe Institute’s research into complexity. 
 In all of these cases we find something approaching a philosophy of internal 
relations based on the redefinition of nature and agency. Frequently these scientists and 
their associates have gone on to propose wide-reaching “metaphysical” syntheses, 
variously describing “an emerging science of wholeness” (Peat/Briggs), “a new kind of 
science” (Wolfram), “a new dialogue with (and re-enchantment of) nature” (Prigogine/
Stengers) an idea of a humanity that was now part of “a web of life” (Capra) and no longer 
necessarily existentially alienated, but potentially once again “at home in the 
universe” (Kauffman).  All of these can be loosely characterised as articulating a “hylozoist 
wonder”76, or even modern forms of panpsychism (which I will return to in a different 
sense in Chapter Seven).77 Whilst it would be a mistake to overstate this point, or to 
describe as a single unified discourse what remain different conceptions of material 
agency and self-organising patterns, it is indisputable that there are significant parallels in 
all of these accounts which can be argued constitutes the beginning of a paradigm shift. 
The cultural effects of this new cognitive (if not economic) relation to nature  – particularly 
within ecological philosophy – have been profound.78 
 Emphasising the resonance of modern systems, process and organismic 
approaches with many vernacular traditions of thought, Sheldrake argues, in terms that in 
this instance are quite non-controversial, that:
... the holistic or organismic philosophy, or the ‘systems’ approach, is in one sense a 
new form of animism: nature is once again seen as alive, and all organisms within it 
contain their own organising principles within themselves. They are no longer 
thought of as souls, as they are in Aristotelian philosophy, but are given a variety of 
other names such as “systems properties” or “emergent principles of organisation” 
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Fig. 2.27 Bénard Cell convection currents in a heated liquid – a favourite example of 
Prigogine – show how a liquid self-organises when a constant flow of heat passes through it 
(such that the liquid has a metabolism). The liquid will typically pass through a few stable 
states before solving the problem through hexagonal close packing.
Fig. 2.28 The effects of atmospheric Bénard cells in shaping sand dunes in a desert.
 Dissipative systems embody a non-human agency that makes the description of their 
conditions of emergence-existence, of becoming, fascinatingly difficult in terms of formal 
human logic and embodied language. The attempt to describe them in terms that emerge 
from the “entity” in question (or more accurately, in terms of our relations to them, and 
through them), is one of the tasks that the cybernetic project, broadly conceived, set itself. 
 In a formulation that suggest that there might be new ways to think about metabolism in 
political ecology as the timing of space, Prigogine and Stengers note that in their work: 
... the analogy with social phenomena is inescapable. Far from opposing ‘chance’ and ‘necessity’, we 
now see both aspects as essential in the description of systems far from equilibrium ... new aspects of 
time have been uncovered ... probability and irreversibility had to be closely related. Only when a 
system behaves in a sufficiently random way may the difference between past and future, and 
therefore irreversibility, enter into its description ... It has often been stated that science spatialises 
time. But we now discover that another point of view is possible.. we have been led to study the ‘timing 
of space.’⁸⁸
There is a fascinating resonance with Marx’s doctoral thesis on the Epicurean philosophy of 
nature, and in particular the dialectical relationship between chance and necessity that Marx 
found expressed in the chance swerve of the Epicurean atom – a paradoxically necessary 
swerve in that it opened to door to history and time, freedom and creativity for Marx, much as 
it does for Bohm, Prigogine and Stengers.
or “patterns that connect” or “organising fields.” But the modern philosophy of 
organicism differs in two fundamental respects from pre-mechanistic animism: first, 
it is post-mechanistic, and is developing in the light of the insights and discoveries of  
mechanistic science; and second, it is evolutionary.79
 Combinations of modern and pre-modern organicisms have thus fed into a wide 
range of environmental philosophies, including the important relational Deep Ecology 
philosophy of Arne Naess, for whom “a human being is not a thing in the environment, but 
a juncture in a relational system without determined boundaries in space and time.”80 
Frequently, today, many ecocentric thinkers see in organicism a return to the belief in a 
Chain of Being – this time, however, ecological – and a basis for a broader animism or 
more general correspondences with folk and/or oriental cosmologies. This often 
productive though potentially problematic tension within conceptualisations of the organic 
– i.e. between a modern scientific holism and a vernacular mystical belief system – is 
replayed throughout the development of ecology, and within the environmental movement 
and ecocentric thought more generally.
 The conceptual development of “re-enchantment” has not been restricted to 
ecocentric theory alone, however. David Harvey – in attempting to chart common territory 
between anti-capitalist green and red political groupings, as well as identify shared 
intellectual labour between ecocentric process based philosophy and Marxian dialectics – 
has proposed an interesting and perhaps surprising cross-reading of the Marxist-Hegelian 
concept of alienation, and subsequent re-enchantment. Harvey states, for example, that 
“parallel strains of thought, such as ‘process-based philosophy’ and ‘organic’ lines of 
argument advanced by, for example A.N. Whitehead, David Bohm, and a variety of 
contemporary ecologists such as Arne Naess and Fritjof Capra, bear some sort of 
relationship to Marx’s dialectics.”81 Whilst nonetheless being clear to distinguish between 
progressive leftish conceptions and the more reactionary moments in some ecocentric 
thought, he suggests that:
... for Marxists, there can be no going back, as many ecologists seem to propose, 
to an unmediated relation to nature (or a world built solely on face to face 
relations), to a pre-capitalist and communitarian world of non-scientific 
understandings with limited divisions of labour. The only path is to seek political, 
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cultural and intellectual means that ‘go beyond’ the mediations ... while 
acknowledging the significance of such mediations. The emancipatory potential 
of modern society, founded on alienation, must continue to be explored. But this 
cannot be, as it so often is, an end in itself for that is to treat alienation as the end 
point, the goal. The ecologists’ and the early Marx’s concern to recuperate ‘in 
higher form’ the alienation from nature (as well as from others) that modern day 
capitalism instantiates must be a fundamental goal of any ecosocialist project ... 
The idea of ‘re-enchantment’ with the sensuous world through a more sensitive 
science, more sensitive social relations and material practices, through 
meaningful labour processes, provides a better language than that of alienation 
with all of its essentialist overtones.82
It is a fascinating yet problematic objective for ecological thinking. In the next chapter I will 
therefore continue to explore these parallels between Marxian dialectics, ecology and 
cybernetics. This then sets the stage for the performance of new political conceptions of 
ecology, metabolism, cognition and dwelling: or what I term a critical urban ecology.
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3 Dialectical Ecology: Towards a Critical Metabolic Materialism
Organism connotes a knotty dialectic: a living system makes itself into a entity distinct from 
its environment through a process that brings forth, through that very process, a world 
proper to the organism.1
[Francisco Varela]
3.1 A Dialectical approach to Organism
David Harvey has noted on several occasions – as seen in the previous chapter – that 
there is much in the traditions of organic and ecological philosophy which, through its 
emphasis on process and relational thinking, shares something with Marxian dialectical 
theory. Thus, he suggests that the latter might:
... learn a great deal from trying to understand ecocentric lines of thought ... They 
help concentrate my mind on the qualitative as well as the quantitative conditions of 
our metabolic relation to the world and raise important issues about the manner of 
relating across species and ecological boundaries that have traditionally been left on 
one side in many Marxist accounts.2 
Whilst I strongly concur with Harvey regarding the desirability of “trying to understand 
ecocentric lines of thought“ within a framework of Marxian dialectical relations, in this 
thesis I am especially interested in other – and often closely associated – traditions of 
relational thinking that are also worthy of “trying to understand”. In particular, there have 
been a series of attempts from figures in systems biology to use relational dialectical 
thinking to redraw our conceptions of the organism, of whole/part relations, and of a series 
of ideas associated with emergence. In addition, within some of the more critical and 
radical strains of neo-cybernetics – notably Gregory Bateson, but also others such as 
Stafford Beer, Francisco Varela and Evan Thompson – we find interesting forms of what 
can well be described as dialectical thinking.
 The biologist Richard Lewontin has argued that a dialectical interpretation of 
dynamic systems theory can avoid what he argues are the twin spectres haunting 
systems biology: atomism, at one extreme, and medieval holism, at the other. He 
suggests that these two tendencies must be reformulated as a thesis-antithesis dialectic.3
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For Lewontin, dialectical method and relational thinking can help us to see and think about 
the ways that complex systems organise themselves. For example, a dialectical 
conception of “organism” understands the relationality of parts to each other, and to the 
whole, but in no sense rejects the possibility of abstracting parts from a whole, or 
abstractly conceiving the whole as whole. Indeed, it argues that such a process of 
abstracting parts from wholes is essential not just to the possibility of modern scientific 
thought (including the activity of reconstructing wholes), but is fundamental to the actual 
processes of life itself. For those thinkers concerned with bringing a dialectical pattern of 
relational thinking to dynamic systems theory, the kinds of propositions and descriptions 
that emerge give a more coherent account of the kinds of phenomena categorised as one 
or other form of emergence.
 One particularly powerful definition of the organism has come from the Chilean 
cybernetic biologists Humberto Maturana and Franscisco Varela (who was a student of 
Maturana), and later extended by Evan Thompson (who was a student of Varela). Both 
Varela and Thompson have described their definition of the organism (and by extension of 
emergent whole/parts relations in general) as being dialectical. Varela takes a working 
definition of dialectics from Lewontin’s book, The Dialectical Biologist, as relational 
properties where “one thing cannot exist without the other, that one acquires its properties 
from its relation to the other, that the properties of both evolve as a consequence of their 
interpenetration.”4 Thompson too has described his thinking in dialectical terms. Whilst 
both Varela and Thompson certainly took some conception of dialectical process from 
Lewontin, who framed his thinking in explicitly Marxian terms, they were equally if not 
more interested in a different tradition of dialectical theory derived from Merleau-Ponty, 
and from the European phenomenology tradition more broadly (I will return to this in 
coming chapters).5 
 Maturana and Varela’s development of a distinct strand of what Gordon Pask 
referred to as “new cybernetics” had a wide impact far beyond biology. Notably, the 
German social systems/cybernetics theorist, Nicklas Luhmann, took many of Maturana 
and Varela’s insights into the operational systems of organisms back into social science. 
Maturana and Varela’s primary conceptual move was the definition of autopoiesis. Simply 
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On the Shoulders of Giants
   
Fig. 3.0. On the Shoulders of Giants, by Paul Pangaro (1995). Pangaro produced this 
cognitive mapping of some of the key concepts of second-order cybernetics for Heinz von 
Foerster.
stated, autopoiesis defines an organism that is not just an organised whole composed of 
parts, but is rather a self-producing and self-organising whole (remembering Kant’s 
prescient definition). An autopoietic unity is autonomous, which is to say, it has a self 
sustaining internal organisational coherence that projects itself into the future, and which 
experiences a world that it itself “brings forth” through (and importantly, is limited and 
defined by) its co-evolutionary interactions and couplings with its environment. An 
autopietic unity is autonomous then, but also – in a profoundly dialectical manner – its 
autonomy derives from its very interconnectedness with the external world. We are here 
at last back to the original conception of organon. It contains two moments. Firstly, there is 
the “simple organism” which is just an organised whole composed of parts. This of course 
describes all machines and tools so far made by humans. The second conception is of an 
organism which exhibits autopoiesis: that is to say, a whole which is composed of a 
feedback network of parts which produce a “membrane” (or “boundary”, “enclosure” or 
“distinction”). This membrane encloses and produces an internal environment within which 
the networked parts can themselves produce the membrane. In elaborating upon how this 
system works, Maturana and Varela thus introduced into cybernetics, ecology and system 
theory a valuable series of terms: autopoiesis,6 structural coupling,7 co-evolution,8 
structural and natural drift,9 and operational closure.10 What I think is notable in their 
conception (and which I think Marxian scholarship has not picked up on) is that the 
organism is based upon a labour theory of both life and cognition.
3.2 A Labour Theory of Cognition
For Maturana and Varela, the most fundamental definition of a living organism is that it is 
autopoietic: a producer, labouring to produce itself. Moreover, they define the metabolic 
relation between an organism and its environment as being cognitive. What is meant by 
this? Primarily they argue that any interaction between a unity and its environment is a 
form of perception – that practice is just what perception is: “all doing is knowing, and all 
knowing is doing”.11 Thus they reminds us that:
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Circularity ... between action and experience, this inseparability between a particular 
way of being and how the world appears to us, tells us that every act of knowing 
brings forth a world.12 
This is true not only of mega-complex mammals like humans, but also of the most basic 
chemical reactions between the most basic organisms. Describing what they call a 
“biological phenomenology”, they state that:
... if a cell interacts with molecule X and incorporates it in its processes, what takes 
place as a result of this interaction is determined not by the properties of molecule X 
but by the way in which the molecule is seen or taken by the cell as it incorporates 
the molecule in its autopoietic dynamics.13
Whilst all living entities occupy the same physical universe, their perceptions of it are 
entirely different, structured by their particular modes of engagement with it. As Alva Noë, 
drawing in particular upon the work of Varela and Thompson, puts it:
... conscious beings have worlds precisely in the sense that the world shows up for 
them as laden with value: sugar! light! sex! kin! The mind of the bacterium, such as it 
is, consists in its form of engagement with and gearing into the world around it. Its 
mind is its life.14 
The identification of the relation between autopoiesis, mind and value is of critical 
importance here in understanding both the most fundamental sense in which mind is 
embodied and extended – a question which forms the specific focus of the next chapters – 
but also in returning to consider how to think the human metabolic relation to nature, 
remembering that I am arguing throughout this study that today one of the key tasks 
confronting architecture and design is to make visible existing relations, and to image and 
configure new relations, to and within nature. This is not in opposition to human culture, 
but as a living culture-nature metabolism, precisely as a non-deluded and non-dualist 
human experience of bringing forth our world.
 For Marx, labour is “a process between man and nature.”15 He states that labour is 
not a process that emerged under capitalism, but is actually a universal process – albeit, 
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of course, one that takes on specific historical and geographic forms. Just a few pages 
into Capital, in its first chapter on “The Commodity” , Marx states:
... labour, as the creator of use values, as useful labour, is a condition of human 
existence which is independent of all forms of society; it is an eternal natural 
necessity which mediates the metabolism between man and nature, and therefore 
human life itself.16 
David Harvey has pointed out that the conception of labour as a universal category is a 
notable occurrence in Marx’s thinking. Harvey notes that “Marx again and again 
emphasises that the categories of political economy are the categories generated out of 
bourgeois practices ... but he makes a singular exception to that rule: labour.”17 Bearing in 
mind then this exceptional role that labour plays, we can return to Marx, who continues: 
... when man engages in production, he can only proceed as nature does herself, 
i.e. he can only change the form of the materials. Furthermore, even in this work of 
modification he is constantly helped by natural forces. Labour is therefore not the 
only source of material wealth, i.e. of the use-values it produces.18 
This is a crucial passage in Marx for all kinds of reasons. It clearly separates Marx’s 
labour theory of value from some other classical, and more recent, labour theories of 
value, in that it recognises that labour is not the sole source of value,19 and that extra-
human “natural forces” also produce value for humans. He then goes on to conclude, 
“labour is the father of material wealth, the earth its mother.”20 This gendering of labour is 
not unfamiliar. Just as matter has the etymological root “mother”, and the earth is 
frequently referred to as a female goddess or mother, so matter is also paired 
etymologically with pattern or the paternal. The patterning of matter is then the labouring 
of it, and the en-minding of it. It is also the en-culturing of matter.  
 In the seventh chapter of Capital, titled “The Labour process and the Valorisation 
Process”, Marx starts by stating that he will “have to consider the labour-process 
independently of any specific social formation.”21 He states that the most basic, “first 
instinctive forms of labour”22, are in fact not even uniquely human, but can be found 
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throughout the natural world. He cites two kinds of examples of this, both of which are of 
great interest to this general discussion. 
 Marx starts by giving what I would argue is a thoroughly ecological and cybernetic 
account of what differentiates “labour in a form in which it is an exclusively human 
characteristic”23 from “those first instinctive forms of labour which remain on the animal 
level.”24 He states: “the human, through its own actions, mediates, regulates and controls 
the metabolism between itself and nature.”25 He goes on, suggesting that this regulation 
and control is a form of a feedback loop, a dialectic, as the human “confronts the materials 
of nature as a force of nature ... through this movement he acts upon external nature and 
changes it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his own nature.”26 
 He goes on to clarify further the distinction between non-human and human forms 
of labour, and uses as an example a comparison between the kinds of constructions that 
Richard Dawkins has described as “extended phenotypes”, and buildings produced by 
human architects. Marx states: “a spider conducts operations which resemble those of the 
weaver, and a bee would put many a human architect to shame by the construction of its 
honeycomb cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that 
the architect builds the cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax.”27 It is having “a 
purpose he is conscious of” that is the crucial difference here, a difference that Gregory 
Bateson would identify as the difference between mind and consciousness, and I will 
return to this at several points in the coming pages. There is much more to be said no 
doubt concerning the way that all organisms produce nature as they produce themselves, 
and the way that humans both produce nature, and produce within that what can be 
described as a “second nature” (to use a term from Lukács). In his review of ecological 
concepts in Marx and Engels, Howard L. Parsons noted – in a passage that many neo-
materialists would do well to reflect upon – that: 
... the logic of man’s dialectical relation to non-human nature does in fact lead to the 
conclusion that the ground of values, if not the values themselves, is prior to and 
independent of man’s conscious intervention in and enjoyment of non-human 
nature. For in the process of sensing, acting upon, appropriating non-human 
objects, man secures objects that are not man made but still have use-value, i.e. 
properties that are value yielding. The dialectical process between human 
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organisms and environment which is creative of human value is illustrative of a 
general pattern of organismic-environmental activity by which species sustain 
themselves and survive. But the adjustive pattern of organisms is the adjustive 
pattern of molecules complexly organised. Molecules bond, and atoms unite or do 
not according to their valences. Value is not an epiphenomenon added to fact; it is 
an inherent activity of matter. What an apeman does in his social group and with his 
tools prefigures what Homo Sapiens does, just as the valuing activity of apeman is 
prefigured in lower primates, in earlier mammals, and in single cell organisms.28
3.3 Technological Metabolisms
Much has been made by both David Harvey and John Bellamy Foster of the footnote at 
the beginning of the fifteenth chapter, “Machinery and Large Scale Industry”, in the first 
volume of Marx’s Capital.29  Marx starts with the suggestive remark that “a critical history 
of technology would show how little any … inventions … are the work of a single 
individual. As yet such a book does not exist.”30 Foster suggests that in this piece of text 
Marx returned to the ancient Greek meaning for organon, which as discussed meant both 
tool and organ, and “expressed the idea that organs were essentially the “grown-on” tools 
of animals.”31 Marx states that technology as he defines it has two aspects (and these two 
aspects reproduce the dualism of “nature” discussed earlier). There is natural technology 
– of “the formation of the organs of plants and animals, which serve as the instruments of 
production for sustaining their life”32 – which he credits Darwin for producing a history of.33 
Secondly, there is technology made by human society. He asks “does not the history of 
the productive organs of man in society, of organs that are the material basis of every 
particular organisation of society, deserve equal attention?”34 This is an interesting 
sentence which opens up all kinds of questions. Although technology has two 
components, they share a common relation, which is that they both exhibit organic 
characteristics. In addition, in a passage that anticipates some of the work of 
neocyberentic social systems theorist Niklas Luhmann, Marx also sets human society into 
the same relationship but at a higher level – “organs that are the material basis of every 
particular organisation of society “ – and thereby produces a very distinct organic 
definition of society by suggesting that the organs of technology are themselves the 
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“basis” for the organisation of society, or that society is organised through the organs of 
technology. For Marx, it is not that (as is often imagined) society is organic, and then 
technology comes along and destroys that, but rather, that human society as society is 
organic in so far as it is technological.35
 Technology, then, has two aspects: natural and social. It is a unitary concept, and 
achieves that through the unity expressed by organon. Technology in the universal sense 
is what we share with nature, but is also our means of engaging metabolically with the rest 
of nature.36 Hence, Marx states: 
... technology reveals the active relation of man to nature, the direct process of the 
production of his life, and thereby it also lays bare the process of the production of 
the social relations of his life, and of the mental conceptions that flow from these 
relations.37 
3.4 Organic Architecture and Urbanism
There has of course been an important extension of the use of “organic” specifically within 
architectural discourse, although it is beyond the reach of this chapter to deal with this in 
anything but the most cursory review. As has already been mentioned, Frank Lloyd Wright 
developed a particularly distinctive sense of organic which combined many of the above 
uses of the term. For Rykwert, Wright’s conception of organic was the first formulation in 
modern architecture of the concept of Gesamtkunstwerk. Wright’s wife, Olgivanna 
Hinzenberg, was a student of the Russian mystic, G.I. Gurdjieff, and she introduced 
Wright to his ideas; the two men met at Taliesin, Wisconsin in June 1934.38 
 It is often noted that Einstein exclaimed upon seeing Mendelsohn’s Einstein Tower: 
“organic!” Rykwert rightly makes much of Mendelsohn’s later reflection upon this 
statement. In a lecture in 1943 Mendelsohn stated that “I understand what he means: that 
you can’t change or take away a part without destroying the whole.”39 In its most common 
architectural usage, organic tends to be associated with a plant-like form. It is often 
associated with architects like Antonio Gaudi, and movements like Art Nouveau, or more 
recently as a description of the biomorphic forms facilitated by digital software. However, it 




Fig. 3.1. The “organic” Einstein Tower by Erich Mendelsohn, 1919-21.
Fig. 3.2. Hugo Häring, housing in Siemanstadt, Berlin. 
Fig. 3.3. IBM Headquarters, Rochester, Minnesota, Eero Saarinen, 1958. For Reinhold 
Martin an exemplary piece of organic organisational architecture.
 
strongest architectural meaning. For Bruno Zevi, in his book Towards an Organic 
Architecture of 1944, it was in this sense, further combined with function and social form, 
that organic really meant something, and in Zevi’s collection of examples one would 
struggle to find any morphologically plant-like architectural examples. Mies captured well 
the tasks that this concept of organicism was confronted with during this period. Speaking 
in 1938, he declared:
Let us recognise that the mechanistic principle of order overemphasizes the 
materialistic and functionalistic factors. It fails to satisfy our feeling that means must 
be subsidiary to ends and our desire for dignity and value. The idealistic principle of 
order, however, with its overemphasis on the ideal and the formal, satisfies neither 
our interest in truth and simplicity not our practical sense. So we shall emphasize 
the organic principle of order that makes the parts meaningful and measurable while 
determining their relationship to the whole. And on this we shall have to make a 
decision.40
 Perhaps the most singular example of an architect coherently bringing together 
this range of conceptions of the organic is a leading German contemporary of Hans 
Scharoun (whose work is also articulated through a related conception of the organic), 
Hugo Häring.41 Victoria Watson has suggested that: 
Häring believed that the new modern culture would be characterised by a much 
deeper and more profound understanding of the relationship between man and 
nature and by an intensification of that relationship through a new awareness of 
‘creativity’. Häring believed that both in nature and in works created by human 
artifice there is an expressive relationship between the form and the content of the 
created work and that the outward appearance of a creation of nature, or a work of 
art, is the sensuous embodiment of a vital inner determination.42
 
In fact, through this conception of organic form, Häring makes a significant new addition to 
the conception of an aesthetic process as a meta-relationship between “subject” and 
“object”. Watson notes, in terms that resonate with my interests in empathy, and Bateson’s 
ecological aesthetics, that “for Häring aesthetic experience consists in the subjective 
recognition of a vital inner determination in the object of experience.”43 Nonetheless, in so 
far as modernist artists and architects were interested in exploring and figuring dynamism 
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 Organic Architectures
Fig. 3.4. Arata Isozaki, Clusters in the Air in 1960-62 for Tokyo. The Metabolist architecture 
group pioneered one attempt to think about human built environments as metabolic 
ecological systems, and their work has obvious resonance with that of the British Archigram 
group. Metabolist theory found an interesting holist philosophical expression in the written 
work of Kisho Kurokawa, which he referred to as the philosophy of symbiosis.
Fig. 3.5 [C]space - the AA DRL pavilion, 2008, designed and developed by Alan Dempsey 
and Alvin Huang with engineers Adams Kara Taylor. The DRL’s engagement with organicism 
is not restricted to formal description, but can be found, in also the sense described by 
Reinhold Martin above.
  
in general, they were inevitably drawn to formal explorations that shared all kinds of 
topological and morphological seams with biomorphic aesthetics (such as in Art 
Nouveau).44 Indeed, in the case of Mendelsohn, his engagement with organicism primarily 
explored a related field of form (literally, in that his work seems to owe as much to the 
morphogenetic coordinate drawings in D’arcy Thompson’s 1917 book On Growth and 
Form as it does to biomimesis directly) to express and intensify the dynamism of 
metropolitan ecologies.
 The continuing popularity of the term “organic” as a description of form in 
architectural discourse comes in waves – a decade or so ago, at the start of the CAD 
revolution, it was everywhere. More recently, it seems to have been replaced by a series 
of related terms, including emergence, ecology, biomimesis, etc. In any case, the broader 
modernist conception of an socio-organic project for architecture seems to be just as 
present today as it was for Mies, Häring and Mandelsohn. Consider, for example, this 
statement by Farshid Moussavi of Foreign Office Architects: 
Architecture needs mechanisms that allow it to become connected to culture. It 
achieves this by continually capturing the forces that shape society, as material to 
work with. Architecture’s materiality is a composite one, made up of visible as well 
as invisible forces. Progress in architecture occurs through new concepts by which it 
becomes connected with this material, and it manifests itself in new aesthetic 
compositions and affects. It is these new affects that allow us to constantly engage 
with the city in new ways.45
 In addition to these conceptions of the organic in architecture, there is of course a 
long tradition in thinking about buildings, and particularly cities, as organisms. This 
tradition might include Engels’s comments on the emergence of segregated quarters in 
Manchester as well as Patrick Geddes observations at the birth of modern urban planning. 
More recently, Richard Sennett is one theorist who has again drawn upon this metaphor. 
The post-war Japanese Metabolist movement in architecture considered the urban and 
the architectural as metabolic systems, where the metabolisms involved included 
personal, social and cosmological orders. In a particularly vivid illustration, the Dutch 
architect Kas Oosterhuis has argued that we can see the house as a living organism if we 
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shift our perception to a different temporality. He suggests that a film of a house in use  
speeded up would look like an organism: 
... it absorbs all kinds of material, including a liquid stream of humans, pulsating in 
and out. It absorbs and it excretes them in a rhythmic pulsating manner ... Since we 
are captured in our arbitrary speed of life we are unable to experience the 
consistency of other life forms which are living at a completely different pace.46
In this sense, the modern metropolis comes close to fitting the definition of autopoetic, 
which the cybernetic biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela define as being 
sufficient to defining life: “living systems are ... physical autopoietic machines: they 
transform matter into themselves in a manner such that the product of their operation is 
their own organisation.”47 
 Manuel de Landa has recently reproduced a version of the city as an autopoietic 
organism, observing that cities are like islands. Firstly, he argues they are islands of heat, 
and secondly, like islands, that their food-webs and their ecosystems are simplified. 
“Islands tend to be unstable ecosystems, because there are very few niches filled,”48 de 
Landa notes, adding that this “lack of resiliency” is also true for the food webs of cities. 
Borrowing a phrase from von Bertallanfy (and more recently Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle 
Stengers), he suggests that “cities are unstable ecosystems far from equilibrium.”49 This of 
course “runs counter to the romantic view of cities held by nineteenth-century social 
thinkers, in which cities were seen as organisms in functional harmony. Today we know 
that neither nature nor cities are in harmony.” 50 
 This kind of thinking about cities as living organisms might then be divided into 
analytic and operative forms. The first uses lessons from the organisational principles of 
organic biology to understand the processes of metropolitan growth. The second tries to 
implement these principles to guide future action. In both cases, there is always an 
unavoidable ideological character to such thinking, although again this can take on many 
forms. For instance, the aim might be to reveal how urban processes left unchecked 
become inextricably linked to, and constitutive of, the unfolding of broader social and 
political forces. It is often however used with more utopian intentions, such as when 
organic thinking is elided with the kind of sentiment that Barry Commoner expressed in 
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the statement “nature always knows best.” It is here, when the model of the natural 
organism is valorised uncritically, that we can get into trouble, in two ways. Firstly, by 
misunderstanding and mis-valorising the natural, we can allow conceptions of nature to 
ideologically obscure broader socio-economic forces (making capitalism seem natural, for 
example).51 In a more subtle way, it also tends to lead to the too hasty rejection of organic 
systems thinking by those critical enough to have observed the first error! It seems to me 
that it is in moving beyond these problematic conceptions of nature that the work of 
Gregory Bateson can be useful. Bateson was always attentive to the way in which it is 
perfectly “natural” for organic systems to become pathological; that organic or natural 
does not in any simple way equal “good”. As he once remarked, “nature is a dirty double-
binding bitch!”52 One task today, it seems to me, is to find a way of working critically with 
organic systems thinking in urbanism, architecture and design practice, in a manner that 
does not succumb to simplistic valorisation, whether positive or negative. 
 Ultimately for Rykwert, “no identifiable organic theory of architecture … can 
usefully be summarised. Yet the constant appeal to the notion of organism, particularly as 
it related to the body image in architecture, seems to be an important recurring theme in 
speculation about building.” He goes on to suggest that if the concept of organicism in 
architecture can be separated from simplistic vegetative mimesis, then “the wider 
importance of a conception of organism will perhaps then be seen as central to 
architectural thinking.”53
 We can find, in the decade since Rykwert made the above statement, at least two 
responses to the challenge he raised. One is in fact to be found in a recent anthology that 
includes Rykwert’s paper. Branham and Hale’s collection, Rethinking Technology, seems 
on the surface to be a generalised reader in architectural technology, but it is actually, in 
effect, an explicit argument that architectural technology has nothing per se to do with 
structural engineering, or building services, or anything like that, but is rather a broader 
engagement with and theorisation of “processes, networks and systems” – a task that any 
“wider conception of organism” demanded by Rykwert is indeed central to.
 A second response can be found in Reinhold Martin’s conception of what he refers 
to as “the organisational complex” – the elision between the application of cybernetics in 
corporate management and organisational theory, and the systems thinking in information 
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and communication theory explored by several generations of post-war American artists 
and architects; a condition which he sees as fairly ubiquitous in that phase of capitalist 
modernity. For Martin, “the susceptibility of vast regions of modernist discourse to the 
designation ‘organicist’ is what renders the term nearly useless or meaningless but also 
supplies it with the potency of indexing that which is taken to be self-evident.”54 Martin 
examines the notion that rather than organic society (in the sense elaborated by Lukács) 
being an exclusively pre-capitalist condition, modern capitalism has instantiated an all-too-
organic society in which an organisational form of “re-enchantment” mediates the interests 
of corporate power. As Martin states: 
... the organisational complex can be described as the aesthetic and technological 
extension of ... the “military-industrial complex”. Its defining epistemologies coalesce 
into an organicism that operates on the model of a total pliant system. Within this 
system architecture acts as a conduit for organisational patterns passing through 
the networks of communication that constitute the systems infrastructure. The 
system’s phantasmagorias – with built architecture also counted prominently 
amongst these – likewise constitute an indelibly real system of images, with indelibly 
real consequences. Far from simply staging a spectacle ... architecture works here 
to integrate spaces and subjects into naturalised organisations.55 
3.5 Ecology, Organism and Metabolism
 In recent years (just as it did in the 1960s and 70s), the term ecology has replaced 
organic as the word of choice amongst architectural academics to capture a systems 
network approach, with an associated sense of some kind of response to the broader 
“environmental question”.56 The growing adoption of this term within architectural theory is 
in line with an ever-expanding ecosystem of ecology sub-disciplines and concepts, which 
include human, social, deep, and political ecology.
 Although, as noted, the word was first coined in print by Haeckel, it seems likely to 
have come into use at a few places concurrently. Ecology, Haeckel stated, “is the study of 
all those complex interrelations referred to by Darwin as the conditions of the struggle for 
existence. This science of ecology, often inaccurately referred to as “biology” in a narrow 
68

sense, has thus far formed the principle component of what is commonly referred to as 
“natural history”.”57 
 Our understanding of the relations between organisms has shifted dramatically 
since then, such that Capra can state that “today we know that most organisms are not 
only members of ecological communities but are also complex ecosystems themselves, 
containing a host of smaller organisms that have considerable autonomy and yet are 
integrated harmoniously into the functioning of the whole.”58 Nonetheless, the basic 
systems approach of ecology has remained and  in fact been extended. Indeed, today, 
unsurprisingly, “ecology” is used to refer to any complex system, whether natural or not.59 
The word is originally derived from Greek oikos, meaning household, and ecology might 
thus be translated as both the science of running a home and the science of running an 
economy. Ecology thus shares with architecture this relation between dwelling and 
economics. It also internalises many of the same complex contradictions that are familiar 
to architecture. 
 Ecology as we understand it today emerged in part out of classical modern 
science, yet in many ways it also started to challenge the epistemological basis of those 
very roots. It does exist as a hard science, yet it also has allegiances with modern 
environmentalism in a broader sense that, as David Pepper has pointed out, gives it an 
irreducible complexity. As such, ecology includes many of the insights of mechanistic 
science, but now combined with intellectual, religious and romantic legacies, ideas and 
practices that are from beyond the enlightenment tradition (either predating it and/or taken 
from remote cultures.)
 Ecology was thus one of a series of disciplines – others would include 
environmental studies and geography – that were defined at the metabolic interface of 
capitalist production and the planet in the nineteenth century.60 Donald Worster has 
suggested that ecology has both arcadian and imperialist roots, a double lineage that 
characterises many individual thinkers (such as Darwin), as well as ecological thought as 
a whole. Certainly, the need to understand the dramatic environmental changes brought 
about or at least dreamed of by capitalist production, meant that proto-capitalist 
organisations such as the Dutch and British East India Companies started employing 




Fig. 3.6. Buckminster Fuller, Geoscope Concept drawing (1962). A particular form of 
systems-organicism was developed by Fuller, who was obsessed with visualising planetary 
systems, emphasising our need to realise that our planet is a spaceship – “Spaceship Earth” 
he called it – whose life support systems need to be maintained. He proposed the 
Geoscope: a series of mapping systems displayed upon a 200 ft diameter 3D globe display 
system, with a proposed 10 million light-pixel spherical display surface, for visualising the 
interconnection of human and natural flows around the planet. 
This 200-foot-size Geoscope would make it possible for humans to identify the true scale of 
themselves and their activities on this planet. Humans could thus comprehend much more readily that 
their personal survival problems related intimately to all humanity's survival.
The Geoscope's electronic computers will store all relevant inventories of world data arranged 
chronologically, in the order and spacing of discovery, as they have occurred throughout all known 
history.
Historical patterns too slow for the human eye to comprehend, such as the multimillions-of-years-to-
transpire changes in the geology of our planet -- for instance, the picturing on the Geoscope Earth in 
two minutes of the drifting apart of the continental plates.
Or in another four-minute sequence picturing, the last four one-million-years each ice ages, spaced 
250,000 years apart, their transforming of the world's oceans into ice cappings, which water shifts 
reveals peninsulas interconnecting what we now know only as islands -- for instance, the Malay 
Peninsula including all of Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Bali, Sulawesi, and the Philippines, as it did in the 
last ice age.
More recently, the design theorist John Thackara has talked about the need for 
macroscopes: “A macroscope is something that helps us see what the aggregation of many 
small actions looks like when added together.”⁸⁵
remind us that in many ways the “metabolic rift” that capitalism instantiates was more 
obvious in the nineteenth century than it is today (even considering issues such as climate 
change). For example, the break in the nutrient cycle that the division between city and 
country produced meant that by the early-nineteenth century Britain’s soil had become 
largely infertile, as all of the nutrients had moved from country to city in the form of food, 
and then from the city to the sea as sewage. Britain started digging up the soil of old 
graveyards (mostly foreign) and importing organic matter from the empire and beyond 
(such as guano from South America) in order to acquire nutrients to keep its soil alive. As 
Justus von Liebig, the German natural scientist who founded organic chemistry and 
whose work was very important to Marx, noted: 
Great Britain ... deprives all countries of the conditions of their fertility. It has raked 
up the battlefields of Leipzig, Waterloo and the Crimea; it has consumed the bones 
of many generations accumulated in the catacombs of Sicily; and now annually 
destroys the food for a future generation of three millions and a half of people. Like 
a vampire it hangs on the breast of Europe, and even the world, sucking its lifeblood 
without any real necessity or permanent gain for itself.62 
Liebig in fact invented the concept of artificial fertiliser as a result, which fixed the nutrient 
cycle problem for a century, but which has arguably returned to us as a problem with 
multiplied force again today.
3.6 Ecology: An Economics of Nature?
 In fact, “ecology” shares much more than an etymological root with “economy”. 
There are a series of key concepts common to both, most notably those of growth and 
circulation.63 Marx introduced some more organic terms into political economy, most 
importantly metabolism – a term which has been taken on by a new generation of thinkers 
today (notably Eric Swyngedouw). But, beyond that, ecology is in important ways an 
economics of nature, as indeed is suggested in one of the early proto-ecological texts, 
Linnaeus’ Oeconomy of Nature (1749), and was then confirmed in Haeckel, who stated in 
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Ecological Mappings: Abstracting Flows
  
Fig. 3.7. Energese was a systems notation devised by Howard T. Odum, which aimed at 
making commensurate human and natural systems, and was intended to provide what he 
described as a macroscopic language. However, for Gregory Bateson, ecologists such as 
the Odum brothers were still too mechanical in their thinking and presumptions of control. 
  
Fig. 3.8. Ecological Energetics diagrams, by Eugene Odum: Silver Springs Study (1950s): 
energy and matter flows through an ecosystem, from the Silver Springs model. (H are 
herbivores, C are carnivores, TC are top carnivores, and D are decomposers. Squares 
represent biotic pools and ovals are fluxes or energy or nutrients from the system.)
his initial definition that “by ecology we mean the body of knowledge concerning the 
economy of nature.”64 
 In the post-war period Eugene Odum adopted the term “ecosystem”.65 In the book 
on Fundamentals of Ecology written in 1953 with his brother Howard T. Odum, they 
started to describe and analyse flows of matter and energy through ecosystems as simple 
flow diagrams. As Pepper notes of their insights: 
... energy and matter flow along pathways within a system before leaving it, and for 
an open system there is much exchange of matter between it and the environment, 
whereas a closed system is characterised by maximum recycling of material ... 
Mature ecosystems (eg Apalachian forests) display high organisation (ie minimal 
entropy) because they are more diverse than immature ecosystems. They have 
more species and more niches are filled, and they are able to capture more matter 
and slow down energy dissipation.66 
Howard T. Odum, especially, pioneered theories and practices around systems ecology 
and ecological energetics, which included studies of human-natural systems economics.67 
This later developed into the concept of “emergy”, which studies the role that embodied 
energy plays in systems. He himself noted that “the study of energy in nature does not 
necessarily imply an economic framework. But that is the way it is has been 
assimilated.”68  Gerald Marten has suggested that:
... it is useful to distinguish three major kinds of ecosystems. Natural ecosystems 
organise themselves. Their outputs for human use include renewable natural 
resources such as wood, fish and water. Agricultural and urban ecosystems are 
organised in part by human inputs of materials, energy and information. The rest of 
their organisation comes from the same self-organising processes that form natural 
ecosystems.69 
It was in order to facilitate the study of energy flows as they move through these different 
natural and social, ecological and economic systems, that Howard T. Odum developed the 
concept of Energese, a diagramatic energy systems language.70  
 Howard T. Odum’s attempts to generate out of ecology a universal systems 
language paralleled similar attempts on the part of other systems thinkers of the same 
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time, most notably perhaps Buckminster Fuller. It has also been compared to Gottfried 
Leibniz’s attempts to develop a ‘universal language system’ (characteristica universalis) 
which would facilitate the transmission of concepts between mathematics, science and 
metaphysics. However, it was more in line with the general lead that ecology and biology 
has taken in systems thinking since the nineteenth century. The Odum brothers’ 
conception of ecosystems has been an immensely powerful concept for organising 
thinking about the web of life and the human metabolic relations within it.
3.7 Ecology: An Epistemology of Dwelling?
However, the single most innovative and important re-conception of the project of ecology 
emerged in the late work of Gregory Bateson, in particular starting in the mid-1960s. 
Whilst I will consider the development of Bateson’s position more thoroughly in the coming 
chapters, it is important to note that for Bateson the tendency of the Odum brothers and 
others (such as Jay Forrester’s MIT-based Systems Dynamics research group, which 
produced the analysis for the Club of Rome’s famous Limits to Growth in 1972) to focus 
primarily on energy and material flows in ecological science was problematic, for two 
reasons. Firstly, Bateson considered that ecosystems had to be considered to be 
communicating and informational systems, at least as much as they were material and 
energetic systems.71 Ecologists were, he suggested, “overemphasising energy exchange 
and attending insufficiently to information exchange.”72 Secondly, he stressed that to 
properly understand ecosystems, we need to find ways to think ecologically, recognising 
ourselves as a part of the system that is being observed or interacted with. In line with 
Bateson’s broader critique of science, he argued that these errors were compounded 
within even more erroneous instrumentalising tendencies, repeatedly emphasising that 
ultimately in complex systems a part can never control the whole. As Harries-Jones has 
noted: 
Bateson realised far ahead of his contemporaries that the primary source of error in 
ecological science lay in false presumptions of an ability to ‘control’ and ‘manage’ 
ecosystems through quantitative measurement.73
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The Whole Earth from Apollo 8: An Ecology of Mind
  
Fig. 3.9. Image of Earth seen from moon. Photograph taken by astronaut William Anders of 
Apollo 8 in 1968. Gregory Bateson’s former student and supporter, Stewart Brand, had been 
campaigning since 1966 for NASA to release an image of the whole Earth, and had been 
joined in this by Buckminster Fuller amongst others. The release of this image is widely 
thought to have been a material factor in the growth of the environmental movement and 
counter-culture during that period. This artefact significantly “extended “ and “embodied” the 
human mind (a theme I will develop further in later chapters).
 Bateson argues then that there are major conceptual errors in our conception of 
our relation to nature. We totally mis-comprehend the form of the relationality (what in 
Marx’s terms we might describe as the relational nature of our species being), Bateson 
contended. For Bateson, ecology, like western science in general, suffered from its 
instrumentalisation - in two directions. Firstly, by attempting to instrumentalise ecological 
knowledge in the interest of human social and economic systems, we can fail to recognise 
the immanent subjectivities of systems under consideration. The second sense of 
instrumentalisation is that in the re-organisation of human environments into technical 
networks and flows, we can all too easily allow the human to become instrumentalised by 
the system. Whilst this is perhaps a more common observation today, Bateson’s analysis 
prefigured contemporary readings such as Bruno Latour’s, in important ways. A more 
political critique of ecological science might typically point out that science is ultimately, in 
the words of the dialectical biologist Richard Levins, the “product of a specific social 
structure that supports and constrains science and directs it towards the goals of its 
owners.” In the case of ecological sciences under capitalism, these owners goals would 
typically include the production of knowledge that facilitates the managing and controlling 
of resource flows, for example. Bateson’s critique is actually slightly different from this, 
although it shares many of the conclusions. However ultimately for Bateson, the problem 
is “epistemological” rather than “political”.
 Bateson’s position is broadly in line with standard ecocentric – and to a lesser 
extent romantic – critiques of the “Promethean” attitude of western science towards a 
nature that is treated as if there to exploit, control and dominate, Bateson’s critique is 
distinct from more recent Deep Ecology positions which argue that to conceive of 
ourselves in opposition to nature is simply morally wrong. It is also distinct from a standard 
Marxian position which would describe the opposition to nature, or our alienation from 
nature, as a historical condition, related solely to capitalist conditions of production. For 
Bateson, the situation is more complex, in that whilst his position encompasses a 
recognition of the specific socio-historical form of our relation to nature (i.e. the Marxian 
position), and the ethics of it (the ecocentric position), he argues that the primary problem 
is epistemological – in other words, a systemic false consciousness of our relation to 
nature that is now a part of our ecological condition.  
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 Over five days in October 1970, Gregory Bateson convened and chaired a 
conference entitled “Restructuring the Ecology of a Great City”.74 The conference brought 
together planners, ecologists and systems theorists in the office of John Lindsay, Mayor of 
New York City, to explore possible components of an ecological theory of the city. 
Bateson’s paper of the same name was published in the third issue of the art/media 
theory journal, Radical Software, in Spring 1971.75  Importantly, Bateson concluded his 
seminal 1972 collected essays, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, with a reworked version of 
this paper on urbanism.76 Whilst I will consider in greater detail the content of Bateson’s 
paper on urbanism and planning in the final chapter, I think that it is worth reflecting further 
upon this ecological turn towards the city, and to consider more broadly the relation 
between a possible project of ecology as a form and practice of knowledge, and the 
concept of the metropolis. 
 Mark Wigley has suggested that “ecology is, from the beginning, a certain kind of 
thinking about or from architecture.”77  Indeed, as has already been noted, the root of 
ecology – oikos –  suggests something like a knowledge of dwelling. What though is it that 
ecology might grasp with regard to dwelling? We need to approach this question, I 
propose, through the concept of the metropolis. David Cunningham notes that “the 
philosophical interest of the concept of metropolis lies in its presentation as a determinate 
negation of the city as a historically specific form of the urban.”78 That is to say, the term 
metropolis describes both an entirely new concrete urban condition that emerges within 
capitalism, and, at the same time, describes the very processes that give rise to it. Within 
the relational spacetime terms set out in Chapter One, the concept of metropolis 
describes a distinct condition, given that the metropolis is both “the primary space ‘in’ 
which exchange happens” (ie. in absolute space and relative space-time as outlined by 
Harvey), even whilst it “designates the general processes by which space itself is formed 
or produced by exchange”79 (in relational spacetime).
 Many of the usual examples of urban “relations to nature” (Carcasonne for 
example) typically show a series of conditions based upon a clear opposition between city 
and country. This city/country opposition can be described within an absolute spatial 
framework: there is city on one side of the wall, and countryside on the other. The 
metropolis however, is not defined in any simple way in opposition to “country” in the 
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sense that the earlier concept of a city was. In terms of absolute space, metropolitan 
nature and culture are co-extensive: the metropolis understood in this way is planetary in 
reach, by definition. However, the city/country opposition is not resolved by this realisation 
– it clearly persists – rather, the metropolis is a concept operating at another (global) level 
of abstraction. There is a sense then in which we might conclude that the metropolitan 
stands in the same relation to the idea of city as the ecological does to the countryside. 
This still does not quite capture it though. Cunningham, in response to Lefebvre’s 
“theoretical need” to think about the urban, suggests that the kind of trans-disciplinary 
“post-philosophy” that can rethink the metropolis would necessarily share something of 
the pattern-form of the metropolis itself. In fact, I wonder whether the kind of knowledge 
that a theoretical account of the metropolis would produce – knowledge that would surely 
be shaped by our complex metabolic relations to nature to an extent not appreciated by 
Lefebvre – might even take on the name of ecology? I do not of course refer to the often 
dismal bourgeois science of ecology as it exists today, but rather the aesthetically re-
conceived ecology as proposed by Bateson. 
 Developed from his reading of C. S. Pierce, Bateson worked with a dialectical 
process of abduction, which, rather like Lefebvre’s concrete abstraction, is “that ‘kind of 
development’ of the concept which (‘more fruitful than classical deduction, and suppler 
than induction or construction’) leads from (abstract) thought, via increasing determinants, 
towards the ‘rich totality’ of relations and mediations.”80 For Bateson, this approach made 
visible the “patterns that connect” the mental ecologies immanent within differential 
organised material systems.81 This suggests I think an additional and necessary 
dimension to the conception of metropolitan mediation: i.e. the metropolis as precisely the 
pattern that connects nature and culture.82 Writing forty years after Bateson’s meeting with 
the New York planners, David Harvey has increasingly come to promote an associated re-
reading of Lefebvre’s Right to the City, stating that:
... the city has to be viewed as a metabolic and ecological system in its own right 
and therefore as a vibrant and increasingly dominant part of the natural world we 
inhabit. While there is, in my view, nothing unnatural about New York City, the 
qualities of the urban environments we create are a major concern and those 
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qualities are not confined to what humans need but also to preserving the whole life-
system upon which we ultimately depend.83
 Yet the complex pattern that connects ecology and dwelling and the metropolis has 
barely been theorised. As Wigley reminds us, our very conceptions of dwelling necessarily 
contain suppressed relations of “domestic” violence, and that this observation is just as 
true of houses or cities conceived at a planetary scale. He suggests that “rather than 
simply reapplying ecological discourse to design, some of the perennial enigmas of the 
house that architects explore could be used to rethink ecology. The discourse can be 
rewired.”84 It is to this rewiring of ecological thinking that I now turn.
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4 Cybernetics and Systems Theory
4.1 Pattern and Matter
We may therefore regard matter as being constituted by regions of space in which 
the field is extremely intense - there is no place in this new kind of physics for both 
the field and matter, for the field is the only reality.1
[Albert Einstein]
Matter and Pattern – triggering the questions “What are things made of?” and “How are 
they organised?” – have, as Gregory Bateson observed, tended to be treated as separate 
entities within the dominant traditions of western thought. Yet the interdependence of 
these questions has repeatedly resurfaced in modern sciences. In the life sciences, 
patterns of organisation are increasingly key to our very definitions of life, whilst, in 
modern physics, matter can best be defined as a pattern of energy in the spacetime field. 
As Erwin Schrödinger, one of the founders of quantum mechanics, put it, “what we 
observe as material bodies and forces are nothing but shapes and variations in the 
structure of space. Particles are just schaumkommen (appearances).”2 Schrödinger wrote 
this sentence in English, and inserted schaumkommen in German, which does not 
translate as “appearances” as it might seem, but rather means “foam bubbles” or 
something like that. Material particles are not fundamental, Schrödinger is saying. It is 
better to think of material particles as patterns that emerge from and are immanent within, 
the fabric of spacetime. 
 The concepts of “matter” and “pattern” are themselves more fundamentally 
connected than it might at first appear. “Pattern” has its roots in the Middle English word 
“patron”, in the sense of something serving as a model. The idea of a pattern book of 
designs, of a template which can be copied, therefore uses the word in exactly this 
original sense. The word patron comes via Old French and from the Latin “pater”, 
meaning “father”. The word “matter” also has its roots in Middle English, and comes via 
Old French from the Latin “materia” meaning “timber, substance” and also “subject of 
discourse”; ultimately the word derives from the Latin “mater” meaning “mother”. So, we 




Fig. 4.1. Santiago Ramón y Cajal, drawing of Purkinje cells (A) and granule cells (B) of 
pigeon cerebellum, 1899. 
 Whilst it is widely observed that the concept of matter has all kinds of maternal or 
feminine cultural connotations, the pairing of matter with pattern is not often made. In the 
classical philosophical formulation, which typically opposes the term “form” (or “mind”) 
instead of “pattern” to “matter”, the gendered nature of the pairing tends to be less 
obvious.3 For Plato, form was to found in the realm of the ideal, a realm which matter can 
only aspire to reflect imperfectly. As Susannah Hagan points out: 
... in the Timaeus, Plato sought to explain the origins and structure of the universe, 
and in so doing, gendered the explanation, so that the creation of the world and its 
staggering variety begins with ideal ‘Form’, and enters the world as material objects 
through the ‘Chora’. Form is described as male, the father and model of the material 
object. The Chora is female, a ‘kind of womb for material existence’, the ‘place or 
space’ which functions as a receptacle, mother and nurse. Form is superior to the 
mere container that is the Chora, as the male is superior to the female.4
For Katie Lloyd-Thomas, this opposition – what she calls the “grip of hylomorphism” – is 
reproduced through the form-giving role of the architect, whereby “the practice of 
architecture and the discourses surrounding it are ... structured around a distinction 
between form and matter where the formal (and conceptual) is valued over the material.”5 
This critique by Lloyd-Thomas regarding architecture in some way mirrors a similar 
critique of cybernetics developed in particular by Kathryn Hayles: i.e. that cybernetics can 
appear to over-valorise virtual or immaterial pattern and information over matter.6 
Ultimately, our conception of “matter” is more closely related to our broader conception of 
“nature”, and our conception of nature is produced through our social relationship with 
nature – which as Marx was at pains to emphasise, is determined in important ways by 
social relations within human society.
4.2 Systems and Networks
Perhaps the single most important concept to have emerged out of biological systems 
thinking has been that of the network: “ecology is networks ... to understand ecosystems 
will be to understand networks.”7 For Arne Naess, the Deep Ecology conception of an 
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Networks and Internal Relations 
 
Fig. 4.2. Networks and internal relations. A network which first appears as a series of objects/
nodes and relations (left), but where a further examination of the nodes (right) reveals them 
to simply be more relations.
Fig. 4.3. Railway bridges passing over canal junction, at Castlefield, Manchester. It was from 
here that the now global modern network infrastructure started to spread.
environment can be defined as “networks or fields of relations in which things participate 
and from which they cannot be isolated.”8
 Today, following in particular the work of the Spanish sociologist, Manuel Castells, 
we think of the network as a sociological concept for grasping the cultural, informational 
and economic forms of capitalism. However, this is just one of many recent use of the 
term. The word “net” has old English and Germanic roots, describing types of fabric 
structures relating to clothing, fishing and so on. The first use of network came, according 
to the Oxford English Dictionary, in 1658 in reference to “reticulate structures in animals 
and plants.” In the mid-nineteenth century it started to be used to describe transportation 
infrastructure. First, in 1839 it was used to refer to rivers and canals, and from the 
late-1860s to railways. It spreads to include a network of electrical cables in 1883, and in 
1914 the first wireless broadcasting network.9 
 Some of the earliest functional network structures studied were the neural 
networks drawn by the pioneering Spanish neurologist, Santiago Ramón y Cajal, at the 
end of the nineteenth century. The organisational structures of neurons remains one of the 
most important examples of a configurational technology embodied in a material 
substrate, and the study of neuronal networks initiated much of the impetus which would 
feed cybernetic research. 
 Within systems biology, the concept of networks facilitated a series of insights into 
the economics of ecosystem flows. An ecosystem can be thought of as something like a 
fractal network. An ecosystem is a series of interconnected nodes, in which each node is, 
for example, an organism. However, if we zoom in on one of these nodes, we see that this 
too is merely a network of organs and other organisms, and so on, all defined by their 
internal and external relationships. Capra has shown that:
... as the network concept became more and more prominent in ecology, systems 
thinkers began to use networks models at all systems levels, viewing organisms as 
networks of systems, just as ecosystems are understood as networks of individual 
organisms. Correspondingly, the flows of matter and energy through ecosystems 




Fig. 4.4. A structural network (a bone interior) 
Fig. 4.5. and 4.6. Biological neural nets.
 
The study and use of networks became one of the most important trans-disciplinary 
moments within system theory. Aas Mark Buchanan has observed:
... networks of things of all kinds – atoms, molecules, species, people, and even 
ideas – have a marked tendency to organise themselves along similar lines. On the 
basis of this insight, scientists are finally beginning to .. see patterns at work where 
they have never seen them before.11
In recent decades the discourse around political ecology has considered how capitalism 
produces a particular set of networked flows of energy and matter, and I turn to consider 
this further in the concluding chapter.
4.2a General Complex Systems
 By the first decades of the twentieth century, many of the key initial systems 
concepts were in place primarily through organismic biologists and ecologists, and these 
relational paradigms were supported by emerging work in areas as diverse as gestalt 
psychology, relativity and quantum physics.12 If the possibility of a conscious general 
systems theory was first given expression through the architectural ideology of the 
Renaissance, such as in Alberti’s writings, and reverberated throughout the nineteenth 
century in everything from aesthetics to organicism, having been given a particularly clear 
(but ideologically impossible for capitalism to use) expression in the work of Marx and 
Engels, then by the early-twentieth century it had acquired an indisputable if initially 
marginal presence across all of the sciences. 
 It is widely considered that the first attempt at consolidating the emerging forms of 
trans-disciplinary knowledge around organisational systems was conceived by the 
Viennese (later American) biologist, Ludwig von Bertalanffy.13 As a biologist, Bertalanffy’s 
most interesting work concerned the realisation that living organisms appear to evolve and 
live in the opposite direction to entropy, the second law of thermodynamics.14 Although 
Bertalanffy was not the first to realise this fact, he was the first to grasp that it was 
because whilst entropy held true in closed systems which move towards homogenous 
equilibrium, living organisms are systems which are in fact open (i.e. there is a flow of 
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energy and matter passing through them) and stable, but far from equilibrium. Within 
organisms, energy and matter become more organised, not less. He stated that: 
... the organism is not a static system closed to the outside and always containing 
identical components; it is an open system in a (quasi-) steady state ... in which 
material continually enters from, and leaves into, the outside environment.15
 From the 1930s onwards, Bertalanffy engaged in developing what he finally 
published in 1968 as his book on General Systems Theory, which he suggested was 
possible because of the fact that “the parallelism of general conceptions or even special 
laws in different fields is a consequence of the fact that these are concerned with 
‘systems’, and that certain principles apply to systems irrespective of their nature.”16 He 
defined General Systems Theory (GST) as:
... a general science of ‘wholeness’ which up till now was conceived as a vague, 
hazy, and semi-metaphysical concept. In elaborate form it would be a mathematical 
discipline, in itself purely formal but applicable to the various empirical sciences. For 
sciences concerned with ‘organised wholes’, it would be of similar significance to 
that which probability theory has for sciences concerned with ‘chance events’.17 
 Clearly, systems theory in this sense has some positivistic aspects, in that it seeks 
a universal science (indeed, Bertalanffy in his youth was a part of the “Vienna Circle”). 
Overall, however, systems theory counters the reductivism which characterised previous 
positivistic approaches, which, for example, would argue that biological systems are 
reducible to physical systems. Systems theory proposes the opposite of this, arguing that, 
through organisation, the whole system creates properties which do not exist when the 
system is reduced. Nonetheless, it can be argued (by for example those advocating a 
more dialectical position) that general systems approaches can themselves be 
characterised by another paradoxical kind of reductionism, in that they focus on wholes 
and a certain level of organisational abstraction, without any methodological need to move 
between concrete and abstract, or between specific and systemic.18
 As we shall see, GST shares much with the cybernetics movement which emerged 
in the mid-1940s, and in many situations today the two terms can be used 
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interchangeably, (moreover, they can both often be swapped with ecology also.) For 
Francis Heylighen, “each can be seen as part of an overall attempt to forge a 
transdisciplinary ‘Systems Science’.”19 Nonetheless, there are key differences between 
the two approaches. Specifically, cybernetics formed itself around a particular series of 
research questions concerning recursion and information feedback, and the challenges 
that this poses for traditional causal logic – whereas GST is concerned with all systems, 
whether or not they exhibit feedback. For Bertalanffy and some others this meant that 
cybernetics was simply a subset of GST.20 Bertalanffy specifically makes a point of 
distinguishing between the areas in noting the influence of cybernetics: "Systems theory is 
frequently identified with cybernetics and control theory. This again is incorrect. 
Cybernetics as the theory of control mechanisms in technology and nature is founded on 
the concepts of information and feedback, but as part of a general theory of systems."21 
However, many cyberneticians consider that Gordon Pask demonstrated that general 
systems theory is in fact a proper subset of cybernetics.22 More recent historians (such as 
Andrew Pickering) have suggested that the ascription of “control” to cybernetics is 
misleading, and have argued that cybernetic interests are better defined as research into 
the emergence of agency and self in systems, whether human or non-human. 
 It is in many ways a paradox of history that systems theory and cybernetics first 
developed (in any significant way) in the USA and Europe rather than the USSR, given the 
latter’s ideological and productive stake in systems practice – which for example in 
architecture has been seen as prefiguring parametric research today.23 Indeed, whilst the 
Soviets did welcome Weiner’s work in his visits during the Macy period, what is less well 
known is that the Soviet Union did from the 1920s independently develop a systems 
theory – Tektology – but it was rejected in different ways by both Lenin and Stalin. Indeed, 
it has been suggested by Gorelik and others24 that the work of Alexandr Bogdanov – 
principally his three volume Tectology: Universal Organization Science,25 published in 
Russia between 1912 and 1917 – provided Ludwig von Bertalanffy with much of the 
material and method for his General Systems Theory.26 
  Bogdanov was a leading member of the Bolshevik Party in its earlier days. In fact, 
prior to the 1905 Revolution it has been argued that he was as important as Lenin. 
However, Bogdanov increasingly distanced himself from the party and immersed himself 
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in theoretical research and developed and published an ever broader systems theory, 
which he considered to be a contribution to Marxian dialectics.27 Lenin’s Materialism and 
Empiriocriticism (1909) was largely a critique (no doubt partly personally/politically-
inspired) of Bogdanov’s early work in this regard. 
 In any case, Bogdanov’s Tectology, having been openly criticised first by Lenin, 
and then ultimately suppressed under Stalin, remained unknown in the west (apart from 
the 1928 German publication that Bertalanffy may have read). It also lay completely 
“forgotten” in the USSR until its rediscovery in the 1970s – although paradoxically by that 
time its aims had already re-entered the Soviet Union via American and West-European 
theorists in the guise of cybernetics and systems theory.
4.3 The Emergence of Cybernetics
Although cybernetics would enter some pretty abstract areas of thought, its core 
investment in the original sense of organon never wavered. For Katherine Hayles, 
cybernetics represents “an unprecedented synthesis of the organic and the mechanical.”28 
As Francis Heylighen puts it clearly:
Information Theory, Control Theory and Control Systems Engineering have since 
developed into independent disciplines. What distinguishes cybernetics is its 
emphasis on control and communication not only in engineered, artificial systems, 
but also in evolved, natural systems such as organisms and societies, which set 
their own goals, rather than being controlled by their creators.29
Whilst the two terms “ecology” and “cybernetics” are, as I have already noted, often used 
interchangeably, especially when talking about systems theory in general, they do 
nonetheless conjure up very different cultural associations. Cybernetics as noted carries 
suggestions of control and leadership, and in popular culture it has all kinds of 
associations with robots, machines and computers. Indeed, in science fiction and 
consumer marketing, the prefix “cyber-” is often used in order to create just that kind of 
association. In recent theory, the root of cybernetics has re-appeared in the figure of the 
“cyborg” – short for cybernetic organism – which has been evoked by many thinkers, 
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notably Donna Harroway and Andy Clark, in order to describe what is frequently referred 
to as a “post-human” condition.30 
 However, in an academic sense, the term does not refer to that at all. Cybernetics 
is rather primarily concerned with exploring what “mind” is, and how it works. It is 
historically defined by its research into and definition of characteristics such as system, 
pattern, information, organisation and ecology – whether in human, natural or 
technological contexts – and almost always featuring circular causality, or feedback. As 
such, cybernetics is a fundamentally trans-disciplinary subject. Indeed, Frank Fremont-
Smith, who as head of the Josiah Macy Foundation which facilitated the Macy series of 
conferences which effectively founded modern cybernetics in the period immediately 
following the Second World War, expressly saw these events as an experiment in trans-
disciplinary practice. 
 Etymologically, “cybernetics” is based on the Greek word for “helmsman”, and 
means “the art of steermanship”31 – and this suggests that cybernetics is particularly 
interested in how systems are organised, how they operate, and how they set, or are 
given, goals. What qualifies as a system for cybernetics is primarily an organisational 
question, not a material question. It is for this reason that the Macy Conferences were a 
self-consciously cross-disciplinary event. The conferences drew together leading thinkers 
from anthropology, mathematics, ethnography, cognitive science, psychology and other 
fields, in order to ask, as Gregory Bateson would later put it, “what is the pattern that 
connects?”  The answers were described through what Gordon Pask would characterise 
as “the art and science of the defensible metaphor.”32 
 Cybernetics is hence the study of underlying organisational order rather than, or in 
addition to, the specific material mechanism. As Ashby puts it, “cybernetics stands to the 
real machine – electronic, mechanical, neural, or economic – much as geometry stands to 
a real object in our terrestrial space.”33 Stuart Umpleby has been responsible for 
popularising a conventional history and theory of cybernetics, primarily through the 
American Society for Cybernetics. He notes: 
... because numerous systems in the living, social and technological world may be 
understood in this way, cybernetics cuts across many traditional disciplinary 
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boundaries. The concepts which cyberneticians develop thus form a 
metadisciplinary language through which we may better understand and modify our 
world.34
  Whilst then drawing upon a wide range of material in order to abstract out patterns 
of organisation, and informational flow, “the truths of cybernetics are not conditional on 
their being derived from some other branch of science. Cybernetics has its own 
foundations.”35 Nonetheless, these have proved difficult to pin down. For instance, we find 
that in the case of leading thinkers like Humberto Maturana, cybernetics could be defined 
as “the science and art of understanding," whilst for Heinz von Foerster, it “interfaces hard 
competence with the hard problems of the soft sciences.”36 In the view of Gregory 
Bateson, cybernetics quite simply was “the biggest bite out of the fruit of the tree of 
knowledge that mankind has taken in the last 2000 years.”37
 There have been three main periods of development for cybernetics as a body of 
knowledge. The first period, which started during the early-1940s, is sometimes referred 
to as first-order cybernetics, and was largely formulated around the Macy Conferences. 
This period came to an end in the early-50s – although the key figures continued to 
develop and refine the key concepts and their applicability across a range of fields.38 The 
second major period of development is often referred to as second-order cybernetics. 
Although this term has been used by various commentators to refer both to conceptual 
and generational shifts, it is generally understood to refer to an extension of cybernetic 
principles towards understanding the participatory role of the observer in observed 
systems.39 This development is considered to have been first formalised in a paper by 
Margaret Mead, called “The Cybernetics of Cybernetics”, which was commissioned by 
Heinz von Foerster and published in 1968.40 Whilst much of the conceptual content of 
second-order cybernetics regarding the active role of the observer had been developed by 
Mead, Bateson, and later von Foerster, throughout the period of the Macy Conferences, 
this insight gained a new importance in the work of a new generation of cybernetic 
thinkers. Above all, it is closely related to the development of social constructivist and 
structuralist thinking in the social sciences more generally. Indeed for many theorists in 
this group, such as Ranulph Glanville, second-order cybernetics is indistinguishable from 
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Gaia: An Ecology of Mind?
  
Fig. 4.7. Graph showing changing chemical composition of Earth’s atmosphere with advent 
of living systems. Ecological Cybernetics becomes manifest in the work of James Lovelock, 
whose conception of Gaia emerged in work that he was doing at NASA. Lovelock was 
charged with devising experiments that future space missions to Mars might use to test for 
life. Whilst researching this, Lovelock realised that there were important, fundamental 
differences between the atmosphere on Mars and that on Earth, and that in principle, a study 
of any planetary atmosphere could be enough to detect whether large scale life existed on 
the planet (a discovery not necessarily popular with NASA as it potentially reduced the need 
for actual space missions!). Lovelock realised that the atmosphere on Mars was stable: there 
were no chemical reactions that could take place. Everything that could occur between the 
gases present had occurred, and they were essentially now resting in a stable equilibrium 
state. On the Earth, the opposite was the case. The atmosphere was made up of a volatile 
and unstable mixture of gases, which were maintained in a steady state, yet one that was 
dynamic, self-regulating and far-from-equilibrium. The earth’s atmosphere was even 
composed of 20% oxygen, a molecule that is generally keen to combine with and oxidise 
almost anything, and which would need to be replenished constantly. The constitution of the 
Earth’s atmosphere is itself a sign that something is actively producing the atmosphere, and 
that there must be life processes labouring on the planet. This realisation ultimately led 
Lovelock to formulate the Gaia hypothesis, which later, following its predictive success, is 
now referred to, by its supporters at least, as Gaia theory. This states that the planet as a 
whole system maintains itself in a state far from equilibrium, but most suited to its continuing 
survival as a system, as a super-organism: “the entire range of living matter on earth, from 
whales to viruses and from oaks to algae, could be regarded as constituting a single living 
entity capable of maintaining the earth’s atmosphere to suit its overall needs and endowed 
with faculties and powers far beyond those of its constituent parts.” It is important to note that 
the chapter on cybernetics is the largest and most important in Lovelock’s book, and is the 
methodological foundation upon which the theory is built, as can be seen in the following 
definition of Gaia as “a complex entity involving the Earth's biosphere, atmosphere, oceans 
and soil; the totality constituting a feedback or cybernetic system which seeks an optimal 
physical and chemical environment for life on this planet”.!⁴⁷ Whilst clearly there are parallels 
between Bateson’s Ecology of Mind and Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis, there are important 
differences too. Lovelock’s Gaia was published shortly before Bateson died, and he did not 
respond to it at any length, although was said to have criticisms. For an interesting 
Batesonian “critique” of the Gaia hypothesis see Chapter Five in Harries-Jones, A Recursive 
Vision. Lovelock himself makes some of these points in his more recent book on The 
Revenge of Gaia (2006).
radical constructivism.41 In recent years in particular there has been growing re-adoption 
of the term neo-cybernetics.
 There is, perhaps, now a third phase, which can be called ecological cybernetics.42 
It is characterised, I would argue, by a precisely ecological condition of cybernetic 
knowledge, and in a number of senses of the term ecological. Most obviously, cybernetics 
theory in various forms has become a key component in understanding and analysing 
ecological systems, both in terms of the new understandings of biological systems, and 
their interconnectedness with human economic and social systems that have emerged in 
recent decades. In James Lovelock’s famous book on Gaia, for example, the chapter on 
“Cybernetics” is the intellectual keystone, from which Lovelock uses a series of cybernetic 
concepts to construct his argument that the Earth, as a planetary ecosystem, constitutes a 
self-regulating meta-organism or “mind”. More broadly, however, ecological cybernetics 
describes a condition where the key concepts have been verified and used across a 
number of disciplines, while at the same time, many semi-independently developed sub-
disciplines – such as chaos theory, catastrophe theory, complexity theory, emergence 
theory, embodied and extended mind theories – are themselves networked together. 
Today, a whole series of concepts formed through cybernetics and systems theory 
underlie all of these contemporary areas of research (even whilst as a term cybernetics 
might be rarely used). As I suggested in Chapter Two, these systems-theory-based 
sciences have in complex ways fed from, and back into, organic and process philosophies 
more generally. 
 Equally, as I will discuss further later, cybernetics and systems thinking were 
inseparable from both radical and counter-cultural tendencies, but paradoxically were also 
key to the emerging strategies for corporate, national and international management, as 
driven by developing ICT technologies. Cybernetics provided the basis of the first 
ecological reports into the problems of ongoing capitalist growth and development (Jay 
Forrester’s System Dynamics/Club of Rome Limits to Growth) – yet it also transformed 
the basis of those very systems of capitalist management and the intensification of 
development. There were certainly some military and secret intelligence funded research 
that was aimed at exploring the potential for government control over the minds of the 
population, and John von Neumann in particular had close connections into the heart of 
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The Cybernetic Arts of “Ontological Theatre”
 
Fig. 4.8. Gordon Pask, ‘Colloquy of Mobiles’, in Cybernetic Serendipity exhibition at ICA 
London, 1968.
Fig. 4.9. Jean Tinguely (with engineer Billy Klüver), a ‘self-destructing kinetic sculpture’ at 
MOMA New York, 1960.
Fig. 4.10. Nam June Paik, ‘TV Garden’ at Documenta 6 in Kassel, 1974.
the US military-industrial complex. Equally however, the more “nomadic” tendency within 
cybernetics staged some of the most radical political and even “spiritual” explorations and 
extensions of what it means to be alive.
 The development of cybernetics and systems theory within the arts and humanities 
has been complex, and also sits outside of a straightforward first-order/second-order 
classification. The high point of explicitly cybernetic art was in the mid-1960s, with figures 
from cybernetics such as Gregory Bateson and Gordon Pask regularly contributing to or 
inspiring radical art discourse – eg. Bateson is cited by Dan Graham as an important 
influence, whilst Stewart Brand’s Whole Earth Catalogue was a direct result of Bateson’s 
influence on Brand. Writers such as the Beat Poets, Thomas Pynchon and William 
Burroughs drew heavily upon its suggestions and methods, and seminal exhibitions, like 
Jasia Reichardt’s Cybernetic Serendipity exhibition at the ICA in 1968, featured work from 
Nam June Paik, Jean Tinguely, and Pask amongst others, .43 Equally, within cultural 
theory and social science, there have been important theoretical developments that owe a 
huge debt to cybernetic thinking. As Bruce Clarke and Mark Hansen have noted:
... recent thinkers such as Michel Serres, Giles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Donna 
Haraway, Bruno Latour and Isabelle Stengers, have deployed neocybernetic 
discourse extensively and transformatively. Neocybernetic discourse is central to 
current historical, interpretive, and theoretical investigations using concepts such as 
narrative, medium, assemblage, information, noise, network, and communication to 
remap the terrain of knowledge with reference to the operational boundaries of 
systems and their environments.44
 Within architectural research in Britain, there is a history of both direct and indirect 
engagements with cybernetic theory.45 In fact, architecture schools have provided a base 
for some of the more itinerant cybernetic thinkers, especially after the few established 
cybernetics departments in universities were closed down. This architectural research is 
not simply a representation or application of cybernetic thought, but also represents a 
distinct staging or performance of cybernetic research. More importantly, this work often 
brought to the fore the really radical component of cybernetic thought: that is, cybernetics 
as a self-reflexive system based on an experimental and performative critique of 
normative theories of control. 
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Architecture and Deuterolearning
     
Fig. 4.11 Gordon Pask worked as a consultant with Cedric Price on the Fun Palace, 
designed for the radical theatre director Joan Littlewood. The building embodied many of 
Pask’s ideas concerning interaction and conversation. Notably, the building had the capacity 
to become bored, and to make provocations. Indeed, in this respect the Fun Palace might be 
seen as a more “accurate” formulation of Situationist thinking articulated through design, 
than Constant’s New Babylon. 
 Working with many of Bateson’s insights on deuterolearning – or learning how to learn 
– Pask developed a series of cybernetic learning environments where a conversation is 
defined as requiring creativity on both sides to constantly reconstruct meaning. Ultimately 
this is necessary to avoid a total loss of information due to entropic noise that a non-creative 
conversation must inevitably collapse into.
Fig. 4.12 Sky Ear, by Usman Haque – one of the few contemporary interaction designers 
who have really grasped Pask’s point that an interactive architecture is not the same as a 
responsive or reactive architecture. 
 
 Andrew Pickering has recently described as “ontological theatre” the “experiments” 
that were staged by a particular group of radical cyberneticians, notably Bateson again, 
but also Stafford Beer, Grey Walter, Gordon Pask and others. For Pickering, systems 
theory and cybernetics can be classified in a quite distinct way. Rather than referring to 
first-order and second-order phases, he suggests that the research can be divided into 
control and anti-control-based modalities. Pickering suggests that cybernetics proper – in 
contradistinction to the “enframing” character of systems theory – is best described as  
“anticontrol,”46 a practice of “revealing” that stages “an ontology of becoming”47. It is 
impossible to grasp fully the issues at stake in the architectural, epistemological and 
ontological experiments that have emerged from this work without reviewing the history of 
cybernetic thought in further detail. In the brief history that follows I have tried to give a 
working account of first-order and second-order distinctions, and the criticisms of 
cybernetics that have emerged in recent decades. However, my conclusions have been 
broadly in line with Pickering’s recent account, which I will return to in my concluding 
chapter.
4.4 First-Order Cybernetics and the Macy Conferences 1947-53
The Macy Conferences ran over a period of six years from 1947 to 1953. There were ten 
conferences in all, which were initiated by Warren McCulloch, financed by the Josiah 
Macy Foundation, and held at the Beekman Hotel in New York City (except for the final 
event, which was at Princeton University). The Macy Conferences were small, almost 
seminar-like events, with never more than thirty participants. Warren McCulloch at that 
time was leading the world in using the concept of the network to model neural circuits in 
living organisms, and others were also doing leading work in this area. Notably, Norbert 
Weiner had similarly been observing the behaviour of network circuits, and would 
formalise the concept of feedback. John von Neumann had a decade earlier written a 
seminal paper on quantum mechanics. His ground-breaking research into computing 
would directly result in the modern digital computer as we know it today. Margaret Mead  
was already an important anthropologist, and as noted would play a central role in 




Fig. 4.13 and 4.14. A Macy Conference in session, and group photo (Margaret Mead in front 
row, Warren McCullouch to her left, and Gregory Bateson in rear row between them).
intellectual at the edge of the natural and social sciences. Beyond this core group of 
participants – who, with a few exceptions, attended all meetings – there were various 
significant guests invited (including, for example, von Beralanffy), some of whom 
subsequently became core group members.48
 The inaugural Macy Conference was entitled ‘Feedback Mechanisms and Circular 
Causal Systems in Biological and Social Systems.’ The title shifted a few times over the 
following events, prior to the adoption of Norbert Weiner’s term “cybernetics” for the title of  
the seventh conference in 1949. Weiner had coined the term cybernetics as the title of this 
area of study, or way of thinking, in his book Cybernetics: Control and Communication in 
the Animal and Machine,49 which was published in 1948,50 although the term had first 
been used in the early-nineteenth century by André Marie Ampère in relation to political 
science.51 The proceedings of the sixth to tenth Macy conferences were written up by 
Heinz von Foerster from 1949-55, and published as Cybernetics: Transactions of the 
Conference. In addition, in 1991 Steve Joshua Heims published The Cybernetics Group, 
an account of the period. Then in 1999 N. Katherine Hayles published an important new 
history of the subject, entitled How We Became Posthuman.
 According to Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead, the impetus for the Macy 
conferences started in 1942, with the publication of the paper on ‘Behavior, Purpose and 
Teleology’ by Arturo Rosenblueth, Norbert Wiener and Julian Bigelow, and the first 
meeting organised under the Macy umbrella, entitled ‘Cerebral Inhibition’.52 The paper 
introduced the concept of “feedback”, and was according to Bateson, “a solution to the 
problem of purpose”53 in the behaviour of organisms and machines.  Bateson realised 
that Weiner’s concept of feedback was closely related to the concept of “schismogenesis”, 
which he had developed in Naven, his account of the anthropological fieldwork that he 
and Margaret Mead conducted with the Iatmul people of Bali, published back in 1936. He 
states “we didn’t realise then (at least I didn’t realise it, though McCulloch might have) that 
the whole of logic would have to be reconstructed for recursiveness.”54
 Attending this preliminary 1942 meeting were many of the individuals who would 
form the core group of the later Macy Conferences,55 and it was here that the concept of 
feedback was further discussed “over lunch.” According to Mead, by the end of this event, 
Bateson “really had the design of what needed to be done.”56 
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 Although the key discussants were kept apart by conditions during the Second 
World War, Bateson maintained a friendship and correspondence with Warren McCulloch, 
and it seems that they each developed plans to ask the Josiah Macy Foundation to 
support an interdisciplinary research project. Bateson recounts how:
... just before going overseas, I had met Warren McCulloch and [Julian] Bigelow, 
who were all excited about ‘feedback’ in electronic machinery. So, while I was 
overseas, and mostly bored and frustrated, I occasionally comforted myself by 
thinking about the properties of closed self-corrective circuits. On arrival back in NY I 
went straight to the Macy Foundation to ask for a conference on these things. 
Fremont-Smith said ‘McCulloch was here a week ago with the same request, and 
he’s going to be the chairman.’ Membership in these conferences, with Norbert 
Weiner, John von Neumann, McCulloch and the rest, was one of the great events in 
my life. Weiner coined the term ‘cybernetics’ for what it was we were discussing.57 
 The initial meeting in 1947 provoked an intense period of development. The group 
met again in October of the same year, and before this second Macy meeting, Bateson 
organised a sub-conference under the title of “Teleological Mechanisms in Society”, and 
Frank another one after, both of which were aimed at developing further a social science 
based understanding of these cybernetic ideas.  As Margaret Mead remembered: 
... there were three groups of people. There were the mathematicians and physicists 
– people trained in the physical sciences, who were very, very precise in what they 
wanted to think about. There was a small group of us, anthropologists and 
psychiatrists, who were trained to know enough about psychology in groups so we 
knew what was happening, and could use it, and disallow it. And then there were 
two or three gossips in the middle, who were very simple people who had a lot of 
loose intuition and no discipline to what they were doing. In a sense it was the most 
interesting conference I’ve ever been in, because nobody knew how to manage 
these things yet.58
 Writing in 1958 in the preface to the second edition of his pre-war anthropological 
work, Naven, Bateson reflected upon the first decade of cybernetic research:
... we now have the beginnings of a general theory of process and change, 




Fig. 4.15 4.16 and 4.17. Grey Walter’s “tortoises”, ELSIE and ELMER, which exhibited 
complex lifelike behaviour when encountering each other, or a mirror.
reexamine all that we thought we knew about organisms, societies, families, 
personal relationships, ecological systems, servo-mechanisms, and the like.59
4.5 The Ratio Club
An English parallel to the Macy Conferences was the Ratio Club, an interdisciplinary 
dining club which according to Margaret Boden “started independently of the transatlantic 
version.”60 The Ratio Club emerged from the Society of Experimental Biology in 
Cambridge, and included several members of Alan Turing’s war-time group from Bletchley 
Park who had broken the Enigma Code, and a group of academics at Cambridge, who 
had clustered around the proto-cybernetician, Kenneth Craik. The Ratio Club met from 
1949 to 1958, and was led and instigated by the neurologist John Bates.61 It included 
Horace Barlow (visual neuroscientist), W.E. Hick (experimental psychology and 
ergonomics), William Grey Walter (neurophysiology and robotics), Alan Turing 
(mathematics and computing), and Ross Ashby (mathematics, electronics). There were 
many links between the Macy and Ratio groups. Warren McCulloch was invited to speak 
at the first Ratio meeting, whilst Ross Ashby attended the ninth Macy Conference in 
March 1952, and Grey Walter the final Macy event in April 1953. 
 The group was perhaps more practical and hands-on than their counterparts 
based in the United States.62  Alan Turing had of course by this time already built a 
working mechanical computer, and Grey Walter would build the two electronic “tortoises” 
ELSIE and ELMER.63 These devices would star in the 1951 Festival of Britain exhibition 
on London’s South Bank. Each of them had a sensor that responded to light sources, with 
different responses (approach or retreat), depending upon the brightness. However, each 
robot also had a light source itself, which produced complex behaviour when the two 
robots then interacted with each other, or with themselves in a mirror (as we shall 
repeatedly see, mirrors, literal or conceptual, seem to play a crucial role in thinking about 
and constructing mind). 
 Of this group, Ross Ashby went on to align himself with much of the Macy 
research, and he wrote a series of seminal cybernetics texts. Alan Turing was perhaps the 
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Fig. 4.18 The NPL (National Physical Laboratory) ACE Pilot computer designed by Alan 
Turing, 1945-50
Fig. 4.19 and 4.20. Ashby’s Homeostat – a demonstration model of a self-regulating system, 
compose of four interconnected Royal Air Force bomb control units with inputs, feedback, 
and magnetically-driven, water-filled potentiometers. 
closest to Bateson’s sense of the broader applicability of the concepts of mind that were 
emerging in cybernetics to the systems of the natural world more generally. It is often 
forgotten that Turing also produced an extraordinary study on Morphogenesis,64 an 
enquiry into pattern, growth and form in plants – a text which deserves to be revisited 
more in the light of contemporary studies of emergence. 
 Fundamentally, both the Ratio Club and Macy Group were preoccupied with the 
question “what is mind?” In other words, how do systems self-organise, and self-assign 
goals, etc. In the years that followed, most of the main participants would publish 
extensively on the subject. Gregory Bateson for example published his collected essays 
Steps to an Ecology of Mind, as well as his book on Mind and Nature; Warren McCulloch 
published his collection Embodiments of Mind; Ross Ashby published Designs for a Brain; 
Heinz von Foerster published Understanding Understanding: Cybernetics and Cognition; 
and Grey Walter published The Living Brain – to list but a few. These pre-occupations 
would continue with the next generation of cyberneticians: Humberto Maturana and 
Francisco Varela would publish Autopoiesis and Cognition, Stafford Beer The Brain of the 
Firm, whilst Varela again, this time with Evan Thompson and Elanor Rosch, wrote The 
Embodied Mind.
 Importantly, some of the key conceptions that emerged during this research – that 
mind was essentially an activity, a relational process or organisation, and not a separate 
thing – and that mind was immanent within, embodied with, material processes, and not 
limited in any simple way to traditional conceptions of self, are being replayed (and to a 
lesser extent, referenced) today in contemporary cognitive sciences and the various 
contemporary neo-vitalist and materialist theorisations. Many of these early texts remain 
an important resource for exploring new conceptions of ecological materialism and 
extended mind. 
 In Stuart Umpleby’s historical account of the development of the field following the 
first period of cybernetic theory, there were three distinct discourses that emerged, not all 
of which continued to use the term “cybernetics”. One strand developed out of the work of 
Alan Turing and John von Neumann, and led to computer science, artificial intelligence 
(AI), and robotics. The second strand arose out of Norbert Weiner’s work on control 
mechanisms and systems, became a part of electrical engineering, and developed further 
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Fig. 4.21 and 4.22. The Watt Steam Governor is a classic example of a very simple self-
corrective cybernetic feedback system – i.e. a negative feedback system. The faster steam 
flows through the main pipe, the faster the axle turns which centrifugally throws the ball 
weights out and up. This lifts a lever to close a valve in the pipe, thereby reducing the steam 
flow. This is the negative feedback, which means that the system exhibits homeostasis, and 
oscillates around an ideal value, like a boat constantly adjusting to maintain its course. A 
positive feedback system on the other hand feeds back upon itself in an amplifying circuit 
(such as audio feedback.) In Fig. 4.23, the Watt Steam Governor system is shown in the 
conventional language of cybernetic diagrams. A dashed line shows a negative loop 
segment. If drawn correctly, it is possible to add up the number of negative loop segments. If 
it is an odd number the system will be negative – i.e. it will reach and maintain a stable state. 
If there are an even number of negative segments, or none, then the systems will be 
positive, and will head off in an amplifying (or collapsing) direction.
into systems engineering. The third strand was grounded in Warren McCulloch’s research 
into mind through the functioning of the brain and central nervous system (and I would 
add Gregory Bateson’s studies of ecological and social systems as minds). Umpleby 
argues that of these three discourses it was only this third stream that maintained 
cybernetics as a fundamentally fluid and transdisciplinary field, whereas the other two 
simply became new applied disciplines. Thus it was primarily this third stream that 
developed into what became known as second-order cybernetics. 
4.6 Key Concepts and Critiques that emerged from Macy Conferences
The Macy Conferences produced a series of important concepts and legacies. I would 
suggest that the most important new concepts, or new definitions of concepts, to emerge 
included: 
1. Feedback65 
2. Analogue and Digital66 
3. Memory67 
4. Neural Networks 




9. Homeostasis and homeorhesis72
10. Law of Requisite Variety73
Consistently, the Macy meetings were concerned with understanding how do networks of 
material relationships embody information? They were working at a time when dualist 
models of mind and consciousness still had enormous influence, and they often struggled 
to find the language to describe both the essential monism or non-dualism of their project, 
and the paradoxical fact that their studies seemed to produce an almost Platonic world of 
information or organisational relations (i.e. they lacked, but also partially produced, 
moments of a dialectical relational conception of spacetime).74 Participants wanted to 
understand how physical systems, through the organisation of their material parts, could 
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embody, form, produce and be affected by information. The material substrates that they 
were concerned with were very different. Mead and Bateson (and later Stafford Beer) 
were concerned with information flow in social groups and organisations. Bateson, Kubie 
and Lewin were interested in the flow of information in the psyche, and the emergence of 
“self”. McCullough and Pitts were interested in the neuronal structures of organisms (they 
later notably wrote for example, with Maturana and Lettvin, a seminal paper on the brain 
and nervous system of the frog).75 What united these different specialists was a process 
of abstraction – a joint concern with how, once whatever parts are organised into wholes 
(real or conceptual, concrete or abstract), their organisation gives rise to new behaviours, 
goals and information flows. Bateson in particular considered the epistemological and 
ontological status of “information”, and it is useful I think to reflect upon the conditions 
under which cybernetic information might be considered in relation to Marxist conceptions 
of abstraction.76  
 Interestingly, whilst most delegates were abstracting pattern out of their matter, 
von Neumann and the “artificial intelligence” group were working with these abstractions 
and re-materialising them. Their work, combined with that of Ratio Club’s Turing, directly 
resulted in modern information and communication technologies, and the digital 
computer.77 
 Discussing the legacy of the Macy events, Katherine Hayles has suggested that: 
... the result of this breathtaking process was nothing less than a new way of looking 
at human beings ... Weiner did not intend to dismantle the liberal humanist 
subject ... he was following a train of thought that, since the Enlightenment, had 
argued that human beings could be trusted with freedom because they and the 
social structures that they devised operated as self-regulating mechanisms.78 
As Hayles notes, cybernetics cannot help but question our definitions of the human, as 
“the idea of the feedback loop implies that the boundaries of the autonomous subject are 
up for grabs, since feedback loops can flow not only within the subject but between the 
subject and the environment.”79 Situated at (or above) the junction of a series of binaries – 
nature/culture, organic/technic, mind/matter – cybernetics was concerned with technology 
as both tool and organ, in the original sense of organon.
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 For several recent commentators such as Hayles, cybernetic research participated 
in the construction of a new dualism between material and information, or rather re-
inscribed the old dualism between form and matter (or as I suggested previously, between 
pattern and matter), and so they feel it can be criticised in some way on that basis. 
Certainly, when Weiner stated that “information is information, not matter or energy. No 
materialism which does not admit this can survive in the present day,”80 it is easy to see 
why such questions might emerge. But these attacks often seem to be based upon a 
misunderstanding of what is being asserted. Cybernetic research was based upon the 
proposition that the organisation that matter takes can only be understood through some 
kind of conception or abstraction of information, and that if reductive forms of analysis lose 
the information embodied as and within organised wholes, they lose something of their 
descriptive power. Pattern is in this sense simply a necessary abstraction from matter, a 
means by which we can understand the mental forms and organisations that are active 
within, and inform, matter. Still, in terms of the language that cybernetics develops, it is 
indeed the case that there is a privileging of terms like “pattern” and “mind” over “matter”. 
Processes of abstraction and pattern recognition did indeed tend by definition to 
foreground the information (i.e. the pattern) over actual matter. Whilst this process of 
abstraction is necessary, it is possible to “forget” that this is a process (and a 
fundamentally perceptual and epistemological process), and by doing so to inadvertently 
privilege pattern over matter. There are important dangers to be aware of when working 
with abstractions, and there are of course all kinds of reductive practices which can 
unwittingly embody all kinds of dominant social and political ideology, such as re-
inscribing a familiar gendered dualism of relations.
 Nonetheless, I am arguing in this thesis that a more sophisticated reading of 
cybernetics is not then that it takes “sides” in the matter/pattern binary, but rather that it 
goes some way to suspending and moves beyond it. In many ways, the attempt by 
cybernetic thought to grasp information as something like a real abstraction, and an effect 
of circular causality, might be understood as an attempt to reproduce Marxist dialectics, 
but without any revolutionary politics attached. Still, there are important distinctions 
between the cybernetic method and Marxian dialectics. For example, Bateson’s use of a 
process of abduction tends to start with the concrete and abstract out organisational 
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patterns, and connections between patterns. Whilst this is a materialist practice, it can 
tend to conclude (as a process) with conceptual abstraction, which can then perhaps lead 
to idealist or dualist tendencies. A dialectical materialist practice, by distinction, starts off 
by positing the kinds of abstractions that neo-cybernetics produces, but then ascends 
back up to the concrete. This is a very important moment in dialectical reason, as it tests 
the validity of the relations of any given abstraction by testing them in the real material 
world. In this sense, neo-cyberentic methodology might contribute as a moment of 
analysis at the beginning of a dialectical approach. Equally of course, cybernetic research 
from its earliest days was in fact constantly returning to concrete practice, whether in the 
McCullouch and colleagues studies of the workings of biological nervous systems as they 
developed theories of neural nets, the psychiatric and zoological work of Bateson, the 
material experiments of Pask, or the robotics experiments of Walter.
 Indeed, in important ways, cybernetic research itself did tend to return to the 
concrete and produce new real abstractions, technologies that themselves seemed to 
promote an immaterialisation of (or simply obscured) all kinds of social relations. Indeed 
within the cybernetics group, and also within systems thinking more generally, two distinct 
tendencies emerged. For Bateson, most scientists and engineers were developing 
cybernetic insights into control and communication as dangerously instrumental 
technologies – to be used in what he saw as misguided attempts to control both natural 
and social systems. This would become for him a massive “epistemological” error, and 
was in many ways the real distinction between first-order and second-order cybernetics. 
This tendency was particularly problematic for him in the area of ecology, which he saw 
increasingly as a disciplinary enframing of nature – Bateson saw the danger as 
quantifying energy and matter, but missing the dimension of communication and mind, 
and thereby failing to grasp the insights of second-order thinking, which revealed, 
precisely, that it is not a straight forward matter to correctly understand or exert 
teleological control over a system from within that system.81
 These processes of immaterialisation and instrumentalisation mirrored (but also 
instantiated and amplified) processes already underway within capitalism more broadly. 
As Hayles notes, “seeing the world as an interplay between informational patterns and 
material objects is a historically specific construction that emerged in the wake of World 
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Fig. 4.24. Archigram, Control and Choice Dwelling, Section, 1967. Architectural, engineering 
and urban practice have of course been primary conduits for instrumental systems thinking. 
Equally, however, architecture has been a primary site for radical cybernetic 
experimentation: socially and technologically utopian speculation. Furthermore architecture 
schools provided a real academic enclave for radical cyberneticians such as Pask, as first-
order systems theory became dominant and dispersed into AI, systems control etc and the 
few genuine independent cybernetic research projects were closed. To this day a strain of 
radical cybernetic practice has survived within some British architecture departments, often 
much to the surprise of systems thinkers based in other disciplines, who typically use the 
term “cybernetics” in a strictly historical sense.
 Nonetheless, many seminal architectural projects that have a degree of what Pickering 
describes as “ontological theatre”, are ambiguously and inevitably in both camps. As Alan 
Colquhoun has noted, the flexibility and indeterminate programme of cybernetic 
environments can easily become “the occasion for the invention of a new type of bureaucrat 
- the ‘programmer’.”!⁵!
 Jonathan Crary goes further in his criticism, arguing that the projects of Archigram 
“actually entailed the full subordination of the city’s inhabitants to the enormity of of their 
systems,” such that “once the city had been reduced to a kit of parts, only a humanist mirage 
could prevent its inhabitants from becoming one more relay in this new network.”!⁵"
War Two.”82 It is impossible to divorce cybernetics from the social and cultural shifts that 
emerged with information and communication technologies, at both personal and 
economic scales. Things and relationships were increasingly present in immaterial forms 
that both undermined and supplemented the material base, not least of money itself, 
which was soon to be freed from its particular physical materialisation in gold reserves.
 There are thus a series of distinct meanings associated with the word cybernetics. 
In addition to referring to a modern body of trans-disiplinary research into the immanence 
of mind within all kinds of material systems, it is also used to refer in general to the growth 
of informational technologies and systems that cybernetic research certainly helped to 
realise within capitalism. In addition, within the research itself there are very different kinds 
of practices. As Andrew Pickering has usefully emphasised, whilst there was a strand of 
cybernetics which proved all too easy for military-industrial capitalism to recuperate, there 
was also another, radical cybernetic tradition, composed of eccentric “nomadic 
scientists” (which for him is populated almost exclusively by the British contingent of 
Ashby, Bateson, Beer, Laing, Pask, and Walter), which passed through a re-conception of 
epistemology into a radical ontology – or what he calls the construction of an “ontological 
theatre” – in which “sketches of another future” were explored through the “conscious” 
experimentation in constructing “self”.83 These two tendencies – one radical, and one 
conservative – map approximately onto first-order and second-order cybernetics.84 
 This full range of associations of cybernetics was in some sense played out in a 
panel discussion involving Gregory Bateson, Meyer Schapiro, Rudolph Arnheim and 
Marcel Duchamp at the American Federation of Arts, entitled “The Creative Act”, in April 
1957.85 In the discussion, the Marxist art critic, Schapiro, started off by opposing the 
extension of cybernetics into art, seeing it as a part of broader processes of rationalisation 
and instrumentalisation of the human under capitalism. Bateson (supported it seems by 
Duchamp, and this was not the first time they had shared a stage) argued that this is not 
necessarily what is at stake in such a question, but rather cybernetic thinking was bringing 
into question the whole condition of producing the human self within and as a part of a 
communicational network. Indeed, for Bateson, cybernetics and art have similar roles, 
both being concerned with communication – art for Bateson fundamentally being about 
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Fig. 4.25. Several institutions might claim central roles in systems and cybernetic research 
(Heinz von Foerster’s Biological Computing Lab at University of Illinois, or the Cybernetics 
department at Brunel), but few are as well founded as MIT – at least in some areas. In this 
interesting diagram the institute traces a direct relation between cybernetics and systems 
research, and the seminal environmental 1972 Club of Rome ‘Limits to Growth’ report. The 
later research of Jay Forrester and the Systems Dynamics group is particularly interesting, 
and controversial. Forrester and his group were amongst the first to use computers to model 
systems dynamics, and their focus was the analysis of human ecologies. They developed 
the first software aimed at this (SIMPLE (Simulation of Industrial Management Problems with 
Lots of Equations) and later DYNAMO (DYNAmic MOdels)), which was used in the 
production of the Industrial Dynamics report of 1961 (for General Electrics.) Forrester went 
on to collaborate with the former mayor of Boston John Collins on what became the Urban 
Dynamics model. Controversially, this model suggested that the construction of low income 
housing tended to produce low income enclaves of poverty. Most importantly, the Systems 
Dynamics group were commissioned by the Club of Rome to produce some dynamic global 
socio-economic resource flow models. Three models were made (WORLD1, 2 and 3). 
Famously and somewhat unexpectedly, all models predicted resource depletion/pollution 
based socio-economic collapse early in the 21st century, and the results were published in 
the seminal ‘Limits to Growth’ report in 1972.
meta-communication, or communication that is self-consciously about communication in 
some way.86
 If then, it is important today to situate the development of post-war cybernetic 
thought historically, it is equally important to situate historically the 1990s critiques of 
cybernetics, as articulated by Hayles and others. In this sense, it seems to me that many 
of the assertions regarding the valorisation of information as a marginalisation of the body 
are overstated, if not simply confused; they themselves must be understood today within 
the context of the apparent immanent arrival of an immaterial world of “cyberspace” as it 
was being anticipated in the late-1990s. In fact, in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, digital (or more accurately post-digital) culture has passed through what Malcolm 
McCullough has described as “the paradigm shift from building virtual worlds, towards 
embedding information technology into the ambient social complexities of the physical 
world.”87
 Much of the “body theory” of the 1990s can thus appear a little naive today. 
Specifically, one should not assume that a simple return to the materiality of the body in 
cognition research would be in itself enough. Indeed we have seen, in the decade since 
Hayles wrote her key text, an enormous return to the body in many of the formulations of 
new materialism, and embodied and extended mind theory (which I will talk about in detail 
in the next chapter) – and indeed, in many contemporary attempts to formulate an 
architectural phenomenology. But what we see here, whilst being progressive and 
challenging in many aspects, is nonetheless often still based on a model of subjectivity 
that largely excludes any political formulation of the question of the production of 
subjectivity and consciousness, i.e. the mode of production of the extended mind, or of the 
extended mind as developed into a specifically political ecology. 
 There was of course always an implicit internal political ecology of cybernetics, 
broadly defined by the particular social, cultural and economic conditions in which it 
emerged. With regard to the Macy Conferences these conditions were complex. We might 
of course ask what were the repercussions of its situation within the military-industrial-
entertainment complex. The relation of cybernetics’ research to the military is significant, 
and needs to be considered. It can equally, however, easily be overstated. The context did 




Fig. 4.26. Dennis L. Meadows, “Basic Interactions Between Population Growth and Capital 
Accumulation” from MIT-Club of Rome "Project on the Predicament of Mankind," 1972
Equally, this was a self-organised, cross-disciplinary attempt to work with what at that time 
still were some truly marginal ideas. When Stewart Brand asked Bateson and Mead 
whether cybernetics could have emerged without the Second World War, Bateson 
answered that Weiner’s meeting with biologists was much more important.88 Whilst of 
course it was inevitable that Bateson would emphasise the importance of biology, it is still 
important to note that the relationship of cybernetics to the forces of capitalism is not 
reducible to any simplistic relationship to the US military. The early cybernetics research 
was indeed supported by a complex mix of military-industrial funding, even whilst the work 
produced might be thought of as a mix of both “royal” and “nomadic” science (in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s terms).89 Certainly, as soon as it was possible to split off those first-order 
technologies of control, and to divide the knowledge into new disciplines, then the more 
nomadic and radically trans-disciplinary aspects of cybernetic thinking were quickly 
starved of research funding. It is today often lamented (somewhat uncritically) by second-
order cyberneticians90 that figures such as Marvin Minsky, and more generally the strand 
of cybernetic thinking that led to cognitive science and AI research based upon symbolic 
manipulation, took away all of the research money. Perhaps ultimately the most important 
point to consider regarding the political economy of the cognitive sciences that developed 
out of cybernetics research is that they represent a major social shift in thinking about 
mind – a social shift in that the technologies behind it and produced by it are fundamental 
to production. It hence genuinely represents a new stage in both the history of human 
ideas about nature, and also the history of human ideas about mind – in which as Varela, 
Thompson and Rosch note, “knowledge has become tangibly and inextricably linked to a 
technology that transforms the social practices which make that very knowledge 
possible.”91
4.7 Second-Order Cybernetics
If the first wave of cybernetic research was focused around the role that feedback plays in 
creating homeostasis, the second wave focused on the role than feedback plays in 
creating reflexivity, which for Hayles is defined as “the movement whereby that which has 
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Figure 4.27-32. A series of moments from Parc Güell, Barcelona, by Antonio Gaudi, built 
1900-3.
 Gordon Pask described the Parc Guell of Antonio Gaudi as “one of the most cybernetic 
structures in existence”.!⁴⁸ Although perhaps initially surprising, in that one might have 
expected Pask to choose something more obviously dynamic and contemporary, upon 
further reflection his choice proves to be a sound one which can teach us something about 
both cybernetics and architecture. 
 There are no moving parts in the Parc Güell's built architecture. If we are to find 
cybernetic structures here, then we can be sure that they will not be located within 
mechanically/technologically activated components, in the way that say Pask and Cedric 
Price's Fun Palace was a cybernetic device that physically reconfigured its parts, or in the 
way that say an installation by Jason Bruges or Usman Haque might move or change its 
lighting according to a change in its environment or occupation. Pask notes that “Gaudi 
(intentionally or not) achieved a dialogue between his environment and its inhabitants. He 
did so using physically static structures (the dynamic processes depending upon the 
movement of people or shifts in their attention).”!⁴⁹
 Rather, the cybernetic structures that Pask refers to here must be due to a system that 
comes into being when the Park is occupied by people. Pask notes that “as you explore the 
piece, statements are made in terms of releasers, your exploration is guided by specially 
contrived feedback, and variety (surprise value) is introduced at appropriate points to make 
you explore.”
    
  
  
been used to generate a system is made, through a changed perspective, to become part 
of the system it generates.”92
 As Hayles herself recognises, many of the criticisms that she lays out as the her 
central thesis in her history of cybernetics93 are often little more than embellished versions 
of criticisms that emerged within the Macy Conference group itself, around Margaret 
Mead, Heinz von Foerster, and in particular Gregory Bateson. As Peter Harries-Jones has 
observed: 
Bateson became the single most important reformer of cybernetics. He was the 
intellectual leader who most thoroughly and continually opposed its dominant face – 
that of determinism and control. The transformation of cybernetics from a science 
concerned with application of feedback as control towards a science concerned with 
applications of how society constructs its own models of change and stability, and 
then proceeds to hide those constructions in its rationalisations about social and 
ecological order, stands as one of Bateson’s intellectual achievements.94
 The questions that Bateson, Mead and von Foerster were asking would be 
returned to repeatedly in their work through the 1950s, 60s and 70s, and would re-
coalesce to constitute what Pask later referred to as “New Cybernetics”, and which is 
today increasingly referred to as neo-cybernetics. For these thinkers it was clear that for 
many of the real concrete systems being considered, the very act of observing the system 
had effects upon the system. This was very obviously true in quantum mechanical 
systems, or social/anthropological systems, or certain electrical circuits for example – but 
it was, they now argued, an unavoidable epistemological principle. As Ashby stated, 
“objectivity is the delusion that observation can be made without an observer.”95 Klaus 
Krippendorff also suggests: 
... the shift from a first-order to a second-order cybernetics signalled a shift in 
scientific attitude toward reality, from privileging the perspectives of detached 
observers, spectators or engineers of a world outside of themselves to 
acknowledging our own participation in the world we observe and construct as its 
constituents.96 
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 Broken ceramics have a complex proto-Dadaist communicational role: by incorporating 
fragments of the “everyday”, reality denies representation, and “stands in” for itself). Forms 
such as flowing curves, which can be seen on roof lines and parapets, begin to rise up out of 
the ground, and come down from the roofs, to form “open enclosures”: architectural 
frameworks that mediate between the shifting topography of the land and the moving body of 
the visitor. Stairs are immediately presented to the visitor, and are used as a way of 
introducing the feeling that this is an architecture to be climbed over, a playground. Parc 
Güell is an exemplary study in relational combinations of spatial archetypes: the basic ways 
that space can enclose and act upon the body: framing, elevation, enclosure, extension. 
 Pask notes, in relation to Gaudi’s work in general that “it is interesting that Gaudi’s work 
is often contrasted with functionalism. Systemically it is a functionalism pure and simple, 
though it is aimed at satisfying only the symbolic and informational needs of man.”!⁵⁰ In this 
essay, Pask notes the important congruences of what he calls “pure architecture” and 
systems theory, suggesting that architecture and cybernetics “share a common philosophy of 
architecture”. His comments support my observation in chapter one that architecture is the 
“foundational” systems theory.
   
  
  
 Second-order cybernetics as a term is generally accredited to a paper written by 
Margaret Mead, but one which von Foerster specifically commissioned, called “The 
Cybernetics of Cybernetics”. Mead drew upon her experience in anthropology, where she 
was amongst the first to recognise the active role that the anthropological observer always 
plays in the social group being observed. As Alan Watts was to point out “from physics to 
psychology, every department of science is realising more and more that to observe the 
world is to participate in it, and that, frustrating as this may first seem to be, it is the most 
important clue of all to further knowledge.”97 Just as important as the recognition of the 
active observer was the other sense in which there was shift towards reflexivity: i.e. in the 
kind of systems that were under consideration. Whereas first-order cybernetics dealt 
primarily with controlled and relatively closed systems, second-order cybernetics deals 
with autonomous and more open systems, and in particular neo-cybernentics is 
concerned with understanding systems that can define their own goals.
 There are several strands of second-order cybernetic thinking that have been 
developed since the days of the Macy group. In the UK the trajectory set out by von 
Foerster in particular has fed into architectural discourse. This lineage includes notably 
Gordon Pask, Cedric Price, John Frazer and Ranulph Glanville, and later figures like Pete 
Silver and Stephen Gage. Glanville’s research has focused mainly on the question of 
teaching and learning as a cybernetic system: he considers the process of design to be a 
second-order cybernetic loop, suggesting that “the designer is the observer in circuit.” 
Much of this is a development and application of Gordon Pask’s work on Conversation 
Theory and Interaction of Actors Theory.98 For Glanville, design is interesting as it allows 
you to participate in two roles at the same time: as the drawer and the observer. Drawing 
therefore allows you to have a conversation with yourself. The senses, as Marx once said, 
become theoreticians through their own practice.
4.8 Gregory Bateson: Patterns that connect ecologies of mind
In retrospect, probably, the most interesting figure to emerge from the Macy events, and 
the various second-order discourses that followed, was Gregory Bateson, in whom all the 
potential and dilemmas of ecological thought in its broadest sense were played out. 
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Fig. 4.33 William Bateson aka WB (1861-1926) – the father of modern genetics
Fig. 4.34 and 4.35. Chladni Figures, produced by using sound to vibrate a plate upon which 
sand or other fine grained particles resonate. For William Bateson, Chladni Figures provided 
a metaphor for understanding organic form, and he speculated about how “resonance” might 
work in organismic morphogenesis. Rupert Sheldrake’s hypothesis of causative formation 
seems to rely upon a related conception of ‘morphic resonance’. 
 To be sure, Chladni Figures are a great means of grasping whole/part systems 
relations. Sanford Kwinter has in a recent paper used these figures in relation to the 
Deleuzian conception of the “virtual”. He suggests that in any given resonant pattern, the 
particles will tend towards an ideal form, which we can visualise, even though in any given 
instance the materialised pattern will be “imperfect”. He suggests that the ideal form that 
“underlies” any given instantiation of “the actual”, is “the virtual”, he states that “both the 
actual and the virtual structures are legible in the same image, though their ontological status 
remains perfectly distinct.”!⁵"
 These resonant patterns have also provided the basis for a range of holistc and 
sometimes mystical accounts of life, the universe, and everything, such as in Harmonic 
Resonance Theory.
Bateson moved through an extraordinary range of disciplines in his colourful career. 
Starting in biology, he later made important contributions to anthropology, psychiatry, 
ecology, aesthetics and media studies, and of course cybernetics and systems thinking in 
general. Adopted as something of a guru by the counter-culture in the 1960s, Bateson can 
properly be described, as Andrew Pickering has usefully suggested, as practising 
something approaching a free-thinking nomadic science, in the sense that Deleuze and 
Guattari referred to. Bateson himself bemoaned the difficulty of finding regular work as 
what he called a “freelance epistemologist!”
 Born in Grantchester, England, in 1904, Gregory Bateson was the youngest son of 
William Bateson, who himself was an important Victorian/Edwardian geneticist and 
biologist. In fact, WB (as the father was referred to) coined the term “genetics”, and 
following the rediscovery of the work of Gregor Mendel in 1900, he became one of the first 
to recognise the importance of Mendel’s work on hereditary traits as passed through the 
cross-breeding of peas.  The elder Bateson was broadly interested in a holistic approach 
to science, and considered how phenomena such as chladni figures (resonant patterns) 
might facilitate an understanding of whole/part relations in living organisms. William 
Bateson was closely associated with Alfred North Whitehead, both philosophically and 
personally, and was at heart a relational-process-based thinker.99
 Notably, William Bateson would challenge the dominant Darwinian interpretation of 
evolution as a gradual process, instead focusing on explaining the many discontinuous 
jumps through the study (teratology) of animal and plant symmetry and metamerism (i.e. 
mutations).100 In a fascinating book, Materials for the Study of Variation: Treated with 
special regard to Discontinuity in the Origin of Species, the elder Bateson drew together a 
wide range of ‘monstrous’ specimens from museum collections the world over that had 
tended to be ignored or marginalised. Discussing this part of his father’s work, Gregory 
Bateson notes that whilst: 
... it is difficult today to define precisely what it was that he was after… it is clear that 
he believed that an entirely new concept of the nature of living things would develop 
from the study of such phenomena. He held that ... natural selection could not be 
the only determinant of evolutionary change and that the genesis of variation could 
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Information and Symmetry Breaking
    
Fig. 4.36 and 4.37. In Materials for the Study of Variation – Treated with special regard to 
Discontinuity in the Origin of Species (1898), William Bateson took a wide variety of 
metameric examples, looking for what Gregory Bateson would later describe as ‘patterns 
that connect.’ 
Fig. 4.38 Whereas the older Bateson suggested a resonant field explanation, Gregory 
Bateson revisited the material in the light of a cybernetic-information theory approach. He 
would theorise the patterns of increasing symmetry as a loss of information – or to put it 
another way, he would define symmetry breaking as the introduction of new information. In 
papers such as ‘The Thing of it Is’, Gregory Bateson described embryological 
morphogenesis as a dialectic of symmetry and difference. He uses as one example the 
frog’s egg. Here the egg is waiting for information to start cell division. This information is 
provided by the entry point of the sperm. This process can be initiated in the frog’s egg by 
simply puncturing the egg with a fine point, such as a horse hair. The egg will start division, 
the initial plane of symmetry having thereby been defined, and this will go on to produce a 
living organism – although this being will not itself be able to reproduce, as it will be missing 
half of its genetic code.
not be a random matter. He therefore set out to demonstrate regularity and 
lawfulness among the phenomena of variability.101
In particular, William Bateson demonstrated that mutations frequently contain more 
symmetry than the norm, and developed the beginning of a conception of genetic 
information as symmetry breaking. This became known as “Bateson’s Rule”.102 Gregory 
Bateson did in fact return to consider this work by his father, and was able to resolve a 
series of what had been, until then, biological anomalies, in light of his own cybernetic 
conception of information flows and patterns of difference.103 
 William Bateson is thus of note to us here, simply because much of Gregory 
Bateson’s work ultimately explored the same non-conformist concerns about evolution 
and information. More than that, the concern with aesthetics as a mode of “second-order 
science” can be traced back to the father in several respects – most importantly through a 
shared interest in William Blake’s passionate critique of Newtonian science (see Fig. 
4.46). 
 Gregory Bateson first read natural science and later anthropology at Cambridge 
University in the 1920s. From 1927-30 he was engaged in anthropological fieldwork with 
the Iatmul tribe in New Guinea, where he first met Margaret Mead. Mead herself, as 
previously noted, would go on to become one of the most important anthropologists of the 
twentieth century, as well as playing a key role in the development of cybernetics. Bateson 
then returned to Cambridge as a research fellow for seven years, and wrote up his 
anthropological research as Naven, which was published in 1936. The same year he 
returned to anthropological field work with Mead – they were now married – but this time 
in Bali for two years. In 1939 they had a daughter, Mary Catherine Bateson, who would 
herself play an important role in the development of cybernetics and environmentalism. 
 Much of Bateson’s early anthropological work concerned studies of how learning 
occurs within individuals and groups. This required a study of the complex and multiple 
levels of communication that operate in such scenarios. He was concerned with how to 
understand and represent information flows – and the interactions of information flows – 
within social groups at various levels of meaning (myth, ritual, daily life). Clearly, Bateson 
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The Cybernetics of Cybernetics
   
Fig. 4.39 Diagram drawn by Gregory Bateson to show the difference between first-order and 
second-order cybernetics, in conversation between Stewart Brand, Gregory Bateson and 
Margaret Mead.
and Mead’s work had all kinds of relations with the contemporaneous development of 
structuralist anthropology by Claude Levi-Strauss in France. 
 In his anthropological work, Bateson considered human societies as analogous to 
organisms in themselves, with groups typically maintaining homeostasis through self-
regulation. He also described how certain social information flows would lead away from 
equilibrium, resulting in splits and the formation of new groups. These socio-informational 
processes were quite analogous, he noted, to the bio-informational processes of cell 
division in embryological development.
 In this early work, Bateson and Mead were already beginning to develop concepts 
that would prove critical to the development of post-war cybernetics. In Bali, Bateson 
focused on using photography and film as a means of identifying patterns of behaviour, in 
one of the first critical uses of modern media in anthropology.104 Importantly, Bateson had 
by this time developed a proto-cybernetic notion of feedback in his analysis of Balinese 
social systems and rituals, through his dialectical conception of schismogenesis. Most 
importantly, both Bateson and Mead were reflecting deeply upon the status of the field 
anthropologist, especially the fact that as observers they are inevitably interfering with that 
which they observed. However, their response was not to ignore this problem, nor to try to 
marginalise it. Rather, they recognise the need to theorise their practice, to work with the 
participatory feedback effects of their observing, as a form of interface. Bateson’s 
innovative use of the medium of photography and film was key to this process, and was 
self-consciously theorised as such in Bateson and Mead’s book on Balinese Character. 
Their conceptualisation of the observer’s participation in the system being observed would 
later, as noted, become a key insight of second-order cybernetics, and resonated with 
similar – and almost aesthetic – “discoveries” in both the natural and social sciences.105
 In a sense, already by this period Bateson had redrawn the boundary between 
different sciences, as well as between the sciences and humanities. Conventionally in 
western thought, we tend to think of a clear distinction between the natural sciences and 
the social sciences, albeit that all kinds of contemporary discourses – including Latour’s 
actor-network theory, Thrift’s nonrepresentational theory, and various strands of Marxian 
theory, not to mention the very processes of contemporary capital – are today once again 
critically rethinking and challenging boundaries between the sciences and humanities. 
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Fig. 4.40 Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead in the mosquito room at Tambunan, Bali in 
1938.
Fig. 4.41. Bateson (bottom left) at the ‘Western Round Table on Modern Art’, San Fransisco, 
California, in April 1949. George Boas is at the head of the table, Frank Lloyd Wright next to 
him, and Marcel Duchamp is two down.
  
Still, as famously bemoaned by C. P. Snow in his 1959 book on The Two Cultures, our 
dominant conception is that physics, chemistry and biology etc form the natural sciences, 
we then think of the social sciences as entirely distinct, producing a very different kind of 
knowledge. For Bateson there was a very different distinction to make, which was 
between living systems and non-living systems – or more specifically, between systems 
that organise themselves according to responses to differences, and those which do not. 
Living systems for Bateson would of course include organisms and ecosystems, but 
importantly would also include human social systems, such as families, social groups, and 
indeed cities. For Bateson, these differential systems cannot be properly comprehended 
through the quantification of mechanical categories such as mass and energy. Living 
systems are complex differential systems, and hence need to be understood through 
pattern and information flow, he argued. Living systems are always primarily 
communicational in character: they are semiotic material processes. For Bateson, 
therefore, it was entirely proper to think of human social systems and natural systems as 
essentially related, and perhaps fundamentally different in kind to non-living systems.106 
 These early years are often glossed over in accounts of Gregory Bateson’s 
influence on cybernetics, but are of crucial importance to the development of his thinking. 
Bateson critique of the dualisms at the heart of western epistemology starts in this initial 
period. He was clearly struggling with ways to go beyond the limits of mechanical 
materialism or the problems of supernatural idealism. In his attempt to get beyond the 
dualism of mind and matter, nature and culture, Bateson shares much with the dialectical 
techniques of Hegel and Marx, and indeed he has been described, not inaccurately, as an 
“Hegelian Ecologist”.
 Gregory Bateson was of course a British citizen, and with the outbreak of hostilities 
in 1939 he was sent to the USA, apparently with the remit of building support amongst 
American intellectuals for their country to enter the war. While over there, Bateson had a 
variety of jobs, including working for what would become the Institute of Intercultural 
Studies (later led by Margaret Mead, and then Mary Catherine Bateson, before it finally 
ceased activity in 2009), and also working at the Museum of Modern Art in New York as a 
film analyst. Crucially, he was in New York in 1942 for the first Macy Group meeting 
entitled “Cerebral Inhibition”, which is where he first met Warren McCulloch.
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Fig. 4.42 Wonko the Sane (aka John Lilly - see footnote 110) and Burgess Meredith (sitting) 
– on board a dolphin interface machine; note the underwater organ keyboard behind Lilly’s 
head!
Fig. 4.43 Gregory Bateson looks out his port window at Sea Life Park, 1965.
 
 After the Macy Conferences, Bateson went on what was by any standards an 
extraordinary intellectual journey. He had a canonical impact within psychiatry, making 
important contributions to theorising the role that communication and informational 
systems play in processes as varied as family, self, and learning.107  Notably, he mentored 
Richard Bandler and John Grinder whilst they founded neuro-linguistic programming 
(NLP), and as the leader of the Palo Alto Group, he formulated the concept of “double-
bind” as a critique and extension of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s and Bertrand Russell’s Theory 
of Logical Types.108 Bateson would go on to document experiments with LSD,109 and 
along with John Lilly110 he studied learning and communication in dolphins.111 He would 
later turn to a consideration of all biological processes as being essentially 
epistemological structures.112 For Bateson, the common aspect to all his research was the 
study of how communication and learning works – and notably, fails – in organised 
systems and networks, whether personal, social, material or ecological. Through his 
distinctive analysis of the human subjectivity and sense of self as the (frequently 
pathological)113 product of a network of mental fields or communication ecologies, both 
natural and artificial, within and beyond the individual organism, he became an important 
influence on a generation of artists and intellectuals.114 Although I will consider Bateson’s 
ecological conception of mental processes further in the next chapter, suffice it to say here 
that he argued that mental process is a property that is ubiquitous in organised material 
systems – and in particular those systems organised to such a degree that we define 
them as living. Regarding the nexus of mental processes that define human subjectivity, 
he stated that:
... the total self-corrective unit which processes information, or as I say, ‘thinks’, 
‘acts’ and ‘decides’, is a system whose boundaries do not at all coincide with the 
boundaries either of the body or of what is popularly called the ‘self’ or 
‘consciousness’.115
 Bateson became increasingly engaged with the question of environmental 
degradation, and as such was adopted by many in the 1960s counter-culture movement 
as an icon and leader. He was always careful to distance himself from both the more 
nostalgic and the more politically radical forms aspects of the counter-culture. 
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Nonetheless, like others – notably Stafford Beer, Ross Ashby, Ronnie Lang, Alan Watts, 
Francisco Varela and Evan Thompson – Bateson became increasingly fascinated by the 
similarities between Buddhist and cybernetic conceptions of mind. He spent his final years 
at the Esalen Institute in Big Sur, California, and died in 1980 at the Zen Centre there.116 
Describing his relationship to the broader counter-culture movement, Bateson stated that 
I have, after all, chosen to live at Esalen, in the midst of the counterculture, with its 
incantations, its astrological searching for truth, its divination by yarrow root, its 
herbal medicines, its diets, its yoga, and all the rest. My friends here love me and I 
love them, and I discover more and more that I cannot live anywhere else. I am 
appalled by my scientific colleagues, and while I disbelieve almost everything that is 
believed by the counterculture, I find it more comfortable to live with that disbelief 
than with the dehumanising disgust and horror that conventional occidental themes 
and ways of life inspire in me. They are so successful and their beliefs are so 
heartless.117
Bateson’s entire career might in a sense be understood as a personal double-bind 
relationship with science, which he insisted – anticipating later social constructivist and 
actor-network positions – had to transform the way it conceived of its performed and 
produced knowledge: “the point is that the ways of nineteenth century thinking are 
becoming rapidly bankrupt, and new ways are growing out of cybernetics, systems theory, 
ecology, meditation, psychoanalysis, and psychedelic experience.”118 Ultimately, as Sergio 
Manghi has argued:
... the ‘ecological’ language created by Bateson, in particular starting in the 1960s, 
has to be considered one of the most important attempts of the 20th century to 
rethink the human condition in the planetary era. It was … an attempt to explore in 
depth our being part of larger systems – interpersonal, social and natural ...119
As Verena Andermatt Conley has also noted, “Bateson exercised a decisive influence on 
many French thinkers of 1968,”120  and in particular his concept of the “double-bind” has 
had an important afterlife in post-structuralist philosophy, notably in the work of Jaques 
Derrida, Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. For Derrida, Bateson’s conception of the 
“double-bind” and “difference” would be influential, and indeed it could be said that 
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following Bateson’s communications-based description of the totality of living systems, 
there is nothing outside of the text. 
 Bateson used the concept of the “double-bind” to develop an important theory of 
schizophrenia, as both an individual and a social condition. He argued that these 
conditions were not clinical (and therefore unsuitable for the pharmacological, surgical and 
electrical treatments that dominated psychiatry in that period), but were rather based in 
the ecology of external and internal relationships that constitute selves:  
... what I am suggesting is that the process whereby double binds and other 
traumas teach us a false epistemology is already well advanced in most occidentals 
and perhaps most Orientals, and that those whom we call schizophrenics are those 
in whom the endless kicking against the pricks has become intolerable.121
 Bateson’s work on schizophrenia was taken up by R.D. Laing in particular, and 
became a key part of the anti-psychiatry movement. Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari 
have acknowledged the importance of Bateson’s work in the formation of their project in 
Anti-Oeidipus and Mille Plateaux. As well as being hugely indebted to Bateson’s 
exploration of schizophrenia – “In short, the ‘double-bind’ is none other than the whole of 
Oeidipus [their italics]”122 – they also named their seminal book Mille Plateaux after 
Bateson’s use of the term: 
Gregory Bateson uses the word ‘plateau’ to designate something very special: a 
continuous, self-vibrating region of intensities whose development avoids any 
orientation towards a culmination point or external end.123 
More than that, though, it is fairly clear that the entire conception of a rhizomatic ecology 
of flows between desiring machines and social machines that characterises Deleuze and 
Guattari’s account owes much to Bateson’s imagination. And of course, Guattari drew 
heavily upon Bateson’s “ecology of mind” in his book, The Three Ecologies. 
 It became increasingly clear to Bateson that it was a particular conception of mind 
as a description of communicative processes in material systems that characterised the 
broad locus of his research, whether he was working with social formations in Bali, or 
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cybernetics at the Macy Conferences, or family and individual therapy in Palo Alto, or 
dolphins in Hawaii, or the environmental question in general. He noted that:
 
I do not need schizophrenic patients or unhappy families to give my thinking 
empirical roots. I can use art, poetry or porpoises or the cultures of New Guinea or 
Manhattan, or my own dreams or the comparative anatomy of flowering plants. 124 
Bateson’s conception of mind had much to say specifically about the human social 
condition, but was much broader than that, in that it equated cognition – as Humberto 
Maturana and Francisco Varela would soon after repeat in defining the project of their 
Santiago School – with the most fundamental processes of living systems.125 Throughout 
this period, Bateson continuously reflected upon lessons from his various research 
practices in relation to the profound epistemological challenges to the “linear” formal logic 
of western thought that were raised by the circular – and later more complex and 
recursive – causality of cybernetics . Bateson drew upon an increasing number of logical 
models to work with and theorise ecological systems of various kinds. For much of his 
career he was strongly grounded in various forms of set theory. Notably, his “double-bind” 
theories were based in his adaptations of the set theory and typological hierarchies of 
Whitehead and Russell’s earlier theory of logical types. He also worked with Ross Ashby’s 
related theory of step changes (as in the “steps” in Steps to an Ecology of Mind). Bateson 
increasingly shifted away from circuit based analysis towards field based models, and 
thus from set theory to group theory.126 In this way, he shifted his intellectual concern from 
circularity to the notion of recursion, noting for example that: 
... it appears that the idea of ‘logical typing’ when transplanted from the abstract 
realms inhabited by mathematicological philosophers to the hurly-burly of 
organisms, takes on a very different appearance. Instead of a hierarchy of classes, 
we face a hierarchy of orders of recursiveness.127
Here he worked notably with the epigentic landscape mathematics of his lifelong 
colleague, Charles Waddington (a Marxian-Whiteheadian biologist), and the related 
Catastrophe Theory of Réne Thom. As the idea of recursion became more important to 
Bateson, he worked with another colleague, George Spencer Brown, who wrote Laws of 
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Form. Francisco Varela’s new work became an important influence in his final years, in 
particular Varela’s dialectical “3 part star calculus”.128 
 Drawing upon all of these inputs, Bateson developed what he described as an 
ecological theory of mind. In this theory, he defined mind – or more accurately, mental 
process – through six criteria.129 He stated that if all criteria are met, “I shall unhesitatingly 
say that the aggregate is a mind, and shall expect that, if I am to understand the 
aggregate, I shall need different sorts of explanations from those which would suffice to 
explain the smallest parts.”130 Bateson was clear in this statement that the key defining 
characteristic of mental process is that it exhibits something closely related to what we 
would today call emergence131 – that is to say, that the organised “whole” exhibits new 
properties of its own. Importantly, for Bateson the new whole is of a different logical type in 
relation to the parts considered in isolation.132 Bateson’s definition of mind is such that it 
specifically includes processes such as embryological morphogenesis133 and evolution134 
as mental processes, in that they are based upon structured responses to differences. In 
fact he states that “thought, evolution, ecology, life, learning occur only in systems that 
satisfy these criteria.”135 Bateson’s description of natural, social and personal systems as 
phenomena that share organisational and epistemological structures, which needed to be 
thought of as being mental in character, was a distinct and proto-dialectical solution to the 
problem of emergence, based upon a pattern of internal relations, and a relational 
conception of space and time – and thus it has much to bring to the issues raised in the 
first chapter.
 Bateson never engaged with Karl Marx’s thought in any sustained theoretical 
sense.136 There is however a distinct pattern which connects these two thinkers. Both 
were fundamentally grounded in a philosophy of internal relations. Both saw 
consciousness as a phenomenon that frequently and dangerously obscures its own 
conditions of emergence. And both interpret the modern conceptual division between 
nature and culture as a particular form of false consciousness. As Jesper Hoffmeyer has 
argued: 
... as soon as we accept the reality of … relative being, we also immediately see the 
significance of Bateson’s lifelong attempt to determine the pattern that connects ... 
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nature and culture. Semiosis is constitutive to both of these realms, evolution and 
thinking are made up of the same stuff, and the name for this stuff is relative 
being.137
 In some sense a link between Bateson and Marx was clearly established in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s intellectual project, which as noted arguably took a number of 
Bateson’s ideas (in particular concerning the dual personal/cultural character of 
schizophrenia) and combined them with Marxian thinking, relating the emergence of the 
schizophrenic condition to the growth of capitalism specifically (and the various systems 
and processes associated with it). However, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that Bateson 
failed to really leave behind his role as a bourgeois scientist, which meant that Bateson’s 
work, and practice, would always be susceptible to recuperation138 by what they refer to 
as Integrated World Capitalism (IWC):   
... the scientist as such has no revolutionary potential; he is the first integrated agent 
of integration, a refuge for bad conscience, and the forced destroyer of his own 
creativity ... Gregory Bateson begins by fleeing the civilised world, by becoming an 
ethnologist and following the primitive codes and savage blows; then he turns in the 
direction of flows that are more and more decoded, those of schizophrenia, from 
which he extracts an interesting psychoanalytic theory; then, still in search of a 
beyond, of another wall to break through, he turns to dolphins, to the language of 
dolphins, to flows that are even stranger and more deterritorialised. But where does 
the dolphin flux end, if not with the basic research projects of the American army, 
which brings us back to preparations for war and to the absorption of surplus 
value.139
There is no doubt much truth in this critique, and it would be accurate to say that Gregory 
Bateson was never directly a political thinker. Indeed, Peter Harries-Jones suggests that 
Bateson was a distinctly “post-political” theorist.140 Certainly, the statement by Niklaus 
Luhmann – a later cybernetic social systems theorist – that “it had always been clear to 
me that a thoroughly constructed conceptual theory of society would be much more 
radical and much more discomforting in its effects than narrowly focused criticisms – 
criticisms of capitalism for instance – could ever imagine,”141  would seem to capture 
something similar to Bateson’s broad ecological “post-political” position too.
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Ecological Aesthetics
       
Fig. 4.44 William Blake, Satan Exulting over Eve (1795). There are few essays by Gregory 
Bateson which do not refer to William Blake in some way. Harries-Jones describes Bateson’s 
entire oeuvre as a continuation of Blake’s “aesthetic attack on the dualism of natural 
science”. Most notably, perhaps, Bateson talked of an ecological aesthetics as a second 
vision, as a supplement and transformation of what Blake described as the single vision of 
modern science. Gregory Bateson’s father, William Bateson, was a collector of Blake prints, 
and the younger Bateson grew up surrounded by Blake’s work. According to his daughter 
Mary Catherine Bateson, in his childhood her father had lived with this original watercolour 
hung in the dining room (it is now in the Tate Britain), and it had a particular significance.
 Of course, Bateson did work and collaborate with many radical political thinkers. At 
the invitation of R.D. Laing, in July 1967 Bateson participated in the founding event of the 
Antiuniversity of London – entitled “The Dialectics of Liberation” – which was held at the 
Roundhouse in Camden, along with Frankfurt School theorist Herbert Marcuse, beat poet 
Allen Ginsberg, postcolonial theorist CLR James, and Stokely Carmichael of the Black 
Panther Party.142 The following year, Bateson organised a conference to discuss the 
emerging environmental crisis, called “The Effects of Conscious Purpose on Human 
Adaptation”, at which he invited the socialist and ecological campaigner Barry Commoner 
to give the opening address to a select group of invited intellectuals and activists. 
However, at the end of this conference, Bateson insisted that the group needed to focus 
on “epistemological” rather than political work in confronting the environmental question. 
As Noel Charlton has summarised: 
Bateson had long-standing doubts about the possibility of correcting our damaging 
ecological behaviour from within the radically dualist understanding of the world that 
we have. We see mind as separate from physical body, man as separate from 
nature, and the self as separate from all that we relate with. He thought that any 
attempt to put things right from within that framework of assumptions would be 
useless, possibly disastrous, and he saw the way humans develop and use 
‘conscious purpose’ as our most dangerous feature.143
For Bateson, our consciousness is therefore problematic in that we are not (and perhaps 
cannot be) conscious of our whole mind, or indeed all of our minds. However, the nature 
of consciousness obscures that fact by making us think that we can or do actually know it 
all (or at least its limits). When the loops of consciousness are amplified through 
technology, the effects can be highly problematic for the individual, and also for society 
and environment. There was for Bateson “a systematic difference between the conscious 
views of self and the world and the true nature of self and the world”,144 which produces 
“systemic distortions of view which, when implemented by modern technology, become 
destructive of the balances between man, human society, and the ecosystem of the 
planet.” However, Bateson argued, in a quasi-romantic sense, that although much of mind 
is inaccessible to modern human consciousness, we are nonetheless able to access or 




Fig. 4.45 Bateson had an intellectual exercise that he would set students, based upon a 
variation of the cybernetic concept of the black box (see footnote 68 in this chapter). Bateson 
would present the students with a crab, lobster or conch shell, and ask them to “produce 
arguments that which will convince me that these objects are the remains of living things.” It 
is a fascinating challenge. He suggests that it is necessary to engage with the object 
aesthetically, “with recognition and empathy. By aesthetic, I mean responsiveness to the 
pattern which connects.”
 There is of course no simple correct answer to this challenge, but the discussion 
involves recognising patterns and structures, and speculating what processes and relations 
they might have internalised and networked in space and in time. Students might speculate 
whether it is feasible to imagine that non-living geological, technical or chemical processes 
are able to produce such an object, but must then end up by questioning at what level of 
complexity or form of processes would a geological or chemical process become “life”? In 
Mind and Nature, Bateson describes a distinctive internal relations approach to the challenge 
posed, whereby patterns of correspondence within and between shell parts are organised 
into a hierarchy of logical types. Bateson ultimately asks: “What pattern connects the crab to 
the lobster and the orchid to the primrose and all four of them to me? And me to you?”!⁵⁴
So by ‘aesthetics’ I mean responsiveness to the pattern which connects. The pattern 
which connects is a meta-pattern. It is a pattern of patterns. It is that meta-pattern 
which defines the vast generalisation that indeed it is patterns which connect.145
Whilst Bateson saw himself as a scientist, his ultimate project must be understood as an 
attempt to transform the very basis of science (a revolutionary task which Deleuze and 
Guattari wanted to claim as their own), in order to introduce a second vision – an 
ecological aesthetics.146 Bateson suggested that processes of empathy might be key to 
achieving a connection with the extended ecology of mind in which we are immersed (and 
which we damage by trying to stamp on our “single vision”). Over the coming chapters 
therefore, I will frequently return to consider Bateson’s ecological conception of mind and 
its legacy in relation to contemporary research in cognitive science, particularly embodied 
and extended mind theory. More specifically, I will suggest that a new exploration of the 
origins of the concept of empathy in nineteenth-century spatial aesthetics might open up 
some interesting ways to renew Bateson’s project.
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5. Ecologies of Extended Minds
All Bibles or sacred codes, have been the causes of the following errors: 1. That man has 
two real existing principles, viz: a Body and a Soul ... but the following Contraries to these 
are true. 1. Man has no body distinct from his soul, for that call’d Body is a portion of Soul 
discern’d by the five Senses, the chief inlets of Soul in this age.1
[William Blake]
5.1 Dualist Legacies
Gregory Bateson introduced the problematic legacy of mind/body and mind/matter 
dualism, using the above quote from Blake, at the opening session of his 1968 conference 
on “The Effects of Conscious Purpose on Human Adaptation”. Of course, Bateson had 
spent his whole life exploring, in different ways, the problems that emerge from the 
formulation of mind and matter as separate entities. As soon as that division is made – a 
division which can seem like common sense if we reflect (or fail to reflect) upon our 
experience in a particular way – then a whole series of epistemological errors will 
inevitably play out. For Bateson, in the western tradition this resulted in what he saw as 
the disastrous and near symmetrical binary of supernatural idealism and mechanical 
materialism:
The two ideas are intimately related. And the relation between them is most clearly 
seen when we think of the mind/matter dualism as a device for removing one half of 
the problem for explanation from that other half which could be more easily 
explained. Once separated, mental phenomena could be easily ignored. This act of 
subtraction of course, left the half that could be explained as excessively 
materialistic, while the other half became totally supernatural … materialistic science 
has concealed this wound by generating its own set of superstitions … [primarily] 
the belief (not usually stated) that quantity (a purely material notion) can determine 
pattern.2
Bateson would spend much of his time trying to explain, in a variety of ways, that pattern, 
or quality, is a relationship between quantities – a ratio – and that this is of an entirely 
different, though immanent, nature. In this chapter, I will turn to consider further the trans-
disciplinary intersection of ecology, and environmental systems thinking and the cognitive 
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sciences, as it has developed in recent theory. The kind of expanded definition of the 
domain of architectural knowledge, design and aesthetics that seems to be key to seeing 
the “environmental question” today requires working through this material. 
5.2 Ideology - A Materialism of the Mind
In its common everyday use, to describe someone’s thinking as ideological is to suggest 
that they cannot think independently for themselves. Nonetheless, it has frequently been 
observed that those who claim to be free of ideology, or in no need of it, are simply in the 
unconscious grip of an older ideological mindset. Ideology in this sense has a complex 
relationship to transparency, in that dominant ideologies often seem to disappear, as they 
take on the forms of 'common sense'. For many Marxist theorists, ideology is in this way a 
form of false consciousness: an imaginary, non-transparent relationship between a subject 
and their real conditions of existence. 
 When we talk about ideology in architecture, we might therefore be referring either 
to architectural theory in a straightforward sense or to forms of false consciousness. For 
the Marxist architectural historian and critic, Manfredo Tafuri, these two readings are 
intertwined in the very concept of “architectural ideology”, which for him describes the 
particular role that architectural theory plays in the reproduction of capitalism.3 
 Still, it is important to note, as Terry Eagleton reminds us: 
... this is not at all how the term ‘ideology’ started life. Ideology means literally the 
study or knowledge of ideas; and as such belongs to the great dream of the 
eighteenth century Enlightenment, that it might be possible to chart the human mind 
with the sort of delicate precision with which we can map the motions of the body.4 
Ideology in this original sense is more like a mix of cultural theory and cognitive science, 
or what Eagleton describes as the possibility that the “most obscure and elusive of 
realities, consciousness itself, could be scientifically known”, through what he suggestively 
describes as “a materialism of the mind.”5
  The term “ideology” was in fact first coined by the French revolutionary Destutt de 
Tracy from a prison cell during the Terror, as a part of what he called zoology, which for 
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him meant a new science of humanity. Eagleton argues – usefully reminding us that there 
is always an immanent politics to any definition of mind – that: 
Ideology ... belongs to modernity – to the brave new epoch of secular, scientific 
rationality which aims to liberate men from and women from their mystifications and 
irrationalisms, their false reverence for God, aristocrat and monarch, and restore to 
them instead their dignity as fully rational, self determined beings. It is the bourgeois 
revolution at the level of the mind itself; and its ambition is nothing less than to 
restore mind from the ground up, dissecting the ways we receive and combine our 
sense-data so as to intervene in this process and deflect it to desirable political 
ends.6 
This materialism of mind was itself then an ideological project which aimed at rendering 
transparent, and therefore open to self-conscious control and improvement, the 
production of human consciousness. Ideology in this sense is – to paraphrase Lukacs – 
an immanent critique of the human mind by the mind.
 Over the course of the last two centuries the concept of ideology has however 
shifted and expanded from this original conception.  For Marx and Engels, the term is a 
key concept in their first major joint work, The German Ideology, a book which provided 
the basis of much of the following development of the concept. Written between April and 
June 1845, this text marks their decisive break with their Young Hegelian colleagues, 
whose work they collectively refer to in the title. 
 In this text, Marx and Engels argue that Young Hegelian philosophy was either still 
in the grip of forms of Hegelian idealism – that is to say, it describes mind and 
consciousness as existing outside of, or determining, the material world – or that this 
idealist position has been replaced, but by a mechanical materialism, as in the case of 
Feuerbach. Marx and Engels’ ultimate project, of course, was to synthesise and transcend 
the philosophical positions of both idealism and what Marx refers to in the Theses on 
Feuerbach as “all hitherto existing materialism,” through the development of a dialectical 
and an historical materialism – or, what I suggest, we might today further develop into a 
cybernetic or an ecological materialism. 
 In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels make the term ideology do a number of 
jobs. They are still working with the concept in its original Enlightenment sense, in that 
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their text contains the idea of a materialism of mind. But they are also starting to use it to 
describe what they see as the error of idealism: the apparent ontological and 
epistemological primacy given to mind over matter. They argue that, on the contrary, 
human consciousness is produced from out of our active practical and historical 
engagement with matter. “Consciousness is,” they argue, “from the very beginning a 
social product.”7 However they also argue that this consciousness is not necessarily in 
any way a transparent or accurate mapping of the territory of practical material activity. 
Indeed, consciousness is able to obscure the very conditions of its own production: 
“morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of 
consciousness” are, they contend, “echoes ... phantoms formed in the human brain ... 
sublimates of their material life-process.”8
 Specifically, in a typically dialectical turn, they argue that the idealism of their 
former colleagues is itself ideological in a second sense, since it is itself a historically 
specific reflection of the class conditions of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German 
intellectuals. Ideology is, in this sense, as later expressed by Lukacs, a particular form of 
false consciousness. As Marx and Engels state in a frequently quoted passage (which I 
will go on to argue anticipates in all kinds of interesting ways the phenomenological 
cybernetics of Bateson, Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and others): 
... consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the 
existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their 
circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon 
arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on 
the retina does from their physical life-process.9
5.3 Gregory Bateson and the Cybernetics of Mind
In many ways, when Marx and Engels state that “life is not determined by consciousness, 
but consciousness by life,”10 they were still not yet being dialectical enough: they too, 
were constrained by the ideological imperatives of their own text. As the cybernetic 
biologists, Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela,  have argued in recent decades 
(and as discussed in Chapter Three), the very processes of life, at a cellular level, should 
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be described as cognitive acts, in that they are decision-based interactions between – and 
co-constituting – an organism and its environment. Hence it is more accurate to describe 
a series of feedback loops that show how life determines mind determines life, which for 
humans produces specific historical forms of species-mind. This kind of argument was 
indeed first proposed in this form by Gregory Bateson in the 1950s and 60s. 
 Bateson, I believe, developed something very similar to Marx and Engels’ critique 
of the Young Hegelians. Just as Marx and Engels moved beyond both idealism and all 
previous materialism, Bateson too proposes a theory of mind which, in his words, is 
“neither supernatural nor mechanical”11. The key to Bateson’s model is a conception of 
“mental process” which is based upon responses to information, which he defines as any 
“difference that makes a difference.”12           
 For Bateson, the living world is full of minds which are all produced through 
material practice: they are minds that are constituted relationally, in networks, through 
their activity, their “actual life-process”. Bateson thus sees ecosystems as ecologies of 
minds. He also sees organisms as ecologies of minds. Human consciousness for Bateson 
is extended across and within these ecologies, as an ecological condition itself, and is not 
in any simple way solely located in the individual brain. Bateson’s ecological conception of  
mental processes as a series of environmentally extended minds is a properly ideological 
project in the original enlightenment sense: a materialism of mind. 
 Bateson’s work anticipated by decades the recent turn in the cognitive sciences 
towards various conceptions of “extended mind” (albeit of course a conception that has a 
long philosophical history, most notably perhaps in Hegelianism). For Bateson, we are 
constantly participating in cognitive systems that extend throughout our environment. He 
states (dramatically prefiguring Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis) that: 
... the individual mind is immanent but not only in the body. It is immanent also in the 
pathways and messages outside of the body; and there is a larger Mind of which the 
individual mind is only a subsystem. This larger Mind is comparable to God and is 
perhaps what some people mean by ‘God’, but it is still immanent in the total 
interconnected social system and planetary ecology.13
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We can I believe (no doubt controversially to some) find something similar in Marx, who 
adopted Leibig’s systems biology concept of metabolism (“stoffwechsel”) throughout 
Capital, and arguably inherited from Hegel something of an extended mind, and extended 
organ, conception of the environment. Marx states: “plants, animals, stones, air, light, etc 
theoretically form a part of human consciousness ... Man lives from nature, nature is his 
body.”14
 Bateson’s position regarding the ubiquity of mind in both natural and technical 
systems and ecologies varied, depending upon the argument he was making. At times he 
would state for example that:
 
... the elementary cybernetic system with its messages in circuit is, in fact, the 
simplest unit of mind; more complicated systems are perhaps more worthy to be 
called mental systems, but essentially this is what we are talking about.15
This clearly suggests that any feedback system contains mental process at some level, 
and he states that “the mental characteristics of a system are immanent, not in some part, 
but in the system as a whole.”16 Now, clearly, this depends upon what you define as a 
feedback loop, on the basis of internal relations. That can certainly include on occasion, 
for Bateson, non-living systems – and indeed he uses steam valves and thermostats as 
examples of basic mental systems. Yet elsewhere, when making a slightly different 
argument, he would also state that:
... there are of course many systems which have many parts, ranging from galaxies 
to sand dunes to toy locomotives. Far be it from me to say that all of these are 
minds or contain minds or engage in mental process. The toy locomotive may 
become a part in that mental system which includes the child that plays with it, and 
the galaxy may become a part of the mental system which includes the astronomer 
and his telescope. But the objects do not become thinking subsystems in those 
larger minds. The criteria are useful only in combination.17 
It is clear from the following statement that for Bateson the issue of understanding what 
mind is ultimately depends upon a philosophy of internal relations: 
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... in a word, I do not believe that subatomic particles are ‘minds’ in my sense 
because I do believe that … the explanation of mental phenomena must always 
reside in the organisation and interrelation of multiple parts ... if de Chardin and 
Butler are right in supposing that the atomies have no internal differentiation and are 
still endowed with mental characteristics, then all explanation is impossible, and we, 
as scientists, should close shop and go fishing.18 
Whilst Bateson was here describing an internal relations based conception of mind, he 
seems not to have accepted a relational-process account of matter itself (which I touched 
upon in Chapter Two, and will return to later in this chapter). Whilst, to be sure, a entity 
with no internal differentiation could have no mental properties, such an object is surely 
inconceivable?19 However, Bateson does seem to shift position on the extent to which he 
saw all matter as actually internally differentiated and organised in a mental sense. 
Certainly, on other occasions he would state that mind is a property of all systemically 
organised matter, and he had yet to come across any other kind of matter.
 Whatever the case regarding the extent to which Bateson’s thinking opens out to a 
full-blown panpsychism or pantheism – or perhaps is just better understood as a form of 
hylozoism – it is clear that he saw mind as being ubiquitous in organised living systems. It 
is important then to note here that this does not at all mean that he regarded mind as 
consciousness. In fact, Bateson sees consciousness as peculiar, and in need of careful 
explanation. He was in a sense taking the opposite side of the Freudian position. Rather 
than presuming that consciousness is normal, and that the unconscious is mysterious and 
in need of explanation, Bateson suggests that the natural world is full of unconscious 
mental process or mind: that is what ecosystems (and indeed social ecologies) are. It is 
our consciousness that he considers to be in need of explanation, as a particular form of 
self-recursive and self-reflective mental activity. Indeed, in one instance Bateson 
described human consciousness as a recent evolutionary arrival that we should be very 
suspicious of! He wrote that: 
… the bits and pieces of mind which appear before consciousness invariably give a 
false picture of mind as a whole. The systemic character of mind is never there 
depicted, because the sampling is governed by purpose. We never see in 
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consciousness that the mind is like an ecosystem – a self-corrective network of 
circuits. We only see arcs of these circuits.
And the instinctive vulgarity of scientists consists precisely in mistaking these arcs 
for the larger truth, i.e., thinking that because what is seen by consciousness has 
one character, the total mind must have the same character. Freud’s personified 
‘ego’, ‘id’, ‘super-ego’ are, in fact not, truly personified at all. Each of his components 
is constructed in the image of only consciousness (even though the component may 
be unconscious) and the ‘consciousness’ does not resemble a total person. The 
isolated consciousness is necessarily depersonified. The whole iceberg does not 
have those characteristics which could be guessed at from looking only at what is 
above water. I mean: the iceberg does – mind does not. Mind is not like an 
iceberg.20
 For Bateson, consciousness in the modern human psyche is actually just a small 
part of our total extended mind, but takes on an ideological form which obscures that fact. 
He stated: 
... if consciousness has feedback upon the remainder of mind and if consciousness 
deals only with a skewed sample of the events of the total mind, then there must 
exist a systematic (i.e., non-random) difference between the conscious views of self 
and the world and the true nature of self and the world. Such a difference must 
distort the processes of adaption... It is suggested that the specific nature of this 
distortion is such that the cybernetic nature of self and the world tends to be 
imperceptible to consciousness, insofar as the contents of the ‘screen’ of 
consciousness are determined by considerations of purpose.21
It is worth noting here, briefly, that Bateson’s use of the terms “mind” and “consciousness” 
is in some way the reverse of the standard use to be found in Buddhist and other 
mindfulness traditions of thought – and also, therefore, as we shall see, amongst some 
cognitive science thinkers in so far as they have been influenced by these traditions.22 
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5.4 The Nature of Mind
It's not what is inside the head that is important, it's what the head is inside of.23
J.J. Gibson
It has been widely observed that thinking about the nature of mind has been transformed 
significantly over the last decade, and certainly in the forty years since Bateson issued his 
monistic challenge to dualist conceptions of mind and matter. For most of the post-war 
period, prior to the last decade, there were three distinct disciplines which each produced 
quite separate forms of knowledge concerning the question of “what is mind?” Firstly, 
there was of course the philosophy of mind: a sub-discipline of philosophy. Then there 
was cognitive science, a discipline which emerged out of early cybernetics discourse but 
which focused in particular on Artificial Intelligence (AI) and understanding mind through 
the analysis of symbolic systems. Finally, there was neuroscience: the study of the biology 
of the physical brain. In addition to these three core disciplines, there were also 
psychology and psychiatry, which researched the states of mind of living humans; 
anthropology, which considers how mind and consciousness varies geographically and 
historically; and more recently evolutionary psychology, which has speculated about how 
human consciousness arose in prehistory. Of course, other disciplines – not least art, 
aesthetics and theology – would also stake claims to producing knowledge concerning the 
nature of mind. Increasingly, contemporary research in all of these areas has the 
character of hybrid assemblages of philosophy of mind, cognitive science and 
neuroscience, and is increasingly being categorised under the disciplinary heading of “the 
cognitive sciences”. Andy Clark describes the current condition well: 
... the philosophy of cognitive science has something of the flavour of a random walk 
on a rubber landscape. No one knows quite where they are going, and every step 
anyone takes threatens to change the whole of the surrounding scenery.24
Before considering how the boundaries between many of these disciplines have become 
blurred in much recent work, it will be useful to briefly describe the distinctions and 
interactions between these various areas of knowledge, introduced through some of the 
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more relevant approaches and terms generally referred to, which have been formulated in 
the philosophy of mind. 
 We can start with the most fundamental of divisions produced by philosophers of 
mind: that between materialism and idealism in the most general sense alluded to above. 
Materialism of course holds that mind is in some way a product of matter, whereas 
idealism holds that matter is either an illusion, or that it is a product of mind – typically the 
mind of God.  In these forms, both materialism and idealism are monist philosophies, in 
that they each hold that there is no fundamental ontological distinction between mind and 
matter (each positing one aspect as fundamental to and constitutive of the other). 
 There are other forms of monism. Neutral monism, for example, holds that neither 
matter nor mind are ontologically fundamental, but both are rather manifestations of 
another more fundamental underlying unifying substance. Both Leibniz and Spinoza can, 
in different ways, be described as neutral monists. It is worth noting that a significant 
minority of contemporary theoretical physicists have described themselves in ways that 
are closely related to neutral monism (often post-Bohmian thinkers, such as Roger 
Penrose). Dialectical monism is similar to neutral monism, again positing a deep 
fundamental unity of what is. Taoism and Buddhism have been described as dialectical 
monisms, and unsurprisingly, many cybernetic theorists – notably Ross Ashby, Gregory 
Bateson, Stafford Beer, Evan Thompson and Fransisco Varela – have found much to 
discuss in the practical phenomenology of mind contained in Taoist and Buddhist 
“mindfullness” practice. 
 Dualism (or more specifically, substance dualism), by contrast, holds that mind and 
matter are quite distinct entities. Substance dualism was most famously and influentially 
espoused by René Descartes in the seventeenth century and has been enormously 
influential in western thinking in a structural sense ever since, even whilst his particular 
version of it has not, as such, been seen as a credible solution.25 
 Whilst philosophical idealism remains an important intellectual tradition, it cannot 
be said to contribute in any straight-forward way to the contemporary theorisations of 




 In distinction to substance dualisms, there is another kind of dualism, property 
dualism, which holds that there is only one substance (typically either matter, or 
something more fundamental) – but that this substance intrinsically exhibits two 
properties, i.e. mind and materiality. Paradoxically, then, neutral monism can be seen as a 
form of property dualism. 
 Nonetheless, most contemporary philosophies of mind are a form of materialism, 
and fall into one of two categories: reductive physicalism and non-reductive physicalism. 
Reductive physicalism holds that consciousness is simply an epiphenomenon of the 
material processes of the brain. It holds that our experience is a by-product of 
unconscious biological processes, and has no causal agency in itself. This is a fairly 
widespread position in the underlying ideology of contemporary scientific practice and 
modern culture more broadly (if less so amongst actual scientists “in conversation”), 
although it can bring with it obvious problems. Most notably, it can be difficult, if not 
impossible, to account for free will, and more importantly it tends to dismiss human 
experience per se as trivial (and paradoxically thereby in practice tends towards re-
inscribing a new dualism). When articulated in the language of emergence, reductive 
physicalism asserts that consciousness emerges weakly from matter: it is a purely bottom-
up emergence, an incidental surface decoration. 
 Non-reductive physicalism, by distinction, holds that whilst the interactions of 
matter might produce mind, they do so in a non-reductive way – that is to say, organised 
matter can have properties that are not simply an aggregate of its components, and are 
not predictable from the unorganised parts. There are at least three stands of non-
reductive physicalism. Firstly, there is strong emergence: consciousness can be strongly 
emergent and exhibit top-down causation. Ideas, to put it simply, are not just an 
epiphenomenon of interacting particles, but themselves have “autonomous” causal power 
(and so free will and such like is saved!).26 
  In general, the cybernetics research into mind mentioned in the previous chapter 
can be most easily understood as a form of non-reductive physicalism, whether we 
consider mind as immanent in the neural net models of Warren McCullough at one scale, 
or in the distributed biological, social and communication network ecologies of Bateson at 
a larger scale. 
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 There are also some new forms of dualism which emerge from non-reductive 
physicalism. David Chalmers seems to hold that consciousness is a distinct substance, 
which emerges nonetheless from matter. There are still other modern dualist positions 
which argue that the only forms of physicalism that make sense are panpsychic.27  
Sheldrake’s cosmology, for example, would fit both of these categories. 
 The various philosophical models of matter and mind relations briefly outlined 
above have of course been paralleled in many considerations of mind and body relations. 
Indeed, even whilst a broadly physicialist philosophy of mind has been fairly mainstream 
in most western thinking, and certainly in scientific thinking, for most of the twentieth 
century, the echoes of a mind/matter dualism has remained inscribed in dominant 
conceptions of a mind-in-brain/body dualism, and even a mind-in-brain-and-body/
environment dualism, which seems to be proving much harder to dislodge. Nonetheless, 
the dominance of the brain as the sole locus of mind or consciousness is now being 
fundamentally revised in contemporary neuroscience. “The mind is embodied, not 
embrained,”28 Antonio Damascio reminds us, and in Chapter Seven I will review in some 
detail what is now known about how the space of the body and its environment is mapped 
cognitively in the brain (and how this spatial mapping is a fundamental process in the 
construction of the “illusion” of self.) In many ways, much of the philosophy of mind 
outlined above is a distinctly Anglo-American analytic philosophical discourse. Yet, as we 
shall see, there have been important process-based and phenomenological traditions of 
embodied mind thinking in twentieth-century continental philosophy which do not always 
align in any simple way with the more analytical approaches set out above. Notable here 
would be the phenomenological thinking of Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
both of whom provided approaches that were incorporated into the cybernetic bio-
phenomenology of Maturana, Varela and Thompson.
 Just as there has been a broad shift towards and beyond embodied and non-
reductive physicalist accounts of mind in neurobiology, there have been similar shifts in 
the AI cognitive sciences. Here, there has also been distinctive new knowledge generated 
from research into artificial intelligence and robotics which reinforces the discoveries of 
neurobiology in fascinating ways. One of the most interesting approaches to have 
emerged – especially for architectural theory in this era of new claims for “intelligent”, 
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“interactive”, “augmented” and “responsive” environments – is the extended mind 
approach. In what follows I will argue for a more dialectical formulation of the material to 
embrace the extended mind proposition, in a way that is ultimately related to Bateson’s 
broader ecological aesthetics. As such, I will turn now to discuss these embodied and 
extended mind approaches themselves.
5.5 Embodied Mind
“The senses become theoreticians in their immediate practice”29 
[Karl Marx]
In 1991, Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch published The Embodied 
Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience as a new synthesis of phenomenology, 
cognitive science and biology, an approach which has since come to be known as 
neurophenomenology. This was an extension of the work that Varela had produced in the 
previous decade with Humberto Maturana: a biological form of second-order cybernetics, 
known as the Santiago School of Cognition. This work arguably did more to revolutionise 
contemporary thinking about mind than any other work in recent decades. Writing in 2005, 
Thompson gives an overview of this position: 
The development of cognitive science over the past two decades or so has seen a 
movement from the classical, cognitivist view that an inner mind represents an outer 
world using symbols in a computational language of thought, to the view that mental 
processes are embodied in the sensorimotor activity of the organism and embedded 
in the environment. This viewpoint has come to be known as enactive or embodied 
cognitive science. Enactive cognitive science ... involves the following three theses: 
 1.Embodiment. The mind is not located in the head, but is embodied in the whole 
organism embedded in its environment. 
 2.Emergence. Embodied cognition is constituted by emergent and self-organized 
processes that span and interconnect the brain, the body, and the environment. 
 3.Self–Other Co-Determination. In social creatures, embodied cognition emerges 
from the dynamic co-determination of self and other.30
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In their book on The Embodied Mind, Varela, Thompson and Rosch made a series of 
radical moves, perhaps the most challenging and illuminating of which was their 
profoundly trans-disciplinary engagement with Buddhist philosophy. They note that the 
concept of a non-unified or de-centred cognitive subject, as it was increasingly uncovered 
in cybernetics and cognitive science (in for example Bateson’s research), had long been 
theorised as egolessness or selflessness in the Buddhist tradition.31 Presenting the book 
as amongst other things a dialogue between western cognitive science and Buddhist 
meditative psychology, given the shared discovery of a non-unified self, they argue that 
the Buddhist tradition is not as external to western thought as might be imagined, given 
that: 
... our western histories of philosophy, which ignore Indian thought, are artificial, 
since India and Greece share with us an Indo-European linguistic heritage as well 
as many cultural and philosophical pre-occupations.32
They go on to suggest that the rediscovery of Asian philosophy in the west (in particular 
the Buddhist doctrines of non-dualism) could parallel the importance of the rediscovery of 
Greek philosophy in the Italian Renaissance.
 The second important philosophical engagement to be found in Varela, Thompson 
and Rosch’s book is their engagement with the European phenomenological tradition. In 
particular, they develop Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s double conception of embodiment, in 
which bodies exist for us as both “outer” physical structures and “inner” lived, experiential 
structures: embodiment thus has a double sense in that “it encompasses both the body as 
a lived, experiential structure, and the body as the context or milieu of cognitive 
mechanisms.”33 This double condition was referred to as the “entre-deux” in Merleau-
Ponty. 
 Varela, Thompson and Rosch rehearse the two main tendencies that have 
characterised cognitive science: cognitivism and emergence. Both of these can be traced 
in their modern form to the Macy Conference period and the “uniquely and remarkably 
successful interdisciplinary effort”34 of post-war cybernetics. However, out of the various 
interrelated conceptions of mind that emerged in this period, they suggest – in an 
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important lesson for interdisciplinary work more broadly – that because of the need to 
define cognitive science as a mature discipline, primarily in order to gain funding:
... one of the many original, tentative ideas was now promoted to a full-blown 
hypothesis, with a strong desire to set its boundaries apart from its broader, 
exploratory and interdisciplinary roots, where the social and biological sciences 
figured pre-eminently with all their multifarious complexity.35
They suggest that the cognitive science that resulted was (and large parts still are) 
dominated by an overly cognitivist approach, which, based upon the metaphor of the brain 
as a computer, sees cognition as computation,36 in the sense of the manipulation of 
representational symbols. As they write, this is:
... the assumption – prevalent throughout cognitive science – that cognition consists 
of a representation of a world that is independent of our perceptual and cognitive 
capacities by a cognitive system that exists independent of the world.37
They note that this approach has produced many insights, and also revolutionised our 
thinking about the self and mind. They include amongst these innovations “the multilevel 
conception of scientific explanation,” which (paradoxically) they argue was important for 
theorising emergence, and even more importantly, the fact that cognitivism demolished 
behaviourism and its legacies in experimental and theoretical psychology, which had been 
dominant since the 1920s.38 Most importantly, no doubt, all models of cognitivism also 
challenge the conceptions of the self to be found in “folk psychology”, and indeed western 
philosophical traditions of the cogito, in that: 
... cognitivism postulates mental (not just physical and biological) mechanisms and 
processes that are not accessible to ... self-consciousness ... one cannot discern in 
conscious awareness or self-conscious introspection any of the cognitive structures 
and processes that are postulated to account for cognitive behaviour.39
Whilst “folk psychology” models of self presume that consciousness and cognition are 
essentially the same thing, “cognitivism runs directly counter to this conviction: in 
determining the domain of cognition, it explicitly cuts across the conscious/unconscious 
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distinction.”40 In fact, for cognitivism, it is not just that cognition spans consciousness and 
unconsciousness, but rather that consciousness is not necessary for cognition at all. 
Drawing upon the work of Ray Jackendoff,41 Varela, Thompson and Rosch conclude that 
cognitivism only results in a new mind-mind dualism (computational mind/
phenomenological mind) which brings with it all kinds of problems regarding intentionality 
and representation, which must somehow straddle both of these domains. However, 
Jackendoff ends up arguing that consciousness is a projection of “intermediate level 
representations” in a computational processes, a position that, like other cognitivist 
positions, ultimately ends up implying that consciousness is an unnecessary 
epiphenomenon. 
 Finding this formulation and conclusion to be implausible and problematic in all 
kinds of ways, Varela, Thompson and Rosch observe that “alternatives to the dominant 
approach of symbol manipulation … were already proposed and widely discussed during 
the early, formative years of cybernetics.”42  Whilst these other approaches – all based 
upon emergence in different forms – broadly fell out of favour in mainstream cognitive 
science for several decades, they started to reappear again from the late-1970s, not least 
as all kinds of self-organising material systems were discovered in physics, chemistry and 
biology, and non-linear and recursive mathematics, in relation to chaos and complexity 
theory (as briefly reviewed in Chapter Two). Notably, of course, Gregory Bateson 
published his collection of essays Steps to an Ecology of Mind in 1972, which (full of 
emergence thinking), and as he frequently observed retrospectively, was fortuitously 
published just as the tide had started to turn against hard-core computationalism (indeed 
his book itself became an important factor in that shift). By the time of the publication of 
The Embodied Mind in the early-1990s, the still marginal but resurgent interest in self-
organising systems in cognitive science was primarily known as connectionism. 
 Connectionism is a form of emergence thinking which suggests that there are 
systems made up of simple components that give rise to emergent global states and 
behaviours, and which correspond to or represent properties in the world, or which 
correspond to specific cognitive capacities – i.e. problem-solving solutions in the world. 
Connectionist models are primarily based upon neural network theories, as primarily 
developed by McCullough and Pitts in the Macy Conference period.43 Other important 
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emergence based models of cognition would include the cellular automata research of 
Stephen Wolfram.44
 Connectionism could broadly be considered as a shift towards taking the found 
observable structure of the brain as an organisational model, whereas, by 
contradistinction, cognitivist models had taken early computers as a model for the brain. 
Because connectionist models are also closer in their organisation to the kinds of 
structures found in real-world biological systems more broadly, they also proved capable 
of revolutionising approaches to robotics and AI. Typically, connectionist models are more 
robust than symbolic processing models, in which the loss of parts of symbols, or the rules 
for manipulating them, can result in the total breakdown of computation. In emergence 
models, global properties are widely dispersed and networked, and are therefore much 
more resilient to local disruption. 
 More importantly, connectionist models are capable of organising themselves in 
such a way as to perform symbolic computational behaviour. Some connectionists 
therefore argue that emergence-based models are more fundamental, and that cognitivst 
and connectionist approaches can act as “complimentary bottom-up and top-down 
approaches”,45 or else can just be seen as operating at different levels or defining different 
domains of cognition.46 Indeed, Varela, Thompson and Rosch do argue that: 
... the most interesting relation between subsymbolic emergence and symbolic 
computation is one of inclusion, in which we see symbols as a higher-level 
description of properties that are ultimately embedded in an underlying distributed 
system.47
 To recap, whilst Varela, Thompson and Rosch mount a sustained critique of 
cognitivism and  all representational models of mind, they nonetheless note that at certain 
levels of operation, and in certain kinds of practices and experiences, human cognition 
certainly does work with symbolic logic and representation. Their critique of cognitivism 
and representation proceeds along two lines: firstly, a critique of symbol-processing as a 
way of working with representations, and secondly, a critique of the representational 
approach to cognition more generally. Asking the question, “how it is that the phenomena 
and behaviour that we take to be the self might arise, in the absence of an actual self?”, 
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they outline a new “enactive” approach based upon “a view of cognition as embodied 
action”48 – an approach that incorporates levels of symbolic computation within emergent 
self-organisation, but which goes beyond both.
 The aim of Varela, Thompson and Rosch was ultimately to outline an approach to 
cognition that could bridge experience and science, arguing that a cognitive science that 
could not account for experience, in terms that were common to both, was seriously 
flawed. Hence our experience could only be accounted for, by including a “cybernetic” 
reflection upon the experience of “accounting for experience” itself, too.49 There is, they 
contend, a necessary circularity to any account of mind, which mirrors the basic circularity 
that they open the book with: i.e. the “entre-deux” of Merleu-Ponty, in that “we are in a 
world that seems to be there before reflection begins, but that world is not separate from 
us.”50 
 Importantly, they also argued that the methods of examining experience in 
Buddhist mindfullness meditation practice and philosophy have a rigour that can bridge 
scientific knowledge and experiential knowledge, and thereby bridge the western post-war 
cognitive sciences and the philosophy of European phenomenology. Specifically, they 
write that 
... the Buddhist doctrines of no-self and non-dualism that grew out of this method 
have a significant contribution to make in a dialogue with cognitive science.51 
Hence, they stress in particular the Buddhist theories of “no-self” in relation to the 
fragmentation or de-centring of self in western theories of cognitivism and connectionism, 
and non-dualism in relation to cognition as enaction. Of course, in a very straightforward 
sense, too, Buddhist mindfullness practice shares something with second-order 
cybernetics, in that it places the observer in circuit: i.e. the observer watches the observer 
observe.
 As a consequence, they propose an interaction between phenomenology, 
meditation and cognitive science that is: 
... a change in the nature of reflection from an abstract, disembodied activity to an 
embodied (mindful), open-ended reflection. By embodied, we mean reflection in 
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which body and mind have been brought together ... reflection is not just on 
experience, but is a form of experience itself.52
This approach is in their view a radical departure in redefining the question of the relation 
between self and mind:
Descartes’s conclusion that he was a thinking thing was the product of his question, 
and that question was the product of specific practices – those of a disembodied, 
unmindful reflection ... And even though it has recently become quite fashionable to 
criticise or ‘deconstruct’ this standpoint of the cogito, philosophers still do not depart 
from the basic practice responsible for it.53
 Like the theories of Bateson, these more radical implications as produced by 
Varela, Thompson and Rosch’s position have yet to be fully worked through.54 However, 
their initial synthesis of cognitivism and connectivism (which they themselves then 
immediately move beyond), clearly anticipated a new generation of theorists such as Andy 
Clark, as when they presciently noted that:
... a fruitful link between a less orthodox cognitivism and the emergence view, where 
symbolic regularities emerge from parallel distributed processes, is a concrete 
possibility, especially in AI with its predominantly engineering, pragmatic orientation. 
This complimentary endeavour will undoubtedly produce visible results and might 
well become the dominant trend for many years to come in cognitive science.55
5.6 Theories of Extended Mind 
“Extended Mind” is a broad term which has been used to describe a range of very 
different though related ideas. What unites all users of the term is some kind of grounding 
in systems thinking, arguing that mind is a process – not a thing or a substance – and that 
it is not simply located in the physical brain in the head. In extended mind thinking, it is 
broadly proposed that the environment plays an active role in cognition.
 There are three independently developed uses of the term “extended mind” that 
have emerged in the last decade. All of these conceptions of extended mind thinking 
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Rupert Sheldrake’s Extended Mind
 Rupert Sheldrake’s particular form of extended mind thinking is reflected in his 
controversial account of vision. Sheldrake discusses the long history of both “intromission” 
and “extramission” theories of vision, and concludes by proposing a model of vision based 
upon a two way process: 
Our minds connect us to the world around us, just as they seem to do. This connection, through our 
sense organs, links us directly to what we perceive. What you see is an image in your mind. But it is 
not inside your brain. Your brain is within the confines of your cranium. Your mind is extended in space, 
and stretches out into the world around you. It reaches out to touch what you see. If you look at a 
mountain ten miles away, your mind is stretching out ten miles.!!⁶
He states that “through our attention, we create fields of perception that stretch out around 
us, connecting us to what we are looking at. Through these fields, observer and observed 
are interconnected.” Whilst I find Sheldrake’s thesis implausible in the terms that he defines 
it, I find the idea to be fascinating, as it captures and combines both the sense of empathy 
and extended mind. Sheldrake rightly challenges the representational schools of cognition, 
and quotes a series of thinkers whose work is based upon embodied cognition, cybernetics 
and ecology (Alva Noë, J.J. Gibson, Francisco Varela) and in fact builds up all of the 
components of an active ecological or systems account of perception. However, he then 
mistakes the information flow, the component that is provided by practical action – or if you 
like, the labour component of vision – and imagines it to be an independent and really 
existing mental field. Sheldrake states that “the basic idea that I am proposing is so simple 
that it is hard to grasp. The image of this book is just where it seems to be, in front of your 
eyes, not behind your eyes. It is not inside your brain. Your mind is projecting it outward to 
where it seems to be.” In this, he is, in a sense, absolutely correct. However, what he is 
missing is a theory of space and time that combines practice and representation, and this 
missing theory has been replaced by a conception of a real field. There is, I would suggest, a 
real field into which we are extended, but it is not a new morphic field, but rather requires a 
process-based account of space-time. 
  
Figure 5.1-5.2 The Classical architectural device of entasis in a curious way illustrates 
Sheldrake’s extramission model of vision, and indeed embodied vision more generally. It is 
not uncommon to come across accounts of entasis which describe the geometric mastery 
that is involved in calculating carefully distorting columns and plinths in order to account for 
the distortions of vision. However, it must surely be the case that, in the initial instance at 
least, this was not a matter of calculation, but was rather a case of generations of Greek 
builders carefully considering what they were seeing, and making adjustments accordingly: 
“up a bit.. across a bit, etc “ They were in effect projecting the curvature of their retina onto 
the stone structure.
emphasise the structural co-evoloution of an organism with its environment, describing a 
fundamentally cybernetic and ecological conception of being in the world. Their core 
argument is that human consciousness cannot in any simple way be reduced and 
localised to the physical brain, but rather requires an understanding of the whole organism 
as embedded in ecologies of material and immaterial communication. Bateson has 
referred to this as “ecologies of mind”: i.e. the ways in which information, or relational 
networks of organised matter and energy, circulate within and between organisms and 
their environments. These ecologies are co-evolutionary in the sense of being historical 
and environmental, temporal and spatial. 
 The first published and most widely known account of “Extended Mind” is that of 
Andy Clark and David Chalmers, published in a paper of that name in 1998.56 Robert K 
Logan has also been using the term since more or less the same period, although initially 
quite independently of Clark/Chalmers.57 However, in recent publications Logan and Clark 
have begun to refer to the others work. Rupert Sheldrake has also been using the term, 
although not in publication until 2003.58 Although Logan’s conception is not quite the same 
as Clark and Chalmers, it is in the same kind of territory, but focusing in particular on 
media ecologies and language. Sheldrake’s work is based within a very different 
panpsychic and vitalist tradition. Whilst I won’t focus on Sheldrake’s interpretation here, it 
is worth noting that he draws upon many of the same references from systems theory and 
recent cognitive research. However, Sheldrake performs what we might call an ontological 
reading of emergence and systems theory – arguing that organic phenomena (which 
include for him socio-cultural phenomena) exist within, and bring into existence, new 
“morphic fields.” If nothing else his account can be credited with making very visible – by 
by trying to imagine and resolve as real physical fields – some of the difficult theoretical 
problems concerning systems, emergence, causation and logic, which are often obscured 
in other, especially non-dialectical, accounts. For this reason, I will touch upon some of 
Sheldrake’s ideas at several points. 
 Instead however, I will primarily focus on the Clark and Chalmers thesis, in 
particular as it has been developed by Clark. This thesis asserts that both immaterial 
social environments – such as language – and material, social and natural environments, 
play real active roles in our processes of cognition. This thinking represents an important 
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new stage in the ongoing shift in what we think of as the nature and boundaries of self and 
body, and of subjectivity more broadly. It also challenges how we conceive of ourselves in 
relation (and as relations) to our spatial environment. As Clark has observed: 
... it matters that we recognise the very large extent to which individual human 
thought and reason are not activities that occur solely in the brain or even solely 
within the organismic skin-bag. This matters because it drives home the degree to 
which environmental engineering is also self-engineering. In building our physical 
and social worlds, we build (or rather, we massively reconfigure) our minds, and our 
capacities of thought and reason.59
 Before considering the Clark and Chalmers account in more detail, it is worth 
noting that there are other accounts of cognition which, whilst not using the phrase 
“extended mind” as such, are nonetheless dealing with similar or associated ideas.60 In 
particular, throughout modernity there have consistently been varieties of extended and 
external mind propositions, in strong and weak forms, that have emerged from artistic 
practice and aesthetic theory. Of particular interest here is the concept of “empathy” that 
emerged in nineteenth-century aesthetics, and the closely related concept of “space” as it 
developed in architectural thinking, and I will dedicate Chapter Seven to exploring these 
concepts. Arguably, the concepts of empathy and space contain important aspects of 
extended mind thinking – in fact David Kirsch’s analysis of the way that humans need to 
configure objects and ideas in space was key to the development of the Clark and 
Chalmers thesis, as we shall see below.
 More recently, extended mind or externalist thinking has resurfaced in artistic 
discourse. Often it seems that this has come from artists who have particularly engaged 
with new digital technology, and have confronted the questions of representation that have 
emerged in AI, from an artistic perspective. The cybernetic artist and theorist, Roy Ascott, 
has frequently flirted with externalist models of cognition (often merging them with media-
based extensions).61 Ascott’s former student, the artist and writer Robert Pepperell, in an 
interesting reading of Nicolas Bourriaud’s Relational Aesthetics,62 also argues that 
aesthetic experience cannot be understood without recourse to extended models of 
cognition. Pepperell writes that:
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Riccardo Manzotti: A Process Oriented Externalist Solution to the Hard Problem
    
Figure 5.3 An excerpt from Riccardo Manzotti, A Process Oriented Externalist Solution to the 
Hard Problem in The Reasoner, Issue 2, 2008, pp.13-20. Manzotti is a professor of robotics, 
but his research increasingly focuses around questions based in process-based and 
relational based accounts of externalism. 
... artists and art theorists have understood aesthetic activity as a distributed 
phenomenon, extending beyond any individual person or mind ... Extensionism 
stresses the extended dimensions of objects and events rather than the distinctions 
between them. When this approach is applied to the analysis of art it reveals the 
widely distributed nature of artworks and the mental qualities they convey. This is 
correlated with a view of the mind that extends far beyond the head.63
Many of these accounts of an extensionist aesthetics have developed in opposition to the 
recent development of neuroaesthetics, which regrettably seeks to reduce aesthetic 
experience solely to neural correlates within the brain.64 They are, moreover typically 
dependent upon radical process-based approaches to reality in general (hence 
discussions often feature references to Whitehead, for example). As we shall see, this is a 
stronger claim about the nature of mind and reality than that  which is made by Clark and 
Chalmers, but one that is possibly more logically consistent. I am particularly interested in 
considering the role that spatial environments play in extending our minds beyond the 
confines of our physical brains. It is clear from the discussion of Kirsch’s work below, that 
extended mind thinking has something useful contribute to understanding how 
architectural and urban environments work. In the next chapter I draw together different 
strands of contemporary cognitive science research on the body in space, relating to both 
extensionist and neuroaesthetic approaches. In turning to consider empathy and space in 
Chapter Seven, I show how existing ideas in architecture, media theory and aesthetics 
might resonate with some of the extensionist approaches set out in this chapter. 
Throughout these accounts I will consistently restate why these questions concerning self, 
consciousness, ecology and aesthetics are inseparable: because in my view there is a 
political ecology of mind.
5.7 The Extended Mind theory of Clark and Chalmers 
 The Clark and Chalmers paper opens with the question: “where does the mind 
stop and the rest of the world begin?”65 The term “extended mind” describes for Clark and 
Chalmers an “active externalism”, or “the active role of the environment in driving 
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cognitive processes.”66 This kind of question was of course explicitly raised by Gregory 
Bateson, who Clark describes as one of his “large subterranean influences.”67 This 
question is not simply reducible to a consideration of prosthesis and tool use as 
extensions of the human, although Clark does indeed consider this material: he for 
instance, rehearses Bateson’s own question regarding the status of the cane that a blind 
person senses with, using this as a seminal example of a general embodied tool 
condition. 
 However, whilst Clark does constantly incorporate a very wide of embodied and 
embedded cognitive science research into and around his thesis, the main specific thrust 
of the extended mind argument (as opposed to general embodiment and enaction) is that 
we can more rigorously demonstrate the reality of proper human cognition operating 
outside of what he calls our “skinbag”. A central component of Clark’s argument in this 
regard is his “parity principle”. This states that if there is any process that happens in the 
eternal world which would be described as cognitive if it happened in the head, then it 
should be described as cognitive too. Clark and Chalmers state that:
... the human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way interaction, 
creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own right. 
All the components in the system play an active causal role, and they jointly govern 
behaviour in the same sort of way that cognition usually does. If we remove the 
external component the system's behavioural competence will drop, just as it would 
if we removed part of its brain. Our thesis is that this sort of coupled process counts 
equally well as a cognitive process, whether or not it is wholly in the head.68 
They note that these cognitive processes are not necessarily conscious activities. Indeed, 
they state that “it seems far from plausible that consciousness extends outside the head in 
these cases” – a qualification that not all theorists would accept as meaningful. Clark and 
Chalmers suggest that the main challenges to their theory comes from a potential 
weakness in their conception of “coupling” – in that “the trouble with coupled systems is 
that they are too easily de-coupled,” or at least it might seem to be so, especially when the 
tools for coupling involve apparently simple memory aids such as a filofax (one of the 
examples used in the original paper), or an iphone (a more recent example). They do, 
however, answer the question of whether potentially temporary and limited cognitive 
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couplings such as filofaxes and iphones might be considered as real mental components 
which are “core cognitive process, not an add-on extra”. What they argue is needed is just 
a relevant level of “reliability” in such devices, plus they note that “occasional de-coupling” 
can occur anyway in the biological brain through “episodes of sleep, intoxication, and 
emotion. If the relevant capacities are generally there when they are required, this is 
coupling enough.”69 However, the really interesting question they then pose is whether 
“the biological brain has in fact evolved and matured in ways which factor in the reliable 
presence of a manipulable external environment.”70 The existence of a real cognitive 
process which demonstrably extends the other processes of mind in loops that extend 
beyond the brain and body is, for Clark, a likely precondition that lends support to his 
second major thesis – which is that the human appears to be distinct from other known 
living creatures in the extent of its ability to plastically reorganise itself to incorporate or 
participate in new cognitive opportunities that arise in its environment. Specifically, Clark 
concludes,that human are distinct in the degree to which they are able to externalise as 
objects and social forms their internal cognitive processes and concepts, which they are 
then able to re-engage with as external objects. Humans do this through socially 
organised matter, spoken and written language, and through their manipulation of 
produced space.
 One of the first examples used to describe what that might mean is that of a Tetris 
computer-game player who uses a rotation function to think about the morphological 
affordances of different shapes in different alignments, or of a Scrabble player who 
reorganises their letter tiles physically on the table in front of them to find new letter-word 
combinations. This is given as an example of the kind of structurally epistemological 
relationship that is set up in cognitive processes that are initiated in the brain, but which 
are extended and completed in the eternal world. Clark and Chalmers argue that the 
Scrabble player is not simply reorganising letters as representations of processes that are 
taking place in the brain, but rather is thinking by moving the physical letters. 
 They take this example, like several of their most persuasive illustrations, from a 
seminal paper by David Kirsch entitled ‘The Intelligent use of Space’, in which it was 
argued that humans actively use spatial organisation as a part of their cognitive practice.  
Kirsch suggests that: 
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... in having a body, we are spatially located creatures: we must always be facing 
some direction, have only certain objects in view, be within reach of certain others. 
How we manage the space around us, then, is not an afterthought; it is an integral 
part of the way we think, plan and behave, a central element in the way we shape 
the very world that constrains and guides our behaviour.71
In this paper, Kirsch shows that there are three distinct kinds of cognitive spatial use:
 i: spatial arrangements that simplify choice;
 ii: spatial arrangements that simplify perception;
 iii: spatial dynamics that simplify internal computation. 
Examples of these would include, at a basic level, the laying out of tools and materials for 
use (a lot of Kirsch’s initial empirical data came from filming people engaged in everyday 
practices such as cooking, manufacturing, etc). In all three of his cognitive spatial 
categories, there were complex projections between world and brain, intention, 
imagination and possibility. For Kirsch:
... it has been repeatedly shown how human agents make use of resources in the 
situation to help draw conclusions and solve problems rather than use abstract, 
symbolic computations. People make mental tools of things in the environment.72
This insight is a useful one. The classical cognitive science approach was based upon the 
idea that the mind worked by producing an internal representation of the external 
environment. This is indeed largely how we seem to experience things: we see the eternal 
world, but we also seem to have an internal representation of that world. If we close our 
eyes we can still conjure up representations, and this visual model largely provided the 
basis for the classical cognitive conception of mind. All of our highest cognitive faculties, 
such as designing or planning, seem to rely upon such internal representations. Not 
surprisingly, early attempts at building artificial agents such as robots or computers started 
from this basis, and attempts were (and continue to be) made to get the robot or computer 
to form a rich internal representation of its environment as the basis of its understanding 
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of, or movement and action within, its environment. In such a schema, the mind is being 
conceived as wholly located in the brain, or in the robot or computer, which then instructs 
the body or the machine what to do.  
 However, it has become increasingly clear that any attempt to create sufficiently 
rich environmental representation in this way is highly information and memory intensive. 
Equally, this potential flood of incoming information to the mind or constructed machine 
has no necessary inherent meaning, and thus attempts to programme how robots or 
computers can identify important features in the environment – a process which seems 
simple and self-evident to us – has proved exceptionally difficult to do. Similarly, even the 
most basic motor actions, such as grasping or moving, are now understood to be highly 
complex cybernetic feedback systems, which again are very difficult to replicate in robots 
or computer using the top-down symbol processing based methods that internalised 
representational models require.
 A shift hence occurred in the 1990s regarding thinking around how to make robots 
navigate environments – a shift which paralleled ideas emerging at the same time in the 
neurobiological cognitive sciences. This shift was characterised by Clark in his paper on 
“Embodiment and the Philosophy of Mind” as a move away from what he defines as an 
“isolationist” position: the notion that the mind creates an entire internal representation of 
the external world, which it then uses to navigate and act in the world.73 As Clark notes, 
“possession of such a rich inner model effectively allows the system to ‘throw away’ the 
world and to focus current computational activity in the inner model alone.”74 This model, 
whether used as a means of understanding the human mind, or as a means of trying to 
build artificial agents that could act in the world, kept running up against problems 
mentioned above. Increasingly, anti-isolationist positions developed, with Clark arguing 
that:
... mind itself is not, after all, a special realm populated by internal models and 
representations so much as an inextricable interwoven system, incorporating 
element of  brain, body and world – a system which resists informative analysis in 
terms of the old notions of model, representation and computation. 75
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Top-Down Computation vs Morpho-Ecological Dynamic Passive Systems
 
Fig. 5.4. Honda’s Asimo (short for Advanced Step in Innovative Mobility). Asimo is a purely 
“top down” walking device, in that its movements are entirely driven by instructions to move 
motors, etc. It mimics the movements of a human, but uses lots of energy and computing 
power to do so (and is extremely expensive to make). 
Fig. 5.5 The Collins Passive Dynamic Robot contains no processor or control or even motor 
mechanism at all.!!⁷ It is rather a carefully balanced and jointed assemblage which when 
placed upon a slope, will walk down it, powered by nothing more than gravity. Moreover, 
these passive dynamic systems typically perform with what is frequently observed to be a 
“life-like” gait. This corresponds to studies of toddlers learning to walk.!!⁸ Toddlers are better 
at walking on sloped surfaces, which suggest that we learn to walk through a form of 
controlled falling over. We can, I think, easily reconstruct this ourselves, by “bounding” down 
a staircase or slope with minimal self-control. Developments in passive dynamics show how 
morphology and context are able to ecologically embody as a system the equivalent of vast 
amounts of “processing”. Pfeifer and Bonard have described this as “morphological 
computation”. For Clark, these are examples of what he calls “nontrivial causal spread”, 
which he defines as “something we might have expected to be achieved by a certain well-
demarcated systems turns out to involve the exploitation of more far-flung factors and 
forces.”  There is more to make of these examples from Clark, however, as I think that they 
open several levels of thinking about embodiment, not all of which he considers. It is not 
simply the case that these are examples of devolved organisation and cognition (as Clark 
tends to describe it), as if there is a central control which then outsources. In fact, I would 
imagine that, on the whole, cognitive faculties accreted around these morphological 
constructions. For example, whilst an organism might make maximum use of morphological 
computing, it still needs some kind of control mechanism, even if for nothing else than 
stopping adjusting direction etc. What must happen is an ever more complex second-order 
layer of neuronal structures are assembled simply to manage an action. However, this is also 
how mind is embodied in another sense, specifically in the way that Lakoff and Johnson 
describe it. That is, walking, even in the morpho-ecological dynamic passive system, is a 
structured set of relations – it is in fact a concept, embodied (just as architecture embodies 
social concepts in buildings). Similarly, it is these embodied conceptual structures, and the 
neuronal assemblages that later mirror and fine tune them, which then provide the basis for 
a conceptual structure in general, once abstracted from their original embodiment (I discuss 
this kind of embodiment further below, in relation to Lakoff and Johnson).
Instead of the agent necessarily relying upon a rich internal representation of the world, 
allowing it in effect to “throw away the world”, anti-isolationist positions argued that:
... bodily actions (such as saccadic eye motions) play vital computational roles, and 
that repeated agent-environment interactions obviate much of the need to create all-
purpose, detailed internal world models. Instead, we visit and re-visit different 
aspects of the scene as and when required, allowing the world to function as ‘its 
own best model’.76
As Clark emphasises, what is really important is not only the extent to which any process 
is representational or not, but also the degree of agent-environment coupling that the 
different models require. Anti-isolationist neural set-ups are based upon what Clark 
describes as “action-oriented” engagements with the world. They tend towards a “radical 
interactionism” with “dense, reciprocal causal exchanges uniting agent and environment in 
a complex web of mutual influence.”77 This, Clark suggests, has only been modelled in 
any useful way through dynamic systems theory, in particular as set out by Scott Kelso.78
 Richer internal representations are, by contrast, more “action-neutral” by necessity, 
and whilst they seem to offer more flexibility of action response, they obviously require 
another layer of relational concepts to process the representations. In addition, the action-
neutral model of the representational mind requires as noted some kind of massive data 
storage. 
 Recent work in both robotics and biology now strongly suggests that these action-
neutral, representation-heavy isolationist models are rare, whether in non-human nature, 
and in any kind of artificially constructed robot agent. Clearly, however, humans are one 
strikiing example where both models co-exist. Clark suggests that for this to be the case, 
“the use of such representations coincides, rather exactly, with the possession of a rich 
public language.”79 
 These kinds of shifts in conceptions of mind that have been unfolding in the 
cognitive sciences for more than a decade, are, as Clark acknowledges, a return to many 
of the insights of first-generation and second-generation cybernetics – and more broadly 
to the ecological psychology of J.J. Gibson, as well as much modern continental 
phenomenology.80 
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The Architecture and Ecology of the Extended Mind
  
Fig. 5.6. Leon Battista Alberti (1404-72), Basilica Sant'Andrea, Mantua, Lombardy, Italy (built 
from 1462 to 1494 - latter additions until 1742). 
 Victoria Watson has suggested that a conceived split between mind and matter “haunts 
architecture’s understanding of the relationship between ideas and things.”!!⁹
 Watson argues that in this basilica by Alberti it is possible to experience through the 
“quality of the spatial relationships” an idea embodied in the building, which is self-reflexively 
about building, and about the relation between matter and mind. She suggests that “it is as if 
Alberti... [was] drawing forth ideas to test the proposition that there might be a harmonious 
link between imaginary projection and sensual experience... to discover direct connections 
between imaginary forms arising in the mind and the embodied sensual experience of 
measured spatial relationships.”!"⁰ Watson reminds us that the emergence of architecture as 
a discipline and profession – often located at the event of Alberti’s publication of On the Art of 
Building – was grounded in a valorised division between mental and physical labour, 
between producing ideas about buildings, and producing the matter of buildings. For 
Watson, Alberti’s work, and working practice (and indeed that of the emerging architectural 
profession) were in complex ways aware of, and indeed about, the recursive dualism of 
mind/matter, idea/thing, thinking/making and architect/builder.
 In this sense, Clark and Chalmers want to argue that: 
... evolution has favoured on-board capacities which are especially geared to 
parasitising the local environment so as to reduce memory load, and even to 
transform the nature of the computational problems themselves ... evolution has 
found it advantageous to exploit the possibility of the environment being in the 
cognitive loop.81 
Clark frequently cites, in this regard, research by Ullman and Richards, or by Blake and 
Yuille,82 which shows how our visual systems have developed a series of mechanisms 
that take advantage of the typical spatial structures found in the external world, and also 
take advantage of our relative motility as a species. Humans do not simply see what is in 
front of us, but rather we visually couple ourselves kinaesthetically with a particular kind of 
spatial environment. For example, it seems when presented with exercises that involve 
transferring information about one set of objects to another, in the way that the eye 
saccades across a scene, what is happening is that the eye-brain is using the world as a 
database.83 Rather than immediately placing into memory everything that is being seen, 
the eye constantly returns to collect data as required.  
 The kinds of environments that extend cognition are not however exclusively 
physical. Language is for Clark and Chalmers a fundamental and social medium by which 
cognitive processes are extended into the world.84 Interestingly, they use the fish-in-water 
analogy to describe the role than language plays as an extended cognitive medium within 
which we are embedded and immersed, through a “sea of words” and a  “linguistic 
surround [that] envelopes us from birth.”85 
5.8 The Embodiment of Concepts
 An important variation of post-Santiago School conceptions of mind embodiment 
was developed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, out of, and as a critique of, Anglo-
American philosophical cognitivist discourse. Lakoff and Johnson are situated within the 
Cognitive Linguistic86 philosophical tradition, but, in their 1999, work Philosophy in the 
Flesh, they effectively positioned themselves in relation to Varela, Thompson and Rosch’s 
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Fig. 5.7 H₂O pavilion by NOX, and Fig. 5.8-9 Robert Venturi, Denise Scott-Brown and 
Steven Izenour, Decorated Shed concept, from Learning from Las Vegas (1972).
 The relationship between ideas and things is not, however, the only haunting of 
dualistic conceptions of mind and matter in architecture. Fransisco Varela has shown that 
ultimately what unites all cognitive organisms – from cells upwards – is the act of sense 
making, or the construction of meaning, in and as their environment. A simple reflection upon 
one’s own experience of architectural environments suggests that there are two distinct 
categories of spatial media experience: physical and symbolic, or kinaesthetic and 
iconographic. In the first case, there is meaning that is generated through the direct 
experience of the body in material physical space. In recent architectural theory – in for 
example the writing of Juhani Pallasmaa – this is often what is meant by “phenomenology” in 
fact. In the second case, there is symbolic meaning, carried by or as the built structure. In 
most spatial environments, of course, both of these processes happen simultaneously, and 
the physical forms of buildings both generate kinaesthetic and organisational significance 
themselves, plus they simultaneously act symbolically, or as organising frames for other 
signifying media.
 These two poles (Kinaesthetic/Iconographic) might be illustrated by the experiential 
landscape of the NOX H₂O Pavilion (kinaesthetic), and Robert Venturi and Denise Scott 
Brown’s duck/decorated shed sketch (iconographic). In the H₂O Pavilion, Spuybroek was 
interested in the experience of space and form as a prosthetic, something directly felt, whilst 
in the sign research, Venturi and Scott Brown were exploring how architecture works as a 
symbolic language. I have written about this some years ago,!"! and at that time suggested 
that these two types of signification were actually processed in different parts of the brain. I 
suggested that kinaesthetic experience was processed in “older”, pre-language regions, and 
iconographic in “newer”, cognitive regions. That seems to me now to be slightly inaccurate, 
although the relation still stands. Rather, I would now suggest that we might understand the 
iconographic in relation to cognitivist models of representational computation, and the 
kinaesthetic in relation to embodied cognition! 
The Embodied Mind. In a statement that characterises in general terms all of the above 
positions, they declared that: 
... there is no true separation of mind and body. These are not two entities that 
somehow come together and couple. ... rather, mind is part of the very structure and 
fabric of our interactions with our world.87
So instead of discussing what they refer to as the “trivial” case of embodiment – by which 
they mean the notion that mind emerges in some way from a brain that is embedded in a 
body – Lakoff and Johnson argue that mind is also embodied in a more important sense, 
in that all of our conceptual structures are ultimately reducible to (or explicable as) 
“metaphors” based upon our bodily experience. Early in their text they use an example 
reminiscent of Santiago School thinking to support the contention that all categories of 
thought are based upon actions. They suggest that: 
... every living being categorises. Even the amoeba categorises the things it 
encounters into food or non-food, what it moves towards or moves away from. The 
amoeba cannot choose whether to categorise; it just does. The same is true for 
every level of the animal world ... How animals categorise depends upon their 
sensing apparatus and their ability to move themselves and to manipulate objects.88 
They contend that reason and language are thus embodied in a profound sense, in that 
“reason piggyback[s] on perception and motor control.”89 We reuse and adapt the 
structures and categories developed for sensing, perceiving and acting, in order to be able 
to also develop more abstract conceptual thought: 
... an embodied concept is a neural structure that is actually a part of, or makes use 
of, the sensorimotor system of our brains. Much of conceptual inference is, 
therefore, sensorimotor inference.90
 As a result, Lakoff and Johnson describe two “conceptions” or “generations” of 
cognitive science, which roughly correspond to the two established orders of cybernetics 
discussed previously. Their first-generation they characterise as the “Cognitive Science of 
Disembodied Mind”, whilst the second-generation they call the “Cognitive Science of 
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Fig. 5.10 Chernikov, constructivist synthesis of kinaesthetic and iconographic. It is also 
interesting to note that whilst the classical theory of architecture arguably achieved a 
theoretical and formal synthesis of kinaesthetic and iconographic modes of architectural 
cognition (see Alberti above), modern architectural knowledge never did manage to 
formulate a unified theory and practice of spatial media – the closest to a modern synthesis 
would be constructivist architecture – in fact this is one way to understand modern 
architecture’s repeatedly announced crisis.
 Thinking about the extended mind and cognition in relation to architecture does not just 
help us to understand the role that building and living in structured environments has played 
in building ourselves, and our other extensions (language in general, etc). It can also help us 
to think about the extended mind, and the embodied cognitive practices, of the architect him/
herself. The most straightforward way that mind is extended, is through tool use. For 
architects, the tools of the trade, which produce the mind of the architect, would include 
directly and traditionally, drawing tools such as pen and pencil, and more recently, various 
interfaces to CAD software packages. All of these tools can be shown to extend the 
architectural mind in historically specific, ways.!""
Embodied Mind”.91 They describe the first-generation as a modern version of the 
Cartesian viewpoint that reason is transcendental. This model implicitly worked with a 
dualism of mind and body, in that mind was embodied in a merely ‘trivial’ sense, in that it 
needed hardware for the software to run on. However, “functionally, mind was 
disembodied” and “symbols characterising thought were taken as internal representations 
of an external reality.”92 
 Second-generation cognitive models, by contrast, propose that the “software” of 
mind does not run upon a neutral brain-computer, but rather is built up out of “our 
sensorimotor experience and the neural structures that give rise to it”, including “our motor 
schemas and our capacities for gestalt perception and image formation.” Lakoff and 
Johnson argue that this means that our “mental structures are intrinsically meaningful by 
virtue of their connection to our bodies and our embodied experience.” This primary level 
of cognition is then, they argue, mirrored and abstracted in our higher brain functions:
... our brains are structured so as to project activation patterns from sensorimotor 
areas to higher cortical areas. These constitute ... primary metaphors. Projections of 
this kind allow us to conceptualise abstract concepts on the basis of inferential 
patterns used in sensorimotor processes that are directly tied to the body.93
Throughout their book, Lakoff and Johnon make the case that all conceptual structures 
are ultimately derived from abstracted and metaphorical physical experience, and that 
“reason is imaginative in that bodily inference forms are mapped onto abstract modes of 
inference by metaphor.”94 In fact, they argue that it is precisely this metaphorical 
abstraction out of the body that makes the Cartesian dualistic position seem plausible in 
the first place.95 Hence they suggest Descartes’ particular conception of a disembodied 
mind arose out of the “knowing as seeing” metaphor,96 and that, more paradoxically, “our 
very concept of a disembodied mind arises from embodied experiences that every one of 
us has throughout our life.”97 In particular they contend that our experience of our body as 
a bounded container leads us to project inwards this conception, once mind is 
experienced self-reflexively: 
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Fig. 5.11 Robin Evans, ‘The Arrested Image’, from The Projective Cast - Architecture and its 
Three Geometries (1995). More intriguingly, for considering the nature of the extended mind 
and the discussion of empathic projection in Chapter Seven, is a model of extended mind 
thinking that comes directly out of architectural theory. In The Projective Cast, Robin Evans 
produced a speculative expanded field of projective relations, in order to try to capture the 
mutual construction of drawings, designed objects, perception and imagination, which he 
called “The Arrested Image”. 
 In this diagram, Evans describes “ten fields of projection” connecting five “objects”, 
which are “almost always thought of as pictures or picture like.” Evans positions the observer 
as a plane of intersection at one of the corners, intersecting three of the fields of projection. 
Behind this plane the fields of projection continue, and Evans positions the imagination here, 
although noting that “the status of these lines as they pass across the border into 
consciousness is not at all clear.” 
 In The Projective Cast, Evans was concerned precisely with considering how 
architecture was conjured as the relations of a system whose loop ran between: imagination, 
projection, action, making, perception, projection and back to imagination. Whilst much of his 
history is concerned with excavating particular historical instances of projective relationships 
and their role in the production of objects and minds, it is clear in his conclusion that his 
ultimate object of enquiry was in fact the role that representation – and by implication 
architecture – plays in our imagining of our minds. Evans stated, in the kind of alchemical 
language that so often characterises discussion of projection, that 
... design is action at a distance. Projection fills the gaps; but to arrange the emanations 
first from drawings to buildings, then from buildings to the experience of the perceiving 
and moving subject, in such a way as to create in these unstable voids what cannot be 
adequately portrayed in designs - that was where the art lay ... the boundary between 
world and self, the objective and subjective. There are two further targets, the perception 
and the imagination belonging to the observer, and two further projective spaces behind 
them. Imagination and visual perception are shown as pictures, because that is how they 
are normally described. They are not pictures, but the fact that they are thought of in that 
way is very significant.!"#
... we conceptualise the mind metaphorically in terms of a container image schema 
defining a space that is inside the body and separate from it. Via metaphor, the mind 
is given an inside and outside. Ideas and concepts are internal, existing somewhere 
in the inner space of our minds, while what they refer to are things in the external, 
physical world. This metaphor is so deeply ingrained that it is hard to think about the 
mind in any other way.98
 Despite the often distinctively traditional liberal humanist character of much of their 
thinking, Lakoff and Johnson do nonetheless provide useful material for helping to “flesh 
out” Marx’s suggestive comments in, for example, the Paris Manuscripts, in regard to the 
way in which “the senses become theoreticians in their immediate practice.” However, it 
seems doubtful to me that Lakoff and Johnson’s attempts to push body-based metaphor 
as an explanation for all human conceptual practices can be fully accepted without some 
amendment. Firstly, they do not really take into account the kinds of mechanisms that 
mirror neuron research has now revealed regarding the incorporation of external tools into 
the organism and its sensorimotor mappings (as will be discussed in Chapter Seven). 
Presumably, this must mean, that just as according to Lakoff and Johnson’s the neuronal 
structures that arose to control our bodies then provided the basis of our more abstract 
thinking (“piggybacking” as real metaphors), if today we are technologically and spatially 
extending our “cyborg” bodies in new ways, then the new neuronal formations that are 
thereby plastically produced (and indeed neuronal circuits with non-neuronal elements) 
must create the conditions for new kids of conceptual metaphors? More broadly, the way 
that we re-project our abstractions back out into the world, before reincorporating them 
once more – which is, I argue, the basis of the kind of recursive mirroring through which 
our higher self-consciousness is produced – would seem to require a more reflexive and 
dialectical metaphor process than they describe: something in other words which can deal 
with embodiment in the context of a technologically extended body, and more broadly with 
what Marx described as “nature as man’s inorganic body”. 
 Lakoff and Johnson do however make some steps in the direction of this last point, 
in the ecological ethics they outline towards the end of their book. In a particularly 
interesting section, they argue that spiritual experience is essentially embodied, and that a 
new understanding of our embodiment could lead to a new kind of non-religious embodied 
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sense of spirituality. The general direction of this thinking has much in common with the 
attempt by Gregory Bateson in his final years to define a secular conception of the sacred 
as immanent to the organisation of matter, and in particular, living systems. Crucially, in 
relation to the next chapter of this thesis, Lakoff and Johnson connect their embodied 
ecological spirituality with processes of empathy and projection:
... the environment is not an ‘other’ to us. It is not a collection of things we 
encounter. Rather, it is part of our being. It is the locus of our existence and identity. 
We cannot and do not exist apart from it. It is through empathic projection that we 
come to know our environment, understand how we are a part of it and how it is a 
part of us. This is the bodily mechanism by which we can participate in nature, not 
just as hikers or climbers or swimmers, but as part of nature itself, part of a larger, 
all-encompasing whole. A mindful embodied spirituality is thus an ecological 
spirituality.99
The kind of ecological expansion of mind that Lakoff and Johnson suggest is congruent 
with Bateson’s conception and offers a proto-political awareness that other embodied 
mind theorists also tend towards. For example, Clark and Chalmers make similar claims 
for the basis of a new mental-ecological culture. Reviewing the impact of their extended 
mind thesis, they observe that:
... there are obvious consequences for philosophical views of the mind and for the 
methodology of research in cognitive science, but there will also be effects in the 
moral and social domains. It may be, for example, that in some cases interfering 
with someone's environment will have the same moral significance as interfering 
with their person. And if the view is taken seriously, certain forms of social activity 
might be re-conceived as less akin to communication and action, and as more akin 
to thought. In any case, once the hegemony of skin and skull is usurped, we may be 
able to see ourselves more truly as creatures of the world.100
5.9 Emergence, Process and Dialectics
I have referred to emergence repeatedly in the preceding pages. The term has become a 
critical, and much disputed, concept in physicalist (and post-physicalist) accounts of mind 
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Fig 5.12 Chris Bolland (Polytechnic Studio student 2003), studies in emergent form using 
computer aided milling machine. Weak emergence is a common property of iterative design 
processes. Emergence in this architectural sense is now often associated with parametric 
methods, and/or the so-called “morpho-ecological”, and generally refers to emergent form: 
form which is not planned or designed in a conventional sense, but rather emerges as an 
expression of a field of forces. Typically, these forces might include projected environmental 
forces such as wind and sun, or socio-phenomenological forces such as view directions. 
Examples of this approach are well documented in for example Michael Hensel, Achim 
Menges and Michael Weinstock, Emergence: Morphogenetic Design Strategies (Wiey: 
Architectural Design, 2004) and Michael Hensel,  Achim Menges and Michael Weinstock, 
Emergent Technologies and Design (London: Routledge, 2010).
Fig 5.13 Erich Mendelsohn, Red Flag Textile Factory, Leningrad 1926. In many ways, 
however, emergence has a much longer history within modern architecture, and claims for 
form as an expression of forces was, for example, articulated in this sense by the 
Expressionist and Futurists (and indeed by empathy theorists). In fact, there is an important 
sense that a conception of strong emergence is active in this earlier work. In, say, Erich 
Mendelsohn’s attempts to both respond to, and intensify, the experience of automobile flows 
and general metropolitan dynamics (material and immaterial) around his buildings (note the 
tram and telegraph poles in the street), we find both a bottom-up form of weak emergence 
(i.e. the analysis or intuition of existing forces) and top-down strong emergence (the 
recursive intensification of those forces and affects).
and organism. Given also that emergence is also a term broadly used in certain areas of 
architectural and urban theory, it is worth considering it further here. 
 As discussed in previous chapters, there is an important history of thinking about 
whole/part relations, which in western philosophy certainly goes as far back to Aristotle’s 
observation that “the totality is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something 
besides the parts.”101 This history also includes in important ways both the traditions of 
organicist philosophy and even the very origins of architectural knowledge as a social 
conception of whole/part relations in built space. 
 Emergence, which was first used as a term in the 1920s by thinkers such as 
Samuel Alexander, C.D. Broad, C Lloyd Morgan and Henri Bergson,102 is historically 
associated with a particular strand of British philosophy,103 and lay at the core of much of 
the systems thinking of the twentieth century. To recap, then, emergence is generally 
defined as the formation of properties and qualities within a systemic whole, which arise 
through a process of self-organisation in the parts of the system. The difficulties of the 
concept concern the ontological status of the whole as a system, or how to theorise the 
relationship between pattern and matter.
 It should be noted that emergence is often used in a somewhat lazy and un-
reflective sense to describe processes which are better referred to as the resultant of a 
series of linear forces or affects. In its stricter semse, however, Mark Bedau has argued 
that the discussions around emergence within systems theory can be split into the two 
distinct forms previously noted: i.e. strong and weak emergence. Weak emergence 
describes the appearance of new forms, behaviours or properties which arise in a system 
due to the collective interaction of the parts, but where those properties might still be 
present in, and ultimately predicable from, the behaviour of those parts. Bedau notes that 
“it is the ubiquity of weak emergence in complex systems that makes weak emergence 
especially interesting.”104 Weak emergence is often described as being bottom-up, in that 
it is the parts which produce a new whole.
 Strong emergence, by distinction, describes a condition in which the parts produce 
a whole, but the latter itself then (or better, simultaneously) exhibits a new form of 
downwards causation on the parts, and as such is more challenging for many thinkers. 
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Bedau, who is ultimately sceptical regarding the existence of strong emergence, suggests 
that:
... although strong emergence is logically possible, it is uncomfortably like magic. 
How does an irreducible but supervenient downward causal power arise, since by 
definition it cannot be due to the aggregation of the micro-level potentialities? Such 
causal powers would be quite unlike anything within our scientific ken. This not only 
indicates how they will discomfort reasonable forms of materialism. Their 
mysteriousness will only heighten the traditional worry that emergence entails 
illegitimately getting something from nothing.105
A classic case for strong emergence has been made by certain non-reductive physicalist 
strands of cognitive science. Proponents claim that that the material base of brain/body/
world is material, but its activity gives rise to mind, which is immaterial. The point of 
claiming strong emergence is that it is not necessarily positing a dualism (i.e. that there is 
mind outside of matter), nor is it a reductive physicalism (i.e. arguing that there is nothing 
to explain). Emergence in this strong sense is specifically the claim that genuinely new 
properties emerge from and through organisational patterns.  
 David Braddon-Mitchell’s scepticism is typical of challenges to the notion of 
emergence, suggesting that it is always disguises forms of dualistic thinking:
... emergentism is the intuitive idea that whatever is emergent emerges from the 
base ... while consciousness is genuinely novel, the ingredients are not. It emerges 
from a physicalistically kosher base ... a marvellous trick: nothing fundamental is 
nonphysical, but consciousness is genuinely novel, and nonphysical, even though it 
is nomologically tied to the physical base. This is the standard that I’ll be holding 
emergentism to, and which I doubt that it can meet.106
David Chalmers, who believes that consciousness can only be explained on the basis of 
strong emergence, more or less states the obvious when noting that:
... strong emergence has much more radical consequences than weak emergence. 
If there are phenomena that are strongly emergent with respect to the domain of 
physics, then our conception of nature needs to be expanded to accommodate 
them. That is, if there are phenomena whose existence is not deducible from the 
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Fig 5.14 Starlings flocking over Brighton Pier form dynamic wholes, which act as proto-
super-organisms.
Fig. 5.15 Self-organisation and emergence have become politicised in much grassroots 
green left discourse, and contemporary movements such as UKuncut and Climate Camp try 
to use these theorised to create a political discourse that might develop its own structures, 
rather than using more conventional hierarchical organisational structures. Equally, ideas of 
emergence and self-organisation have been used on the right, by neo-liberal economists 
such as Hayek, and in some descriptions of the Big Society. I discuss the need for political 
ecology and radical cybernetic based critiques of these ideas in Chapter Eight.
facts about the exact distribution of particles and fields throughout space and time 
(along with the laws of physics), then this suggests that new fundamental laws of 
nature are needed to explain these phenomena. 107
 Much of the conceptual difficulty that surrounds these different formulations of 
emergence arises from two different though connected kinds of explanation, which can be 
respectively described as epistemological and ontological. In this distinction, ontological 
strong emergence describes the production of real new properties that cannot be 
predicted reductively from the existing parts nor are in any simple linear way determined 
by them. Epistemological strong emergence, on the other hand, describes situations 
where, it is argued, it is not possible for us to know or model in a deterministic manner a 
given system, but that nonetheless the system is in principle deterministic. 
Epistemological emergence concerns the method of reductionism in our thinking about 
any system, rather than the doctrine of determinism. Although there is much dispute over 
the validity of real world examples, many systems which are often described as chaotic 
are, it is suggested, only seemingly non-linear and unpredictable from the outside, but are 
nonetheless deterministic systems themselves. However, practically all of these terms are 
disputed in various ways.108 
 A second and perhaps even more important conceptual difficulty seems to arise 
from a failure to define and reflect upon what exactly is meant by whole and part, or what 
is the conceptual form and concrete reality of the spatial and temporal inter-relation 
between whole and part. As Thompson suggests, the most coherent way to think about 
emergence is in terms of what he describes as “dynamic co-emergence”, in which it 
ultimately makes no sense to discuss whether the parts reductively contain micro-
properties of the whole, given that “part and whole co-emerge and mutually specify each 
other.”109
 Intriguingly, these critical scientific and philosophical concerning the 
epistemological and ontological status of self-organising systems, their knowability by 
other self-organising systems (in particular, their knowability both within, and as a part of 
our human experience), and the need to maintain a complex co-determined conception of 
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whole-part relations, has provided the context for a renewal of interest in the project of a 
“dialectics of nature”, and of Friedrich Engels’ prefiguring of a theory of emergence.110 As 
Lucien Sève makes clear, a dynamic co-emergence approach is necessarily dialectical:
... in an organic totality, the whole forms its parts and is simultaneously formed by 
them through embryological or historical processes. Playing in this way an active 
role in the production of its parts, the whole also leaves an imprint on them. Hence a 
paradox that is inconceivable from a non-dialectical point of view: in a certain sense, 
the whole is present in each of its parts, which can then be said to belong to the 
whole in a very unusual way.111
For Sève the dialectical tradition provides ways to deal with the seemingly ex nihilo arrival 
of new properties and qualities in systems that many contemporary theorists of 
emergence struggle with: 
... a key merit of the dialectical category of ‘jump’ is that it completely rejects any 
attempt to dismiss or trivialise the newness of the new ... the disturbing fact that 
[although] ... the acquisition of new properties by the new quality is necessary and 
therefore foreseeable from a quantitative point of view, it may none the less be 
qualitatively unpredictable.112
Ultimately, a dialectical systems concept of materialism suggests that the contradictions 
found in theses of strong emergence are based in a particle-based metaphysics. Although 
it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore this point any further, I suggest that 
dialectical process-based approach might go some way resolves these problems, by 
fundamentally attributing causality to dynamic patterns of organisation, and not to matter 
itself. Indeed, in such a model matter itself would be defined as a particular kind of 
process. Evan Thompson has in more recent work made a very similar argument, noting 
that
... ‘nature’ does not consist of basic particulars, but fields and processes, and this 
difference between a process-viewpoint and an elementary-particle-version of 
Cartesian substance metaphysics does make a difference to the philosophical 
issues about emergence. In the former view, there is no bottom level of basic 
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particulars with intrinsic properties that upwardly determines everything else. 
Everything is process all the way ‘down’ and all the way ‘up’, and processes are 
irreducibly relational - they exist only in patterns, networks, organisations, 
configurations, or webs.113
In a similar vein, Mark Bickhard follows through to its logical conclusion some of the 
strongest criticisms of strong emergence (notably from Jaegwon Kim), demolishing both 
reductive and non-reductive physicalism on route. Bickhard too proposes a process-based 
metaphysics solution to emergence, suggesting that “grasping why physicalism is 
untenable ... opens the logical space for a fecund notion of genuine emergence.”114 In the 
conclusion to this thesis, I will return to some of these questions, suggesting a pattern-
process approach to thinking about matter and organisation, and will consider why this 
matters to the patterns that connect architecture and ecological consciousness.
5.10 Ecologies of Extended Mind
Surprisingly, perhaps, we have ended up back at the junction of the structuralism/post-
structuralism debate, as it was articulated at the intersection of architecture and 
philosophy in the lat-1980s/ early-90s. Mark Wigley, for example, noted that architecture 
shares the constructional metaphors and basic building logic of a certain way of thinking 
philosophically in general (eg. foundation, structure, etc).115 The cognitive dialectic of 
organism/environment produces space and time, as abstract conceptual form, and as 
concrete realities: from the membrane of the cell to the metropolis.
 There are a series of routes that open out from the material in this chapter. One 
route arises from the repeated appeals by thinkers interested in mind embodiment and 
empathy, a concept which, as will be seen in Chapter Seven, arose historically from 
concepts in spatial aesthetics, andlater became key to Bateson’s notion of an ecological 
aesthetics. Another route examines what is known about the neurophenomenology of 
spatial empathy, and in the next chapter I will therefore explore more specifically what is 
known about the cognitive mapping of the embodied and extended mind in space. And 
even more broadly, following the observations of both Thompson and Bickhard regarding 
emergence, it is worth pointing out that whether one approaches the question from the 
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point of view of matter (as in Chapter Two), or mind (as here in this chapter), it seems that 
a dynamic, dialectical vision of systems ecology based on a process-based metaphysics 
has the most to offer to those of us disturbed by the dualisms and dubious politics 




6 Bodies and the Timing of Space: The Architecture of Cognitive Mapping
The objects we perceive in our surroundings – cities, villages, fields, woods – bear the mark 
of having been worked on by man. It is not only in clothing and appearance, in outward form 
and emotional make up that men are the products of history. Even the way they see and 
hear is the inseparable from the social life process, as it has evolved over the millennia. The 
facts, which our senses present to us, are socially preformed in two ways: through the 
historical character of the object perceived and through the historical character of the 
perceiving organ.1 
Max Horkheimer
6.1 Mind and Ecology
Despite the increasingly widespread adoption of various conceptions of embodiment 
across the cognitive sciences, much thinking still seems to default to the habit of 
assuming a tight correlation between mind and brain – or at least between mind and 
brain-plus-body. However, as was argued in the previous chapter, mind can surely only 
make sense when seen as a wider ecological concept. Mind is always composed of loops, 
relations and processes that integrate an actor and its environment, as subject and object. 
Mind is always, in this Batesonian sense, fundamentally aesthetic and fundamentally 
ecological. In the case of human consciousness, these loops necessarily pass through the 
physiological and neurological processes of the body and brain. However, whilst 
necessary in this regard, the brain is not alone sufficient for any explanation of 
consciousness. As Alva Nöe notes:
... not only can we not explain mind in terms of brain alone, but we can only explain 
the brain, and its role in helping give us minds, by thinking of the place of the brain 
in the context of our interaction with the world.2
In this chapter, I will draw together thinking on the relations between an enacted, extended 
and ecological mind, and the neurology of an embodied brain, with a focus upon our 
cognitive mapping of our body in space. Understanding the way that the body is mapped 
as a body, and thus as a body in space, is increasingly seen as vital in grasping how mind 
and consciousness arise in humans. As far as I am aware, this is the first time that 
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Fig. 6.1 View of internal/surface brain structures. Typically today the structural anatomy of 
the brain is introduced through a division into cortical and sub-cortical structures. The major 
sub-cortical nuclei are clustered around the brain stem and below the cortex, and include the 
thalamus (which is often described as a relay station), and the basal ganglia (typically 
described as motor-based and action-based), but which also includes the amygdala 
(generally thought important in decision making and emotion). The hypothalamus regulates 
homeostatic mechanisms in the body, such as metabolism, food intake, and temperature, 
whilst the cerebellum, at the back of the brain is closely integrated with the frontal cortex, 
and is involved in planning and coordinating movements. The hippocampus is generally 
thought to be involved in spatial and memory processes.
 The popular reference to “grey matter” refers to the visual appearance of the neurons 
on the surface of the cerebral cortex. The white matter beneath the cerebral cortex is made 
up largely of nerve fibres (i.e. the axon-dendrite connections between the cortex and the 
lower regions of the brain.) If a section is taken through the brain, the layer of grey matter on 
the surface is composed of cortex neurons (in total six neurons, or less than 1 cm thick), and 
the white matter below that is a dense network of connections between these neurons. The 
characteristic folding pattern of the cortex increases the surface area, which increases the 
number of cortex neurons that can be located there. 
 All of the different brain regions are composed of different variations of two particular 
kinds of specialised cells: the neuron and the glia. There are approximately 100 billion 
neurons in the human brain, and around ten times as many more glial cells, which support 
neuronal activity in a variety of ways. A piece of brain the size of a grain of sand contains 
100,000 neurons, 2 million axons, and 1 billion synapses. Neurons are cells which conduct 
electricity in short impulses which can be frequency modulated - thereby encoding 
information into different firing rates. The neuron can be broken down into a number of 
elements. The main part of the cell - called the soma - contains the nucleus, and branching 
off of this are thousands of projections called dendrites and axons. The dendrites bring 
information in the form of modulated electrical signals into the neuron from other cells, and 
axons take signals from the neuron to other cell’s dendrites. The bridge between one 
neuron’s axon and another’s dendrite is called a synapse, and each neuron has between 
one thousand and ten thousand synaptic connections to other neurons, muscle cells, glands 
etc. A neuron can be anything from a few millimetres to the full height of the body in length. 
Bundles of axons and dendrites are referred to as nerves. The various glial (meaning "glue") 
cells do not transmit electric signals, but rather maintain the neurons.
research from so many different areas of neurological and psychological research into 
how the brain maps space has been drawn together in one place, certainly in relation to 
architecture and spatial environments.3 When viewed together, it seems to me that this 
material makes the embodied account of mind incontrovertible. Furthermore, much of this 
material also lends support to the the general externalist, extended and ecological 
approaches to cognition that I have built up over recent chapters. This is perhaps not 
surprising. An externalist approach to mind might expect to find its clearest support in 
exploring how it is that the organism describes and defines its external environment. 
 Whilst this chapter is not in any simplistic way an exercise in neuroaesthetics, 
there are some interesting readings to be made regarding how we experience 
architectural form.4 In particular, I will propose “an affordance based theory of decoration 
in architecture”. However, my primary aim – following on from the last chapter on 
extended mind, and preceding the next chapter on empathy – is to explore the 
mechanisms through which our sense of our self emerges from our sensuous and 
physical engagement with the world.
 In the previous chapter we saw many of the problems associated with the idea that 
minds “compute” on the basis of “representations” of the external word. However, there is 
clearly representation in some form going on, and understanding what form this takes, 
and what it means for thinking about architecture in the broadest sense is a key aim of this 
chapter. Above all, the attempt to define an architecture of mind – i.e. the claims that we 
can legitimately make concerning our minds, bodies and environments – is not an abstract 
and neutral scientific or philosophical endeavour, but always a live political project; it is a 
way of making claims about who and what we are, individually and collectively.
6.2 The Architecture of the Brain
The possession of a nervous system is common to all multi-cellular creatures.5 The brain 
– which together with the spinal cord is conventionally described as constituting the 
human central nervous system (CNS) – is not necessarily best considered as one organ 
at all, but is rather more like a network of nuclei or sub-brains. Furthermore, our central 
nervous system is itself inseparable from the physical human body, which is itself 
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Figure 6.2 and 6.3 Left and Right functional elevations of brain (to be interpreted with 
caution).
inseparable from its broader physical and social milieu. Before considering the 
interrelation between the brain and the environment through various forms of spatial 
practice, and cognitive mapping processes, it is useful to briefly lay out some of the basic 
concepts and terms that are used to describe and think about the human nervous system.
 The network of brain regions that make up our human nervous system can partly 
be understood as the result of our evolutionary history, in that there is – according to one 
simplified interpretation at least – a layering to the brain network: the archaeology of our 
phylogenetic trajectory. The oldest brain in our head is, according to this account, a fish-
reptile brain, which is located at the top of our spinal column. Built over that is the 
mammal brain. And finally, on top and in front, is the primate brain, the cortex, of which the 
largest version is that of humans. The most widely disseminated version of this 
interpretation was popularised by Carl Sagan as “the triune brain”, which he described as 
being composed of the reptilian complex, the limbic system, and the neocortex.6 The 
triune brain was seen as the neuronal analogue to the broader conception of “ontogeny 
recapitulate phylogeny” – which (although broadly refuted in its original form) interprets 
the embryo’s development as a series of stages that seem to retrace the historical lineage 
of the species.
 The concept of the triune brain is clearly an oversimplification,7 and recent studies 
suggest that brain evolution is not in any way a simple additive process. There has been a 
highly plastic series of reorganisations of a whole series of sub-components of our 
inherited reptile and mammal brains – some were grown, others were cross-connected, 
allowing latent potentials that can be found present much lower down in the phylogenetic 
tree to become dominant,  and so on. These sub-components of the compound brain, 
called nuclei, are cross-connected or networked together, and networked back to the 
cortex, in ways that are specific to humans. Nonetheless, the triune brain is still a useful 
way to start to think about the organ – as a network of sub-brains, each of which has a 
distinct evolutionary history.8 
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Figure 6.4 Diagram of the architecture of the neuron.
  Seth Grant is a leading researcher involved in the proteomics of the synapse: the 
study of groups of proteins associated with synapses across different species (synapses 
being the connecting mechanism between neurons). Specifically, Grant has been 
researching the evolution of the synapse between species, and the results are interesting in 
regard to cybernetic arguments. Grant looked at a range of different organisms, including 
vertebrates, invertebrates and also single-cell organisms that do not have nervous systems, 
such as yeast. The results have suggested that “there appears to be a very interesting 
connection between the molecular complexity of synapses, and the anatomical complexity of 
big-brained mammals such as ourselves.” (Seth Grant in conversation with Ginger Campbell, 
accessed from http://docartemis.com/brain%20science/51-brainscience-Grant.pdf )
 Intriguingly, these findings support the the work of Maturana and Varela regarding 
cognition. Grant has found that 25% of the proteins that are active in human synapses can 
be found in yeast. However, yeast do not actually have any synapses, rather these “proteins 
that are found in unicellular animals are used by those animals in their response to their 
environment.” 
 As discussed previously, Maturana and Varela argue that the very act of engaging with 
an environment, even the simplest chemical response, can itself be considered to be a 
cognitive act. However, one wonders whether they would have anticipated that literally some 
of the same chemicals used in this primary cognitive-practical activity have remained central 
to the cognition of all of the organisms that have evolved, including humans. As Grant points 
out:
“... what this is telling us is that the very origins of the brain, the evolutionary origins of the 
brain, are not in animals like jelly fish and other very simple animals with a few neurons in a 
very simple brain, but the origin of the brain is much earlier than that – it is right back in 
unicellular animals, and that ancient molecular machinery was allowing that animal to make 
decisions and respond to its environment.” (Ibid.)
6.3 Embodied Brains
If the brain in our head is actually a network of sub-regions, it is also a part of a larger 
network of neuronal and nervous tissue running throughout the human body. Our nervous 
system is not just the network of nerves that sensitise our skin and/or specialise to form 
our various senses. All of our major organs are sheathed by and interpenetrated with 
neurons, and as a result each organ should be thought of as also making to the greater 
brain system. The glandular system also makes a significant contribution to the chemical 
information flows throughout the nervous system. 
 Some research suggests that the so-called limbic system, which is widely 
associated with emotional experiential content, is closely connected to frontal lobes, and it 
is in part through this connection that emotional content is given a rationality, thereby 
allowing the “intelligence” of the limbic system to be incorporated into our “newest” brain. 
The hypothalamus in the brain is also deeply connected into these systems, and “can be 
regarded as the ‘brain’ of ... [an] archaic, ancillary nervous system.”9
 Perhaps most intriguing and important of all – given widespread folk beliefs 
throughout history in the cognitive role of the heart – is the fact that the heart is the only 
organ apart from the brain that is primarily composed of neurons.10 The neurons in the 
heart are of a specialised kind, with heightened electromagnetic sensitivity and function. 
Heart cells collectively self-organise in order to transmit beats of electric pulses through 
their structure, in order to pump blood around the body. In fact, heart cells grown in a petri 
dish will spontaneously start to beat in unison.  
  Although there remains much work to be done in understanding exactly what this 
neurocardiological system is, and how it should be thought about, some argue that the 
“brain of the heart” is an independent cognitive system with its own independent 
autonomic nervous system running through the body, and which proactively interacts with 
the brain in the head in ways that facilitate or inhibit cognition, perception, and decision 
making processes based there.11 In addition to direct neural connections, the heart 
communicates with the main brain, and thus the rest of the body, through biochemical 
(hormones and neurotransmitters)12 and biophysical (pressure waves) means – and some 
suggest, through electromagnetic fields.13 
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Figure 6.5 Drawing of Purkinje cells (A) and granule cells (B) from pigeon cerebellum by 
Santiago Ramón y Cajal (1899). There are different types of neurons. They all carry electro-
chemical nerve signals, but differ in structure (the number of processes, or axons, emanating 
from the cell body) and are found in different parts of the body. Sensory neurons or bipolar 
neurons carry messages from the body's sense receptors (eyes, ears, etc.) to the CNS. 
Motoneurons or multipolar neurons carry signals from the CNS to the muscles and glands. 
These neurons have many processes originating from the cell body. Interneurons or 
pseudopolare cells form all the neural wiring within the CNS. These have two axons (instead 
of an axon and a dendrite). One axon communicates with the spinal cord; one with either the 
skin or muscle.
 Neurons are either on or off, excitatory or inhibitory, and the number of possible brain 
states – that is to say, the number of distinct permutations of combinations of connections 
between neurons, etc – is greater than the number of elementary particles in the universe! 
Whilst the primary means of communication within neurons is electrical; with signals 
travelling at 200 mph, there are also a significant and wide variety of chemical signals, 
constituting communicative systems that operate at a variety of speeds through the body. 
Whilst the transmission of data across synapses is usually mediated by chemical signals, 
there are also other chemical signals in constant flow, from for example the nervous systems 
interconnection with the glandular network, through which information is processed at very 
different speeds.
 Although there are only 40,000 neurons in the heart, this is similar to some nuclei, 
although numerically small compared to the total number of neurons in the main brain. 
However, the majority of the specialist neurons in the heart, which are called sensory 
neurites, have a distinctive electro-magnetic function, and create an electromagnetic field 
which is around five hundred times stronger than that of the brain in the head, and which 
can even be detected several feet away from the body.14 
 There are a number of speculative reading that have coalesced around this kind of 
information. It has, predictably enough, attracted all kinds of New Age interpretations. 
Equally, it has all kinds of potential attractions to externalist approaches. The kinds of 
suggestions that are made concerning ‘cognitive’ roles for the heart include the 
proposition that the electromagnetic field of the heart might act as a rhythmic information 
carrier wave for all of the cells in the body. Others suggest that this means that the heart is 
also very sensitive to electromagnetic fields in the environment, and that the heart does in 
fact create a distinctive electromagnetic field around the body. Some researchers claim 
that in this way we respond “instinctively” to the fields of other people, animals, and plants, 
as well as to the fields created by particular landscapes, geologies etc.15 If there is in fact 
any basis to the idea that the heart is plays some kind of secondary role as a magnetic 
field sensor, to what extent the electromagnetic signatures of the stones and services of 
buildings and cities might contribute, to a deeper level of architectural empathy?16
6.4 Cognitive Maps
A neurologist might conclude that God is a cartographer... for everywhere you look in the 
brain, maps abound.17 
[V.S. Ramachandran]
Mind is ... influenced by ‘maps’, never by territory, and is therefore limited by the 
generalisation that its receipt of info will never prove anything about the world or itself.18
[Gregory Bateson]
Whatever the ultimate intellectual robustness of some of the more speculative concepts of 
extended senses (whether based upon morphic, informational or electromagnetic fields), 
we can be sure that there are real connections between the human organism and its 
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environments. These are based in the receptors of electromagnetic fields that we know as 
our eyes, the receptors of auditory fields of vibration that our ears respond to, or of the 
olfactory fields of the nose, or the haptic fields of our largest organ – the skin. Whilst if the 
heart does act as a sensory organ for electromagnetic fields of a different wavelength to 
the eye, and even if the brain is able to pick up on the informational fields that pattern the 
matter of the rest of the universe, it still does not change the fact that this would just be 
more sensory information, which still needs to be processed, or given meaning, in the 
same way as we do with the other more familiar senses.19 
 In previous chapters I have reviewed the cybernetic and constructivist conceptions 
of the relationship between us as a subject and the external world, which can be 
summarised through the analogy that the taste of sugar is not in the sugar! To explain, the 
sugar molecule is not inherently sweet. Sweetness is in fact what some philosophical 
discourse would describe as a qualia, and is constructed through a particular capacity of 
an organism such as the human to react with an element of the external world in a 
systemic feedback loop, thereby connecting a carbohydrate, sensors on the tongue, 
connections to the brain, and quite possibly a range of other cultural associations 
connected with wherever the carbohydrate molecules have come from. A similar approach 
is considered to be true of all internal constructions of external reality. We do not in any 
simple way directly see or feel the outside world. Nor do we carry around a single “internal 
representation” that we solely refer to in any simple sense. What we as an organism do is 
dynamically interact with the world, and the enaction of those process do in some sense 
constitute maps for processes operating at other “levels”. It is through our interactions with 
the exterior world, and the maps (or system mirrors) that are produced and that we have 
access to, which feedback into determining new external interactions. The experience of 
the sweetness of sugar is then a system, a loop that is both external to the body, 
constituting one map, but also passing through (and referred to by) other internal maps.
 The psychologist E. C. Tolman coined the term “cognitive map” in 1948 to describe 
an animal's mental representation of space.20 However, the concept of body schema was 
previously used by the neurologists Henry Head and Gordon Holmes in 1911 to describe 
a person’s cognitive maps of their own body (indeed they realised that these schema even 
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Penfield Sensory and Motor Mappings
 
Fig. 6.6. Physical models showing the two Penfield Maps (sensory on left, motor on right).
Fig. 6.7 A photograph of Penfield mapping of a patients brain in progress. Numbers show 
tested areas
Figs 6.8 The original Penfield mappings, drawn by H.P. Cantilie (sensory on left, motor on 
right).
changed with whatever clothes were worn). The term “body image” was later added in 
1935 by neurologist Paul Schilder. 
 Since its first use at the interface of psychology and neurology, the concept of 
cognitive mapping has spread widely.21 It became an important term in sociology and 
urbanism, notably in the work of Kevin Lynch during the 1970s, in which Lynch explored 
the ways that people navigate in cities.22 Over a decade later, the critical theorist Frederic 
Jameson took on Lynch’s concept within his discussion of late-modern capitalist culture, 
suggesting that the processes of mapping oneself spatially and culturally were closely 
related. 
 In this chapter I want to review what exactly is meant by cognitive mapping, and 
what is known about some of the actual processes involved. In fact, I will show that an 
understanding of the ways that the “brain in the head” maps the “space of the body”, and 
the body’s parallel interactions with the world, can bring radical insights into our 
understanding of architecture, and an extended appreciation of the concept of empathy. 
Empathy hence describes aspects both of the map-making process and the pattern that 
connects the resultant maps in our mind
6.5 Penfield Maps
In the 1930s and 40s the neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield, working at Montreal Neurological 
Institute, discovered two maps of the body on the surface of the cortex: the primary 
sensory and motor areas.23 Penfield discovered these areas while preparing to operate on 
epileptic patients – basically using an electrode to explore the surface of the cerebral 
cortex, to make sure that he did not cut out anything essential. What followed from his 
studies were the Penfield Maps (made famous by the drawings produced by his assistant 
H.P. Cantilie) of the sensory homonculus and the motor homonculus, which showed that 
the amount of brain dedicated to the different parts of the body was not proportional to 
size, but to use.
 Other animals have body maps that correspond to their specific lifeworld. Indeed, 
looking at the cognitive maps of different animal species emphasises the enormous 
differences in experience and the different worlds that are in Maturana and Varela’s 
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Ur-maps in the Cerebellum
Fig. 6.9. Cognitive maps of the body, found in the cerebellum - perhaps the oldest maps of 
ourselves that we have.
phrase, “brought forth”. For mammals with whiskers, such as cats and mice, those organs 
(which of course humans do not have at all) dominate their sensory maps. For the star-
nosed mole, the array of feelers that it has for its nose are all-important, apparently to the 
extent that the layout of the neurology of their sensory maps is visible to the naked eye as 
a shape on the surface of their cortex. In other animals there are entire senses that we do 
not have at all: some migratory birds, for example, have visual neurons that have built-in 
magnetised elements, which means that they literally sense the Earth’s magnetic fields, 
for use in migration, etc.24
 In recent years there has been a dramatic increase in the number of cognitive 
maps that have been found laid out in the human brain. In fact, in addition to the two maps 
discovered by Penfield in the posterior region of the frontal lobe, there are an additional 
fifty or more major cognitive maps (and many more secondary ones), all of which have 
some bearing on how we extend our minds through our bodies and into our environments. 
All are involved in different ways in making and experiencing the spatial environment 
around us. A no doubt incomplete list of major cognitive maps includes: 
1. touch/somasensory (Penfield)
2. primary motor (Penfield)
3. visceral – interoception (maps of organs, used in emotions)
4. proprioception (musculature etc)
5. secondary somasensory 
6. pre-motor cortex - moving intention
7/8. cerebellum 
9/10. maps of the body, on the body, such as on ears and feet (i.e. reflexology/
accupuncture maps) 
11. peripersonal space -i.e. body coordinate maps (mirror neurons) 
12. extrapersonal space parietal lobe (mirror neurons)
13. grid cells in hippocampus
14. place cells in hippocampus 
15-45. more than thirty visual maps
160

Much of this new knowledge of the neurological workings of the human brain and body 
has in various ways astonishingly confirmed ideas mind and body in the world from very 
different knowledge areas, such as the phenomenology of aesthetics and philosophy, or 
eastern philosophy, or the radical constructivist position that emerged from cybernetics. In 
particular, the work that has developed out of the discovery of mirror neurons has 
particular interest for any anthropological and ethnographic understanding of empathy 
theory, since more broadly it suggests some of the ways in which tool use and the practice 
of building might have played critical roles in the development of human consciousness 
out of our “mind-at-large.” 
 In addition to the primary motor cortex found by Penfield, it has since been 
discovered that the primary somasensory (or touch) map, is in fact four separate maps 
laid out in close adjacency.25 Two of these deal with touch, and two with proprioception 
(the felt sense of limb movements and positions.) There is also a secondary somasensory 
map which facilitates a greater degree of touch sensitivity. The skin, which as noted is the 
largest sensory organ, is not merely a touch receptor. There are also “distinct neural 
pathways that mediate sensations of warmth, cold and pain originate on the skins surface. 
These sensations have their own ... maps in the brain, but the paths used by them may be 
interlaced in complicated ways.”26 
 The pre-motor cortex located in the frontal lobe deals with the intention to move 
our limbs, whereas Penfield’s primary motor cortex is of course involved in the actual 
movement of limbs. There are maps charting the various muscles and joints, as well as a 
set of visceral maps. The visceral maps are an anatomical mapping present to a lesser 
degree in some primates, but are absent in almost all other animals; they represent the 
heart, lungs, liver, colon, rectum, stomach and other internal organs in the right frontal 
insula, and are the neural correlates of the sheaves of neurons that surround our organs 
(as previously mentioned).27 Through this visceral network we are able to map 
interoception, the internal state of our body, which through some complex relationship to 
the autonomic and other secondary nervous systems mentioned above, provides us with 
a distinct sense of rationality on the basis of social emotions.28 In addition to these cortical 
maps, there are two very old maps of the body that have recently been found in a 
completely different brain region, the cerebellum. The cerebellum is one of the oldest 
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Fig. 6.10 Diagram of mouse sensory map, which is dominated by the whiskers (A-E) and 
paws.
Fig. 6.11 Diagram of racoon sensory map, which is dominated by paws.
parts of the vertebrate brain, but which nonetheless contains half of the neurons in the 
brain. These maps in the cerebellum create in my view an extraordinary figural gestalt, an 
almost a Goethean archetype of humans as ur-animal!
6.6 Visual and Kinaesthetic Maps
 
There is, then, as we have already seen in the brief survey above, a complex network of 
cognitive maps related to the human body. In addition to these, which I will return to again 
later, there are said to be at least 30 major maps related to vision – mostly located in the 
temporal lobes (located below the temples).29 The workings of the visual mapping in the 
brain is both complex and contested. This is not least because we are actually concerned 
with two different questions when considering vision. Firstly, there is the processing of 
optical information from our eyes. But there is also the issue of constructing what we 
experience as vision, which is a very different thing indeed. The visual psychologist Beau 
Lotto in particular has demonstrated – in a series of live participation-experiment lectures 
and projects developed by his research laboratory Lotto Lab at UCL – that our actual 
experience and our visual perception are produced and systemically structured in ways 
that do not correspond to what might be imagined would be the characteristics of an 
simple and linear mechanical representation. Our perception and experience are shaped 
by our expectations in all kinds of ways. If we are waiting for someone dressed in red, 
then you will see more people wearing red. Equally, at a more basic level of perceptual 
construction, Lotto Lab have demonstrated that our perception of the building blocks of 
our experience – colours,  shapes, distances, duration – are produced in relation to their 
context and our needs, and can be “deconstructed” through a series of perceptual 
experiments.
 The construction of the experience of vision, in both practical and representational 
senses, is very closely related to the sense of the moving kinaesthetic body in space. 
Maps related to our kinaesthetic experience of space and body are thought to be located 
in the posterior parietal cortex. Blakeslee notes that: 
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Fig. 6.12 Brain scans of a migratory bird, showing that they have neurons which contain 
magnetically sensitive molecules to pick up the Earth’s magnetic fields. These are fed into 
the visual cortex, meaning that these birds in some way see the magnetic fields as visual 
overlays. In all of the above instances it is clear that the animal in question “brings forth” a 
very different phenomenological world to that of humans.
... parietal neurons are not concerned with identifying things in terms of their names, 
identities, or meanings. Rather, they are concerned with the composition of space 
and your body’s relationship to its surroundings ... some maps ‘think’ in head and 
neck centred co-ordinates; some are trunk centred; some are arm and shoulder 
centred; some are eye-centred; some are hand-centred; some are whole body 
centred.30 
 Other maps then co-ordinate these maps with the motor maps in a process that, as 
we shall see, seems to be key to create a unified sense of self. The visual, sensory and 
motor areas are themselves networked together to form other, second-order maps. But 
just as importantly, they are networked through our action in the external world. In an 
important sense this process is the neurological correlate of the mechanisms that 
extended mind theory in general is concerned with. When you decide to move, this 
decision is initiated in the pre-motor cortex, and implemented through the motor cortex 
(i.e. one of the Penfield Maps.) Here is the primary motor cortex which deals with basic 
movements, and the supplementary motor area, which deals with more complex 
movement mapping skills. Simultaneously, as the signals are sent to the muscles, other 
signals are sent back to the cerebellum and parietal lobes. As the muscles then actually 
start to activate, even more signals are returned from the muscles and joints back to the 
cerebellum and parietal lobes. Together with the maps produced by visual feedback, a 
complex cybernetic loop is set up.
 However, the visual recognition and motor areas are not simply joined in their end 
use. They co-evolve, in the development of each organism. Our vision, and that of 
mammals in general, essentially requires a sensing body in order to correctly develop. 
Experiments were conducted in 1963 by Richard Held and Alan Hein with two kittens, in 
which both kittens were held in connected moving baskets, but only one of them was 
actually in control of moving the baskets. The one which was in control of its movement 
developed normal vision as it grew up. The other kitten, which experienced exactly the 
same visual movements, but without any motor feedback – that is to say, without a proper 
cybernetic extensions of mind – did not develop normal vision.31 These experiments, and 
others since, have shown that  maps of the body and senses are plastic in the sense that 
they develop according to experience and sensory input.32 More significantly, they show 
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Fig. 6.13 Paul Bach-y-Rita’s first experiments concerned feeding visual information from a 
video camera into touch pads fixed to the back of a dentists chair. Famously, this was 
ineffective until the subject took the camera in hand – the combination of motor and visual 
feedback is essential to the construction of a visual field. In more recent work Bach-y-Rita 
developed a micro sensitive touch pad which is felt on the tongue; this system is now used 
by deep see underwater divers in low light conditions.
 Areas which in normal development might be used for hearing or sight will get used in 
other ways in people where the hearing or vision senses are in some way damaged. The 
brain in general is, then, according to much contemporary work, highly plastic. Richard 
Gregory defines plasticity in the following way: “Plasticity in the nervous system means an 
alteration in structure or function brought about by development or experience. But not just 
any alteration, to qualify for term plasticity, an alteration has to show pattern or order. 
Plasticity here means patterned alteration of organization.” Richard L. Gregory, The Oxford 
Companion to The Mind (Oxford: OUP, 1998) p.623.
that the very formation of the senses requires an active body, and that the maps of the 
senses are not an additional representational add-on, but are a key part of the circuit. Of 
course, philosophers and artists who have reflected rigorously upon these questions in 
relation to their own experience have long known this to be the case. Whilst mechanistic 
and reductive approaches to the brain sciences had tended to try to define particular 
functions in particular areas of the brain, contemporary research tends to make it clear 
that that is only part of the story. The brain actually works as a network, with complexity 
arising through the assembled interactions of different areas of the body. Our visual 
perception of space is entirely dependent upon our ability to actively move in space. 
Again, this is an instance of science supporting the previous insights of artists and 
philosophers. For example, the neurological schema outlined above corresponds to what 
the Marxian philosopher Henri Lefebvre referred to as our representational space and our 
spatial practices (as referred to in Chapter One).33 
 The maps of the body also feedback information between the senses, the 
environment, and the physical structure and organisation of the brain, and the whole 
bodily circuit is required for the senses to work. As Giacomo Rizzolatti, the leader of the 
team of neurologists that discovered mirror neurons, puts it: 
... these acts [moving our arms, hands, etc], insofar as they are goal-oriented and 
not merely movements, provide the basis of our experience of our surroundings and 
endow objects with the immediate meaning they hold for us. That rigid divide 
between perceptive, motor, and cognitive processes is to a great extent artificial; not 
only does perception appear to be embedded in the dynamics of action, becoming 
much more composite than used to be thought in the past, but the acting brain is 
also and above all a brain that understands ... this is a pragmatic, pre-conceptual 
and pre-linguistic form of understanding, but is no less important for that, because it 
lies at the base of many of our celebrated cognitive abilities.34 
6.7 The Mind’s I
The U.S.-based Indian scientist, V.S. Ramachandran has noted in regard to the existence 
of various kinds of vision maps – but these comments are equally applicable to all the 
senses – that “the mere existence of this map does not explain seeing, for ... there is no 
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Fig. 6.14-15 Paul Bach-y-Rita
 Jeff Hawkins argues that the plasticity displayed by the cortex under conditions 
explored by Bach-y-Rita, and which are demonstrated in all kinds of traumatic or other 
conditions where normally visual areas are used for tactile senses, suggest that the the 
division of the cortex into functional areas is in some sense misplaced. Hawkins argues that 
“cortex is cortex”, and is primarily concerned with pattern recognition, from any source. In 
fact he suggests that the cortex will “look for patterns in whatever is available” and that its is 
programmed through “exposure to patterns in the world through your senses.”!⁰⁹
 Hawkins suggests that our appreciation of music is in fact key evidence for the pattern 
recognition structures of the brain: “You could take an easy example of a pattern that exists 
in time like a melody. You can't recognize a melody by hearing one note. You have to hear it 
through time. You can only make a prediction like ‘what's the next note I'm going to hear in 
the melody’ if you've been exposed and remembered how patterns move through time- how 
the notes move through time. So one of the key elements of this theory- the memory-
predictions framework- is that the brain is storing in sequences of patterns. You can think of 
them like little songs, like little melodies, but we do it not just for auditory. We do it for vision 
and we do it for tactile. So now the sensory inputs as well. There's a theory about how 
memories are formed by storing sequences of patterns through time in a hierarchical 
memory structure.”
little man inside watching what is displayed on the primary visual cortex.”35 This 
statement, an assertion of what is known as the “homunculus fallacy”, is familiar from the 
broader philosophy of mind. The homunculus fallacy effectively dismisses a whole series 
of models of mind, because they rely upon a model of representation which merely 
displaces the problem of consciousness deeper into the mind, by imagining another mind 
(an homunculus) that is observing the representational screen of the first. An infinite 
regression is suggested of which one can only asks: “how is the mind of that internal 
homunculus working – is there another homunculus inside observing that?”
 Whilst I would of course agree with this critique of simplistic representation-based 
models of mind, the problem is not as easily dismissed as the “homunculus fallacy” 
argument suggests. Indeed, according to Ramachandran’s own insights, there is in some 
sense an internal homunculus, in the form of other internal maps. In fact, one might refute 
the “homunculus fallacy” argument to some extent by arguing that the mind is indeed 
something like a network of homunculi. This in fact, amounts to an approximation of 
Marvin Minski’s insight in The Society of Mind, by which he proposed that our minds can 
be understood as an internal society.36 
 Images of infinite regression, or of recursion, remind us of the kinds of conditions 
conjured by opposing mirrors or by video feedback. As noted in Chapter Four, Douglas 
Hofstadter in particular argued that self-consciousness might  precisely be the kind of 
recursive loop which is found in feedback systems, and in cybernetics such suggestions 
are commonplace. There is a curious sense, then, that the infinite regression problem or 
“homunculus fallacy” might be refuted through cybernetic feedback models. There is not a 
line of homunculi, but rather a chain or network of homunculi (in the form of cognitive 
maps), and it is thus this very feedback, with the observed in effect observing the 
observer, that is in some way responsible for some our experience of self-consciousness. 
 A recent model of visual information processing, as proposed by Gerald Edelman, 
suggests that there are multiple feedback loops between visual cognitive maps, and once 
again we are given a mirror-based description: “the brain’s information flow resembles the 
images in a funhouse full of mirrors, continually reflected back and forth, and continually 
changed by processes of reflection.”37 Blakeslee also describes this feedback process: “in 
the cortex, so-called lower areas absorb raw sensory information and pass it over to 
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Fig. 6.16 and 6.17 Research is testing the so-called acupuncture and reflexology points on 
the ear and feet – of Traditional Chinese Medicine – which might be whole body re-mappings 
that give access to other maps, in ways not dissimilar to the phantom limb remapping 
discussed below.
higher areas where it is processed and then passed over to still higher areas. But there is 
no ultimate top area where everything ‘comes together’... once information reaches the 
higher regions, it is fed back down the hierarchy.”38 In fact, in most areas “for every fibre 
carrying information up the hierarchy there are as many as ten fibres carrying processed 
information back down the hierarchy.”39 This kind of description of internal processing in 
humans is of course entirely in line with cybernetic descriptions of mind. Indeed, Blakeslee 
turns to an entirely second-order cybernetic analysis when she states that “the meaning of  
this massive feedback architecture” is that: 
... mind operates via prediction. Perception is not a process of passive absorption, 
but of active construction.” 40 
6.8 Pathological Mappings
“There is a pain somewhere in the room ... but I couldn't positively say that I have got it.”41 
[Mrs Gradgrind, in Charles Dickens]
The clearest demonstrations of the reality of these multiple body maps, and indeed the 
clearest suggestions concerning the architectural significance of these maps, often 
emerge in extreme situations – for example in situations where an individual has had a 
limb amputated.42 Phantom limbs sensations have been frequently reported; the individual 
feels the presence, through pain, movement or paralysis, of a limb that is no longer there. 
Famously, Lord Nelson lost his arm in an attack on Santa Cruz de Tenerife, and thereafter 
suffered from phantom limb syndrome, which he took as “direct evidence for the existence 
of the soul.”43 
 V.S. Ramachandran has led research into this phenomenon, and has shown how 
in a limb amputation, the relevant map territory of the lost limb can become occupied by 
other expanding limb maps. In the Penfield Map, the hand and arm area are flanked by 
that of the face and the shoulder, and sure enough, Ramachandran found the hand to be 
remapped onto the face in phantom hand cases, and in one patient he also found “a 
beautifully laid out map of his missing hand tucked onto his left upper arm.”44 Often what 
166
Recursive Body Maps? 
Fig. 6.18 Diagram showing mirror-box experiment by Ramachandran.
Fig. 6.19 Drawing showing typical phantom limb remappings (after Ramachandran). 
  
would happen is that stimulation of the face would directly trigger sensations in the 
phantom limb. 
 Ramachandran explored the hypothesis that the syndrome’s origins lay in 
feedback and cognitive mapping issues, rather than being a physical neurological or even 
spiritual problem.45 He explored this hypothesis again through the use of mirrors.46 A box 
was constructed so that the patient could insert their real hand into one hole, and ‘insert’ 
their phantom hand (or partial limb) into another. There was however, a mirror in the box 
such that, with a bit of adjustment, the reflection of the real hand can be made to align 
with the felt position of the phantom hand. If the patient now tries to conceptually perform 
some symmetrical movements, as if conducting an orchestra, such that the moving 
phantom hand is felt to to in the dynamic position of the seen reflection, then the results it 
seems could be dramatic. Ramachandran reports that phantom limbs that had been 
paralysed, or painful, are restored initially to movement, and frequently then disappear 
after practice. Ramachandran’s thesis is that the phantom initially emerges due to the 
persistence of some cognitive maps of the body (exactly why is not clear). It seems to be 
resolved through the use of his device, as the visual feedback provided by the mirror box 
obviously correlates with the persisting map, but after that is not backed up by further 
feedback from the real muscles, which are of course not there. The inconsistency in the 
feedback forces another attempt at remapping – this time by eliminating the phantom limb.
 However, not all cross body mappings are necessarily unpleasant or pathological. 
Ramachandran notes that the maps of the feet are next to that of the genitals, and 
suggests that this is why foot fetishism and sexual sensitivity in feet is so common.47 
Furthermore, in Chinese traditional medicine and reflexology there are thought to be 
homunculus maps of the body and organs – which are mapped over, in particular, the feet 
and ears – that are effectively thought of as built in remote control devices to access the 
maps of the body and its various sub-brains. There is some current research exploring 
these traditional Chinese conceptions of the body and energy in relation to phantom body 
cross-mapping.48
 We do not not necessarily need to use mirrors to explore our cognitive map 
layouts. We can explore our body image and feedback loops through other analogue 
mapping techniques. The most common of these is the rubber hand illusion. Basically, it is 
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Fig. 6.20 Olaf Blanke lead one of several teams of neuropsychologists (others notably 
include Henrik Ehrsson’s team) which have in various ways explored how it is that we come 
to have a sense of ownership of a defined body. Blanke’s team have, in their case using VR 
headsets (although other versions of similar experiments can simply use a rubber hand), 
created OBEs by confusing the cognitive maps (or more precisely, the cross-mapping of 
visual and motor-maps). It is my assertion that the kinaesthetic experience of architecture - 
as described by empathy theory – can be understood as a form of out-of-body experience. 
Describing the experience, Blakeslee states “and so, you see this motion and you feel this 
motion, and then you leave your body. You move out of your body toward the virtual reality 
representation of your body. It’s a dissociation.” My argument in this regard is that this 
dissociation, or alienation, is closely related to the aesthetic experience of spatial empathy. 
In fact, in a series of important senses, architecture and urbanism initiate a series of 
dissociative’ experiences.
Fig. 6.21 Rubber hand Illusion set up. The real hand is obscured, but is stroked in a 
synchronised manner with a visible rubber hand - which is typically incorporated into the 
body schema.
 
found that if you place a rubber hand on a table, and place your real hand under the table 
or otherwise out of your sight, and then have someone simultaneously stroke both your 
real and rubber hand, you will soon incorporate the rubber hand into your body schema. 
More complex virtual-reality-based versions of this effect has been produced by Henrik 
Ehrsson49 (initially at UCL, now at the Karolinska Institute in Sweden) and Bigna 
Lenggenhager (at the Ecole Polytechnique in Lausanne). In both these cases, a user 
wore a VR headset, so they could see an avatar in front of themselves. They were then 
stroked with a stick along their back, whilst they watched the same happening to the 
avatar. At a certain point their sense of awareness jumps and they feel like the avatar 
body is their own.
 In fact, as Ramachandran has noted, it is not at all necessary for the object of 
projection to have an close formal relationship to the form of the hand or body. It is 
possible to project your sense of your body onto a table or chair through the same 
technique. He suggests that “the idea that you can actually project your sensations to 
external objects is radical and reminds me of phenomena such as out of body 
experiences.”50 Whilst one can agree that this idea is radical, it is surely a closely related 
process to the aesthetic concept of spatial and formal empathy, that we are discussing 
here. I would also agree therefore that this has something to do with reported out-of-body 
experiences – although one the out-of-body experience that I think that this has most 
resonance with is architecture.51 
 There is, I will propose over the coming pages, a much more interesting 
relationship between architecture and space, and a whole range of out-of-body 
experiences (OBE), than has been appreciated so far. Neurologist Olaf Blanke52 has 
induced OBEs in patients by stimulating the right angular gyrus, and Michael Persinger53 
has induced OBEs and a broader range of transcendental experiences with his so-called 
God Helmet (a transcranial magnetic stimulator.)54 In both types of experiments it is the 
area where the temporal and parietal lobes meet (just above your ear) which is found to 
be the area that maps your body in space. In Blanke’s research (much of which was 
produced and disseminated with the philosopher Thomas Metzinger), stimulating the right 
side above the ear caused patients to report suddenly finding themselves floating in the 
air with their backs pressed against the ceiling.55 Stimulating the left side caused patients 
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to report feeling themselves being held by a shadowy figure. Although the patients 
involved often argue that these experiences are completely “real”, Blanke suggests that 
these experiences are the result of shifts in and projections of body maps: 
OBEs are related to a failure to integrate multisensory information from one’s own 
body at the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). It is argued that this multisensory 
disintegration at the TPJ leads to the disruption of several phenomenological and 
cognitive aspects of selfprocessing, causing illusory reduplication, illusory self-
location, illusory perspective, and illusory agency that are experienced as an OBE.56 
Although there remain accounts of OBEs by reliable witnesses that cannot yet be 
exhaustively accounted for Blanke’s analysis57, his basic proposition that this 
phenomenon relates to shifts in the ecology of body and space maps, offers a convincing 
explanation of, at the very least, some of the mechanisms involved.58 In the context of 
both extended mind theories and the aesthetics of empathy, the spatial component of 
these experiences is obviously critical. Is the fact that people imagine themselves 
projected onto the ceiling, the architecture, important, or not? Is the fact that the many 
battlefield or sports field accounts of OBEs adopt an aerial plan view significant, or not? 
 Ramachandran notes that: 
... for your entire life you have been walking around assuming that your ‘self’ is 
anchored to a single body that remains stable and permanent at least until death. 
Indeed, the ‘loyalty’ of your self to your own body is so axiomatic that you never 
even pause to think about it, let alone question it. Yet these experiments suggest the 
exact opposite – that your body image, despite all its appearance of durability, is an 
entirely transitory internal construct that can be profoundly modified with just a few 
simple tricks.59
It is interesting now to reflect upon these out-of-body experiences in the light of some of 
the discussion in previous chapters. The fact that our sense of body ownership is so easily 
adjusted, suggests that it might well vary historically and culturally, as much artistic and 
even behavioural evidence would suggest. It also means that we should wonder whether 
we might already in fact be occupying a series of related “out-of-body positions”, and that 
in some sense, it is the dominance in our modern consciousness of being tightly located 
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within our bodies alone (rather than experiencing as our self, our ecological extension) 
that requires explanation. This is of course not to say that there are not good reasons why, 
as individual organisms, we have also to be aware of the physical boundaries of our own 
“skinbags”. Indeed, for Andy Clark:
... the preconditions for the emergence of a rich sense of self begin to be met, I 
suspect, when on the basis of such information [sense of location and body 
boundaries] a loose knit system begins to stabilise itself and to actively protect its 
own problem solving infrastructure.60
Equally, as soon as we recognise the malleability of this sense of bodily ownership, we 
can start to recognise moments whereby we can identify all kinds of collective 
experiences as shared and social bodies (from sports to sex to political revolution). It 
suggests all kinds of possibilities for future, so-called “post-human” developments.
6.9 Peripersonal Space
To briefly recap, then, the idea that there is a straightforward representation of the world in 
our minds is problematic. Nonetheless, there is still representation of some kind going on: 
we do not solely use the external world as a “live database”, that we access in real-time, 
whenever we need information about it, or where we are in it.61 We use maps: lots of 
them, doing all kinds of things. These maps are then networked together and nested, in 
many different ways. The maps are mostly found across the cortex, the “newest” region of 
the human brain. However, there are also maps located in the cerebellum, one of the 
oldest structures in the brain, plus there are also important spatial maps in the 
hippocampus. Some of these maps are practically direct and unmediated reflections of 
our real-time muscular and skeletal activity: information dynamically produced regarding 
our bodily movements and locations in space. Others are constructed on the basis of 
sensory interaction with certain environmental domains: i.e. information produced by our 
senses as they actively participate in the flows of the external world beyond the various 
“edges” of our bodies. Still other maps are produced by combining in various ways these 
primary maps. In other words, there is an ecology of maps, a network of feedback loops 
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Fig. 6.22. Leonardo da Vinci, The Vitruvian Man (1487) - a map of peripersonal space?.
Fig. 6.23. Anthony Gormley, a mapping of human body and movement zones in space.
Fig. 6.24 A mapping of psychological/defensible space zones around the body (after Alice 
Coleman): intimate space, personal space, social space, public space.
   
  
between the mind, body and external world, and it seems that this ecosystem, as our 
interface with the broader ecology of minds, is a key component in our experience of 
consciousness. In a very real sense, it is not simply that we use maps, but that we are 
maps. And maps, as Bateson (drawing upon Alfred Korzybski) emphasised, are always 
and can only be constructed in relation to experiences of difference.62 
 In addition to the maps so far discussed, we also have a complex series of 
mappings of the space beyond our bodies. 63 Our peripersonal space is that bubble of 
space that surround our body, and which is itself mapped through a series of body co-
ordinate maps located in the parietal lobe.64 It is defined by the space that we can reach if 
we swing our arms and legs around, or bend and twist our torso.65 It is a dynamic space 
that shifts and changes as we move around in the world, and interact with other beings.66 
In our brain, this space is mapped out as an extension to the way that our bodies are 
mapped out. If an object or another person enters this space, neurons mapping that space 
will fire, just in the same way that neurons will fire if your arm has been touched. It seems 
that this space is mapped through a combination of visual, auditory, olfactory and various 
other clues and stimuli. It is not something that we are generally consciously aware of; it 
has become part of our mind, but not our consciousness: 
... every point on your body, each internal organ and every point in space out to the 
ends of your fingertips, is mapped inside your brain. Your ability to sense, move, and 
act in the physical world arises from a rich network of flexible bodymaps distributed 
throughout your brain – maps that grow, shrink, and morph to suit your needs.67 
Peripersonal cognitive maps are the neurological basis of our aesthetic and kinaesthetic 
sense of prosthetic bodily extension. By picking up a stick that we can swing around, our 
peripersonal fields extends to map this enlarged space of action. Again, this is no a 
metaphorical description, nor one that is “only” based upon aesthetic reflection or critical 
self-analysis; it has been confirmed in the way these neuronal mapping processes are 
working. When we pick up a stick, are maps of ourselves are literally extended.
 Of course, in an important sense, many of these cognitive maps of peripersonal 
space have been, prior to their recent “re-discovery” by modern science, well established 
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Fig. 6.25-6. Eastern philosophy and medicine in particular has long claimed to have 
rigourously mapped and manipulated a series of fields surrounding and interpenetrating the 
body. It seems that if nothing else, these describe the interrelations of the kinds of cognitive 
maps described in this chapter, and many yogic and martial art practices might be 
understood as methods for keeping these maps in form.
  
in esoteric literature, being widely documented for instance in the experience of martial 
arts and yogic practitioners. Blakeslee offers one way to understand this testimony:
... peripersonal space is physically, literally mapped in your brain’s parietal and 
frontal lobes. So are your motor intentions within that space. Your sense of owning 
this space is so real and encompassing that you may feel tempted to feel that you 
can direct or otherwise manipulate the space as if it had substance or intrinsic 
energy. This is because your experience is of your brain’s representation of that 
space, rather than the space itself ... because the many maps of the body mandala 
share information back and forth, these beliefs can even percolate down to the 
primary touch map and generate phantom sensations – tingles and gentle forces – 
that the mind interprets as perceptions.68 
 Peripersonal space has been known in western cultures too of course too, and 
perhaps is even described in Leonardo da Vinci’s diagram of The Vitruvian Man. There 
are descriptions in fact from a wide range of cultural humanist sources, most explicitly in 
modern times for by Henri Poincaré and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, or in the personal space 
(Proxemics), discussed by Edward T. Halland, or more mundanely in the still popular 
urbanist conception of “defensible space”. Peripersonal space is not simply some loosely 
defined and imagined approximation, or an effect produced through copied cultural 
behaviour. It is rather precisely mapped in the brain as an extension of our body, in a way 
that is not differentiated from the physical body, but is instead defined as the potential 
space of the body: 
... the same neuron that discharges when we brush the monkey’s arm also becomes 
active when we move our hand close to the animal’s forearm, entering its visual 
receptive field. If you find this hard to believe, bring your hand close to your cheek: 
you will feel it before your fingers actually touch the skin. It is almost as if the 
personal (ie cutaneous) space of your cheek reaches out to embrace the visual 
space that surrounds it.69 
 The posterior parietal lobe is where a number of feedback loops from both the 
senses and muscles converge. There are several multimodal70 maps in this area which 
combine them; in particular there is an important map in the fold at the rear of the parietal 
lobe that brings together visual and touch sense loops, and has what is called a bimodal 
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receptive field – that is, it responds both to actual touch on a given body part and to 
activity in the space immediately around that body part. This is not to say that it is 
necessary to call upon the use of “morphic fields” or anything like that. Peripersonal space 
is mapped and felt either via vision or other senses responding to an object enter the field. 
As Eric Kandel describes it, “the visual receptive fields of these neurons ... appear to have 
been transformed from a retinal frame of reference to a reference frame centred on the 
position of the [relevant limb].”71 We are needless to say not actually conscious of these 
processes as processes. However, we use and feel them in our actions at every moment. 
Indeed it is these processes that form the basis of tool use.
6.10 Tools and the Extensions of Peripersonal Space
... the useful object would be the highest achievement, an anthropomorphised 'thing', the 
reconciliation with objects no longer closed off from humanity and which no longer suffer 
humiliation at the hands of men... Mankind would no longer suffer from the 'thingly' character 
of the world, and likewise 'things' would come into their own. Once redeemed from their own 
'thingliness', 'things' would find their purpose. But in present society all usefulness is 
displaced, bewitched.72  
[Theodore Adorno]
There is of course a long history of propositions from cultural theory concerning the ways 
in which tools and environments act as prosthetics, whether as extensions or reformations 
of the human body, through projection, cognitive mapping, alienation, empathy and so on. 
Certainly they have been commonplace since the discourse of the empathy theorist 
Robert Vischer in the mid-nineteenth century. However, there was until recently little 
opportunity to test whether the notion of prosthetic tools was just a metaphorical 
description, or whether tools really are incorporated into the cognitive maps of the body 
and its surrounding peripersonal space, in the sense that we have been discussing. It was 
only in 1996 that Atsushi Iriki at the RIKEN Institute in Japan73 started to explore this area, 
with the help of some macaque monkeys.
 The macaque monkeys were trained by Iriki to use a rake to recover fruit. Brain 
scans showed that once these tools were being used, they were indeed incorporated as 




Fig. 6.27-8. Iriki’s experiments with macaque monkeys are amongst the clearest 
demonstrations that, as far as certain cognitive maps in the brain are concerned, tools really 
do serve to extended the body.
 
  
integrated into the map of the monkey’s hand when used, and similarly the space 
described by the moving tool extended the peripersonal space being mapped.
 Iriki has engaged the macaque monkeys in an ever more complex series of tool 
experiments, using mounds, mirrors, rakes of different lengths, video cameras and 
joystick, and even abstract representations – such as seeing the fruit represented by a 
white dot, or the rake by a white line, on a video screen. In all cases the monkeys were 
firstly able to learn how to use the tools to get the fruit, and secondly were shown to 
extend their cognitive maps in the ways described. 
 In an analysis of the brains of some of these monkeys, Iriki was able to show that 
the tool use displayed was not simply a case of “learning” through the use of existing 
pathways, but was full-blown neural plasticity – i.e. the growth of new pathways. This is 
why it always took some weeks to train the monkeys to use the tools in question. It is 
suggested that the kinds of connections between maps that were produced through this 
new plasticity in the monkeys are already much more present in more evolved apes, and 
even more interconnected in humans. It is thought that the adoption of an upright gait was 
the most important change to the plasticity of the brain in humans, in that it massively 
increased what we could do with our hands, and the mapping of this new activity in turn 
transformed the human brain.74 
 For Andy Clark, it is this plasticity regarding incorporating tools into the flows of the 
mind that is at the core of the extended mind thesis. He states that: 
... advanced biological brains are by nature open-ended opportunistic controllers. 
Such controllers compute, pretty much on a moment to moment basis, what 
problem solving resources are readily available and recruit them into our problem 
solving wholes. Neural plasticity, exaggerated in our own species, makes it possible 
for such resources to become factored deep into both our physical and cognitive 
problem solving routines.”75 
 In fact, for Clark, it is not simply that tool use was something novel, that the 
distinctly plastic human brain was able to do, but rather that tool use is all that any 
organism does. For Clark, ultimately there are no selves; instead, “it is tools all the way 




    
Fig. 6.29-30. The performance artist, Stelarc, has been a leading experimenter of post-
human cyborg reconfigurations and extensions of the body, adding both internal and external 
elements - this project: Amplified Body/Third Hand/ Virtual Arm (1995) Mark Wigley has 
suggested that in “the reconfiguration of architecture on ecological principles ... Prosthetic 
extension is a form of ingestion. As the body expands, the environment is literally brought 
inside. Space gets reconstituted. Architecture is what you swallow.”
Fig.6.31 An early Coop Himmelblau performance.
Fig.6.32 David Greene’s well-known “attempt to mate with a photocopier” in 1980.
  
  
and body extension can tell us a great deal about the experience of architectural form and 
space – for as Marquand Smith has noted, prosthesis is always in complex ways about 
place.77
 The fields or maps that surround our body are, then, both experiential and 
representational. They exist as extended systemic relations between our minds and 
bodies and the external world. They affect the way that we behave and experience, 
although at the macrocosmic or classical scale they have no “independent” physical 
reality.78 They also have no obvious independent sensory capacity – that is to say, were 
all of your other senses (such as sight, sound, smell and touch) to be disabled, then it 
seems that you would not sense in these maps any object entering your peripersonal 
space.79 However, these outer maps do affirm a radical ecological mind position in which 
the organism is absolutely coupled to its environment. There is no single boundary 
splitting the two, but rather a series of what we might call mentally-mapped metabolisms.
 Under particular social and cultural conditions, these maps can be shared between 
people, in that your maps can extend to include the bodies of others. Whilst for modern 
western subjects this normally only happens at a non-conscious level, it can enter into 
phenomenal experience in certain states of consciousness – for example under the 
effects of certain drugs, or in certain cultural situations, such as sports stadiums or 
nightclubs or in revolutionary practice, etc.
 It also emerges in certain neurological conditions, such as particular forms of 
synesthesia, such as vision-touch synaesthesia, where (it is presumed via mirror 
neurons), some individuals can see auras around other people – although this is 
presumably a projection peripersonal space maps, made visible.80
6.11 Architecture as a Dissociative Mapping
The Himba people of Namibia have achieved, it would appear as a cultural condition, a 
sense of space that is similar to vision-touch synaesthesia. The Himba are particularly 
conscious of their sense of peripersonal space. They say that they are aware of each 
others body-field bubbles, and that they feel a direct sense of socially mixing fields 
whenever they meet anyone. They say that this is a key part of their social existence, and 
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The is a relationship between a nomadic rejection of the normal extended body that 
architecture provides, and the becoming-visible of the sphere of peripersonal space that 
surrounds the body – both in the stories of the Himba, and nomadic architectural research by 
some members of Archigram.
Fig. 6.33. David Greene carries his space around in the 1968 Suitaloon project.




that they can’t imagine how lonely it must be for others who do not experience this as a 
conscious daily event. According to Blakelee, “the Himba say they are never alone 
because their space maps fuse with others’ throughout the day.”81 It seems also that the 
shamans among the Iatmul of New Guinea are also able to see a cloud or aura – what 
they call ngglambi – surrounding people.82
 The Himba people live a nomadic pastoral existence in the Kunene region 
(formerly Kaokoland), and so there might well be a relationship between their nomadic 
lifestyle, and the intensified apperception of peripersonal body space. Specifically, I 
wonder whether there is also a relationship to the lack of actual buildings in their 
environment for them to project themselves onto, and the fact that they seem to channel 
some peripersonal space maps through their visual cortex. In this regard, it is striking that 
in several radical streams of architectural imagination, during the 1960s and 70s, there 
was an imagining of the individual surrounded by a bubble of space. Typically, this was 
found in the work where there has been a sustained meditation on a nomadic condition of 
spatial existence, as a way of theorising a nomadic modern technological condition. We 
thus can see the emergence of the bubble in the projects of David Greene and Mike 
Webb of Archigram, in for example the Cushicle and Suitaloon projects. These architects, 
having rejected the tectonic building as an appropriate medium for the future of 
architecture, meditated on other technologies that can extend and mediate the social 
(though typically individual) body and its environment and in their imagination – and, I 
would argue, once again start to intuit the existence of their own peripersonal space as a 
potential unit of architecture. For Greene et al, their peripersonal space, once again 
glimpsed, became reified into a physical bubble.
 The reflection upon the particular social and environmental spatial experience of 
the nomad is vital here. We should remember that we all have peripersonal space maps 
(and many others) networked in our brains. However, for most of us, our peripersonal 
maps are not available to our conscious awareness. They are but one of many mental 
processes that we draw upon within consciousness in all kinds of ways, but which we do 
not experience as a physical bubble in normal situations.  
 In fact, one tentative hypothesis, is that it might be the experience of architecture in 
general, which overrides our peripersonal fields in our conscious awareness? I wonder 
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Fig.6.35. Reyner Banham, The Environment Bubble (1968). One of the rare examples of a 
collective bubble.
Fig. 6.36 Buckminster Fuller’s proposed bubble over central Manhattan. Struggling towards 
a collective peripersonal space?
Fig. 6.37 Haus Rucker, at Documenta V 1972.
Of course, the image of the “Spaceship Earth” from Apollo 8 (see Fig. 3.9) might be the 
largest collective bubble study of this period.
  
then, if our building activity is quite simply the transformation of this sense of space, into a 
state of dissociation or alienation? In urban cultures, peripersonal space fields have to 
undergo constant adjustment and projection through a range of other spaces, and which 
prefigures in a general sense what Simmel came famously to identify as the blasé 
condition needed to survive the specific intensity of the modern city. If we live in buildings 
and cities, our spatial experience is such that our peripersonal space is distorted, 
extended and overwritten to such an extent that it is not available to conscious experience 
in any recognisable form (although it is still there in our minds, and we constantly use it in 
all other kinds of extended ways). However, perhaps for individuals in some human 
cultures which have not reified their peripersonal space fields into built structures, some of  
these maps are available to experience consciously as fields, and even to be incorporated 
into vision. This might suggest that the loops and mirrors within which conscious 
experience can play is in fact plastic – a point that I will return to again. 
 There are of course equally big differences between the peripersonal space 
bubbles of the Himba and the imagination of the 1960s cybernetic architectural avant-
garde, and a critique of the later position is all too easy to make. Whereas the Himba are 
situated within an open “natural” field, Archigram and other architects were imagining an 
open “post-natural” field – using modern industrial materials and technology – and set 
within a degrading planetary ecology. Whereas the peripersonal space bubbles of the 
Himba are mental and social, the Suitaloon project, for instance, is physical and personal. 
Whereas the Himba people talk about how they experience the mixing of body maps as a 
primary social experience, the kinds of technological bubbles produced by the 1960s 
generation of techno-nomadic explorers suggest a quite different social experience. 
Typically, we find in the latter an expression of a much more isolated and self-defined 
individual. This time, the individual is in some sense isolated from his or her environment, 
and is often unable to intermingle and join with the bubbles of others. If anything in these 
1960s visionary projects, the primary coupling is not social, but with the stylised 
commodity of the bubble itself, and perhaps the network of information systems that the 
bubble is then connected into.83  It is as if the socio-economic forms of the Himba allow a 
visceral and visual socio-subjective experience of peripersonal space sharing, whilst 
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Fig.6.38 NOX, H2Oexpo Pavilion (1999). Lars Spuybroek has explicitly conceived of his 
projects in terms of prosthesis and cognitive mapping. He states that "with practice and 
training, the movements of the prosthesis can become second nature, regardless of whether 
it is flesh, wood or – a little more complex – of metal, as in the case of the car. That is the 
secret of the animation principle: the bodies inner phantom has an irrepressible tendency to 
expand, to integrate every sufficiently responsive prosthesis into its motor system, its 
repertoire of movements, and make it run smoothly ... movement can only be fluent if the 
skin extends as far as possible over the prosthesis and into the surrounding space, so that 
every action takes place from within the body, which no longer does things consciously but 
relies totally on ‘feeling ’… the body forms itself by action, constantly organising and 
reorganising itself motorically and cognitively to keep 'in form.'"!!!
 
under capitalist relations – as we know from Marx (and Archigram) – all social 
relationships are mediated by and embodied in privately-owned commodities. 
6.12 Extrapersonal Space and Affordances
Our peripersonal, or near space, is thus mapped as a direct extension of our body, which 
in turn is defined by a series of overlapping fields based on vision, and on various body 
parts. The space beyond that, our extrapersonal or far space, is also mapped, but again 
separately. This is made clear through examples of the condition of “spatial neglect” which 
have been documented in individuals with damage to either their near or far spatial 
mapping. For example, Anna Berti and Francesca Frassinetti have patients with right 
hemisphere lesions which affects their left peripersonal space. This showed up when 
asked to indicate the midpoint of a given line. The individual could not do this by hand, in 
peripersonal space, but they could do it at a distance using laser pen! Revealingly, they 
could not repeat this same exercise at the same distance using a rod, confirming that the 
point of the laser was seen and thereby in their far space field, but the end of the rod was 
felt as an extension of their body, so was incorporated into their near space! 84
 Rizzolatti (via multiple references to Henri Poincaré and Maurice Merleau-Ponty) 
notes that because we are mobile beings rather than animals fixed to a location (like say 
sea-polyps), our extra-personal space always has the potential to become our 
peripersonal space – i.e. it is always space that we might move into. More than that, he 
argues that we are constantly surveying both near and far space, using both visual and 
motor neuronal circuits, looking for opportunities for physical engagement. He quotes 
Ernst Mach’s 1905 paper on “Knowledge and Error”, stating that: 
... ‘the points of physiological space’ are nothing other than ‘the goals of various 
movements of grabbing, looking and locomotion.’ These movements are the starting 
point from which our body maps the space that surrounds us, and it is due to their 
goal directedness that space acquires form for us.85  
This is a very interesting statement in terms of the way that it sets out a series of relations 
between form and space as a function of embodied and enacted goals. More broadly 
178
The Cognitive Maps of Architectural Form
      
Fig.6.39. Much of the rustication of the Palais Ideal was formed by Facteur Cheval’s hand. 
Such technique necessarily produces a surface articulation which is rich in hand affordances 
(i.e. groves that one can hold).
Fig.6.40. Rebecca Horn’s work has explored the extended active body, in pieces such as “I 
can touch both walls at the same time.”
Fig.6.41.  Borromini’s Church of San Carlo alle Quattro Fontane (1638-41), the kind of 
interior that feels particularly prosthetic and full of affordance at all kinds of scale, and which 
Wölfflin would describe through an empathetic extension of the mind and body. I am 
suggesting that when we see decorated and articulated surfaces such as these, we are 
immediately firing off all kinds of affordance based pre-motor circuits
 
here, Rizzolatti, like many of the present generation of neuroscientists, makes use of J.J. 
Gibson’s concept of “affordance’” to describe the process that his team have uncovered. 
 Gibson described himself as an “ecological psychologist”, which for him meant that 
the organism could only be defined and understood in relation to its environment. 
Gibson’s work parallels some cybernetic approaches and prefigures many aspects of 
extended mind thinking, and provides a key component for the approach that I am 
promoting in this thesis.
 Gibson argued that we see the world in terms of what he called the affordances of 
objects, by which he meant the actions that they facilitate. Our perception is tied to 
potential action – whenever we see objects, we also see things that we can do with them 
– and hence we see affordances that facilitate our interaction and “not only abstract 
physical [or geometrical] properties.”86 We perceive by observing whether we can sit on, 
pick up, hold, grasp, throw, etc. these objects, and thereby bring forth our particular 
species-world. This insight by Gibson into our interaction with the external world is 
increasingly backed up by neurological evidence, which show that we have maps that do 
indeed chart such affordances. There are a set of feedback loops between visual and 
premotor maps that do this. When we look at a cup, our hand is ready to pick it up, and 
similarly, when we see a step, our legs are ready to step up.87 The particular network of 
neurons that are responsible for this have been called mirror neurons, and they are 
responsible for a whole series of similar projective and mimetic tasks. 
 As well as responding to objects that the body can engage with in different ways, 
there are also motor-neuron-based maps which respond to specific three-dimensional 
forms: “one of the most important properties of the visual dominant and the visual and 
motor AIP motor neurons is that they respond selectively to specific 3D stimuli. Some 
respond to spherical objects, others to cubes, others again to flat objects, etc”88
 It is perhaps worth noting that Bruno Latour has suggested that Gibson’s 
conception of affordance helped him to think about the ways that objects have some kind 
of immanent agency. Latour states that
... there might exist many metaphysical shades between full causality and sheer 
inexistence. In addition to ‘determining’ and serving as a ‘backdrop’, things might 
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Fig.6.42-6.43 John Portman's Bonaventure Hotel, Los Angeles (1974-76). Mirrored space 
has, as I have mentioned on several occasions, been key to grasping something of the mind 
and body in space. In Postmodernism, Frederic Jameson describes the Bonaventure Hotel 
as a mirrored container that produced a distinctly post-modern phantom body experience. 
For Jameson, in this interior the very spatiality of late capitalism “has finally succeeded in 
transcending the capacities of the individual human body to locate itself, to organize its 
immediate surroundings perceptually, and cognitively to map its position in a mappable 
external world” (Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism 
Durham: Duke University Press, 1991),p.44). For Jameson, “the alienated city is above all a 
space in which people are unable to map (in their minds) either their own positions or the 
urban totality in which they find themselves” (ibid., p.51).
authorise, allow, afford, encourage, permit, suggest, influence, block, render 
possible, forbid, and so on.89
6.13 An Affordance-based Theory of Architectural Pattern and Decoration
If our basic peripersonal space maps inform one kind of architectural and spatial 
experience, albeit often below consciousness, I think that the oscillation between 
peripersonal and extrapersonal space – as activated and initiated through our constant 
projection of affordances – is of much more immediate importance to architectural 
experience. In particular, I suggest that Gibson’s theory of affordances might form a key 
component of an architectural theory of pattern and decoration. 
 Rizzolatti finds much in the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty to help him describe 
the conditions of an affordance based, perception-through-potential-action model of 
spatial cognition. To be sure, when Merleau-Ponty suggests that “in the action of the hand 
which is raised is contained a reference to the object ... as that highly specific thing 
towards which we project ourselves, near which we are, in anticipation, and which we 
haunt,”90 we have it seems a fairly accurate description of the processes that Rizzolatti is 
dealing with. One of the cognitive or empathetic mechanisms through which we respond 
to architecture is I think precisely in the manner described here by Merleau-Ponty, and 
clearly, particular kinds of architectural texturing or embellishment will activate this 
sensibility more or less intensely. I suggest that when we see a moulding, or an articulated 
surface, we first explore it in our imagination through the haptic affordances that it does or 
could offer. This can be a conscious activity, but need not be so. It is often semi-
submerged in our consciousness, I suspect. We can, if we reflect upon our perceptual 
activity, sense these projections going on, but often they are transformed into – or joined 
with – all kinds of  other parallel readings that architectural and urban environments 
initiate (including other cognitive maps and of course symbolic messages). 
 These processes of engagement with architectural pattern and decoration are 
similar then to the more mundane affordance calculations that are enacted by our muscles 
and pre-motor cortex areas, every time that we see, say, a cup on a table. We do not 
consciously think about picking up every cup that we see, although it can be shown that 
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Fig.6.44. Extension to the Museum of Childhood, Bethnal Green, London, by Caruso St John 
(2002–2007). Although patterned and carefully made, the tension between the resolute 
flatness of this facade and the geometric suggestion of a patterned depth, make this object 
strangely frustrating.
Fig.6.45. Grossstadt Architekture, by Ludwig Hilbersheimer, 1921. The repetition of the mass 
building cell, it was proposed, would initiate a new kind of collective empathy.
Fig.6.46 A vernacular Italian rooftop. The tiles, made by shaping clay around the tiler’s thigh, 
is irreducibly full of affordance, and is therefore easy to empathise with.
  
  
precisely this is in fact happening in our minds. Anticipating some of the discussion in the 
next chapter, we can say that a theory of architectural affordance and cognitive mapping 
suggested here, describes actual modes of spatio-formal empathy.
 Affordance also I think work at several scales. It is likely that vernacular, hand-
made buildings do by necessity offer more affordances, simply because they are, by 
definition, entirely composed of components that are hand-held (this is not necessarily to 
make any kind of value judgement here.) Whilst decorative or constructional patterning 
often activate these hand-based affordances, there are also I think a whole series of 
affordances based upon the body as a whole: steps, frames, platforms, and changes in 
levels. These kinds of spaces take on individual whole body affordances, and also start to 
multiply them into multi-body affordances too in terms of social space. In this way, 
affordances define what might be thought of as archetypal architectural elements such as 
stairs, door openings, windows, etc.
 It is important to consider that the perception of affordance is not only a question of 
practical engagement, or, as I am arguing, aesthetic sensuousness. It might actually play 
a much more important role in cognition more generally. As Rizzolatti notes: 
... motor vocabulary ... requires continual interaction between perception and action. 
However ‘pragmatic’ it may be, this interaction still plays a decisive role in 
constructing the sense of objects; without it the majority of the so called ‘higher 
order’ cognitive functions could not take place.91 
Drawing once again upon Lakoff and Johnson’s conception of the embodied basis of 
cognition, and my previous comments upon the potential of our extended bodies to 
provide the basis of extended concept forms, I suggest that architectural affordances 
might be key to understanding the role that architectural environments play in extending 
the metaphors available for adaption to higher cognitive faculties.92 
 It is interesting to consider how affordances might be used in discussing the 
conditions brought forth by some contemporary structures. The smooth surface of many of  
the “first generation” of computer-generated “hypersurface” images – and as realised in 
much recent work by Gehry, Hadid et al – brings forth an ambiguous haptic imaginary. 
Often a seamless smoothness denies all hand-based affordance, and perhaps thereby 
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prevents any potential for cognitively “grasping” the object, even whilst their spectral 
reflectiveness might attract other libidinal sensibility. In a very different way, the facade of 
the extension to the Bethnal Green Museum of Childhood by Caruso St John offers an 
image of abstraction, in that it seems to offer a possible visual affordance, yet its flatness 
denies any need for the motor circuits to engage, and as such it feels strangely frustrating 
– even whilst this very sense of frustration might be all too accurate an account of the 
possibility of grasping the contemporary commodity, whether as object or spectacle. 
 If highly decorated environments can provide places that are full of affordances for 
humans, is this in fact necessarily stimulating? Might it be just as cognitively radical to be 
in an environment that is devoid of such possibilities? The large expanses of unarticulated  
and un-ornamented surfaces that describe the archetypal modernist environment are 
typically lacking in affordance. Whilst, as aesthetic objects, such environments (classically 
rendered in for example Hilbersheimer’s early sketches) have a painfully therapeutic 
quality, does one need to have an already highly abstracted sensibility to appreciate this? 
Would immersion in such an environment result in a restricted extension of cognitive 
potential, or does it free up the mind for plastic re-conception?93 
 The architecture of Frank Gehry presents a particularly paradoxical case study in 
haptic affordances. Gehry famously designs his buildings by working with small physical 
models, like a sculptor. These are then digitised in 3D, and scaled up into buildings. These 
buildings are thereby shaped into highly plastic-morphic forms, yet the experience of 
inhabiting these spaces can often remain rather empty. There is I suggest very little scope 
for affordance-based projection in a Gehry designed structure, as the surfaces are 
typically smooth and unarticulated. In fact, whilst there can be occasional moments of full 
body empathy – such as surfaces to sit on or lean against, etc – these too are rare and 
occur somewhat by chance, as the spaces do not seem to have been designed to be 
inhabited at all. Gehry’s buildings are clearly most effective and engaging when looked at 
from a distance, or in a photograph. This is because, I would suggest, in those modes of 
engagement, the viewer is most able to experience an affordance-based relationship with 
the building as a visual object which has some abstract relationship to its original mode of 
production – we can imagine holding the small initial model, feeling its contours in our 
hand. However, whilst making these kinds of objects is a process that is probably good for 
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Figure 6.47 and 6.49. Frank Gehry, Bilbao Guggenheim. 
Figure 6.48. Frank Gehry’s design method is lampooned in The Simpsons
As hand-made models, Gehry’s architecture makes some kind of “sense”: a bit like the 
sensation models that are used by visually impaired children. When scaled up into buildings, 
however, it is less clear what responses might be expected from the viewer or user.
  
  
the brains of the architects and clients involved, as they explore affordance with the 
original hand-held models, it is in fact ultimately creating a new and extreme form of 
spatio-mental elitism?
6.14 Mirror Neurons and Empathy
In recent research it has been suggested that what have become known as mirror 
neurons are actually the neurological correlate of the empathy-type spatial sensibility of 
the mind discussed above. It is these neurons that bring together much of the cross-over 
between haptic, motor and visual systems, and it is these neurons that initiate the mimetic 
projections that mean that when we confront the world, we confront an array of 
affordances.94  
 According to popular anecdote, mirror neurons were discovered by chance in the 
laboratory of Giacomo Rizzolatti, when they realised that certain motor circuits were 
activating in monkeys when they were watching the scientists pick things up. According to 
Rizzolatti: 
... [the] recognition of the actions of others, and even of their intentions, depends 
first of all on our motor repertoire ... the mirror neuron system is indispensable to 
that sharing of experience that is at the heart of our capacity to act as both individual 
and as members of a society. Forms of imitation, both simple and complex, of 
learning, of verbal and gestural communication, presuppose the activation of 
specific mirror circuits ... emotions, like actions, are immediately shared. The 
perception of [the emotions of others] activates the same areas of the cortex that 
are involved when we experience these emotions ourselves.95 
 The theatre director, Peter Brook, has commented that mirror neurons have done 
no more than explain what was “common knowledge” in the theatre world: that 
performances are always collaborations between audience and actor. Again, for Rizzolatti: 
... the study of mirror neurons appears to offer, for the first time, a unitary 
experimental and theoretical framework within which to decipher this form of shared 
participation and ... the basis of our common experience.96
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 The same comments that Brook has made regarding theatre can I think be applied 
to architecture. In the case of architecture, mirror neuron systems play roles in many of 
the processes that will be discussed in the next chapter regarding the aesthetics of 
empathy. In both of these aesthetic models (i.e. architecture and theatre) there is some 
kind of feedback loop set up in which mind emerges as a system of projections out from 
the human subject, as well as sensory inputs in from the external world. 
 In an important sense, these aesthetic epistemologies are more in line with 
contemporary cognitive models than many of models that characterised twentieth-century 
biological schema, which tended to imagine a linear connection between perception 
producing cognition producing movement.
6.15 Grid Cells, Place Cells and Entoptic Pattern Projection
The final modes of cognitive mapping of space to be considered are in some ways not 
grounded directly in body-based action at all. They are in fact surprisingly abstract and 
geometrical mappings, and form the basis of our large scale comprehension of space. 
Grid cells and place cells are  located in one of the “oldest” parts of the brain – the 
hippocampus – and provide a very different type of spatial cognitive mapping to those so 
far discussed.97 However, just like our peripersonal space mappings, I suggest that we 
can find projected abstractions of these neuronal structures within our built environments, 
just as we can interpret our neuronal structures as interiorised mirrors of our 
environments. 
 Most of the body maps discussed so far have been egocentric: they are based in 
the human body, and are key to any sense of self. Place and grid cells, however, are more 
geocentric, and as such are two-dimensional. Place cells are organised according to the 
actual place and space that the body is in.98  They are formed as a particular permutation 
of cells each time you visit a new space-place, and seem to be an important component in 
the mechanism by which we recognise places. Equally, although place cells seem to 
exhibit strong metric properties, the cognitive map of the place cells can be informed by 
the dynamic body based cognitive maps discussed above.99
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 Grid cells are located in the entorhinal cortex in the hippocampus, at an 
organisational  level above place cells.They fire as the body moves in space, although the 
grid that they describe is an hexagonal co-ordinate system (not our more familiar 
orthogonal grid).100 In addition, “head direction cells” work with place and grid cells, and 
fire whenever the head is facing a particular direction. They seem to form the basis of an 
innate sense of cardinal direction, whilst “spatial view cells” are attached to significant 
objects or views in an environment.101 Like almost all brain regions, the hippocampus has 
a significant ability to plastically re-organise itself on the basis of lived experience and 
practice, and a recent study by Eleanor Maguire has shown that London cab drivers have 
enlarged posterior hippocampi, with experienced drivers show greater enlargement than 
new drivers.102 It would be interesting to see what the hippocampi of architects are like, 
although I can find no studies of this as yet!
 The hippocampus, as well as dealing with these spatial tasks, plays an important 
and related role in memory formation. There is in fact some debate concerning what 
emphasis should be placed on the specifically spatial role of the hippocampus, as 
opposed to viewing abstract spatial cognition as just one case of a broader provision of 
relational memory.103 It has been demonstrated that the hippocampus is involved in 
cognitively mapping non-spatial relationships, such as family and social relationships, and 
indeed in positioning ideas within relational frameworks. Indeed, the mnemonic power of 
the hippocampus in managing spatial relationships has been consciously used at least 
since the time of the Roman Republic, when orators were taught to remember their 
speeches by imagining that they were walking through a building, with each room 
representing a particular point. Recent research seems to be concluding that the 
hippocampus is primarily concerned with space, and it is through our lived spatial 
relationships that we have developed a broader capacity to organise memories, and think 
relationally.104
6.16 Embodiments of Mind
Knowing is an action of the knower ... all knowing depends upon the structure of the 
knower ... it is rooted in the very manner of his lived being, in his organisation. We hold that 
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the biological roots of knowing cannot be understood only through examining the nervous 
system; we believe it is necessary to understand how these processes are rooted in the 
living being as a whole.105
[Humberto Maturana and Fransisco J. Varela]
Clearly, the relative spatial abstraction of grid cells and place cells creates a very different 
basis for cognitive mapping than the empathetic-prosthetic relationships with external 
world that the network of body-based cognitive mappings discussed earlier in the chapter 
facilitate. Still, in all cases the human organism and its environment are co-constituted 
through a mapping process, and in terms of our experience, a “world is brought forth” 
through spatial practices of various kinds. Importantly then, it is not simply that the body 
and its various spaces are mapped in the human mind, but rather, the human mind and 
human consciousness, are in large part produced through these spatial practices and the 
associated network of mapping processes. Understanding the experience of this 
dialectical relation between organism and environment is what Varela and Thompson 
have described as neurophenomenology. Clearly, by definition such a conception contains 
no implication of a “natural” or stable human condition
 I have also introduced another conception of cognitive mapping, a critical-theory-
based extrapolation of an urbanistic concept developed by Kevin Lynch, which was later 
used by Frederic Jameson to rethink concepts of totality found in Lukacs and 
Hegel. These two conceptions of cognitive mapping share more than a relation to 
urbanism (interesting though that is). They also seem to reflect in some way something 
that seems to happen in the hippocampus – a spatialising moment that structures our 
ability to organise both abstract mental concepts and our own biophysical bodies.
 Spatial practice and the consciousness it produces would seem to be a likely 
precondition for advanced relational memory and abstract conceptualisation. The 
organising of stones in space by humans, and the experience of recognising patterns of 
organised matter in the external world, is a precondition for, or perhaps co-emergent with, 
the conscious organising of abstract thoughts. The sociological thinker Georg Simmel, 
and the architect-turned-social-commentator Siegfried Kracauer – both of whom I will 
discuss in the next chapter – noted that something interesting happens when the 
“external” space that is mapped “internally” in the mind, consists of a space that is already 
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Let’s get these stones organised!
 
Might it be that the organisation of stones in Carnac are in fact a drug-induced projection of 
grid cells? Does the placing of stones in a line co-evolve with the ordering of ideas or even 
words in a sequence?
Fig.6.50 Field of standing stones at Carnac, France. 
 
Fig.6.51 The kind of entoptic pattern most frequently reported in psychadelic experience, 
interpreted as neuronal structures with recursive feedback through the visual cortex.
Fig.6.52 EEG mapping of grid cells in rats.
  
  
an externalisation or alienation of the human mind – that is to say, when the space or 
object mapped is not simply “found” by the subject, but has already been socially 
produced.
 In the megalithic grid structures of Carnac in Brittany, it could well be that we are 
seeing the first steps towards social forms of human conscious abstraction via a projection 
of internal grid cells in the human brain. The organisation of the stones is a necessarily 
social act, as indeed is their experience. Once externalised and manifested as objects, 
these become visions of a rational space. They act as mirrors of the mind’s structures and 
can be mimetically reintegrated into consciousness.  Grid cells, with their apparent 
prefiguring of something like a Cartesian grid, seem to provide an unexpected 
neurological basis for what Lefebvre would later refer to as abstract space. When we look 
now at the grids of modern city planning are we really just looking at a socialised 
extension of our hippocampus? 
 Whilst highly speculative, David Lewis-Williams has suggested that similar 
processes might be responsible for the emergence  of modern human intelligence. Lewis-
Williams argues that the patterns that can be found in Palaeolithic petroglyphs (and 
indeed in the production of extant shamanic and nomadic cultures, and especially in San 
rock art), show strong signs of being related to the induced experience of entoptic patterns 
– that is to say, patterns which are based in the structures of neurological organisation.106 
For Lewis-Williams, as for the even more speculative Terrence McKenna, ingested 
psychoactive botanics are suggested as a possible stimulus for this process.
  Entoptic phenomena are geometric patterns that emerge under particular 
conditions, and consist of two types.107 These are phosphenes and form constants. Whilst 
phosphenes are induced by physical pressure on the eye, or entophthalmic structure 
within the eye, form constants derive from the structures of the bigger optic system. 
Lewis-Williams summarises the condition as follows: 
... there is a spatial relationship between the retina and the visual cortex: points that 
are close together on the retina lead to the firing of comparably placed neurons in 
the cortex. When this process is reversed, as following the ingestion of psychotropic 
substances, the pattern in the cortex is perceived as a visual percept. In other 




Fig.6.53 A matrix diagram comparing entoptic patterns, San rock art and Paleolithic art.
 
Fig.6.54 Petroglyphs showing entoptic patterns in Grapevine Canyon, Nevada.
Fig.6.55 The oldest known example of abstract human thinking is a pair of iron ore stone 
ochre, decorated with abstract criss cross designs, and dated to 70-75,000BC. These were 
found in the Blombos Cave in South Africa.
  
  
These initial projections of internal mental objects out into the external world, create a 
distinctly mirrored condition. Whilst, as noted in the previous chapter, we are in a sense 
only able to engage with or empathise with anything in the world in so far as it too has 
aspects of mind – i.e. it is in some way patterned. For Gregory Bateson of course, 
recursive mental patterning characterised all living material systems, and was the basis of 
our initial apperception of, and ecological mental extension into, our environments. 
However, the more that we have structurally-coupled ourselves to our environments, and 
the more that we have re-shaped and re-patterned our world, then the more it is the case 
that the objects that we empathise with are in fact externalisations of our own minds, and 
have been made with our own bodies (and thus are thereby especially full of affordances) 
a particularly intense feedback mechanism occurs. This mirrored feedback between the 
body-mind and a projected environment creates the recursive pre-conditions for the 
emergence of modern self-consciousness and complex language, with all of the benefits 
and delusions that these brings. It is hard, then, not to see the urge to create architecture 
coming out of these processes.
 In the next chapter I will turn to consider ideas associated with nineteenth-century 
empathy theorists in Germany, in terms of the realisation that there was something 
happening in space, some kind of extended feedback relationship between our minds, our 
bodies, the environments with which we co-evolve, and the objects that we make, use and 
find. Empathy theory can even be said to have constituted an early form of extended mind 
theory. Whilst there have been both idealist and materialist constructions of empathy 
theory at different stages of the historical development of the concept, there has not yet 
been an explicitly modern, political and ecological formulation. It is intended therefore that 
that these two chapters might provoke further research work in that direction.
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7 Aesthetics, Technology, and the Spirit of Matter1
So by ‘aesthetics’ I mean responsiveness to the pattern which connects. The pattern which 
connects is a meta-pattern. It is a pattern of patterns. It is that meta-pattern which defines 
the vast generalisation that indeed it is patterns which connect.2
[Gregory Bateson]
7.1 Empathy, Mind and Aesthetics
In the previous chapters, it was noted that the concept of empathy has been turned to on 
several occasions by thinkers within the cognitive sciences. For George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson, as for Evan Thompson, some concept of empathy is necessary to grasping both 
the nature of inter-subjectivity, and – as part of the same process – recognising the 
specific process by which our environment itself is productive of and constituting some 
kind of subjectivity. Empathy thereby contributes to an active extended component of our 
subjectivity as humans. For Gregory Bateson, empathy suggested a route by which 
patterns (which for him are mental processes, or the traces thereof) might be recognised 
in very different kinds of organised differential material systems. Once recognised, 
patterns might then be seen to be related to each other by other patterns, seen through a 
process of abduction which itself shares something with empathy so as to reveal endless 
higher, lower and transversal levels of patterned abstraction. For Bateson, the process of 
projecting ourselves into the world “with recognition and empathy” is essential if we are to 
gain what might be described as a living feeling for the specific forms of rationality 
produced by the ecologies within which we produce ourselves. 
 So what, then, is meant by empathy? I will need to approach this question from 
several directions over the coming pages, but we can start with a standard dictionary 
definition, that the everyday meaning of empathy describes “the ability to sense and 
understand someone else’s feelings as if they were one’s own,” while also noting that it is 
an anglicised form of the Greek empatheia, meaning affection or passion.3 In fact, the 
word empathy is a fairly recent addition to the English language, being coined by Edward 
Titchener in 1909 as the translation of the German word Einfühlung4 (literally ‘feeling 
into’), which he found used extensively in the work of the aesthetic-philosopher-turned-
psychologist Theodore Lipps (whose work he was translating).5 There is in fact an 
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important history of concepts that lie behind this seemingly innocent word, which connect 
it directly – and no doubt surprisingly – with the formulation of the concept of “space” in 
modern architectural aesthetics and phenomenology. 
 Empathy as a concept has indeed an irreducible basis in spatial aesthetics, and its 
use as a fundamental component of some contemporary cognitive philosophies brings 
architecture into the heart of discussions about human consciousness. What is so 
fascinating about this etymological history is that it also appears to be an accurate 
reflection of neurological relations. Recent research into what have become known as 
mirror neurons (discussed in the last chapter) suggests that they play key roles in what 
are now seen as three interrelated processes. Firstly, mirror neurons are involved in the 
cognitive mapping of the space of the body, and the body’s technological extensions 
through the use of tools. Secondly, mirror neurons are central to constructing our theories 
of mind regarding other people (i.e. recognising other minds). Thirdly, mirror neurons play 
key roles in language. This suggests that the historical development of the concept of 
empathy, from spatial aesthetics to psychology and the cognitive sciences, is not merely a 
linguistic accident, but actually reflects a socio-biological relation: i.e. an extended network 
or system in which space and language are socially produced. Architectural knowledge 
concerning spatial aesthetics might have a real contribution to make here, then, in 
understanding and working out an extended theory of mind in broader terms.
 Titchner’s choice of empathy as a translation for Einfühlung makes clear the word’s 
relationship to sympathy, and in particular the old alchemical or medicinal sense of this 
word, as a sympathetic attraction between things as well as people.6 It was in fact this 
sense, as a way to understand the “alchemy” of art – or, how it is that “form” might be 
related to, and found attractive or beautiful by viewers – that Einfühlung had initially been 
used by the German art theorist, Robert Vischer, in 1871, in its first modern aesthetic use. 
However, the underlying concept of Einfühlung – that we are in constant physical and 
mental feedback or dialogue with the entire world around us – was deeply rooted in both 
esoteric philosophy and mainstream German thinking, and had been for instance clearly 
expressed in the aesthetics of German Romanticism. 
 The first published use of the term Einfühlung was by Johann Gottfried von Herder, 
in This Too: a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity of 1774. In his essay, 
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Herder proposed the concept of empathy as a historical-critical method: that is, a way of 
feeling oneself into the mindset or spirit of other times and places, in order to understand 
the meaning of their works of art. Importantly, as Joseph Rykwert points out, for Herder 
processes of Einfühlung were essential to his elaboration of the notion of organic 
principles in political life and community.7 Herder also frequently suggested empathy-like, 
psycho-physiological readings of formal expression, such as in his sentence stating that 
“the beauty of a line is movement, and the beauty of movement, expression.”8 
 Herder’s colleague, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, also developed a method of 
“feeling-into” as the basis of his organicist and proto-phenomenological “living science”. 
Goethe’s experiential scientific method, as elaborated in texts such as The Experiment as 
Mediator between Subject and Object (1772) and The Theory of Colours(1810), was 
based upon the proposition that the “holistic scientist” should feel themselves into the 
object of study, until a sudden organic and “intuitive” understanding of the whole living 
process at hand occurred.9 
 Like Titchner, Sigmund Freud was indebted to Lipps’ subsequent development of 
the concept of empathy, seeing it as “essential for establishing the rapport between 
patient and analyst that makes interpretation possible”.10 The term Einfühlung first 
appeared in his paper on “Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious” (1905). In this 
paper, Freud noted the close relation between empathy and “mimesis”, a move that was 
to have significant influence.11 Both Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno referred to this 
paper of Freud’s when developing their own ideas around mimesis as an art-philosophical 
concept, and there is an under-acknowledged, although direct, connection between the 
aesthetico-critical concepts of empathy and mimesis. It is, for example, wholly in a sense 
derived from empathy that Adorno said that “by means of the mimetic impulse, the living 
being equates himself with objects in his surroundings.”12 Benjamin’s use of mimesis to 
unpick the commodity could similarly be considered to be an unknowing return to the 
young Marx (whose 1844 Paris Manuscripts were not published until 1927) and the 
emergence of empathy within associated young Hegelian circles, as we shall see. It is 
also worth noting that recent work by Neil Leach, for example, has – by drawing on 
Benjamin and Adorno – used mimesis and empathy together.13 
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 Lipps’ development of empathy, firstly in an aesthetic sense, and then later to 
“explain how we discover that other people have selves”,14 has been very important in the 
development of modern psychological discourses: it can be said to have constituted 
psychology’s first theory of mind. Today, our recognition of other minds is broadly known in 
psychology as having ‘a theory of mind’ (also known, confusingly, as “theory theory”), and 
is often referred to as cognitive empathy. In embodied mind thinking, as discussed in 
Chapter Five, empathy constitutes a key third moment in describing the essentially inter-
subjective nature of self. As Thompson describes it, “self and other enact each other 
reciprocally through empathy.”15
7.2 Empathy and Spatial Prosthesis
What, therefore, can be said to be the basis of this aesthetic concept of empathy? 
Empathy is the idea that we experience physical form through processes of relational 
projection, imagining ourselves onto the shapes, or into the spaces, of the world. Empathy 
suggests that architectural experience, or at least the physical, kinaesthetic, 
phenomenological and non-iconographic components of architectural experience, might 
be thought of as a fundamentally prosthetic impulse. Consider for instance the experience 
of driving a car or riding a bike, or even just using a tool. Our cognitive map of the limits of 
our body quickly expands to include the vehicle or tool as a prosthesis, almost as soon as 
we start to work with it. We are, for example, acutely aware of the limits of the vehicle, and 
feel any potential collision as an impingement upon our own self. We feel it by extension 
as a part of our body. Empathy theory asserts that we experience form and space in 
precisely this way. We imagine the building and our spatial environment as a second skin, 
an extension or projection of our body and our psychology: we wear spaces and 
morphology like clothing or a membrane, an interface or prosthesis, physically and 
psychically, and indeed socially and collectively. Hermann Lotze, in one of the earliest 
formulations of this concept, suggested that “no form is so unyielding that our imagination 
cannot project its life into it.”16 The cognitive map or body-image that we carry around with 
us is constantly adapting to the environment that we find ourself in, and for all of these 
empathy theorists, the moving, active body was key to understanding these dynamic 
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processes of adaptation. When in a building or a city, one expands into and empathises 
with it. Empathy theory describes space (and the objects contained by space) as an 
alienated, yet recoverable organ of our individual and social bodies. It is the medium 
through which mind and matter connect through pattern and form, a “utopian” joining of 
subject and object. Empathy, in Bateson’s language, is the meta-pattern that connects 
patterns in the subject with patterns in the object. 
 Empathy developed thus as one of a three closely interrelated terms: empathy, form 
and space. And as soon as we start to investigate the interrelated developments of these 
concepts, we find that we are engaged in a distinctly second-order systems discussion of 
pattern/matter relations in cybernetic terms. By second-order, I mean that there are 
patterns immanent in the organisation of the object matter (in this case, architectural 
objects) and there are also patterns immanent within the subject matter, which is the 
perason using the building. Empathy, I suggest, must be understood as the study of the 
meta-pattern that connects these co-evolving patterns.
 The concepts of empathy, form and space underwent an extraordinary development 
in the final decades of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth. These 
ideas continued to develop throughout the twentieth century, although were increasingly 
articulated in architecture through a more abstract discourse on “space” and “form” rather 
than “empathy” as such. The history of the development of these concepts has finally 
started to be written in recent decades, and I am indebted here to a series of texts. The 
first important and most encyclopaedic review was produced by Cornelis van der Ven in 
1978,17 although it is not clear how much influence this book had at the time of writing. 
However, just over a decade later, in 1991, a paper by Mitchell Schwarzer in 
Assemblage18 seems to have been much more successful in bringing into contemporary 
critical theory and architectural history a recognition of the role that the aesthetic 
discourse on empathy had in the formation of the modernist concept of space in 
architecture. The success and influence of the Schwarzer paper was no doubt in part due 
to the fact that a couple of years later, in 1994, Harry Francis Mallgrave and Elephterios 
Ikonomou published an important edited collection of translations into English of the major 
texts of nineteenth-century German aesthetics, including the key papers by Robert 
Vischer, Heinrich Wölfflin, Adolf Hilderbrand and August Schmarsow on empathy, form 
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and space. The publication of Mallgrave and Ikonomou’s collection opened up a new 
phase of research amongst Anglophone architectural historians, notably including Adrian 
Forty’s substantial entries on “Form” and “Space” in his book on Words and Buildings 
(2000).19
 “Space” and “form” have had a fairly continuous ongoing development during the 
last few decades. Most notably perhaps, thinking around space has been dramatically 
extended through the translation in the early-1990s of ideas from the French Marxist 
philosopher Henri Lefebvre, which has not only impacted upon the associated disciples of 
urbanism and geography, but has also been brought into architecture directly through 
(albeit in very different ways) the writings of architectural theorists like Bernard Tschumi 
and Iain Borden. “Form”, too, I would say, has continued to undergo development, in for 
example certain attempts to theorise and talk about emergence and parametrics.20 At the 
same time, empathy also underwent a period of renewed conceptual development in 
design theory and practice, as a way of thinking about movement in animation and 
parametric design, by for example Lars Spuybroek and Kari Jormakka.21 
7.3 Space and Mimesis
When reading architects talk about space, it often seems like they are referring to a 
mystical, metaphysical substance. This for instance is Le Corbusier on the subject: 
... the architect, by his arrangement of forms, realises an order which is a pure 
creation of his spirit; by forms and shapes he affects our senses to an acute degree, 
and provokes plastic emotions; by the relationships which he creates he wakes in us 
profound echoes, he gives us a measure of an order which we feel.22  
In recent decades, post-modern critics have often attacked this kind of discourse around 
space in modernist architecture, suggesting that it is an obscurantist attempt by architects 
to be elitist, to confuse clients and to confuse each other, and reflects a social desire 
amongst architects to be able to talk about something higher than the banalities of 
everyday construction. Whilst there is no doubt some truth in all of these assertions, I 
would argue that what appears to be a rather mystical and esoteric discourse, describing 
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obscure projections between mind and matter, is in fact simply and precisely that, and 
needs to be taken seriously as such (rather than merely dismissed as elitist per se). The 
architectural-aesthetic concept space does indeed have some very rhizomatic roots 
through a series of panpsychic and theological concepts.23 
 Even whilst various concepts of space have had a long history in the natural 
sciences, philosophy and mathematics, as Adrian Forty notes, “outside a small circle of 
German aesthetic philosophers ... ‘space’ simply didn’t exist in the architectural 
vocabulary until the 1890s.”24 The concept of space was introduced into architectural 
discourse by August Schmarsow and Adolf Hilderbrand, and was intended as a 
supplement to the already established concept of form and as a tool of art historical 
analysis.25 Further developed by fellow historians Alois Reigl and Paul Frankl, 
Schmarsow’s proposition that “the history of architecture is the history of the sense of 
space”26 was to be used to understand the formed spaces of different times and places as 
the traces or manifestations of different social, mental and cosmological sensibilities. As 
architectural historians they tried to empathise with the spatiality of other times. However, 
the term “space” quickly started to operate as a synthetic and propositional concept as 
well. Space was felt by modern architects as a complex concept which was able to 
express and manifest the emerging sensibilities and aspirations of modernity, in particular 
the concept of abstraction. The conception of architectural space developed by the 
empathy theorists was disseminated widely through the writings of Wilhelm Worringer, 
Siegfried Giedion, and by Walter Gropius who, van der Ven suggests, “adopted the idea of  
space as the core of the artistic research of the Bauhaus”27 – the leitmotiv of an abstract 
yet sachlich gesamtkunstwerk led by architecture as the “mother art”. 
 For these modernist architectural thinkers, it was through working with space that 
architecture might be able to contribute to and articulate a new international language, 
grounded in what humanity shared – our bodies and their spatial practices – rather than 
struggling with what Adolf Loos had famously dismissed as the impossibility of forming a 
modern metropolitan collective language based upon old or local symbolic 
ornamentation.28
 In the account of empathy and space that follows, I wish to focus on three areas of 
analysis that are missing from the existing literature. The first primarily concerns the 
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historical interpretation of the emergence of the aesthetic discourse around empathy. 
Specifically, I argue that important strands of this discourse emerged from Young Hegelian 
circles, and, in addition, had a “panpsychic” component.29 This historical account is in fact 
quite novel: the existing literature has almost exclusively emphasised the importance of 
Kantian aesthetics to these later German thinkers.30 The Kantian interpretation is 
important to be sure, but it is also incomplete.31 Importantly, I think, a consideration of the 
Young Hegelian tendencies within empathic aesthetics allows relations to emerge with 
other thinkers from this tradition, notably Karl Marx. In fact, just as Schmarsow suggested 
that the sense of space underwent historical development (an obviously Hegelian and not 
Kantian idea), Schmarsow’s near-contemporary Karl Marx developed a number of ideas 
precisely about the historical production and social development of the human body and 
senses (not long after he had read Hegel’s Aesthetics). It is useful therefore, I think, to 
read these two thinkers together. Furthermore, as already noted, some aspects of a later 
Marxian aesthetics in and around the Frankfurt School – notably the concept of mimesis 
of Benjamin and Adorno – develops directly out of the psychological aesthetics of 
empathy.
 A consideration of these questions opens up questions concerning the relationship 
of an empathic phenomenology to technology, and the applicability of this approach to 
thinking about the new forms of spatiality which emerged throughout the twentieth century 
– in particular network architecture – and to considering how ideas concerning empathy 
are now playing an increasingly active role in interaction design today.
 Finally, I will conclude the chapter as I started, tracing the relation between the 
origins of empathy in spatial aesthetics and the contemporary deployment of a conception 
of empathy in the theories of embodied mind philosophers and cognitive scientists. This 
connection has until recently been entirely missing from architectural accounts, and whilst 
work involving empathy in psychology or the cognitive sciences often provide accounts in 
passing of the origins and resonance of the term, these are often incomplete or simply 
incorrect. Getting this matter right is important, as I am asserting that empathy has a 
specifically spatial contribution to make to extended and embodied mind approaches to 
theorising mind and consciousness. Just as importantly perhaps, in terms of Bateson’s 
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account, is that it is the distorted form, or even lack, of a modern empathy with ecological 
systems, that instantiates what Marx described as our “metabolic rift” with nature.
7.4 Pantheism and the Young Hegelians
Germany is now the fertile soil of pantheism. This is the religion of our greatest thinkers, of 
our best artists ... Pantheism is the open secret of Germany.32 
[Heinrich Heine]
As mentioned above, the standard interpretation of the emergence of the German 
aesthetics of empathy typically describes it in terms of Kantian aesthetics. Adrian Forty, for 
example, repeats this interpretation of the origins of empathy, stating that Kant was 
“effectively the founder of this philosophical tradition.”33 For Kant, of course, space was an 
a priori category, something which was structured into the mind, and which in turn 
structured bodily and mental experience of the world. Mallgrave and Ikonomou describe 
Kantian categories as: 
... the presumption that we actively constitute form and space in our schematization 
of the world. They are, in effect, mental constructions of the observer, the subjective 
condition under which sense perception operates. They are less an image 
corresponding to an external reality and more a mode under which we arrange the 
objects of perception, a transcendental ideality.34
  
Whilst this clearly captures something of the active role of the observer in producing 
empathic spatial and formal experience, this remains on the whole, I think, fairly 
unconvincing as the primary source of empathy. Empathy was, right from the start, a 
much more systemic and mutually dynamic conception of relations between mind and 
matter. As we shall see, empathy is not at all accounted for simply as a theory of 
observation. Empathy is always a system, and always a reflexive or dialectical relationship 
between a mutually constituting subject and object. In empathising, there are projections 
connecting the imagination of the observer and the object, but these projections in a 
complex way subjectify the object, and are projected back, completing the loop. In the 
earliest roots of empathic thinking, these projections are imagined to be real spiritual 
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processes, and are as such immersed in a very non-Kantian set of discourses that were 
very much alive in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European and specifically German 
culture – which, as Heinrich Heine suggests in the quote above, had more to do with 
pantheism (everything is god) and panpsychism (all matter has mental properties) than 
with Kantian critical philosophy. 
 Specifically, then, I suggest that we need to understand the development of the 
concept of empathy in relation to, on the one hand, the philosophy of Hegel, which was 
perhaps the first major modern dynamic systems theory, and, on the other, broader 
tendencies in German culture, in which organicist, panpsychic, animist, gnostic, romantic 
and neo-platonic philosophies were never far from the surface of intellectual debate – 
whether articulated through vernacular organicist conceptions of nature, or the substantial 
philosophical tradition of panpsychism, most notably including Leibniz, Herder, Goethe, 
Schopenhauer, Lotze and Spinoza (who whilst not German exerted a major influence 
there). 
 In fact, Hegel’s system can be seen itself as a particular form of idealist panpychism, 
describing a universe pregnant with mind striving towards self-consciousness, a subject/
object continuum in which these two poles are not entirely separate and discrete – i.e. this 
is me here, and that object over there is not me – but rather are connected areas of 
intensity within unfolding and evolving systems of mind and matter (objectified mind), or 
fields of alienation and relational abstraction. It is within this context of both vernacular 
and philosophical traditions of panpsychist thinking, and more specifically of course the 
legacy of Hegelian thought, that the Young Hegelians emerged around the University of 
Berlin, in the early-to-mid nineteenth century. Of this group, Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Marx, 
Friedrich Engels and Frederich Theodore Vischer are of particular interest here.35 All of 
these writers were to develop theories of projective alienation. Feuerbach first directly 
attempted a materialist reworking of Hegel, and specifically attempted to reverse Hegel’s 
emphasis on the role played by religion in understanding mind and matter. In The 
Essence of Christianity (1841), he argued that rather than some universal spirit being 
present in and realised though man, it was rather man that created God and religion, as 
projections – and thus as alienated forms – of himself. The importance of Feuerbach’s 
influence upon Marx is well documented, not least by Marx himself. Less well documented 
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– in fact almost completely un-commented upon within Marxian scholarship – is the 
influence of Frederich Theodore Vischer, whose major work, the four volumes on 
Aesthetics (1846-56), we know was read and returned to by Marx at various times in his 
life.36 Vischer’s Aesthetics was a massive study based upon Hegel’s own book on 
Aesthetics. For Vischer, the subject of aesthetics is important as he finds in it a more 
advanced stage of spiritual development than religion, and it provided for him something 
similar to what Marx had in parallel described as “making the world philosophical.”37 In the 
words of William J Brazill, the role of aesthetics for Vischer is seen as:
... the overcoming of alienation, a progressive fusion of human consciousness with 
matter that was itself the meaning of history. Thus for Vischer aesthetics was the 
key to human development, for man fashions his own consciousness in historical 
forms so that he might know as an object the spirit inherent in himself.38
Whilst, no doubt, Marx would have been influenced by Hegel’s text on Aesthetics, rather 
than by that of Vischer per se, it is clear nonetheless that he maintained an interest in 
Vischer’s book. It is this that constitutes, I suggest, a link between two revolutionary new 
discourses of the nineteenth century: on the one hand that of Marx, and on the other that 
of the architectural and aesthetic concepts of space and empathy. In both of these 
discourses, as arguably in Hegel himself, subject and object co-evolve in dynamic 
systems and relational networks that display immanent or what we would today describe 
as emergent or animated properties.  
 Hegel stated that “art spiritualizes, it animates the mere outward and material object 
with a form that expresses soul, feeling, spirit.”39 However, if for Hegel the aesthetic object 
is really an expression or objectification of mind, and for F.T. Vischer it was rather more 
like humanised matter, for the latter’s son, Robert Vischer – who as I noted used the term 
Einfühlung – it was more clearly, as van de Ven describes it, “that the soul was no longer 
innate in the object observed, as Hegel maintained, but it was rather a projection from the 
individual observer.”40 In other words, Hegel’s spirit was now becoming space itself.
 In his essay On the Optical Sense of Form (1873), Robert Vischer builds upon an 
panpsychic phenomenology and aesthetics taken from the elder Vischer’s work,41 but 
developed through a cross-reading with the insights of the proto-Freudian Karl Albert 
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Scherner, whose work on The Life of the Dream (1861) was acknowledged by the 
younger Vischer when he wrote: 
... here it was shown how the body, in responding to certain stimuli in dreams, 
objectifies itself in spatial forms. Thus it unconsciously projects its own bodily form – 
and with this also the soul – into the form of an object. From this I derived the notion 
of empathy.42
In this ambitious text, Robert Vischer outlined the major components of a sophisticated 
theory of architectural empathy, developing a socio-biological thesis on beauty through a 
series of descriptions of different types of formal empathy. These ranged from 
speculations about correspondences between material form and the physical biological 
structures of our senses and nerves – through statements such as “the horizontal line is 
pleasing because our eyes are positioned horizontally”43, and even “light produces an 
agreeable vibration in the respective nerve group through the regular form of its wave 
movement”44 – to general statements about the projecting of the sensations of the body in 
the process of establishing aesthetic relations with matter: 
I can without difficulty place myself within its inner structure, at its centre of gravity. I 
can think my way into it, mediate its size with my own, stretch and expand, bend 
and confine myself to it.45 
In a particularly interesting passage in relation to Marx’s conceptions of tool-organ 
prosthesis and technology (remembering the discussion in Chapter Three), Robert 
Vischer described the particular type of empathy at work when we use tools: 
We invent working, driving, primordial figures, derived from the created world, 
figures who treat things as such simply as an appendage of themselves, very much 
as I feel a stick to be an extension of my arm and an increase of my power. This is a 
special sense of form [Formgefühl], which, like a foreign shoot grafted onto pure 
self-feeling, can be described as a continuation of it.46
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In this passage Vischer directly anticipates some of the mirror neuron cognitive mapping 
research discussed in the last chapter, which shows how our mental maps of the space of 
our body, and the space around our body, is literally incorporated in tool use. 
 If Vischer was here recognising the extent to which our conception of self is an 
active process of production, for Marx, too, there was no “natural” or “normal” condition of 
humanity. He too sees the species as being self-consciously productive in the world. That 
is to say, humankind produces itself as species, it produces its world: as such, it produces 
its own self-consciousness. This consciousness is the opposite of matter, but also 
identical with it. This is because for Marx consciousness emerges out of productive 
material sensuous activity. He states that “production thus not only creates an object for 
the subject, but also a subject for the object.”47 Again, Marx paraphrases the elder 
Vischer’s book on Aesthetics, noting “the beautiful exists only for consciousness … beauty 
is necessary in order that the spectator may merge with it [matter]”48 – and, again, “that 
the enjoyment of the beautiful is immediate, and that it requires education would seem to 
be contradictory. But man becomes what he is and arrives at his own true nature only 
through education.”49 Quoting Schiller, Marx notes that “beauty is simultaneously an 
object, and a subjective state. It is at once form, when we judge it, and also life when we 
feel it. It is at once our state of being and our creation.”50
 When Marx asserts that “man is affirmed in the objective world not only in the act of 
thinking, but with all his senses,”51 he is returning to an aesthetics of the human body as a 
way of developing Feuerbach’s materialist critique of Hegel beyond the limits of either 
materialist and idealist philosophy. The objectification of reality, the projection of man’s 
subjective forces and abilities, is itself a material process for Marx. So when he declares, 
“all objects become for man objectifications of himself,”52 and “the sense of an object for 
me goes only so far as my senses go,”53 he seems to be thinking in ways very close to 
Schmarsow. This can be seen when he writes “the spatial construct is, so to speak, an 
emanation of the human being present, a projection from within the subject.”54 Similarly, 
when Marx suggests that “the senses have their own history. Neither the object of art nor 
the subject capable of aesthetic experience comes of itself”55, and again “the senses have 
become theoreticians in their immediate practice”56, and “the forming of the five senses is 
a labour of the entire history of the world down to the present,”57 he seems to be laying 
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the philosophical basis for why, as Schmarsow noted, there is a dialectical history of the 
sense of space. Equally, the empathy theorists were in effect engaged in the kind of 
intellectual work – i.e. a detailed historical study of our historical forms of body sensibility – 
that Marx seems to call for (think for instance of his comments regarding the need for “a 
critical history of technology”), and which, in terms of the sense of space, Lefebvre would 
later interpret as “rhythmanalysis”. 
 More generally, it was in unravelling the animistic nature of the commodity that the 
structures of a panpsychic aesthetics would be so productive for Marx. The commodity is 
for Marx “a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological 
niceties,”58 which has, he suggests, “a mystical character.”59 The commodity, Terry 
Eagleton notes, is:
 
... a kind of grisly caricature of the authentic artefact, at once reified to a grossly 
particular object and virulently anti-material in form, densely corporeal and elusively 
spectral at the same time. The commodity for Marx is the site of some curious 
disturbance of the relations between sense and spirit, form and content, universal 
and particular: it is at once an object and not an object.60
Marx developed this analysis in order to establish the basis from which to rewrite history, 
economics and philosophy, this time starting from the experience of the sensuous human 
body – as a naturalism – into its extensions and prosthetics in the form of (class) society. 
These extensions of the body are for Marx organically produced and reproduced by 
technology (as discussed in Chapter Two), which takes on the “aesthetic” task of 
engaging with matter. Technology and art therefore play a similar aesthetic role here. Both 
mediate or bridge the gap between subject and object, between consciousness and 
matter.   
 Heinrich Wölfflin states, in line with empathy theory in general, that “our own bodily 
organisation is the form through which we apprehend everything physical”61 and that 
“architecture, as an art of corporeal masses, can relate only to man as a corporeal 
being.”62 If, as Mark Wigley has observed,  “the evolution of technology is the evolution of 
the human body,”63 then we might expect that as our bodies are extended and 
transformed by what Marx describes as “the productive organs of man in society, of 
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organs that are the material basis of every particular organisation of society,”64 so too is 
our sense of space. This is not to suggest that our sense of space, and thereby 
architecture, simply reflects in some linear relationship other socio-technological forces 
(such as are described by the more mechanistic versions of the Marxist base/
superstructure model), but, rather, are better understood as a part of a cybernetic system 
of mind. Indeed, as Paul Frankl – one of the second generation of historians to come out 
of the German empathy school – observed, architectural form is semi-autonomous; we 
can look to changes in architectural form as the basis for local and temporal changes in 
metaphysical ideas, as much as the other way around. If, for Marx, it is through the new 
material organs of industrial technology, and the new immaterial organs of the networks 
(or ecologies) of capital flows and commodity exchange, that the human being has been 
most clearly extended and the commodity form “animated”, then it is towards these 
aspects that we should we should turn in search of the next stage of development in 
thinking about empathy and space. 
7.5 Global Networks: Making the Invisible Visible
We could create the universality of consciousness foreseen by Dante when he predicted that 
men would continue as no more than broken fragments until they were unified into an 
inclusive consciousness. In a Christian sense, this is merely a new interpretation of the 
mystical body of Christ; and Christ, after all, is the ultimate extension of man ... I expect to 
see the coming decades transform the planet into an art form; the new man, linked in a 
cosmic harmony that transcends time and space, will ... become an organic art form. There 
is a long road ahead, and the stars are only way stations, but we have begun the journey.65
[Marshall McLuhan]
Roy Ascott has suggested that art in the twentieth century was preoccupied with the 
question of making the invisible visible.66 Locally Available World unseen Networks 
certainly matches that description. Better known by its acronym, LAWuN is a project that 
Archigram member David Greene has been working on for the last forty years. It is work 
that seeks to project architecture away from matter – i.e. away from building and towards 
pure network, pure event-information-space. Recent manifestations of the work have for 




Figure 7.1. The electromagnetic spectrum. Architecture has tended to focus on frequencies 
of visual light, but this starts to expand in the work of David Greene and others.
Figure 7.2. David Greene and Michael Barnard, Invisible University-The Infraneutral 
Electrical Aborigine, 1974.
Figure 7.3. A scaffolding frame in a field, adjusted photograph by David Greene, LAWUN 
Project 2 (1972): “The nearest thing to a village or town or building that should be allowed.” It 
is I think significant with regard to Greene’s project that the Hegelian, Alexandre Kojève, 
would suggest that if post-historical man became animal again, he would build like a spider, 
constructing networks, cages, scaffolding, and bridges.
Figure 7.4. Greene continues to develop LAWUN projects, and in the 2004 exhibition in a 
window of the Selfridges store on London’s Oxford Street, included the work of several 
digital artists and students, including research from my Polytechnic design studio: Fig. 7.5. 
The Electronic Stone by Chris Gotsis (2005).
      
typically featured “Electric Aborigines”: technologically-extended nomads who would travel 
with their own prosthetic environments. 
 According to Greene, fixed, permanent architecture will be reduced to “a servicing 
frame in a field waiting to be used or built upon. Very concentrated. The nearest thing to a 
village or town or building that should be allowed.”67 For him, the real architecture here 
happens at the interface of the body and the ether of communication networks 
encompassing the planet. 
 LAWuN remains a highly contemporary project,68 even whilst this work is very 
openly indebted to mid-twentieth-century communications theorists such as Marshall 
McLuhan, who in turn was indebted to Gregory Bateson’s ecological conception of 
communications media. At the same time, we can explore the pre-occupations within 
LAWuN and find useful affinities that are much older. If the medieval cathedral used the 
experience of one immaterial medium – light – in conjunction with matter to ask 
theological questions through architectural experience, is Greene perhaps just doing the 
same but with a three-fold increase in wavelength from visible light waves to the realm of 
invisible radio waves? 
 In order to approach this question, it is useful to return briefly to Hegel’s theory of 
aesthetics. For Hegel (simplifying enormously), art was an expression of the development 
of spirit/mind through time. For the Hegelian “Idea” to be fully expressed, it was necessary 
for it to overcome matter, which is why for Hegel architecture was the lowest of arts.69 
Hegel suggested that the last stage of architectural development was the Gothic interior, 
which he described as a chamber of mind, and “the concentration of essential soul life 
which thus encloses itself in spatial relations.”70 
 In fact, it is in relation to Hegel that Cornelis van der Ven makes what is I think his 
most suggestive observation, which is that if architectural theorists took Hegel’s hierarchy 
to heart – and so long as architecture only thought of itself as an empathic relation 
between the corporeal human body and the mass of a building – then architecture would 
stay at the lowest level. However, to the extent that architecture is able to re-theorise itself 
as being primarily about the empathic relation between the living body and space, 
architecture might perform a dramatic dialectical jump! By redefining architecture as not 
just an, but the, art of space, rather than an art of substance, the way can be found to 
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Pantheistic images within contemporary culture
  
Figure 7.6.The Emperor, from Star Wars (1977).
Figure 7.7 The Matrix (1999)
Figure 7.8 Discredited (though very popular) images of Kirlian field photography. 
position architecture as the highest rather than lowest of art of a Hegelian aesthetics. 
Within such a schematic, we can conclude, immaterial architectural projects, such as 
Greene’s LAWUN, are the most Hegelian architectural projects of all!
 There is, however, yet more at stake in these issues than might at first appear. 
Greene is not alone in working with what I argue are the spiritual forms of invisible 
networks or fields. A pantheistic cosmology, which in its general form imagines the 
universe of matter to be interpenetrated with fields or networks of energy or spirit centred 
upon the active human body, is a surprisingly frequent image in contemporary global 
culture, and can be found in manifestations as varied as the ‘Jedi force’ in the Star Wars 
films to the dominance within contemporary management theory of what we might 
(following Slavoj Zizek) call ‘Wall Street Buddhism’.71 More than just a by-product of 
entertainment technology, or a commodification of eastern religions, this panpsychism has 
had, as I have suggested, a particularly productive and interesting history, drawing 
together in perhaps unexpected ways the philosophy of Karl Marx and the emergence of 
the discourse around space in architecture. In Marx, a form of panpsychism is used to 
describe the quasi-mystical properties of the commodity. In modern architecture, spectres 
of Hegel’s Geist still animate the concept of space.
7.6 Empathising with Abstraction - Metropolis and Mind
If Worringer, Giedeon and Gropius developed and disseminated one spatial discourse out 
of empathy theory into architecture, then a second related discourse – also grounded in a 
“post-Hegelian” theory of formal alienation – emerged in sociology. Georg Simmel, 
perhaps more than any other thinker, took on the relation that empathy thinking had 
articulated between architectural and urban form and mental form. He conceived of the 
city as “an objective mind”, an expression of what he described as “the great project of the 
mind, to overcome the object as such by creating itself as an object, and, thereby 
enriched, to return to itself.”72
 For Simmel, there are important correspondences between the forms of experience, 
the forms of society and the forms we make – specifically the form of the modern 
metropolis.73 Simmel suggests that “the city is not a spatial entity with sociological 
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consequences, but a sociological entity that is formed spatially,”74 and hence the 
metropolis provided the particular conditions in which the ‘space’ of concrete experience 
(superindividual ‘society’) and the ‘space’ of inner experience (individual subject) are 
mapped onto each other. This mapping is a ‘pattern that connects’ if ever there was one. 
In fact, we might add to our previous definition of the metropolis as the pattern that 
connects nature and culture, a second definition: the metropolis today is the pattern that 
connects the individual and the multitude.75 
 Frankl’s suggestive remarks concerning the active role that physical form (as 
material concepts) might have in producing metaphysical ideas were given further 
resonance by Simmel, and were soon tested for political potential in the cauldron of 
Weimar Germany, where the concept of form oscillated headily between aesthetic and 
sociological registers. For an activist architect like Bruno Taut, this socio-aesthetic opening 
of form suggested that “architecture will thus become the creator of new social forms.”76 
Taut was no doubt encouraged in this approach by the (heavily Simmel-influenced) 
architectural theorist, Adolf Behne, who, as Forty puts it: 
... attempted to reverse the prejudice against form as inherently asocial by 
suggesting that ‘form’ was the means by which individuals would acquire 
consciousness of the collective nature of the society to which they belonged.77
In a fascinating passage that captures many of the possibilities and problems associated 
with modernist architectural theory’s attempt to work through the demands placed upon it, 
in part through this dual conception of form, Behne stated:
... form is nothing more than the consequence of establishing a relationship between 
human beings. For the isolated and unique figure in nature there is no problem of 
form ... The problem of form arises when an overview is demanded. Form is the 
prerequisite under which an overview becomes possible. Form is an eminently 
social matter.78
We could easily replace “form” with “pattern” in the above passage and make out of it an 
interesting cybernetic reading. What really stands out is the phrase about “the problem of 
an overview.” This really is a problem, and in fact it is a first-order error: for anyone to 
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imagine that form or pattern can in itself provide an overview, in and of itself, presumes 
the kind of detached and transcendental viewing position that so alarmed Bateson when 
regarding first-order systems approaches. As suggested previously, what is interesting 
about empathy theory is that it is a second-order aesthetic discourse, in that the observer 
is always necessarily “in the circuit”. However, the kind of formulation that Behne slips into 
above directly anticipates (and no doubt encourages) the kind of non-reflexive 
instrumental and determinist use that the concept of form was indeed put up to within 
certain strands of modernist practice.79 As Forty concludes with regard to form:
... developed in the nineteenth century as a solution to certain specific problems – in 
particular the nature of aesthetic perception, and the processes of natural 
morphology – ‘form’ was an extraordinarily productive concept ... But whether it has 
been so successful an aid to thought about the different problems confronting 
architecture in the twentieth century is more doubtful ... it might be said to have had 
disastrous consequences through its part in sustaining the belief in architectural 
determinism.80
Although, then, as Behne suggests, it is indeed possible to see “a form in humanity, a 
pattern articulated in time and space,”81 the challenge would seem to be precisely not to 
objectify pattern, whether in theory or practice. Although I cannot pursue this point in detail 
here, it is important to note that Simmel’s conception of society as a formal pattern did not 
just influence architectural and urban thought, but provided the basic premise of sociology 
in general. As Adrian Forty again notes, “Simmel was promoting sociology as a science of 
forms.”82 It seems to be a commonplace in recent sociology readers to observe, for 
example, that Ruth Benedict’s seminal anthropological work on Patterns of Culture (1934), 
produced the equivalent of Simmel’s metropolitan analysis for pre-industrial social form.83 
Bateson and Mead were of course personally associated with Benedict and her work, and 
this is one route through which we can connect some aspects of Bateson’s ecology of 
mind approach to social form back to Simmel.
 There are also other parallels. The spatial separation that occurs for Simmel 
between inner and concrete experience is, he argues, repeated within the psychic space 
of the metropolitan individual. It creates exactly the kind of recursive and self-obscuring 
pathology produced by the messages (including messages transmitted through the media 
207

of money) between the individual body and the social environment that so preoccupied 
Bateson half a century later. Simmel famously described how the intensity of nervous 
stimulation that the metropolitan individual is subjected to leads to the emergence of the 
blasé attitude of the city dweller. This is best understood as the “growth” of an “extra 
organ” – i.e. a “distancing organ” in the psychological switch from emotional to rational 
thought that occurs as a defensive mechanism in the individual to cope with living in what 
Baudelaire, in a memorable and important phrase for both Benjamin and Simmel, had 
described as a “kaleidoscope equipped with consciousness.” 
 McLuhan too refers to Baudelaire, suggesting that the latter: 
... had in mind the city as corporate extensions of our physical organs. Our letting go 
of ourselves, self-alienations, as it were, in order to amplify or increase the power of 
various functions, Baudelaire considered to be the flowers or growths of evil. The 
city as amplification of human lust and sensual striving had for him an entire 
organismic and psychic unity.84 
It should come as no surprise, then, that something closely associated to Simmel’s blasé 
attitude formed the starting point for media theorist Marshall McLuhan’s analysis of “the 
extensions of man”, in the next phase of metropolitan development in the post-war 
period.85
7.7 Network Spatiality
A building today is interesting only if it is more than itself; if it charges the space around it 
with connective possibilities.86 
[Alison and Peter Smithson]
As Mitchell W. Schwarzer has noted, by the mid-1940s the architectural and art historian, 
Paul Zucker, felt able to reformulate:
... the spatial divisions that Schmarsow had previously given to the three visual arts. 
Alongside architecture (shaped space and formed mass), Zucker rehabilitated 
sculpture as a spatial art (formed masses and spaces shaped by them) and added 




Figure 7.9 Frederick Keisler, ‘Future City’ installation (1937)
Figure 7.10 Oskar Schlemmer, ‘Dance of Slats’, Bauhaus stage (1927)
In these network projects shown above we find an architectural web that ultimately 
encompasses the planet, in the guise of an interface to, a framework for, or a reification – a 
making visible and material – of the immaterial networks of modernity. And just as the initial 
experience of immaterial networks radically develops and extends through processes of 
alienation the sensuous human body, these environmental interfaces continue to ask 
questions of subjectivity in modernity, the separation of subject and object, as a dialectic of 
mind and matter. 
 However, it is not at all clear, I think, how we should conceive of the utopian 
architectural network projects. Should these be understood as actual propositions, or should 
they be understood as ways to use the architectural imaginary to think about things, and to 
produce concepts, that cannot be formulated in any other way?
Schmarsow’s spatial divisions have in fact been revised several more times since being 
expanded into urban theory in the first half of the twentieth century. Perhaps one of the 
most important reinterpretations – in that it still very much pertains to aspects of our sense 
of space – is that already anticipated in the earlier discussion of Greene’s LAWuN project: 
that is, the network.
 The network can be seen as a structural figuration of space consciousness in 
modernity, one of the forms through which we currently imagine and reproduce our 
relations to society and the world. Indeed, following Manuel Castells, we might say the 
network is the cultural form of global capitalist metropolitan modernity. As an idea, and a 
conceptual figure, the network has a long intellectual history. As we have seen in Chapter 
Two and Chapter Three, the network emerged as a concept in eighteenth-century biology, 
and, by the nineteenth century, images of networks could be found structuring abstract 
scientific diagrams in physics, biology and chemistry as atomic structures, force fields and 
bodily circulation systems, and increasingly as concrete realities in the form of town and 
regional plans, or as transportation, communications and infrastructure systems. 
 The figure or concept of the network has been very productive in modern times as a 
tool, as a piece of technology, partly because of the complex formal properties of the 
network figure: it is potentially endless, isotropic, heterotropic, dynamic, non-centred, 
centred, multi-centred. And these formal properties allow us to use the network to 
describe and analyse and produce phenomena as varied as those listed above. We can 
clearly see the ecological usefulness of the modern conception of the network in Fritjof 
Capra’s description of living systems:
... whenever we encounter living systems – organisms, parts of organisms, or 
communities of organisms - we can observe that their components are arranged in 
network fashion. Whenever we look at life, we look at networks ... the first and most 
obvious property of any network is its non-linearity – it goes in all directions. Thus 
the relationships in a network pattern are non-linear relationships. In particular, an 
influence or message, may travel along a cyclical path, which may become a 
feedback loop. The concept of feedback is intimately connected with the network 
pattern ... self organisation has emerged as perhaps the central concept in the 
systems view of life, and like the concepts of feedback and self-regulation it is 
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Figure 7.11 Superstudio, “In the future there will be no need for roads or squares” (1971)
 Using concepts that can be productively turned to think upon this utopian network 
imaginary, Manuel Castells has argued that today our condition might be describes as 
“increasingly structured around the bipolar opposition of the Net and the Self”, as played out 
within and between an “opposition between global and local” – or what he calls “the space of 
flows” and “the space of places”. The “space of flows” is the abstract and yet very real 
dynamic networks of capital, communications, transport, technology, commodities, etc. 
circulating around the planet. The term also encompasses our mind’s experience and 
mapping of this space, and the real physical places dedicated to enabling these flows: “the 
corridors and halls that connect places around the world”. The “space of places”, by contrast, 
is the specific, physical, local, historical material world that we live in everyday. Although the 
space of flows sits “above” and in relation to the space of places, they map onto each other 
unevenly (see Harvey et al), and unequally.
 Cities, argues Castells, are artefacts uniquely and problematically positioned as a 
mediating interface between these competing spaces: “Cities, as communications systems, 
are supposed to link up the local and the global, but this is exactly where the problems start 
since these are two conflicting logics that tear cities from the inside when they try to respond 
to both, simultaneously.”!!" 
 Nonetheless, he argues that we need to build between the space of flows, and the 
space of places, a series of “cultural, political and physical bridges.”!!⁴  These projects 
anticipate Castell’s demand, for an architecture that connects, mediates, provides an 
interface between the space of flows and the space of places. 
closely linked to networks. The pattern of life, we might say, is a network pattern 
capable of self-organisation.88
Beyond the descriptive and analytic power provided by its formal properties, the network’s 
importance as a socio-cultural gestalt figure is no doubt also due to its resonance or 
correspondence with the dominant organisational forms within capitalist society: in other 
words, the production, circulation and exchange of capital and commodities. Quite simply, 
mental images or cognitive maps of global networks are produced through the experience 
of the circulation of capital and commodities, and through communication patterns. For the 
modern metropolitan subject, our lived everyday encounters with these network 
environments fundamentally and radically changed our understanding of ourselves in 
relation to objects, environments and each other. For Simmel, they produced a distinctly 
extended body and mind:
A person does not end with the limits of his physical body or with the area to which 
his physical activity is immediately confined but embraces, rather, the totality of 
meaningful effects which emanates from him temporally and spatially.89
 These experiences are something to do with the way we produce our own sense of 
space. In pre-industrial society, every object that an individual was likely to encounter in 
their lives would come from their immediate world. Each object would thus have a local 
history, meaning, use value and so on. For the individual in modern industrial society, 
however, the relationship through exchange to every other object on the market network is 
radically different in kind. The market network came to be experienced as an extension of 
the local environment, and experienced as a transformation of the individual's sense of 
space. Developments within communications technologies, as noted by Marshall 
McLuhan, similarly intensify our experience of the extensions of the local environment 
created by market networks, more specifically as extensions of the individual themselves, 
and are equally radical in transforming our experience of, and sense of space. He 




   
Figure. 7.12-15 Stills from Reyner Banham’s documentary film “Reyner Banham Loves 
LA” (1972).
The obsession of architectural historian Reyner Banham (“I learned to drive in order to read Los 
Angeles in the original”) and his contemporaries with the automobile could be seen as an 
outdated form of object worship, and in a sense it was. But it was also an expression of 
something else – in fact the clearest possible expression of a particular modern condition: that 
of occupying a network, in this case a network of roads. We should not, then, think of the object 
“car” as the actual machine, the end game. The car is just the first level immersive interface to a 
much bigger assemblage: the entire road network. The car is a means by which man could 
immerse and extend himself into the network organism as an experiential system: the man - car 
- road network.
 
 McLuhan was influenced by Gregory Bateson in all kinds of ways, and for “media 
ecologists” such as Paul Ryan,91 or artists such as Dan Graham, this pair of thinkers 
constituted the twin columns of a whole new way of thinking about modern global 
environments. In many ways, McLuhan’s conception of the way that media construct 
messages – for McLuhan, “the ‘content’ of any medium is always another medium”92 – 
owed much to the communicational theories that Bateson (and indeed many others) were 
working on in the 1950s. For Bateson, it was useful to think about the nature of messages 
through a theory of logical types, in which “human verbal communication can operate and 
always does operate at many contrasting levels of abstraction”93, and “every 
metacommunicative or metalinguistic message defines, either explicitly or implicitly, the 
set of messages about which it communicates.”94
 McLuhan made an innovative reading of this basic conception from information 
theory that a message always contains multiple levels of meaning, some of which concern 
clues about how to contextualise and interpret a signal. Essentially, I suggest that he used 
the same structure to think about the way that new media and technology work as new 
forms of metacommunication themselves, recontextualising the existing field. Like 
Bateson, and like Marx before that, McLuhan insists that because technologies – which 
for McLuhan are media – are real extended organs, then it is new media which constantly 
reorganise the entire personal and social body. He suggests that:  
... the effects of technology do not occur at the level of opinions or concepts, but 
alter sense ratios or patterns of perception steadily and without any resistance. The 
serious artist is the only person able to encounter technology with impunity, just 
because he is an expert aware of the changes in sense perception.95 
Buildings and cities, too, can be interpreted as media, but they seem to occupy a 
particularly complex position in McLuhan’s model. He notes in general that cities support 
what the young Marx described as our “species being”, our life processes. McLuhan 
states, in an essay on “Housing: New Look and New Outlook”, that: 
... if clothing is an extension of our private skins to store and channel our own heat 
and energy, housing is a collective means of achieving the same end for the family 
or the group. Housing as shelter is an extension of our bodily heat control 
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Figure 7.16 Moscow Metro Station (1930s)
Figure 7.17 Gants Hill station, east London, on London Underground Central Line (1930s).
Public transportation systems offered similar potential for systemic immersion, as a collective 
subject, and carried with them, through their shared and non-consumerist interface a 
potential for a quite different social imaginary, as Frank Pick and Charles Holden on the 
London Underground, and of course the designers of the Moscow Metro, understood clearly. 
  
mechanism – a collective skin or garment. Cities are an even further extension of 
our bodily organs to accommodate the needs of large groups.96
Whilst buildings and cities are in this basic sense extensions of our metabolisms and our 
bodies, the other media that buildings and cities frame and enable are also extensions of 
our nervous systems, and our minds, and some must in a complex way (according to 
McLuhan’s own conception outlined above) take architecture as their content. 
Interestingly, this reflexive condition of architecture seems to get played out in a very 
particular set of formulations that can only be understood as concerning a shift in the 
sense of space. Remembering that, for McLuhan, language in general had initiated a 
fragmentation in consciousness, he suggests that: 
... literate man, civilised man, tends to restrict and enclose space, and to separate 
functions, whereas tribal man had freely extended the form of his body to include 
the universe. Acting as an organ of the cosmos, tribal man accepted his bodily 
functions as modes of participation in the divine energies.97
However, for McLuhan, the fragmentation that he associates with the technologies of 
mechanisation starts to be reversed with electronic media. He suggests that “electric 
circuitry is Orientalizing the West. The constrained, the distinct, the separate – our 
Western legacy – are being replaced by the flowing, the unified, the fused.”98 This 
suggests for McLuhan that “the aspiration of our time for wholeness, empathy and depth 
of awareness is a natural adjunct of electric technology.”99
 There is, I suggest, an important connection between the emerging sensibility that 
McLuhan is trying to describe in these quotes, and the role that the network played (and 
continues to play) in the modern architectural imaginary. McLuhan is no doubt astute in 
associating these shifts in spatiality with the immaterialisation and transformation of 
production, and social relations more generally, through electronic media. However, given 
that this shift can be traced back, as I have argued, to the nineteenth century, it seems 
plausible that what the “electric” presents in a pure and experientially immaterial form 




Figure 7.18 Yona Friedman, three dimensional future city studies (1950)
Figure 7.19 Mondrian, Composition with Red, Yellow and Blue (1921)
Figure 7.20 Guy Debour, The Naked City (1969)
 
that makes “electricity”) is the product of immersion in global production, exchange 
networks and social relations.
 In fact, it seems to me that it is absolutely clear that this shift in the sense of space – 
through the way that individuals produce cognitive maps to describe their relations to their 
social and physical environments – can be clearly seen in modernist architectural and 
artistic production. Whilst there are of course a few major typological precedents for the 
network which can be found in pre-modern art and architecture, suddenly by the early-
twentieth century the network is everywhere. We can feel the presence of infinite networks 
for instance in the painted grids of Mondrian, where we can find expressed, as van der 
Ven suggests, “the new spirit, that of space itself, as the visible immaterialisation of 
form.”100 We can empathise and project ourselves into dynamic networks in the force-field 
forms of the Futurists and Expressionists. We can plug ourselves into and wear the 
endless megastructural frameworks of post-war architects ranging from Constant to 
Soleri, Archigram to the Metabolists, Friedman to Superstudio. Ultimately, these various 
endless three-dimensional gridwork studies are I think spectres associated with Alexandre 
Kojève’s suggestion that if post-historical man became animal again, he would build like a 
spider, constructing networks, cages, scaffolding, and bridges.101
7.8 Ecological Empathy
I started this chapter with a discussion of the concept of empathy as a theory of mind in 
the work of Lipps, and its shift of the concept into new areas of psychology and 
philosophy, where it continues to undergo interesting development whilst retaining its 
original spatial component. One of these strands of development led into phenomenology, 
where it was taken up in particular by the philosopher, Edmund Husserl, to form the basis 
of key phenomenological conceptions of perception and inter-subjectivity. For example, 
Evan Thompson makes a series of observations, following Husserl, along the lines that 
empathic processes are initiated in every act of perception – in that, whenever we observe 
an object, we are aware that we cannot see all sides of it. We imagine, at some level, 
what it must be to perceive the object from other subject positions, in a process described 
in phenomenological philosophy as appresentation.
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  In fact, Thompson argues that empathy is an extremely significant concept, and is 
nothing less than “the precondition of the science of consciousness.”102 He states that: 
... if the phenomenological analysis of empathy and the open intersubjectivity of 
consciousness is on the right track, then it follows that the naturalistic perspective of  
cognitive science presupposes empathy as its condition of possibility, in particular 
the reciprocal empathy by which self and other are concretely co-determined. By 
this assertion I do not simply mean that cognitive science is an intersubjective 
enterprise that depends on the shared, pre-theoretic, lived experience of the 
scientists themselves. I mean something more radical, namely, that the very object 
of cognitive science – the embodied mind as a natural entity – is constituted as a 
scientific object through reciprocal or reiterated empathy in the human life-world.103
Lakoff and Johnson put the concept of empathy to a related albeit different task. They 
started in territory normally outside of the scope of naturalistic accounts, although on 
similar ground to Bateson’s later work, by observing that “imagined empathic projection is 
a major part of what has always been called spiritual experience.” They added that:
... the capacity for imaginative projection is a vital cognitive faculty. Experientially, it 
is a form of ‘transcendence’. Through it, one can experience something akin to 
‘getting out of our bodies’ – yet it is very much a bodily capacity.104 
They also suggest that empathy must play a role in what they describe as a theory of 
“embodied spirituality”, recognising what Bateson would insist is the “mental” character of 
the environment. Here they declare:
... the environment is not an ‘other’ to us. It is not a collection of things we 
encounter. Rather, it is part of our being. It is the locus of our existence and identity. 
We cannot and do not exist apart from it. It is through empathic projection that we 
come to know our environment, understand how we are a part of it and how it is a 
part of us. This is the bodily mechanism by which we can participate in nature, not 
just as hikers or climbers or swimmers, but as part of nature itself, part of a larger, 
all-encompasing whole. A mindful embodied spirituality is thus an ecological 
spirituality ... [and] requires an understanding that nature is not inanimate and less 
than human, but animated and more than human ... embodied spirituality is more 
than spiritual experience. It is an ethical relationship to the physical world ... it is thus 
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an activist moral attitude not just towards individuals, but towards society and the 
world.105
I think that this ecological extension of empathy is extremely important and useful in many 
ways. However, we are essentially talking about complex forms of cognitive mapping, and 
it is useful at this point to recall the provocative suggestions that Frederic Jameson has 
made in this direction. This is doubly significant, as Jameson also brings to the fore the 
role of ideological critique in regard to cognitive mapping, reminding us that there is 
always a politics behind the maps that we produce, and the individual and collective 
selves that we thereby bring forth.
 Jameson, in his often referenced essay on “Cognitive Mapping”, sets out some 
“possibilities for a new kind of Marxist aesthetic”106 – one which ideologically examines 
spatial sensibility, looking for what Louis Althusser described as “the Imaginary 
representation of the subject’s relationship to his or her Real conditions of existence,” via 
what Jameson calls “an extrapolation of [Kevin Lynch’s] spatial analysis to the realm of 
social structure.” 107  For Jameson, there is – as Simmel, Kracauer, Worringer, Behne and 
the second generation of empathy theorists suggested – some kind of correspondence 
between the forms of society, the forms of individual experience, and the forms of the 
environment. In fact, I would suggest that the network, as considered above, can be 
understood as a specific historical form of spatial sensibility, acting in different 
manifestations as both the “real conditions of existence” and as “imaginary 
representations”. Even more than that, it is also in some way the ur-form of spatiality itself, 
making visible the concept of space and viability of socio-spatial cognitive mapping. The 
experience of networks help to bring spatiality in general to our cognitive minds.
 Returning to the “ecological aesthetics” suggested in different ways by Bateson, 
Lakoff and Johnson, and Thompson, there are now a few things that can be said. I would 
suggest that there is an important sense in which the so-called Gaian impulse in general 
might be thought of as an “inverted global totemism”. As McLuhan observed, “the 
aspiration of our time for wholeness, empathy and depth of awareness is a natural adjunct 
of electric technology.”108 That is to say, I think, in my view it is our empathy with the 
metropolis, our “second nature,”109 and even our empathy with the global abstraction of 
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the systems and networks of capitalism, that allows us now to see the planet as a single 
global ecosystem. This is the same condition, albeit reversed, that Bateson described with 
regard to totemism110 in certain pre-industrial societies: 
Anthropologically, it would seem that from what we know of the early material, that 
man in society took clues from the natural world around him and applied those clues 
in a sort of metaphoric way to the society in which he lived. That is, he identified with 
or empathised with the natural world around him and took that empathy as a guide 
for his own social organisation and his own theories of his own psychology. This was 
what is called ‘totemism’. In a way, it was all nonsense, but it made more sense than 
most of what we do today, because the natural world around us really has this 
general systemic structure and therefore is an appropriate source of metaphor to 
enable man to understand himself in his social organisation.111
Our technological ecologies – such as cities, production systems and so on – with which 
we have “as cyborgs grown” can thus also experienced as extended or external minds, 
just in the same way as “natural” ecologies. Our ability to form simulations of other minds 
(people, ecologies, economies) to create internal maps or representations, seems to be 
critical to the emergence of our self-consciousness as a historical species, and yet it is 
continually repeated in our individual production of ourselves.  We might say that today, 
paradoxically, the global metropolis “really has this general systemic structure”, however 
pathological, and that we are indeed using it as the basis of “metaphors” that enable us to 
see, however inadequately, the natural world around us.112 The challenge facing modern 
human culture is to find ways to examine and work with the metaphors that we embody, 
given that the mismatch between consciousness and mind is becoming more ideologically 
distorted than ever, through the operations of advanced capitalism.
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8 Conclusion: Towards a Critical Urban Ecology
... the world is to be comprehended not as a complex of ready-made things, but as a 
complex of processes, in which apparently stable things no less than the concepts, the 
mental reflections in our heads, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being 
and passing away.1
[Friedrich Engels]
8.1 The Architecture of Autopoiesis
I opened this thesis with the suggestion that the kinds of concepts which architecture 
produces – through its organising and ordering of matter and bodies in space and in time 
– are inherently relational and systemic. I argued that the emergence of the discipline of 
architecture in the Renaissance prefigured the later development of systems theory in 
general, and did so through its staging of a series of questions concerning whole/part 
relations via theories and practices of formal composition that included scale, harmony, 
balance and proportion. On the one hand, we must think of the discipline of architecture 
that emerged from this historical juncture as an autonomous and autopoietic system, 
whose meaning remains internal to itself: architecture was and remains at root a 
discourse about architecture. Equally, of course, architecture is, even whilst autonomous, 
structurally coupled to all kinds of other discourses – such as law, finance, science, 
technology and religion – and as such is also physically embedded within the material 
condition, and informational systems and ecologies of the natural and human worlds. 
 The concepts that architecture produces as architecture are therefore always in 
some way also expressive of, and interdependent with, discourses, processes and other 
cultures beyond architecture. Moreover, we experience and perform these concepts in an 
extended and embodied condition. Clearly here, when talking about architecture, I do not 
simply refer to building but to an entire discourse – grounded in thinking about and 
producing space as a social and material phenomenon – articulated through building, 
making, writing and drawing. Architecture thus conceived has a dual or dialectical relation 
to other discourses and material and ecological processes. It is both wholly autonomous 
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and radically interdependent, at the same time. This means that it is possible for 
architecture to make available to social experience its very embeddedness within, and as 
constituting, a complex cultural and material world. But it also means that it is possible for 
these relations to be expressed in a language that is to a large degree autonomous. 
Importantly, this relational autonomy means that there is at least the potential for 
architecture to articulate social and political concepts that cannot be expressed through 
other discourses – such as law and finance – which dominate the construction and 
narrative of modern capitalism.2 
 In the first four chapters of this thesis, I traced the ideological and instrumental 
development of a series of systems theory concepts in discourses linked to the natural, 
social and built environments, from across the arts and humanities, as well as the natural 
and social sciences. I drew several conclusions from this part of my study. Firstly, I noted 
that the concepts that we have inherited to think about our environment – including terms 
such as nature, ecology, organism, sustainability etc – are all inherently problematic, and 
require constant critical ideological attention. Equally, each of these terms is incapable in 
its current form, of thinking through and meeting the tasks that confront us regarding our 
relation to the broader planetary webs of life and matter. So we have no choice but to use 
these terms – we have nothing else at present – but need to shape them to new tasks, 
while developing new concepts too. Finally, I observed that there must be implicit in such 
a position, a new attempt to describe the world that we find ourselves in, and which we 
help to produce. I noted that this necessarily “re-enchanted” account (as both David 
Harvey and Isabelle Stengers have described it) must also include a recognition of what is 
at stake politically in any such attempt.
 Recent theory – notably for example Bruno Latour’s actor-networks, Nigel Thrift’s 
non-representational theory, and Timothy Morton’s particular strain of Object Oriented 
Ontology – has become increasingly adept at articulating the extended relations of all 
kinds of concepts, objects and processes, in ways that breach the boundaries of 
traditional disciplines and discrete areas of knowledge. These “new materialisms” are all 
undoubtedly useful, although each has specific limitations. 
 I have not on the whole dealt directly with any of these recent theories, but instead 
attempted to develop my own distinct “ecological materialism”. I did so by returning to 
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consider the emergence of various “philosophies of organism” in cybernetics, systems 
theory, ecology and the life sciences, in parallel with a reconsideration of Friedrich Engels 
“Dialectics of Nature” project. In that important collection of notes and papers, Engels 
argued for a conception of a dynamic materialism whereby “the general nature of 
dialectics [is] to be developed as the science of interconnections, in contrast to 
metaphysics.”3 In addition, then, to introducing the question of architecture and systems 
theory, my first chapter also framed this very question within a Marxian dialectical method 
of internal relations.
 My return to Engels’ “Dialectics of Nature” project is not at all intended to be a 
simple restatement of old dogmatic and sectarian disputes within what, even for for most 
academics, would be seen as rather arcane and marginal areas of Marxist theory. Rather, 
my task here is to note that some of these questions have simply reopened in recent 
years due to the development of new ideas and observations about reality. The impetus 
for this reopening comes from several sources – most notably, systems theory has 
developed in ways that seems to converge with dialectics, and indeed, seems to require a 
dialectical approach to resolve certain logical dilemmas, in particular theories of 
emergence and complexity. However, the impetus is in fact much more broadly based 
than that. 
 The standard refutation of the dialectical materialist project is that the dialectical 
process needs to contain a subjective component, which western Marxists took to be 
lacking in objective modern science. Today it appears as an irony of history that this 
position was advanced in Marxist theory, at the same time as the very question of 
subjectivity, and observer effects, were being raised in one area of science after another. 
The question of subjectivity has repeatedly arisen in various guises within science and 
technology studies, and within second-order systems theory in recent decades. I suggest 
– although I do not have the space or training to develop further here – that the issue of 
subjectivity in science, rather than being a problem for any “Dialectics of Nature” project, 
might actually be its point of conceptual re-entry.4
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Fig. 8.1 David Bohm, quantum physicist (1917-92)
Fig. 8.2 Stafford Beer, management theorist/ neocybernetician (1926-2002)
Fig. 8.3 Gordon Pask, artist/ neocybernetician (1928-96)
Fig. 8.4 Francisco Varela, cybernetic biologist (1946-2001)
Fig. 8.5 Isabelle Stengers, scientist/critical theorist/philosopher (1949-)
Fig. 8.6 Ilya Prigogine, chemist (1917-2003)
Fig. 8.7 Alexandr Bogdanov, tektologist/bolshevik (1873-1928)
       
8.2 Our Extended Oikos
 The encounters that I staged in this thesis between Marxian dialectics, and 
contemporary neo-cybernetics and complexity theory, occured at several moments 
through different chapters. Notably, in what I believe to be a novel move, I brought 
Marxian dialectics into direct relation with Maturana, Varela and Thompson’s cybernetic 
biology account of the organism, and of the way that any organism as a perceptual unity-
process “brings forth” a world. In Chapter Three I sketched a “labour theory of cognition” 
as a means to bring Varela’s dialectical theory of cognition, in particular, into a more 
conventional Marxian account. I also observed that Smith and Harvey’s development of a 
conception of “the production of nature” was preceded by several decades in the neo-
cybernetic account of living systems that are always defined through their productive 
relations with their environment.5 
 Chapter Two to Chapter Five then turned in different ways to think about ecology 
and cybernetics. Whenever one does this, one is invited, of course, to think in terms of 
whole systems – their processes, boundaries and interactions – while also thinking about 
the articulation and exploration of radically new conceptions of mind, life, information and 
language. In summary, it is worth concluding that there are two discourses that I take to 
be vital from my study: radical cybernetics and urban political ecology.
 The first of these discourses, that of radical cybernetics, as I define it here, refers 
to work produced in particular by Gregory Bateson, Stafford Beer, Francisco Varela and 
Gordon Pask, who between them developed a self-reflexive criticism of systems theory’s 
tendency to talk in terms of optimisation, efficiency, control and so on. Andrew Pickering 
has noted, in a reading which closely aligns with my own, that “the ontology of cybernetics 
is a strange and unfamiliar one, very different from that of the modern sciences”. He writes 
that whilst the modern ideology and practice of science was fundamentally 
representational, within this cybernetics group there emerged a radical though marginal 
research interest which staged a non-representational approach. This was based upon a 
“hylozoic wonder”, and a “reciprocal coupling of people and things”, and tried to develop a 
new philosophy and science of material process. Describing this work as “ontological 
theatre”6, Pickering has suggested that this form of neo-cybernetics – as opposed to 
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mainstream systems theory and ecology – staged a study of “anticontrol”7 and “an 
ontology of becoming”8 that drew back “the veil the modern sciences cast over the 
performative aspects of the world, including our own being.”9 
 Notably, then, I insist upon a critical philosophical reading of the legacies of 
cybernetic research that is markedly different to the mainstream technocratic 
interpretation of cybernetics that has developed in recent decades. The binary oppositions 
that do continue to structure so much contemporary thinking, such as matter and pattern, 
nature and culture, subject and object, were profoundly problematised in neo-cybernetic 
research – not just conceptually, but as Pickering has emphasised, through real 
experimental projects. Cybernetics provided a somewhat unique space for materiality and 
subjectivity to perform as networks of agency. Across an ecology of practices – art, 
architecture, psychiatry, biology, robotics, biological computing, cognitive science and 
even management theory – we therefore find in these neo-cybernetic experiments the 
beginnings of a reformulation of the project of western knowledge, leading to a different 
way of thinking about what “things” are, and what we can know about them. The legacies 
of this project have I would argue, an ongoing and important contribution to make to a new   
form of materialism today. I have tried to relate much of the material that was consided in 
my later chapters to this emerging way of thinking about the world.
 The second key discourse that emerged from the first four chapters of this thesis is 
urban political ecology, broadly conceived. Recent writings on urban political ecology (in 
particular in human geography but also in architecture and planning, landscape urbanism, 
as well as sociology and philosophy more broadly) have begun to make the case for a 
comprehensive rethinking of notions of urban metabolism. In this thinking, dichotomies of 
“natural” and “social” ecologies or “natural” and “man-made” environments, are eschewed. 
Instead, urban processes are conceived as part of an all-encompassing, open and 
dynamic metabolic system.10 As already noted, I have made repeated moves to relate this 
more Marxian approach with some of the novel insights of neo-cybernetics.
 By definition, urban political ecology politicises the ostensibly “environmental” 
aspects of urban ecological debates and “ecologises” the socio-political and economic 
dimensions of urban processes and flows. Importantly, urban political ecology aims to be 
sensitive to describing the “metabolic rift” enacted by capitalist production – namely the 
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Fig. 8.8 The Cybersyn main hub room, Santiago 1971, designed by Italian interaction 
designer Gui Bonsiepe. There has been a consistent if marginalised engagement between 
marxist thinking, systems theory and ecology. Perhaps most notable is the Cybersyn project  
– a collaboration between British cybernetician Stafford Beer and Salvadore Allende’s 
Chilean socialist project – which formed an extraordinary anticipation of the potential that 
activists see today in web 2.0 distributed network infrastructure. Upon election in 1970, 
Allende invited Beer to set up a network of telex machines distributed throughout the 
country’s major factories and community centres, providing the world’s first working internet-
like social network. The project explored how such a system might provide the basis of a 
“distributed democracy” or bottom-up model of a planned economy. 
 During this period Chile provided an extraordinary hothouse for radical systems theory, 
bringing together Beer, and the local cybernetic biologists Humberto Marurana and 
Fransisco Varela. The Cybersyn network’s greatest moment was said to be in out-
manoeuvring a US led attempt by foreign lorry drivers to lay siege to Santiago. In the CIA/
General Pinochet coup of 1973, Allende and the team of cyberneticians were all 
assassinated, and the Cybersyn network destroyed. Beer was by chance back in England at 
the time. Describing the Cybersyn system, Beer stated that:
We have developed a system on our own. What you are about to hear today is revolutionary – not 
only because this is the first time that this is applied in the world –  it is revolutionary because we are 
making a deliberate effort to give the people the power that science gives to us, enabling them to use 
it freely.
disconnect between social, economic, and environmental worlds. Our metabolic rift thus 
conceived is not a simple technical problem that might be solved through narrowly defined 
systems design responses: instead, re-imagining our entire relation to nature becomes, 
according to this analysis, a crucial political activity today.
 Political ecology as a discourse offers a broad conceptual framework within which 
to research a democratic and critical metabolics, and would itself I think benefit from 
radical cybernetic and ecological aesthetic expansion. For Neil Smith, 
... political ecology provides a powerful means of cracking the abstractions of this 
discussion about the metabolism or production of nature. Rooted in social and 
political theory it is also grounded in ecology ... When complimented by an 
environmental justice politics, which is ... more politically activist in inspiration, 
political ecology becomes a potent weapon for comprehending produced natures.11
One of the novel contributions that I believe that I have made in this thesis, is to bring 
together a radical neo-cybernetic ecology of mind with the kind of explicit socio-
politicisation of urban ecological thought found in urban political ecology. There is, I would 
suggest, important intellectual work that can be done straight away in this conjoining. 
Urban political ecology can be used to frame a questioning of the social and political 
construction of the real that is enacted in both the radical and the technocratic tendencies 
in ecological systems design and theory. Equally, the insights of neo-cybernetic and 
complexity theory into the way that systems (including capitalism) maintain themselves, 
while also under certain conditions undergo radical reorganisation, can reinforce more 
classically Marxian accounts of evolutionary and revolutionary change.
 The synthesis of urban political ecology and radical cybernetics that I propose 
does in fact revisit territory that can be found in nascent form in Engels’ notes on the 
Dialectics of Nature. In a rather brilliant passage that directly anticipates contemporary 
theoretical and practical concerns, Engels stated:
Let us not … flatter ourselves overmuch on account of our human victories over 
nature. For each such victory nature takes its revenge on us. Each victory, it is true, 
in the first place brings about the results we expected, but in the second and third 
places it has quite different, unforeseen effects which only too often cancel out the 
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Fig. 8.9 Friedrich Engels (1820-1895)
first. The people who, in Mesopotamia, Greece, Asia Minor, and elsewhere, 
destroyed the forests to obtain cultivable land, never dreamed that by removing 
along with the forests the collecting centres and reservoirs of moisture they were 
laying the basis for the present forlorn state of those countries. When the Italians of 
the Alps used up the pine forests on the southern slopes, so carefully cherished on 
the northern slopes, they had no inkling that by doing so they were cutting at the 
roots of the dairy industry in their region; they had still less inkling that they were 
thereby depriving their mountain springs of water for the greater part of the year, 
and making it possible for them to pour still more furious torrents on the plains 
during the rainy seasons ... Thus at every step we are reminded that we by no 
means rule over nature like a conqueror over a foreign people, like someone 
standing outside nature – but that we, with flesh, blood and brain, belong to nature, 
and exist in its midst, and that all our mastery of it consists in the fact that we have 
the advantage over all other creatures of being able to learn its laws and apply them 
correctly.12
In this passage Engels seems to be anticipating a language of political ecology, on the 
one hand, and of complex systems theory ideas – such as emergence and recursive 
feedback in referring to “the second and third places” – on the other. 
8.3 Emergence and the Rheomode
 The concept of emergence – as referred to above – has therefore surfaced 
repeatedly during the course of my research, and was approached from several directions 
in different chapters. More broadly, the question of the ontological status of emergence is 
becoming key to much of the debate in new materialist discourse. In my discussions 
around this concept, I drew upon thinkers – notably Bertell Ollman, Richard Levins and 
Richard Lewontin – who have considered how a process-dialectical approach might 
resolve some of intractable issues faced when trying to account for strong and weak 
emergence in the terms of classical logic. In conclusion, I would re-affirm this position. 
The theorisation of emergence is perhaps one of the clearest cases where a renewed 
Marxian dialectics might make significant contributions to contemporary materialist 
debate. In a particularly clear and useful passage, Roy Bhaskar has suggested that:
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In emergence, generally, new beings (entities, structures, totalities, concepts) are 
generated out of pre-existing material from which they could not have been 
deduced. There is a quantum leap, or nodal line, of (one feels like saying) the 
materialised imagination ... akin to that occurring in the ... transforms of the 
rudimentary epistemological dialectic ... This is matter as creative, as autopoietic. It 
seems, if it can be vindicated, to yield a genuine ontological analogue of Hegelian 
preservative determinate negation. It consists in the formation of one or other of two 
types of superstructure (only the first of which has generally been noted in the 
Marxist canon), namely, by superimposition or intraposition of the emergent level on 
or within the pre-existing one – superstructuration or intrastructuration respectively.13
I concur entirely with Bhaskar’s reading here, and again when he goes on to note – in 
terms similar to Harvey and Lefebvre work on relational space-time and rhythmanalysis 
respectively – that:
Emergence entails both stratification and change ... emergent entities and causal 
powers. But if ... all changes are spatio-temporal, and space-time is a relational 
property of the meshwork of material beings, this opens up the phenomena of 
emergent spatio-temporalities. There are two paradigms here, both instantiated in 
reality ... relata of a new (emergent) system of material things and/or ... new  
(emergent) relata of a pre-existing system of material things. In either event they 
establish new ‘rhythmics’, where a rhythmic is just the spatio-temporal efficacy of the 
process.14
 An important aspect of my concluding thoughts concerns our cultural need to 
develop a popular conceptual language and set of conceptual metaphors capable of 
communicating and working with a dialectical conception of space-time, and dealing with 
problems like emergence. As I have shown in the previous chapters, both Gregory 
Bateson and the theoretical physicist David Bohm suggested that we needed to confront 
these kinds of questions through a consideration of how we might consciously “evolve” 
our very language and aesthetic sensibility. Both suggested that this project must lead to 
some kind of paradigmatically aesthetic reformation of, or extension of, science. Gregory 
Bateson’s work in this regard has been described tellingly as “ecological aesthetics”. 
David Bohm called his project “the rheomode”. I will consider both of these terms further, 
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as I ultimately wish to argue in this conclusion that architectural research can serve to 
revitalise and contribute to these intellectual projects today.
 Bohm suggested that many of the contradictions and paradoxes that arise when 
physicists try to formulate accurate descriptions of “matter” (and indeed “mind” and 
“form”), arise from the structures of everyday western language, coupled with the 
reductive ideology of modern scientific method. For Bohm, western languages tend to 
privilege nouns, and as a result construct for us a perceived world of discrete subjects and 
objects. Our language obscures the fundamentally dynamic and interconnected process-
based nature of “what is”. Reality, Bohm insisted, is instead a process of differentiated 
wholeness. He wrote that:
... the notion of a permanent object with well defined properties can no longer be 
taken as basic in physics ... Rather, it is necessary to begin with the event as a 
basic concept, and later to arrive at the object as a continuing structure of related 
and ordered events.15
Bohm suggested that we should start by assuming “that what is, is movement itself” – and 
therefore that if we observe this field of movement, then “what is observable is the set of 
relatively fixed invariants in this movement plus their relationships to the movement as a 
whole.” Bohm declared:
Classical physics says that reality is actually little particles that separate the world 
into its independent elements. Now I'm proposing the reverse, that the fundamental 
reality is the enfoldment and unfoldment, and these particles are abstractions from 
that. We could picture the electron not as a particle that exists continuously but as 
something coming in and going out and then coming in again. If these various 
condensations are close together, they approximate a track. The electron itself can 
never be separated from the whole of space, which is its ground.16
 Bohm imagined a new verb-based form of language, which he called the 
“rheomode” (from the Greek word for flow). He hoped that such a language might make it 
easier for us to see, describe and understand this kind of dynamic unfolding wholeness. In 
discussing these ideas, Bohm noted that he was influenced by two philosophical schools: 
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Whiteheadian process thought, and Hegelian-Marxist dialectics. Bohm suggested that if it 
were possible to reformulate quantum theory in rheomodic terms, then it might move 
beyond the paradoxes that characterised its standard interpretation: indeterminacy, non-
locality, wave-particle duality, the role of the conscious observer etc. 
 Bohm’s colleague David Peat has since noted that Bohm’s collaborators and 
students struggled to work with the “rheomode” – one cannot after all just invent a new 
verbal language. Equally however, he did make some fascinating insights and progress. 
Notably, in his last year, Bohm – and thereafter more extensively David Peat – held a 
series of dialogues with members of the Blackfoot tribe of North America, whose language 
was found to align with Bohm’s notion of one structured around seeing a world of dynamic 
processes rather than objects and subjects.
 Bohm actually liked to experiment mentally with all kinds of imagined physical 
“prosthesis” to develop metaphors that could help him and others conceive of the 
processes of the so-called “holomovement”. These thought experiments included 
holograms, rotating cylinders of glycerine, computer video games, fishtanks – and his 
favourite metaphor, apparently was ballet. Peat and Bohm have both recounted in this 
regard the famous anecdote that Einstein used to need to squeeze a rubber ball whilst 
thinking about relativistic problems.
 I suspect that Bohm, in his use of these metaphors, was actually feeling himself 
towards a more material and embodied form of the “rheomode”. Indeed, Bohm’s use of 
metaphors can in some sense be understood as attempts to construct new embodied 
concepts through these kinds of processes. It is precisely in this sense that I believe that 
there is interesting work that can be done today regarding ecological aesthetics. Art and 
architecture can produce concepts which can be experienced directly, but which are 
otherwise ineffable, invisible and incomprehensible. It might be the case that new mental 
paradigms regarding our ecological condition, and the material world around us, can only 
emerge after we develop new ways of imagining material process and organisational 
transformation. In this sense, architecture has some critical work to do as an autonomous 
practice, and by this I mean autonomous even from the act of building. Such a project 
would involve the exploration of cognition and space-time pattern and order, so as to 
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produce abstract conceptual metaphors about space, time, matter, energy, process, 
metabolism, emergence. 
 In Chapter Five, I noted in concluding that the cognitive theorists George Lakoff 
and Mark Johnson have argued that because mind is both embodied and empathic-
mimetic in a fundamental way, all of our conceptual structures are ultimately “metaphors” 
abstracted from bodily experience and re-networked. In Chapters Six I then further 
reviewed a series of contemporary ideas concerning the way that this process actually 
works – i.e. how the embodied brain empathically maps and experiences the environment 
within which it is embedded and extended. 
 The human embodied brain is a pattern recognition and copying organism. The 
embodied brain perceives through its interactions a certain range of differential patterns 
unfolding in the world around it, and in doing so internalises aspects of these in complex 
ways that literally plastically reorder the material organisation of the brain. The patterns 
that we produce and project into the world are, in this real sense, also re-internalised. We 
then reuse and adapt the structures and categories developed from sensing, perceiving 
and acting, in order to be able to develop more abstract conceptual thought. So, in 
constructing and transforming our world, we really do in some way construct and 
transform parts of our selves.
 There is, clearly, a lot at stake in how we conceive of our mode of being in the 
world. It is not simply a question of achieving an accurate “objective” understanding of 
how our minds and environments interact, but also, and more importantly, a political 
project that ties together our demands concerning our environments with our political 
demands for new forms of “post-alienated” or “re-enchanted” consciousness.
8.4 Ecological Aesthetics: A Critical Metabolics
 I have come to the conclusion that a language of relation, process and metabolism 
would seem better able than existing concepts – of say matter, or nature, or even systems 
(which is perhaps too contaminated with instrumental associations) – to provide an 
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account of the differentiated dynamic unity of what is, even whilst describing the specificity 
of human processes enfolded within this. “Our world is an open systemic entropic 
totality,”17 Bhaskar notes.
 If David Bohm proposed a rheomodic language in response to developments in 
theoretical physics, Gregory Bateson made a similar attempt to develop an ecological 
language, following his observations of living, social and technological systems of all 
kinds. Bateson argued – in a passage that I read whilst recalling the philosophy of 
relational space-time described in Chapter One – that:
...language continually asserts by the syntax of subject and predicate that ‘things’ 
somehow ‘have’ qualities and attributes. A more precise way of talking would insist 
that ‘things’ are produced, are seen as separate from other ‘things’, and are made 
‘real’ by their internal relations and by their behaviour in relationship with other 
things and with the speaker. It is necessary to be quite clear about the universal 
truth that whatever ‘things’ may be in their ‘pleromatic’ and thingish world, they can 
only enter the world of communication and meaning by their names, their qualities 
and their attributes (i.e. by reports of their internal and external relations and 
interactions).18
 Both Bohm and Bateson insisted that there was a relation between understanding 
the shift in the conception of mind and form in their theories, and understanding the nature 
of ecological crisis. Both related their formulations of new conception of “order”, of mind 
and matter, and the questions of “what is self?” and “what is environment?” Bohm and 
Bateson suggested that misconceptions in the way that we think of ourselves as isolated 
and distinct selves, and our minds as isolated personal phenomena located inside our 
heads, are in some sense pathological – and that these same pathologies can be found at 
the root of broader global ecological crises.
 In order to understand Bateson’s conception of ecological aesthetics, it is first 
necessary to recap his broader ecological conception of mind. Writing in 1975, Bateson 
noted that “you and I are so deeply acculturated to the idea of ‘self’ and organisation and 
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species that it is hard to believe that man might view his relations with the environment in 
any other way.”19 Reflecting upon Bateson’s position, William Kaizen has recently argued:
... if McLuhan takes technology to be ‘extensions of man’, Bateson goes further. He 
gives up any notion of man, redefining the self as an expanded mental field in which 
the subject and its objects are no longer separable. For Bateson, ‘mind’ is no longer 
bounded by the individual body, becoming a conjunction of self and world produced 
through communicative ecologies.20
 Ecological aesthetics is the name given by Peter Harries-Jones to a broad 
research study that can be found in Bateson’s later work, and in my formulation of it here 
here I am indebted to Harries-Jones’ commentary. Ecological aesthetics can broadly be 
understood as Bateson’s fascination with the way that living systems have an 
informational aspect through the very ways that their material processes interact. Bateson 
believed that a dialectical process organised around a logic of abduction could describe 
many recursive systems. Bateson suggested that abduction was analogous to the way 
that a moire pattern emerges out of the interaction of two other pattern fields, when seen 
from a specific point of view. Abduction was for Bateson a ubiquitous process in the living 
material world, and described the way that patterns of matter interact with and copy bits of 
each other. Abduction constituted something like a metabolic logic for him. But it was also 
key to understanding human perceptions of the world, and this he felt that the study of it 
could lead to  a new epistemological paradigm which could beneficially inform human 
actions in the world.
 For Bateson, educational developments were key. Ecological aesthetics for 
Bateson was about developing empathy and understanding for the “non-intuitive” 
behaviour of complex feedback systems, and this can only come through staging social 
and ecological experimental engagements:
... the problem of how to transmit our ecological reasoning to those whom we wish 
to influence in what seems to us to be an ecologically ‘good’ direction is itself an 
ecological problem. I believe that ... our greatest (ecological) need is the 
propagation of these ideas as they develop – and as they are developed by the 
(ecological) process of their propagation ... the ecological ideas implicit in our plans 
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are more important than the plans themselves, and it would be foolish to sacrifice 
these ideas on the altar of pragmatism.21
For Bateson, the wider consequences of not confronting the issues that he raised were 
profound and disturbing. In a highly suggestive passage he wrote:
You decide that that you want to get rid of the by-products of human life and that 
Lake Erie will be a good place to put them. You forget that the eco-mental system 
called Lake Erie is a part of your wider eco-mental system – and that if Lake Erie is 
driven insane, its insanity is incorporated in the larger system of your thought and 
experience.22
8.5 Restructuring the Ecology of a Great City
 Over the last two hundred years, the effects of human activity – and specifically 
capitalist production processes – have it seems reached into and touched almost every 
pore of the planet, and in doing so have coupled with and transformed much of it in the 
process. It is important to note that there is nothing inherently good or bad about such 
extensive activity. All kinds of other living species also have or have had a similar global 
reach and transformative inter-penetration – not least the bacteria at work in our own 
bodies, and which are even integrated into our very cells.23 Our extended reach into the 
web of life on this planet is also in important ways an extended communication with the 
natural world, and it should not be simplistically abhorred (as can be the case in some 
ecocentric discourse). The living planet is characterised by a dynamic, evolving co-
production of reality, a series of nested metabolic processes. These typically tend to self-
organise into meta-systems that stabilise and self-regulate – as famously described by 
James Lovelock in Gaia – but which are nonetheless are frequently, necessarily and 
productively far from equilibrium – as described by Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers. 
Adjectives such as “harmonious” and “balanced”, which can often be found in econcentric 
literature, are in this sense not particularly helpful, and can even be downright misleading. 
 However, having pointed this out, it is clear that capitalist production systems have 
taken on particularly pathological, dominating and instrumentalising forms with regard to 
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the well-being of other life on the planet we share. Moreover they have possibly initiated a 
series of processes that are at the very least challenging to the future of human 
civilisation, and damaging to the growth of individual and collective selves. Whilst we need 
to dismantle and/or transform the conceptual opposition between nature and culture (and 
at the same time that between natural and social science, and the humanities and 
sciences), we must guard against the mistake thereby of absolving ourselves from 
responsibilities towards the non-human world. Whilst we might challenge some 
conceptions of what nature is, this does not at all mean that there is nothing to be valued 
there, as some contemporary interpretations tend to suggest. The conceptual challenge 
confronting us is in some ways properly post-humanist, in that we need to explore what 
are as yet fleeting impressions of new ways of producing or performing our individual and 
collective eco-mental selves as flexibly immanently revealed within, and not enframing of, 
a broader web of life and poetic technology. 
 As I noted in Chapter Seven, there is a dialectical – and indeed in many respects 
paradoxical – relationship between the “metropolitan” mental forms that are produced by 
modern globalisation processes, and our ability to recognise the planet as a dynamic web 
of interconnected and networked systems: our extended oikos. Just like the embodied 
subject, as a society too our perception is closely connected to our practical action. We 
only see the world as we change it in some way. Our growing recognition of the 
complexity of the non-human ecologies around us is closely related to our very 
transformations of those environments. There is then a tragic paradox here, in that 
following Bateson – and indeed Francisco Varela and Stafford Beer – we must recognise 
that like any complex system, our metabolism is our cognition, and we can only know the 
world that we engage with. It would seem that the “observer effects” that our 
contemporary global forms of capital accumulation take on have aspects that are 
profoundly damaging with respect to the planet that we share and rely upon; this is 
damaging to both ourselves, the nature that we produce, and all kinds of entirely other 
eco-mental systems with which, and within which, we dwell. 
 Equally of course, our human metabolism, in the widest material and immaterial 
sense, is by now so inextricably coupled and intertwined with all kinds of extra-human 
planetary ecologies, that we cannot simply withdraw either. To withdraw, were such an act 
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conceivable, would itself initiate all kinds of ecological crises. Rather, we need to move 
forward in a manner as open as possible to more biodiverse, progressive, sustainable and 
socialised futures.
 Gregory Bateson pointed out that thinking about our relationship to the non-human 
world is itself an ecological problem of personal, social and planetary dimensions. Any 
such description must start out from the fact that it is always “us” that is describing the 
system in the first place – we are always in some way within the ecology being described. 
Conceiving of this relation in the wrong way, Bateson suggested, constituted the primary 
epistemological error of western civilisation, 
 In several places in this thesis I have referred to what Marx described as the 
metabolic rift that capitalism instantiates. In other places, in an often parallel narrative, I 
described the epistemological rift that Bateson so keenly felt. It seems evident to me that 
Bateson lacked a Marxian perspective on what was at stake politically in his work. 
Nonetheless, he did become increasingly political as he got older – both in terms of 
environmental politics, but also, interestingly, in considering the contribution his 
conception of an ecology of mind might make to planning the development of cities and 
cultures. 
 In a fascinating intervention in 1970, Bateson organised a workshop with the New 
York City Planning Department, to try to teach the planners a more ecological – in the 
broadest sense – way of thinking about the city. Bateson submitted a paper – 
Restructuring the Ecology of a Great City – which was subsequently published and 
revised in various places. Whilst conventional sustainable design theory today might 
suggest that we need to reduce waste, and be more efficient in our use of resources, in 
this paper Bateson suggests that there are problems with thinking in terms of concepts 
such as efficiency, at least in any narrowly defined way. 
 Bateson started his paper with an extremely useful formulation regarding the goals 
of any ecological critique of industrial society. Postulating what “a healthy ecology of 
human civilisation” in relation to the rest of the planet might be, he suggested that our goal 
is to achieve the following socio-ecological condition : 
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... a single system of environment combined with high human civilisation in which 
the  flexibility of the civilisation shall match that of the environment to create an 
ongoing  complex system, open-ended for slow change of even basic (hard-
programmed) characteristics.24
This is, I suggest, a singularly useful conception. Firstly, Bateson affirmed that we are 
talking about a “high” human culture. This is no simple rejection of modernity. He notes in 
passing – in contrast to some of the more nostalgic and reactionary theorists that can be 
found in the green movement – that “it would not be wise (even if possible) to return to the 
innocence of the Australian aborigines, the Eskimo, and the Bushmen. Such a return 
would involve  loss of the wisdom which prompted the return and would only start the 
whole  process over.”25
 Bateson insists that to meet his criteria a “very great flexibility will be needed.”26 
His insistence upon the importance of understanding flexibility might easily be mistaken 
for a simple truism: of course flexibility tends to be valorised positively – why would one 
not think that flexibility is better than inflexibility. However, such a commonsense reading 
misses much of importance in this discussion. For Bateson, “the pathologies of our time 
may broadly be said to be the accumulated results of this process – the eating up of 
flexibility in response to stresses of one sort or another.”27 
 We need to note that Bateson was working within and building upon an emerging 
body of cybernetic analysis. In particular, he was referring here to Ashby’s Law, which 
states that two systems (such as human and non-human ecosystems) are: 
... describable in terms of interlinked variables ... such that for any given variable 
there is an upper and a lower threshold of tolerance beyond which discomfort, 
pathology, and ultimately death must occur. Within these limits, the variable can 
move (and is moved) in order to achieve adaptation. When, under stress, a variable 
must take a value close to its upper or lower limit of tolerance, we shall say, 
borrowing a phrase from the youth culture, that the system is ‘up tight’ in respect to 
this variable, or lacks ‘flexibility’ in this respect. But, because the variables are 
interlinked, to be up tight in respect to one variable commonly means that other 
variables cannot be changed without pushing the up-tight variable. The loss of 
flexibility thus spreads through the system. In extreme cases, the system will only 
accept those changes which change the tolerance limits for the up-tight variable.28 
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Bateson then went on to note that:
... if a given variable remains too long at some middle value, other variables will 
encroach upon its freedom, narrowing the tolerance limits until its freedom to move 
is zero or, more precisely, until any future movement can only be achieved at the 
price of disturbing the encroaching variables. 29 
An exploration of the ways that learning, teaching and adaptation occurs in organised 
systems therefore characterised Bateson’s research (and indeed that of many of his 
colleagues). As has already been seen, a consideration of how to learn to empathise with 
ecological systems was a key theme of this work in terms of urban planning, and he 
continued by saying that:
The healthy system, dreamed of above, may be compared to an acrobat on a high 
wire. To maintain the ongoing truth of his basic premise (‘I am on the wire’), he must 
be free to move from one position of instability to another, i.e., certain variables such 
as the position of his arms and the rate of movement of his arms must have great 
flexibility, which he uses to maintain the stability of other more fundamental and 
general characteristics. If his arms are fixed or paralysed (isolated from 
communication), he must fall ...
  During the period when the acrobat is learning to move his arms in 
an appropriate way, it is necessary to have a safety net under him, i.e., precisely to 
give him the freedom to fall off the wire. Freedom and flexibility in regard to the most 
basic variables may be necessary during the process of learning and creating a new  
system by social change. These are parades of order and disorder – which the 
ecological analyst and planner must weigh.30
 There remains today an enormous amount that can be learned from Bateson’s 
notes on ecological planning. In the section that follows, I will therefore reflect upon some 
contemporary ecological systems design theory, and will consider what a critique based 
upon the insights of both urban political ecology, and Bateson’s neo-cybernetic ecological 
aesthetics, might potentially look like.
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Cradle 2 Cradle - Remaking the way we make things
  
Fig. 8.10-1. Cradle to Cradle (c2c) is one of the more important contemporary whole 
systems design theories. It is both a critique of existing manufacturing models, and a new 
manufacturing paradigm. It was conceived by American architect William McDonough and 
German industrial chemist (and former leading Greenpeace activist) Michael Braungart. 
They audaciously proclaim c2c to be “the next industrial revolution.” Whereas many 
“sustainable” (a term they reject) design therories and economic models insist on the need 
to develop a zero growth economy, Braungart and McDonough insist that growth is possible 
– but only if on the basis of their metabolic system. 
 The basic principles are simple. According to c2c thinking, an analysis of natural 
ecological systems shows that “waste equals food”. Living systems are not, they argue, 
characterised by any human sense of efficiency. A fruit tree, they note by example, produces 
vast amounts of fruit that will never germinate, but will rather fall to the ground and rot. 
However, this is in no sense an ecological problem, as the waste from this system is up-
cycled as food for other systems in its environment. Braungart and McDonough argue that 
all (literally all) human production needs to be re-conceived so that nothing ends up 
abandoned in landfill. The proposed industrial ecology models itself on the principles that it 
describes working in the natural environment, wherein the waste of one part of the 
ecosystem becomes food for another part. 
 In c2c thinking, everything needs to be a part of one of two metabolisms - the 
biological nutrient cycle and the technical nutrient cycle. To be a part of the biological 
nutrient cycle basically means that something is capable of being safely composted and 
returned to the ground, or otherwise used as food by another organism. To be part of the 
technical nutrient cycle means to be designed to be easily recycled (or better, up-cycled). 
Interestingly, what this actually means is two different kinds of economies emerge. The 
biological metabolism generates an economy based upon direct consumption, whether 
consumed by us as food or by microbes as compost. The technical nutrient cycle on the 
other hand generates an economy which is increasingly seen as largely not based upon 
consumer ownership at all, but is rather based upon service contracts. 
 Braungart has used the example of television to illustrate the shift. People want to 
watch television, they do not want to own what will increasingly be understood as a box of 
dangerous metals and chemicals. Whilst today it is still possible to throw away a television, 
in the near future the disposal of such items will inevitably become difficult and expensive. 
On the c2c model, it increasingly makes sense for these kinds of items to remain the 
responsibility of (and under the ownership of) the manufacturing organisations (whether 
privately or socially owned is not discussed), who lease them on service contracts but retain 
ownership of what for them is a box of valuable material resources. They design them to be 
easy to repair/recycle/up-cycle, and effectively use their customers as a storage site for 
fixed capital assets. Inevitably, it means a much closer and longer term relationship between 
producer and user, and the kinds of business models that emerge are quite different to 
mass producing cheap disposable goods. They potentially suggest mutual ownership and 
co-operative models shared by users, as well as more typically capitalist formations. 
 For many supporters of c2c principles, one of its biggest attractions is that, like natural 
ecosystems, the metabolisms that it proposes as a whole do not produce any waste. This 
means that growth and material abundance might become conceivable again, albeit on very 
a different basis to the consumer capitalism of today.
8.6 Contemporary Whole Systems Design approaches
 In the decades since Bateson met with the New York planners, environmental 
issues have provoked, and provided the context for, a series of design responses – almost 
all of which are based upon systems theoretic concepts in some way. There is much to be 
commended in many of these approaches, and I have cited examples such as 
McDonough and Braungart’s Cradle 2 Cradle and Ezio Manzini’s Sustainable Everyday, 
not least because of what I consider to be their importance and usefulness today. These 
systems design approaches have interesting contributions to make to thinking about 
architecture, design and urban and regional planning, based upon attempts to articulate 
and practice a renewed relation to nature. However, all of these systems based theories, I 
argue, still need significant and ongoing amendment. 
  Not only are the systems disciplines deeply entwined within all of ecological 
theory, but systems approaches lie at the heart of almost all important approaches to 
“sustainability” in design thinking today. These approaches can all too easily become new 
attempts to achieve control and domination over nature, and/or equally, over humans, 
when they are unfolded within a capitalist framework. To find ways to incorporate an 
awareness of these issues within systems design, I propose that we have to subject these 
systems approaches to a double critique, based upon radical cybernetics and urban 
political ecology. The former suggests that any attempt to explore and implement 
sustainable systems design must be conceived as an attempt to practice an open-ended 
and “experimental approach to design as a process of revealing rather than enframing.”31 
The latter critique insists that we must work through “political projects that are radically 
democratic in terms of the organisation of the processes through which the environment 
that we (humans and non-humans) inhabit become produced.” 
 This dual critique is, I would suggest, key to re-imagining the project of urban 
planning today. It is also the basis for evaluating existing design activist and systems 
design initiatives – i.e. do they facilitate, and are they open to, real democratic systemic 
change? Do they suggest a new conception of nature and culture? Do they promote a 




Fig. 8.12 Diagram showing different network structures. 
 The relationship between the local and the global comes up in almost all discussion 
around sustainability, whether concerning energy use, food production, money, or politics.
Feudal economic formations were primarily based around disconnected localities and 
centralised power structures emerging (a). Capitalism developed a global market, but one 
which was a series of linked centralised structures (such as the nation, and the corporation), 
similar to (b) below. Globalisation has been generally experienced as a destruction of the 
local, with centralised global networks dominating disconnected localities. It is widely argued 
that the most advanced elements of capitalism (such as the internet, or global capital flows) 
are increasingly organised themselves on distributed network models (c). Just as capitalism 
is increasingly organising itself upon distributed network models, so too are many anti-
capitalist networks (as famously theorised by Michael Hardt and Antoni Negri). 
 Design theorist Ezio Manzini has argued that IT communications technologies are 
increasingly facilitating a re-valorisation of the local, but as a connected local, as a 
distributed network. He more broadly argues that designers need to conceive of multi-local 
global distributed network systems. As an organisational form, this kind of network structure 
is by far the most robust. 
 In terms of our own future scenarios, distributed local-global networks offer the most 
robust and progressive models as they are organisational forms that devolve power, and 
they could work across  a range of future scenarios from new forms of democratic 
ecosocialism, to continuing capitalist development, to total breakdown. Equally, if large 
sections of the planet are to become vulnerable to climate events or political instability, then 
the large scale centralised organisational forms that currently dominate our food, energy 
and political structures will become very problematic. With many of our current organisations 
and infrastructures, if the centre is taken out, the periphery dies. With distributed network 
structures, large sections of the net can be removed, but the localities can still survive and 
communicate. It is for these reasons that environmental thinking is on the whole supporting 
the development of globally linked but locally based democratic organic food and renewable 
energy networks. 
they actually only providing greater access for capital to further commodify and privatise 
public space?
 If systems theory responses underly, with varying degrees of consciousness, 
almost all ecological design approaches, it is just as true that related systems concepts 
are informing and arising within the broader green left discourse. In particular there has 
been a return to various anarchist theory informed conceptions of self-organisation. As 
with Manzini’s more directly design activist work, concepts of self-organisation within non-
hierarchical networks have been thus revisited and revitalised through the use of digital 
social media technologies. As David Harvey observed at the World Social Forum in 2010:
Contemporary attempts to revive the communist hypothesis typically abjure state 
control and look to other forms of collective social organisation to displace market 
forces and capital accumulation as the basis for organising production and 
distribution. Horizontally networked as opposed to hierarchically commanded 
systems of co-ordination between autonomously organised and self-governing 
collectives of producers and consumers are envisaged as lying at the core of a new 
form of communism.  Contemporary technologies of communication make such a 
system seem feasible. All manner of small-scale experiments around the world can 
be found in which such economic and political forms are being constructed. In this 
there is a convergence of some sort between the Marxist and anarchist traditions 
that harks back to the broadly collaborative situation between them in the 1860s in 
Europe.32
8.7 Architecture and the Production of Concepts
 Throughout this thesis I have been trying to think about architecture as a producer 
of concepts which are both experiential and cognitive. Architecture can be used to stage a 
speculation upon the nature of order. It offers a distinctly aesthetic mode of thinking about 
systems and the relations between processes, and as a discipline and profession – in its 
modern form at least – has a curiosity and need to consider a wide range of systems, 
whether ecological, urban, social, financial, phenomenological. Such embedded or 
situated concept formation extends ideas about the individual and the social, the body, 
and the mind, in time and in space. As noted, I am not here restricting architectural 
knowledge to the production of buildings. Indeed, in the contemporary period, new 
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buildings per se are probably one of the less interesting avenues and applications of 
architectural research. Certainly many of the theoretical studies referred to in this thesis 
do not necessarily have immediate tectonic implications. I am rather making a claim for an 
architectural contribution to contemporary debates concerning “ecological thought”, and 
the attendant attempts to redefine nature, matter, mind, self, agency etc. 
 Architecture, as I am trying to define it, is an extended domain that spans the 
individual performing body and our collective social forms. It both mediates and 
conceptualises metabolic flows of matter, energy and communications that are, in the 
words of David Harvey, “wholly natural, and wholly social, at the same time.”33 The idea of 
architecture here is a technological and social prosthesis – an organ – that extends the 
human subject in time and space. It is also a sensitivity to the multifarious ways that the 
human organism is always already, both naturally and culturally, ecologically extended. In 
the previous chapters, a conception of the human emerges which is quite distinct from the 
models that characterised classical humanist discourse. The human is not really in any 
simple way the clearly bounded object that can be seen as distinct from and opposed to 
the rest of the world, but is always, in an important sense, a highly plastic and adaptive 
assemblage of biological, social, energetic, material and environmental systems. In this 
sense, it is not simply the fact that today we are witnessing the emergence of what has 
been described as a planetary post-human cyborg condition, but rather that this condition 
has always been the case – albeit though in very specific and different socio-cultural and 
ecological forms at various points in history. 
 Within such a formulation, architecture can and does play a distinct role. We might 
say indeed that the architectural event mediates some kind of abstract yet practical 
conception concerning an extended human-natural environment. The architectural 
proposition is here that which stages and brings into the domain of experience, these 
individual, social and political and natural and cultural ecological events. 
 Ultimately, this thesis suggests that critical urban ecology – the architectural 
investigation of ecological aesthetics and urban political ecology – will be a key field of 
both theoretical and practical investigation in the coming years, as the deep contradictions 
of capitalism unfold at an intensified global scale, potentially destroying entire swathes of 
the planet’s social and ecological fabric. 
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 Critical urban ecology will take the form of both abstract theory and the articulation 
of concrete political demands. It must include both autonomous formal research into both 
an abstract and an experiential language of process, organism and ecology, but also real 
design and policy intervention. It must facilitate and inform both top down global planning, 
and bottom up and distributed local activism. I therefore conclude that there is indeed 
scope for a critical enclave of architectural knowledge and practice, one that might resist 





Appendix 1: Design Research – Video Feedback as Rhythmanalysis 
   
Fig. A.1 Initial video feedback studies produced by Alexis Kyrakides.
"What we live are rhythms – rhythms experienced subjectively. Which means that, here at least, 'lived' 
and 'conceived' are close: the laws of nature and the laws governing our bodies tend to overlap with 
each other – as perhaps too with the laws of so called social reality." 
Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991) p.206.
 During the first two years of my teaching on the Graduate Diploma in Architecture at the 
University of Westminster, I was particularly interested in exploring the question of “interface” 
in architecture (which I later explore further, organising the “Spatial Interface” conference at 
the University of Westminster in 2005). I set a series of project briefs under the title ‘Dancing 
with the Machines’, which asked students to work with machines and media as design tools, 
as design contexts, or as extensions to a human-machine cyborg which needs to be 
designed for. Here I was particularly interested in exploring how empathy theory might 
facilitate an exploration of the way that the human body interfaces with technology, media 
and tools in space – empathy being one of the feedback loops of architectural experience. 
 Often the studio was interested in creating interactive systems which were capable of 
generating images as part of the system. These included experiments by several students 
over a few years which involved setting up ecologies of digital video camcorders and 
monitors, as in the early studies of Alexis Kyrakides and in the installations of Alkiviades 
Sakellarides. In both of these cases the students worked within the spaces produced by 
video feedback. This is a simple cybernetic system which can be described by the diagrams 
below. 
 The video camcorder is set up to feed into a monitor, such that the monitor is displaying 
live the video produced by the camcorder. If the camcorder is set up so that the lens is facing 
the monitor, i.e. recording its own image, then a basic positive feedback loop is created. It is 
positive loop, in that any signal which is introduced into the system becomes amplified, as it 
spins around the loop at speeds determined by the frequency of the monitor refresh rate, the 
video software and the circuitry. Typically, the signals introduced became the moment of 
interface with an emergent “organism” or “mind”, and included:
 
- an object such as a moving hand inserted into the space between the camera lens and the 
monitor 
- the movement on the screen being filmed of a mouse cursor or other screen-based signal
- noise created via dust or imperfections in the lens, monitor, or circuitry,
 In addition to the primary positive feedback loop, there were also in most cases at least 
some negative feedback loops as well. For example, there are inbuilt limits set on the 
circuitry of most monitor, which stops the signal endlessly amplifying until the monitor tubes 
burn out. 
   
Fig A.2 Video feedback images produced by Alexis Kyrakides
 The first student to engage seriously with this work was Alexis Kyrakides. He extended 
his experience of video feedback experiments into a proposal for a cybernetic landscape, 
called the “Kinematic Garden,” proposed next to the Thames Barrier and near to City Airport, 
in London. The scheme won the RIBA Silver Medal 2001, the Serjant Prize and the SOM 
Prize. Cedric Price described the scheme as “a mushroom of delight!” The text that written to 
describe the scheme read:
 The Kinematic Garden is a spatial experience that introduces concepts of the 
continually evolving system as architecture, and relates ideas of process, temporality, 
cause and effect, and self-propagation states and events. Through interaction, the 
future course of the system is modified. Time becomes an elastic concept – the event 
destabilised. Evolutionary structures become revealed through time and form. The 
Kinematic Garden is not a fixed design, it is a language of parts that may be 
prescribed to any site, to invigorate it and to reveal the vibrancy of its urban fabric, as 
a series of events and experiences. 
 Through a series of vastly interconnected “dumb” devices – dumb in that there 
is no programming, no digital system, just a simple analogue stimulus response to 
immediate surrounds, a manmade synapse – emergent structures of event and 
experiences develop and cascade around the very fabric of the site as light, vibration, 
and sound. It is this very notion that dictates one of the fundamental premises of the 
kinematic garden, that emergent properties exist within the framework of simple 
interactions. The site is alive – in the system is trapped the very life of the city and its 
users as a perpetual feedback loop of cause and effect. The site has “miked up” the 
city.
 The site is alive with an ambient resonance of events within the urban fabric, 
feeding off the events that surround it. Incoming planes landing can be felt through 
the kinematic grass, the operation of the Thames barrier reverberates through the 
site. A person waving their hand may set off as a wavefront that would allow someone 
to feel it some distance and time away. The site is alive, a non-linear system that is a 
real nature.
   
Fig A.3 Video feedback images produced by Alexis Kyrakides
 The scheme continually feeds-back on itself, responding to changes in light, 
sound, and media patterns. Its liquid form pulses and evolves in response to its 
environment and its users, whose presence and movement forms an integral part of 
the kinematic experience. Users may learn to drive the machine, to seek brief periods 
of control within its constant state of non-linear, emergent flux - an electro-analogue 
prosthesis.
 Grown out of the performative spaces of video feedback, this is architecture as 
a membrane: a kinaesthetic interface to the global city. Dancing with the machines, 
between the rhythms of the body and the rhythms of the airport, this kinematic garden 
is a landscape that you can learn to drive.
Fig A.4-5. Scenes from the Kinematic Garden
    
   
Fig A.6 Cybernetic diagram of basic video feedback setup
 In general, there was a combination of negative and positive feedback loops in these 
systems. One of the principles of cybernetics states that whenever there is a odd number of 
negative loop segments, the system will be self-regulating, and able to reach equilibrium 
states – or indeed, maintain itself at a steady state far from equilibrium. 
 Experiments with these systems can be fascinating, as there are some strange 
emergent organisms that come to life within these ecologies. The experiments included 
exploring how to play, how to drive and work in the space between the camera and the 
monitor, and the world that is “brought forth” – in the sense of Maturana and Varela – on the 
monitor display. These experiments also proved to be an excellent pedagogic method for 
exploring questions around kinaesthetics, body movement in space, emergent form and 
pattern, analogue and digital, and spatial interface.
 Stroking the space between the camera and screen in order to bring an organism to 
life, and the experience that one’s cognitive map was growing to incorporate the space on 
the screen and that one was learning how to drive the environment, enacted the same kind 
of technological study of empathy that Lars Spuybroek was working with when discussion 
projects like the NOX Water Pavilion (see Fig. 5.xx for a further discussion.) The experiments 
provided excellent constructs for a reflecting upon a number of concepts from Henri 
Lefebvre. The experience of engaging with these assemblages of cameras, monitors and 
mirrors seemed to speak directly to an aspect of rhythmanalysis: they could be theorised as 
interface environments where the mix of image and performative space dialectically enacted 
the terms spatial practice, spatial representation and representations of space. It is also of 
course very useful to consider this exercise as a study in internal relations and relational 
spacetime.
   
Fig A.7. Alkiviades Sakellarides extended video feedback installation
 Alexis Kyrakides described one of the aims of the studio: “If we are to push the 
idealised goal of creating intelligent buildings that behave as complex systems rather than 
fixed, deadweight buildings, then we must be sure that as architects we more fully 
understand the principles of complexity, emergence, and non-linear systems, that events in 
space and time have, within the seeming chaos, an elegant, hidden order that possesses it 
own beauty, but also a level of efficiency that dwarfs the simple attempts of man to control 
his environment with such linear thinking.”
 The year after Alexis won the RIBA Silver Medal for the Kinematic Garden scheme, 
Alkiviades Sakellarides also explored video feedback, this time constructing a more 
ambitious assemblage of multiple monitors and mirrors, in an enclosed environment, but with 
an additional TV external output. 
  
Fig A.8-9 images of the interior of video feedback installation. Constructed and photographed 
by Alkiviades Sakellarides
   
Fig A.10 A cybernetic ecology diagram showing the feedback loops of the installation by 
Alkiviades Sakellarides.
 I find these student experiments very useful to look back on now. They are both very 
clear examples of the construction of cybernetic ecologies, in that they clearly construct a 
scenario in which the participatory role of the observer is concretely expressed and visible in 
the system. Interestingly, these kinds of video feedback ecologies are referred to by Douglas 
Hofstadter as examples of primitive strange loops. For Hofstadter, strange loops are 
examples of systems which have the ability to pick up on and internally represent patterns in 
their external environment, and also to recognise and replicate patterns within their own 
structures. Strange loops are patterns, but patterns which are themselves pattern recognition 
and replicating tools. For Hofstadter, strange loops are not just minds (normally patterns in 
this sense are minds), but are actually the foundations of self-consciousness. He states “a 
mere pattern called ‘I’ can shove around inanimate particles in the brain no less than 
inanimate particles in the brain can shove around patterns. ..an ‘I’ comes about.. via a kind of 
vortex whereby patterns in a brain mirror the brain’s mirroring of the world, and eventually 
mirror themselves, whereupon the vortex of ‘I’ becomes a real causal entity. For an imperfect 
but vivid concrete analogue to this curious abstract phenomena, think of what happens when 
a TV camera is pointed at a TV screen so as to display the screen itself.. what I call ‘self-
engulfing television’... or a ‘level crossing feedback loop.’” (Douglas Hofstadter, Gödel, 
Escher, Bach - An Eternal Golden Braid (London: Penguin, 2000) p.xxiv). Interestingly, 
although we did not realise it at the time, Hofstadter had described a possible installation 
which could achieve more fully what he describes as “self-engulfing television”. It involved 
mirrors and sounds very much like the installation by Alkiviades Sakellarides.
   Appendix 2: Design Research – 
   The Extended Mind of Open Tables: Socio-Spatial Interaction
              
Figs. A.11-21. Open Tables Installation in Truman Brewery, Sept 2008. Open Tables is an 
ongoing research project – a software application and a spatial environment – which 
researches and facilitates collaborative working between individuals and groups. The first 
prototype of Open Tables was launched as a website at the Nous Gallery, London in 
September 2008, and the main installation was installed at the Tent London 2008 design 
show, in the Truman Brewery on Brick Lane, later in that month. Designed and built by WAG 
Architecture, with a team of collaborating engineers and hackers, OT was perhaps the 
world’s first website to have a physical front end. The aggregator software that we produced 
for Open Tables has since been adapted and deployed in the Open Studios project for the 
Department of Architecture at the University of Westminster. 
 Open Tables was conceived to be an immersive information ecology, that facilitated in 
particular co-design activities. It brings together contemporary thinking from a number of 
diverse practices and intellectual disciplines: innovation management, mind-mapping, 
workplace design, network theory, interaction design and cognitive science. Specifically, 
Open Tables is an application and study in Extended Mind thinking. Our minds are not in any 
simple way confined to our physical brains, but are broadly dispersed out into the 
environment. We thus use our external environments as cognitive spaces: in a real sense, 
cognitive processes which start in the brain are extended out into the world, through tools, 
language, social practices and so on. We empathise with these environments and the 
information that they contain. Open Tables creates the conditions for collaborators to share 
their Extended Minds. It is, in Roy Ascott’s definition, a telematic environment.
  
                     
  
The project originated in a brainstorming workshop that I led as part of a Holistic Design short 
course at Schumacher College in February 2008, where the group explored the question of 
whether it might be possible to develop a design context, platform or environment that would 
work as an open-source design environment. The central concept that emerged in this 
workshop was the idea of an ‘open table’ environment which at this time the group imagined 
might be primarily web-based, but which might also take on real physical form. We imagined 
this might be a transitory presence in, for example, cafes or similar spaces. The proposition was 
to create a virtual and sometimes real ‘creative commons’ space or network, where designers 
might share ideas, take problems to be solved etc, in an open source way. It was imagined that 
it might facilitate LETS-type financial transactions, if necessary, and that external clients might 
also post needs to be solved, etc.
 A number of ideas taken were from this workshop as the start of a competition entry at 
WAG Architecture a few months later, where we collaborated online with two members of the 
original design team during the competition process. WAG won the Tent Urbantine “Fast 
Architecture” competition, and those individuals then came to London to join us for the 
installation and operation of the project. The core competition team was myself, Filip Visnjic and 
Wei Lee from WAG, with ex-Schumacher students Fabio Barone and Amalia Lauer. The design 
development and installation construction team was as above, but also including Cordula 
Weisser and Antonio Passaro from WAG, with consultants Alexander Kohlhofer (interaction 
design), Thomas R. Koll (software engineer) and Marco Quaggiotto (information design), all co-
ordinated by Filip Visnjic.
 
    
 The Tent Urbantine “Fast Architecture” competition had been sponsored by the 
Workspace Group PLC, a company that rents out office and studio space – largely to small 
and often creative industries companies. The competition brief asked for explorations 
concerning future developments in workplace environments. Our proposal took on some of 
the original Open Tables ideas concerning collaborative working, and explored in what ways 
a spatial environment could facilitate collaborative working – in particular drawing upon 
recent developments in what has become known as pervasive or ubiquitous computing. This 
was defined by the legendary PARC Xerox visionary, Mark Weiser, as “the third wave in 
computing, just now beginning. First were mainframes, each shared by lots of people. Now 
we are in the personal computing era, person and machine staring uneasily at each other 
across the desktop. Next comes ubiquitous computing, or the age of calm technology, when 
technology recedes into the background of our lives.”
 I was particularly interested in drawing upon experiences that I had had – both good 
and bad – contributing to creative “brainstorming” workshops or sandpits for companies such 
as WHSmith, BP, Procter and Gamble, and Trusthouse Forte. Typically, these exercises 
were based upon fast-moving collaborative exercises, often led by brand development and 
management consultants, producing what were often referred to as “group 
minds” (essentially walls and tables covered in Post-It notes). These sessions were notable 
for me in that, when successful, they have been some of the most distinctly trans-disciplinary 
experiences, bringing together wide mixes of professions and skill sets. Indeed, this serves 
to remind one that capital is also inherently trans-disciplinary, and one important reason 
trans-disciplinary work in academia is needed is simply to stand any chance of seeing the 
world as it is!
 The core purpose of the Open Tables research project was to explore the potential for 
new kinds of collaborative working to emerge in spaces that combine analogue and digital 
modes of interaction: engaging both the mind in its various forms, through a more physically 
and socially immersive engagement with the senses, in the navigation and production of 
information. 
 What does this project mean, then, as design research? Well, typically when using 
computers, and accessing networks of information on the internet, we occupy a somewhat 
autistic condition – a lonely and strictly individual engagement with a computer monitor and 
keyboard. In this installation, however, we explored how the interface and interaction with 
networks might be expanded to a more social condition. A typical meeting room in an office 
has a table to sit around, and probably a flip chart and projector. More creative organisations 
often realise the importance of providing a variety of stimuli and environments, and typically 
have some break-out, lounge-like spaces. Open Tables combined these two familiar 
conditions, and intensified them by introducing web-based information flows and social 
networking scenarios, in this instance using interfaces which are based upon digital 
projections, displays and interactions, incorporated into familiar objects, provoking physical 
interactions with data, often social, using the whole body, rather than just a mouse and 
keyboard. As Malcolm McCullough has observed, “interface design has become interaction 
design, and interaction design has come into alliance with architecture”, requiring the 
development of “a theory of place for interaction design” (Malcolm McCullough, Digital 
Ground: Architecture, Pervasive Computing and Environmental Knowing, MIT, Cambridge 
MA (2005) pp. xiv-xv)
           
 Open Tables worked by collecting (or more accurately in software terms, aggregating) 
from the web: text and images from RSS based web sites, as well as Flickr and YouTube 
content, according to various keyword searches or news feeds. For the Tent Urbantine 
installation, we had defined four research topic areas, looking at (somewhat self-reflexively) 
contemporary design issues around sustainability, workplace environments, and ubiquitous 
computing. However, Open Tables can of course be set up to research any topic depending 
upon the needs and interests of the client/participant/co-designer – from bike design to stock 
markets. Indeed, the aggregator application behind the University of Westminster Open 
Studios project collects feeds from each studio and research group blog in exactly this way.
 Within the OT installation the webapp content was engaged with via XML outputs 
through a series of physical spatial interfaces. Three interactive tables were constructed out 
of hybrid assemblages of recycled antique furniture, Max MSP software and hacked 
Nintendo Wiimotes (which provided a means of producing spatial infrared based 
interactions). The interfaces were designed to be big enough to be used by more than one 
person, and indeed perhaps even difficult to use by just one person. 
 
Fig. A.22 Marco Quaggiotto, Knowledge Landscapes (2008), an interactive database or 
network visual interface, which visualises interconnections between information. Marco is a 
software designer, and was a service systems design masters student of Ezio Manzini at 
Milan Polytechnic. We first met at Manzini’s “Changing the Change” sustainable design 
conference in July 2008 in Turin, and he collaborated on aspects of the Open Tables 
development, and adapted the knowledge landscape software to work as one of the wall 
interactives for the Open Tables installation.
 In addition to the social tables there were other interactive wall stations. The wall 
elements were in general concerned with giving an overview of the data-ecology as a whole. 
One presents selected content in a digital Post-It note format, which allows the content to be 
clustered, mind-mapped and organised as required. On other walls the collected content is 
presented as “knowledge landscapes” – an  showing relationships between for example 
different content items and their tags. In addition to working at the interactive stations, 
participants can contribute by sending sms text messages and photos from mobiles, or just 
by engaging with the main Open Tables website using standard computers.
 The installation was constructed out of objects bought at various scrapyards and flea 
markets in east London, and created a surreal, Benjaminian feel. The scaffolding framework 
was suggestive of a lost piece of Constant’s New Babylon project, or any one of the utopian 
network projects of modernism. We generally attempted to define a hybrid aesthetic of 
adjustability, hackerism, etc, – in both the software and the hardware – which would stand in 
stark contrast to the slick but untouchable aesthetics of typical consumer interfaces, and 
indeed the increasingly polished surfaces architectural construction. 
 The interfaces worked with familiar physical interactions, and familiar computer desktop 
interfaces, and as such de-familiarised both. The drawers of the Victorian writing desk were 
wired up to open folders on the application, for example. In general, this combination of 
informational technologies and familiar domestic objects and spaces suggested a broader 
potential for creating new collective meanings, exploring, as McCullough has suggested, a 
contemporary condition: “whereas previous paradigms of cyberspace threatened to 
dematerialise architecture, pervasive computing invites a defence of architecture.... 
interaction design must now serve our basic human need for getting into place” (p. xiv).
  
    A.23.. High level view down into Open Tables Installation in Truman Brewery, Sept 2008
Caroline Jones has suggested that there are today six strategies through which 
contemporary artists can work to establish relations with technology. These are:
1. immersive: the cave paradigm: virtual helmets, etc
2. alienated: taking technology and making it strange
3. interrogative: repurpose or remake devices to enhance aspects, or, translating data into 
sensible systems
4. residual: working with an old technology
5. resistant: work that refuses to use marketed technologies for their stated purpose
6. adaptive: creative extension of tech, producing new subjects
In fact, to different degrees the Open Tables project manifested each of these modes of 
engagement with technology, although we did not set out specifically with that intention. See 
‘The Mediated Sensorium’ in Caroline A. Jones (ed.), Sensorium: Embodied Experience, 
Technology and Contemporary Art (Cambridge, MA: MIT List Visual Arts Centre, 2006).
 
Fig. A.24. We first developed a mock-up of the installation, and constructed the various 
interactives, in a railway arch in Hackney Central, donated by a sponsor and former client 
and supplier (Artemis Stones). 
Fig. A.25. Convincing the directors of the main sponsor of the exhibition – Tent London and 
Workplace Group PLC – that they were not just giving their money to lunatics. Filip Visnjic is 
on left, and Antonio Passaro is middle rear.
Appendix 3: Design Research – Athens Tower of Winds
This competition design for a mobile fabric evaporative cooling tower in Athens was based 
upon an urban ecology approach. The design was developed in 2003 at WAG as a 
competition entry for “Ephemeral Structures in Athens”, prior to the Athens’ hosting of the 
2004 Olympics. Our final design was developed with structural engineer Aran Chadwick of 
Atelier One, and environmental engineer Professor Brian Ford, who was at WSP 
Environmental (now head of Nottingham School of Architecture.)  The WAG competition 
team was myself and Cordula Weisser, and in the early stages Torsten Lange. 
 The brief asked for structures which might host temporary urban events (concerts etc) 
in Athens at the time of the Olympics, and widely used terms like ephemeral and parasitic in 
the brief. From the start we wanted to explore what an ephemeral and parasitic architecture 
might be, outside of the usual formal clichés (enjoyable as they might be on occasion). Our 
approach was based upon an analysis of the Athens urban ecology, which made clear that 
during the summer, the most socially valuable and usable urban space was composed out 
of shade and cool air. It seemed that any proposal needed to work with this primary 
condition of the site. We conceived of the architecture of the scheme as the production of 
environmental conditions, rather than any actual structures. We also wanted if possible to 
produce a scheme which might leave a legacy to the city after the Olympics. We started with 
studies which explored shadow creating devices, where an ‘ephemeral’ architecture of 
shadow might ‘parasitically’ move across existing buildings and urban spaces, defining a 
transient social space.
      
Fig A.26-7. Diagrams charting temperature and pollution levels in Athens, and thermal imaging 
maps showing Heat Island effect in Athens (See Santamouris, N. Papanikolaou, I. Koronaki, I. 
Tselepidaki and D.N. Assimakopoulos, “THE ATHENS URBAN CLIMATE EXPERIMENT - 
TEMPERATURE DISTRIBUTION” - part of the POLIS research project. Also see Oke T.R.  : 
'The Distance between canopy and boundary layer urban heat island'. Atmosphere, vol. 14, no. 
4, p.p. 268-277, 1976)
A more detailed study of the urban ecology revealed that Athens has a very particular local 
environmental condition, known as a “heat island” effect. The city has an average summer 
temperature of 37 degrees Celsius. It suffers from extreme pollution, primarily composed of 
heavy particles near ground level produced by car emissions. Because the city is surrounded by 
mountains on three sides, and is relatively sheltered from winds, this pollution builds up to 
levels which are bad for public health. In addition, because of the high levels of UV light, many 
of the pollutants acts as a corrosive catalyst which damages the fabric of historic buildings. 
However, the pollutant particles are heavy, and are concentrated in the first 40 m above ground 
level. The pollutants and buildings can be understood in eco-cybernetic terms, as a positive 
feedback loop - that is to say, amplifying the signal of the sun.
 In this design proposal outlined below, by cooling and drawing down clean air from 
60m above street level (above the worst pollution levels), pollution is dissipated, and part of 
the heat cycle is broken. Once dissipated and dispersed, the pollutants will be safely broken 
down in the natural environment. The scheme below can be understood as the introduction 
of a negative feedback loop into the Athenian ecology, allowing the city to self regulate and 
maintain itself as an organism.
    
 The Tower of Winds takes its name from a first century BC structure located next to the 
Roman Agora in the Plaka area, which contained a water clock, sundial, weather vane and 
compass. This proposal for a modern Tower of Winds has two orders of figuration within 
Athens. Firstly, as an object, it is a suspended fabric tower. The fabric is translucent/
transparent, and is decorated with a sophisticated opaque patterning, which incorporates 
PV fabric. The patterning varies across the height of the tower, and is designed to produce 
different shadow effects from the sun (depending upon the time and place) across the 
streets and buildings of the city. The cables which hold down the base of the tower are 
hollow and water is pumped up these tubes, which spiral up around the tower. These water 
tubes have small holes facing onto the inside which allow small amounts of water to weep 
out and run down the inside of the tower. This water evaporates, and because of the effect 
of the latent heat of evaporation, energy is taken out of the air inside the tower, and it cools. 
A draft is then created flowing down through the tower, and clean air is then drawn down 
through the top of the tower from above the pollution level.
 As the worst pollution in Athens is primarily particles at or near street level, the air that 
is drawn down from 60m is relatively clean. The effects of evaporative cooling in the tower 
would be sufficient to generate a pleasant light breeze, and a temperature drop of around 
11° C during the day. By cooling and drawing down clean air from 60m above street level 
(above the worst pollution levels), pollution is dissipated, and part of the heat cycle is 
broken. At night the process reverses and warm air generated from the heated urban fabric 
is funnelled away up the tower. If multiple towers were used throughout the Athenian 
summer, there would be a significant amelioration of the heat island effect, and a 
corresponding increase in public health. The form of the tower is a minimal surface (similar 
to those generated by engineer Frei Otto, by spinning an oil film. These forms have been 
demonstrated to generate the greatest airflow.
There have been a few crazy schemes proposed in recent years, which have suggested that 
the Acropolis should be covered in a glass box, to protect the buildings from corrosion during 
the most polluted periods. In this proposal, there is no need for such permanent constructions. 
Instead, on the worst pollution days, a pair of wind towers can be erected over the Acropolis, 






1 Roy Ascott, “Syncretic Fields: Art, Mind and the Many Realities”, lecture given on April 30, 2007, 
at Design Media Arts, UCLA. See Streaming Culture lecture series, accessed 14.5.09  http://
dma.ucla.edu/events/calendar.php?ID=469
2 Manfredo Tafuri, The Sphere and the Labyrinth: Avant-Gardes and Architecture from Piranesi to 
the 1970s (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1987), p.2.
3 I have taken the term “Critical Urban Ecology” from a symposium organised by Karin Jaschke 
held  8.12.10 at the University of Brighton which I gave a paper along with Doug Spencer and Ross 
Adams.
4 Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order out of Chaos: Manʼs new Dialogue with Nature 
(London: Flamingo Fontana, 1985), p.9.
5 John Briggs and F. David Peat, Looking Glass Universe: The Emerging Science of Wholeness 
(London: Fontana, 1984), p.179
6 Tafuri, op.cit.
7 Bruce Clarke and Mark B.N.Hansen (eds.), Emergence and Embodiment: New Essays in 
Second-Order Systems Theory (Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 2009), pp.1-2.
8 The original proposal was informed by themes developed during the two masters degrees that I 
had completed in the previous decade. In the MSc in Computing and Design, led by Paul Coates at 
UEL, I had worked with digital scripting and parametric processes, and developed a thesis that 
touched upon complexity theory, emergence, non-standard mathematics, topology and perception, 
“inspired” in particular by Henri Poincaré, Robin Evans, and a reading of the concept of “nomadic 
science” found in Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattariʼs Mille Plateux. A few years later, on the MSc 
Architectural History, led by Adrian Forty and Iain Borden, I attempted a critical reading of 
architectural expressionism – in both its historical avant-garde and contemporary forms – through a 
theory of “metropolitan prosthesis” and a conception of “empathising with abstraction”, based upon 
thinkers such as Walter Benjamin, Georg Simmel, and nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-
century German aesthetics. 
9 This doctorate was thus initially conceived as a PhD by Design, and in many respects still is, 
although appears to all intents and purposes to have been submitted as a conventional thesis; the 
differences are getting narrower.
10 See for example, David Harvey, The Enigma of Capital (London: Profile, 2010)
11 Marx notes, in terms that bring to the fore the congruence between dialectical and cybernetic 
methods, that “individual moments ... determine each other internally and search for each other 
externally; but ... they may or may not find each other, balance each other, correspond to each 
other. The inner necessity of moments which belong together, and their indifferent, independent 
existence towards one another, are already a foundation of contradictions.” Karl Marx, Grundrisse: 
Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Harmondworth: Penguin, 1973), pp.414-15. 
Harvey cites this with regard to an early version of his co-revolutionary thesis in David Harvey, 
Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 
p.240. 
" Harvey develops his “method of moments” in particular out of a footnote at the beginning of 
the Chapter Fifteen on machinery in Capital, where Marx states that: “Technology reveals the 
active relation of man to nature, the direct process of the production of his life, and thereby also 
lays bare the process of the production of social relations of his life, and of the mental conceptions 
that flow from these relations.” Karl Marx, Capital Volume 1 (London: Penguin, 1990), p.493.

Footnotes to Chapter One
249
1 However, as Reinholt Martin observed, and Murray Fraser has re-emphasised, aspects of 
cybernetics and systems theory in the west played a deeper role – which I would suggest was 
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a corrective mechanism, a means of grasping and bringing under control the relatively unplanned 
networks of capital – or was at least used to symbolise such control. See Reinhold Martin, The 
Organisational Complex: Architecture, Media and Corporate Space (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2003). For a discussion around the role that cybernetics played in an immaterialisation of post-war 
Anglo-American construction, see Murray Fraser with Joe Kerr, Architecture and the ʻSpecial 
Relationshipʼ: The American influence on post-war British Architecture (London: Routledge, 2007), 
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can be taken back into more abstract conceptions of society and organisation” (p. 373). 
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human artefact... architecture is abstract thought applied to building” (p.11). Paralleling in many 
respects the insights of Harvey and Lefebvre, although not mentioning either (and thereby missing 
any political or historical conception of relational spacetime as I hope to set it out below), Hillier 
observes that humans inhabit two types of world in parallel: “a continuous material world of objects 
and spaces which we occupy and move about in physically, and a discontinuous world of 
expressive forms, signs and symbols which we occupy cognitively. The former is real space the 
later logical space. Building is the meeting point of the two worlds, where real space is converted 
into logical space” (p.396). 
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material. However, suffice to say that following a somewhat cursory reading, I am sympathetic to 
many aspects of the book (and indeed I independently retrace aspects of his argument), even 
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9 Braham and Hale open their reader book with a by now familiar quote from Illich, in which he 
states that “sometime during the 1980s the technological society which began in the fourteenth 
century came to an end ... the age of tools has now given way to the age of systems, exemplified in 
the conception of the earth as an ecosystem, and the human being as an immune system.” See 
Ivan Illich, The River North of the Future: The Testament of Ivan Illich, as told to David Cayley 
(Toronto: House of Anasazi Press, 2005), p.77. Illichʼs notion that with the emergence of 
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questions for us here is what does it mean for architecture when “the tools of design and 
construction, have become a matter of systems?”
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human ecology (Paul and Anne Ehrlichʼs Population, Resources, Environment), Hans Magnus 
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practice. As the Soviet dialectical theorist Evald Ilyenkov describes it: “one can say that the ascent 
from the concrete to the abstract and the ascent from the abstract to the concrete, are two mutually 
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bibliography (Santa Cruz CA: University of California Santa Cruz Reference and Research 
Services, 1999).
17 David Harvey, Reading Marxʼs Capital Lesson 5. Accessed on 1.8.2008 from 
www.davidharvey.org
 
Footnotes to Chapter Two
255
18 There are I think a number of serious misconceptions – both factual and conceptual – 
surrounding a collection of manuscripts of Engels which he had proposed to develop into a book 
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between the two men. As the biologist J B S Haldane noted in his 1939 preface to Dialectics of 
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preface.htm)
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similar questions have been approached in second order systems thinking, for example.
" The rejection of a dialectical conception of nature is generally situated with the early 
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coined by both Dietzgen and Kautsky in 1887. John Bellamy Foster argues that in Western 
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translates as appearances, but it does not. Schaumkommen translates as “foamy, bubbling up”, or 
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Bolshevik Utopia, published in 1908. 
" In 1918 Bogdanov founded the Proletkult movement, which was initially supported by the 
Bolshevik government, although it later fell out of favour. His broader medical research continued 
throughout this period, and he notably invented the modern blood transfusion process. In fact, he 
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2009.
33 Ashby, An Introduction to Cybernetics, p.2.
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Varela, ʻIntroductionʼ in Heinz von Foerster, Observing Systems : Selected papers by Heinz von 
Foerster, Edited by F.Varela, (Santa Barbara, CA: Intersystems Publications, 1982), p.xi.
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41 Constructivist thinking in this sense has nothing to do with the early-twentieth century European 
art and architectural movement of the same name. Nor should it be confused with the 
mathematical constructivism of for example set theory. It should also be differentiated from other 
sociological and philosophical constructivisms (although there is much that is shared also). Radical 
Constructivism was first coined by von Foerster, and was based in his and Batesonʼs thinking. It 
was further developed by Ernst von Glasersfeld, and is the philosophical position that sits behind 
the strain of cybernetic thinking that has most directly fed into certain schools of architecture in 
recent years through figures such as Ranulph Glanville and Stephen Gage. This states that the 
observer is active, in all kinds of ways, in constructing the world that they experience and interface 
with. The constructivist position – that I cannot know what the world is without me – is quite distinct 
from a solipsist position, which says that the world is in me. It does not in anyway doubt the 
existence of an external reality – it is just that we do not experience the full blast of what is there, 
but rather “bring forth” into our construction those aspects of reality that we can engage with in 
some way. Radical constructivists do not see this as a passive activity, but rather emphasise that 
there are degrees of freedom and choice in what is constructed. Indeed, radical constructivism 
reminds us that there is a politics to the internal as well as external worlds that we construct. As 
von Glasersfeld states, “I have reiterated many times, radical constructivism does not suggest that 
we can construct anything we like, but it does claim that within the constraints that limit our 
construction there is room for an infinity of alternatives. It therefore does not seem untimely to 
suggest a theory of knowing that draws attention to the knowerʼs responsibility for what the knower 
constructs.” Ernst von Glasersfeld, ʻAn exposition of constructivism: why some like it radicalʼ, in 
G.J. Klir (ed.), Facets of Systems Science (New York: Plenum Press, 1991), pp. 229-38. Maturana 
and Varela also emphasise that in western culture (remembering here that Varela, like many other 
cyberneticians, was impressed with Buddhist methods of observing the processes of mind) we can 
be particularly unaware of the way that we construct our experience of the external world. They 
note that “this special situation of knowing how we know is traditionally elusive for western culture. 
We are keyed to action not reflection, so that our personal life is generally blind to itself. It is as 
though a taboo tells us: ʻit is forbidden to know about knowingʼ. Actually, not knowing what makes 
up this world of experience, which is the closest world to us, is a crying shame. There are many 
things to be ashamed of in the world, but this ignorance is one of the worst.” Humberto R. 
Maturana, and Fransisco J. Varela, The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human 
Understanding (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1987), p.24.
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different distinction. Hayles argues that “just as Heinz von Foerster served as the transition figure 
between the first and second waves, so Francisco Varela  bridges the transition between the 
second and third waves.” (Hayles, How we became Posthuman, p.222.) For Hayles, the distinction 
between second-wave and third-wave cybernetics is “getting the system to evolve in new 
directions” – which means for Hayles that “in contrast to the circular processes of Humberto 
Maturanaʼs autopoiesis, the figure most apt to describe the third wave is a spiral” (Ibid., p.222). 
This is, to be sure, an important distinction. However, it is one that most commentators would I 
think place at the boundary of first-order and second-order, or perhaps better still, at the boundary 
of radical and conservative cybernetics. In other places, Hayles makes a slightly different 
distinction again, suggesting that the three waves characterise three distinct historical “interplays 
between embodied forms of subjectivity and arguments for disembodiment.” (Ibid., p.7.) She 
suggest that “the first, from 1945-1960, took homeostasis as the central concept; the second, going 
roughly from 1960-1980, revolved around reflexivity; and the third, stretching from 1980 to the 
present, highlights virtuality.” (Ibid., p.7.)
43 See Jasia Reichardt (ed), Cybernetic Serendipity - the computer and the arts, (London: Studio 
International Special Issue, 1968)
44 Bruce Clark and Mark B.N.Hansen (eds.), Emergence and Embodiment - New Essays in 
Second-Order Systems Theory (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2009), pp.5-6.
45 These would, for different reasons, include the likes of Buckminster Fuller, Frederick Keisler, 
Cedric Price, John Fraser, Gordon Pask, Ranulph Glanville, Christopher Alexander, Archigram, 
Reyner Banham, Stephen Gage, Pete Silver, Will McClean, Bill Hillier, and many others. (One 
might include Koolhaasʼ OMA/AMO - certainly in so far as they have tried to position themselves as 
a systems consultancy at a certain scale of systems management and branding).
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46  Andrew Pickering, The Cybernetic Brain - Sketches of Another Future (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2010), p.31.
47  Ibid., p.30.
48 The core group who attended the initial event in March 1946 was made up of Gregory Bateson 
(anthropologist), Julian Bigelow (computer engineer-inventor), Gerhardt von 
Bonin (neuroanatomy), Lawrence Frank (social science), Frank Fremont-Smith (medicine / Macy 
Foundation representative), Ralph W. Gerard (neurophysiology), Molly Harrower (psychologist), 
George Evelyn Hutchinson (ecology), Heinrich Klüver (psychology), Lawrence Kubie (psychiatrist), 
Paul Lazarsfeld (sociology), Kurt Lewin (psychology), Rafael Lorente de Nó (neurophysiology), 
Warren McCulloch (neuropsychiatry, Chair), Margaret Mead (anthropologist), John von 
Neumann (mathematics), Filmer S. C. Northrop (philosophy), Walter Pitts (mathematics), Arturo 
Rosenblueth (physiology), Leonard J. Savage (mathematics), and Norbert Wiener (mathematics). 
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western. 
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definition, but it is just a subtitle. He goes on to add that Weinerʼs second book, The Human use of 
Human Beings, should have been published first, and is a much better introduction to the big ideas. 
For Glanville, the most important figures in the Macy conferences were “McCulloch, Mead and 
Bateson.”
50 Claude Shannon in a letter to Norbert Wiener in the 1940's: "Use the word `cybernetics', Norbert, 
because nobody knows what it means. This will always put you at an advantage in arguments." as 
cited at http://www.asc-cybernetics.org/foundations/definitions.htm accessed 1.8.08
51 According to Edward A. Shanken, ʻCybernetics and Art: Cultural Convergence in the 1960sʼ, in 
Bruce Clark and Linda Dairymple Henderson (eds), From Energy to Information: Representation in 
Science and Technology, Art and Literature (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), p.257.
52 Arturo Rosenblueth, Norbert Wiener, and Julian Bigelow, ʻBehaviour, Purpose and 
Teleology,ʼ Philosophy of Science Vol. 10 (1943). pp. 18-24
53 Stewart Brand, Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead (in conversation), ʻFor Godʼs Sake, 
Margaretʼ in CoEvolutionary Quarterly 10 (June 1976), pp.32-44. Accessed online 1.7.08 at http://
www.oikos.org/forgod.htm
54 Ibid.
55 According to Stewart Brand, the twenty participants of the 1942 Cerebral Intuition conference 
“included representatives of anthropology, psychobiology, physiology, psychiatry, neurology, 
psychology, medicine, anatomy and electronics. Among those present were Gregory Bateson, 
Lawrence K. Frank, Frank Fremont-Smith, Lawrence Kubie, Warren McCulloch, Margaret Mead, 
Arthur Rosenblueth.” Brand, in Brand, Bateson and Mead ʻFor Godʼs Sake, Margaretʼ
56 Mead, in Brand, Bateson and Mead ʻFor Godʼs Sake, Margaretʼ
57 From a letter sent to publisher as a part of biography for a book proposal called The Evolutionary 
Idea  (the manuscript of which Bateson superseded with Mind and Nature), in John Brockman (ed.) 
About Bateson (London: Wildwood House, 1977), p.10.
58 Mead, in Brand, Bateson and Mead ʻFor Godʼs Sake, Margaretʼ
59 Gregory Bateson, ʻPrefaceʼ to the Naven: A Survey of the Problems suggested by a Composite 
Picture of the Culture of a New Guinea Tribe drawn from Three Points
of View. Second Edition (Stanford: Stanford U P, 1958), p. viii.
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60 Margaret Boden, ʻGrey Walterʼs Anticipatory Tortoisesʼ in The Rutherford Journal. Accessed 
online 1.8.08 at http://www.rutherfordjournal.org/article020101.html
61 In a letter to Grey Walter of 27th July 1949, John Bates suggested forming a club of “people who 
had Weinerʼs ideas before Weinerʼs book appeared”, this letter was transcribed in Philip Husbands 
and Owen Holland, ʻThe Ratio Club - A Hub of British Cyberneticsʼ, in Phil Husbands, Michael 
Wheeler, Owen Holland (eds.), The Mechanical Mind in History (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT 
Press, 2008), pp.91-148.
62 The practical bent of the English cognitive-cybernetic research has continued to this day, with 
situated robotics providing the key research knowledge that Andy Clark has built his Extended 
Mind thesis upon – although Clark makes surprisingly little reference to the historical extended 
mind thinking in much cybernetic theory, and refers almost exclusively to contemporary theorists 
and experimentalists.
63 ELSIE: Electro-mechanical robot, Light-Sensitive with Internal and External stability, and 
ELMER: ELectro-MEchanical Robot.
64 P.T. Saunders (ed), Collected Works of Alan Turing: Morphogenesis (London: North-Holland, 
1992).
65 Feedback is arguably the most important concept to have emerged in the first wave of cybernetic 
research, and it describes the way that information moves around a circuit (whether organic or 
mechanical.) Feedback is a key element in understanding homeostasis. Capra notes that “the 
concept of the feedback loop introduced by the cyberneticists led to new perceptions of the many 
self-regulatory processes characteristic of life. Today we understand that feedback loops are 
ubiquitous in the living world, because they are a special feature of the nonlinear network patterns 
that are characteristic of living systems.” Capra, The Web of Life, pp.58-59.
66 Their discussion around these two terms was primarily concerned with whether the brain should 
be considered as analogic or digital. Long before digital became exclusively associated with silicon 
chip based computer processors, digital meant an on/off switch. Analogue referred by contrast to 
“those that vary continuously and in step with magnitudes in the trigger event.” (Bateson) One 
might say that digital refers to absolute states in a relative space-time, whereas analogue is more 
dependent upon a relational spacetime. For a discussion see Gregory Bateson, ʻCriteria of Mental 
Processʼ in Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 2002), p.103-04.
67 Bateson emphasises that what he calls “the holistic and mental character of the system” is most 
clearly demonstrated by the fact that it is a historical system, it incorporates time into the 
functioning of its mental circuitry. He states that “message material (ie successive transforms of 
difference) must pass around the total circuit, and the time required for the message to return to the 
place from which it started is a basic characteristic of the total system ... it is thus in some degree 
determined not only by its immediate past, but by what it did at a time which precedes the present 
by the interval necessary for the message to complete the circuit. There is thus a sort of 
determinative memory in even the simplest circuit.” Ibid., p.100.
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68 The cybernetic conceptual tool of the Black Box goes back to James Clark Maxwellʼs 
experiments with electro-magnetic fields. He defined Maxwellʼs Daemon (the first black box) as a 
conceptual clarification device in his Theory of Heat. Its conceptual use in cybernetics can be 
traced more directly as an abstraction of a real test that is used electrical engineering study. A 
student is given box with inputs and outputs, and by using various tests, must ascertain what 
component is inside. This of course has many real life applications as well (from bomb sites to ICT 
systems to particle colliders) where a system canʼt be dismantled. In fact, the black box concept is 
widely used to discuss systems with both known and unknown unknowns. Beyond that, as Ross 
Ashby reminds us “in our daily lives we are confronted at every turn with systems whose internal 
mechanisms are not fully open to inspection, and which must be treated by the methods 
appropriate to the black box.” Ashby, An Introduction to Cybernetics, p.86. Assuming the 
experimenter has certain resources for acting (e.g. prod it, shine light, etc) and observing (photo, 
record temp, etc), Ashby states that there are three questions to ask:
1. how should experimenter proceed?
2. what properties are discoverable, what are fundamentally not?
3. what methods should be used?
" Ashby notes – in a formulation that makes clear the early emergence of second-order 
reflexive thinking – that “by acting on the Box, and by allowing the Box to affect him and his 
recording apparatus, the experimenter is coupling himself to the Box, so that the two together form 
a system with feedback: [box] [double arrow][experimenter]” op. cit. That is to say, we study our 
relation to the black box, not the black box itself. 
" In fact, as Glanville has noted, humans can hop between two observing positions – one 
immersed in circuit, and the other in a ʻhigher levelʼ observing circuit. This fundamental formation of 
cybernetics is very similar to holding a dialectical position, and it seems clear to me that the 
spacetime relationality of cybernetic theory is very evident here. Although I cannot pursue this line 
of thought any further here, I think this does nonetheless suggest a site of convergence for a 
meeting between a dialectical Marxian mode of thought, based upon an internal relations based 
conception of spacetime, and second-order cybernetics.
69 Information is pattern: literally that which gives form to, or informs, matter. One rigourous 
definition of information was produced by Claude Shannon, key to which is the concept of 
negentropy (see next footnote). For Bateson “[A]ny ongoing ensemble of events and objects which 
has the appropriate complexity of causal circuits and the appropriate energy relations will surely 
show mental characteristics. It will compare, that is, be responsive to difference (in addition to 
being affected by the ordinary physical ʻcauses such as impact or force.) It will ʻprocess informationʼ  
and will inevitably be self-corrective towards homeostatic optima or towards the maximalisation of 
certain variables... A ʻbitʼ of information is definable as a difference which makes a difference. Such 
a difference, as it travels and undergoes successive transformation in a circuit, is an elementary 
idea...” Bateson, ʻThe Cybernetics of Self: A Theory of Alcoholismʼ, in Steps to an Ecology of Mind, 
p.315.
70 Negentropy is negative entropy. Just as entropy is defined (as the second law of 
thermodynamics) as the tendency of things to become homogenous and disordered, negentropy 
defines the negative condition of this, or order in a system. Negentropy is a key concept in 
understanding how living systems (and indeed some ʻnear to livingʼ systems, such as Prigogineʼs 
dissipative structures) reverse entropy and bring organisation to matter. Both Weiner and Shannon 
realised that there was more broadly a relationship between information and the laws of 
thermodynamics. Weiner coined the term negentropy, and the concept is key to Claude Shannonʼs 
theory of information. Here, negentropy describes the amount of order or information in a noisy 
signal. 
71 “[T]he most fundamental concept in cybernetics is that of ʻdifferenceʼ, either that two things are 
recognisably different, or that one thing has changed with time.” Ashby, An Introduction to 
Cybernetics, p.9.
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72 Homeostasis is for Hayles the primary idea of the first wave of cybernetic research. The concept 
first emerged in the work of French physiologist Claude Bernard, and his concept of the milieu 
interieur, in the late nineteenth century. Bernard was particularly attentive to the coupling of the 
organism to its environment, and realised that organisms create stable internal environments, in 
which they ʻliveʼ and are protected from variable external environments, and through which they 
produce themselves as organisms. He stated that “The constancy of the internal environment is the 
condition for a free and independent life," and that this “constancy” is homeostasis: the ability of a 
system to maintain its internal conditions of existence (homeorhesis is the ability of a system to 
maintain a stable trajectory.) Homeostasis was developed further by Walter Cannon, initially in his 
book The Wisdom of the Body (1932). As developed by cybernetics, homeostasis is dependent 
upon feedback. Specifically cybernetics shows how through combinations of positive and negative 
feedback a system can maintain a steady state, even whilst inputs from and outputs to an external 
environment vary. Sweating is a simple example of a homeostatic response to rising external 
temperature. 
73 The Law of Requisite Variety was discovered and formulated by Ross Ashby. It shows that for 
any one system to control another, it must have at least as many potential states if it is not to be a 
ʻdictatorʼ. Of course, systems can self-control, but this is specifically looking at two systems. This 
Law can have interesting applications. If we consider the capitalism/nature opposition, we can ask, 
will capitalism ever have more states than the natural world? The answer is always no. This is 
actually practically the case in the straightforward opposition (i.e. if one compares the complexity of 
the global ecosystem with that of the global economy), but is also logically inevitable in the 
universal sense of nature, as ultimately capitalism is a part of nature (even though from inside 
capitalism it appears that nature is produced by capitalism.) This means that according to the Law 
of Requisite Variety, capitalism can never successfully dominate nature without ʻdictatorshipʼ.
74 In particular, it might be argued that G. Spencer-Brownʼs Laws of Form might be thought of as a 
cybernetic attempt to formulate from first principles a recursive account of relational spacetime. 
75 J. Y. Lettvin, H. R. Maturana, W. S. McCulloch, and W. H. Pitts, ʻWhat the Frogʼs eye tells the 
Frogʼs Brainʼ, in William C. Corning and Martin Balaban (eds.), The Mind: Biological Approaches to 
its Functions (New York : Interscience Publishers, 1968) pp.233-58. To get a glimpse of the politics 
of cybernetics research funding, this paper states in a note that the research was supported in part 
by the U.S. Army (Signal Corps), the U.S. Air Force (Office of Sci. Res., Air Res. and Dev. 
Command), and the U.S. Navy (Office of Naval Res.), and in part by Bell Telephone Labs, Inc., and 
the Research Laboratory of Electronics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
76 A real abstraction for Marx describes the condition of a ʻconceptualʼ or virtual abstraction become 
real or actual. For Marx in Capital, this is how money is conceptualised (and practiced of course). 
Lefebvre develops a distinct concept of ʻconcrete abstractionʼ, which he uses to describe urban 
form. David Cunningham works with differences between these two abstractions as a means of 
producing “a concept of metropolis” (see ʻThe Concept of Metropolis: Philosophy and Urban Formʼ, 
in Radical Philosophy 133 (2005)pp. 13-24). It seems to me that for Bateson (reading him as a 
Hegelian Ecologist perhaps), the entire biological world can only be understood as systems that 
really work with abstraction, and in which processes of value creation and communication are 
ubiquitous. There does appear to be a concrete sense in which biological systems (and perhaps all 
material processes) do unfold through and together with the production of what Lefebvre describes 
as the “ʻpureʼ forms [of].. identity and difference, equivalence, consistency, reciprocity, recurrence, 
and repetition”. (Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991) p.100.) Given 
that, it seems to me that there might be useful work to do, exploring the specific biosemiotic 
conception of Bateson (plus that of with Varela) through Marxian conceptions of real and concrete 
abstraction.
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77 This is doubly worth noting as there is much useful criticism of some schools of philosophy of 
mind which have been accused of imagining that the brain is a computer. Without wanting to 
underplay the often useful nature of these critiques it is worth noting that in fact the computer was 
modelled on animal neural networks. There is a concern that some models of mind are actually 
based on the metaphor of the computer, not the reality of the brain-in-body-in-organonic 
environments. However, the computer itself really does exist as an abstract model of the human 
brain, and it is not entirely inappropriate to use it in this way. There is only a problem if this model is 
imagined to provide a complete description of mind, which it cannot.
! It is also worth noting that the digital computer was not the only computer imagined by 
cybernetic research. Gordon Pask and Stafford Beer in particular, imagined and experimented with 
very different biological and physical computing models, and Andrew Pickering has noted that had 
they had the same funding as the American miltary-industrial establishment gave von Neumann, 
then a very different histroy of computing may have arose (Pickering in interview with Neil Baker 
February 2010, accessed 15.1.11 from http://vimeo.com/10929373).
78 Hayles, How we became Posthuman, p.7.
79 Ibid., p.2.
80 Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics. or Control and Communication in the Animal and Machine 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1948), p.132.
81 Bateson states, for example: “The problem is to change the rules, and insofar as we let our 
cybernetic inventions—the computers—lead us into more and more rigid situations, we shall in fact 
be maltreating and abusing the first hopeful advance since 1918. 
! And, of course, there are other dangers latent in cybernetics and many of these are still 
unidentified. We do not know, for example, what effects may follow from the computerization of all 
government dossiers.
! But this much is sure, that there is also latent in cybernetics the means of achieving a new 
and perhaps more human outlook, a means of changing our philosophy of control and a means of 
seeing our own follies in wider perspective.” 
Gregory Bateson, ʻFrom Versailles to Cyberneticsʼ lecture given April 21, 1966, to the “Two Worlds 
Symposium” at Sacramento State College, in Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, p.336.
82 Hayles, How we became Posthuman, p.14.
83 See Pickering, The Cybernetic Brain.
84 Although for Pickering this is by no means a complete mapping. Indeed, he has commented that 
in many respects second-order cybernetics ended up going in the wrong direction: “think of the 
tedious stuff that von Foerster produces at the end of his career.” Pickering in conversation with 
author, 24th February 2010 at “Cybernetics: From the ontological theatre to the environmental 
crisis” symposium hosted by The Science Technology Culture Research Group at the University of 
Nottingham.
85 The panel discussion was convened for the opening of Marcel Duchampʼs (and his brothers) 
exhibition of the same name.
86 For a discussion of this panel, see William Kaizen, ʻSteps to an Ecology of Communication: 
Radical Software, Dan Graham and the Legacy of Gregory Batesonʼ in Art Journal (CCA, Fall 
2008), pp.87-107.
87 Malcolm McCullough, Digital Ground: Architecture, Pervasive Computing and Environmental 
Knowing, (Cambridge MA: MIT, 2005), p.ix.
88 Stewart Brand himself is of course also a complex and controversial figure here. The publisher of 
the Whole Earth Catalogue, Brand oscillates between left and right forms of libertarianism. In the 
catalogue, for example, he gives a Milton Freidman book a positive review, as an example of 
“radical thinking”!!
89 I am indebted to Andrew Pickering for thinking about the complex tendencies within cybernetics 
in royal/nomadic terms. 
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90 For example, Ranulph Glanville has made this point on several occasions in lectures.
91 Francisco J Varela, Evan Thompson, Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science 
and Human Experience (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), p.5.
92 Hayles, How we became Posthuman, p.8.
93 Hayles describes her project as a study of three interrelated tendencies in post war society: 
firstly, “how information lost its body”; secondly, “how the cyborg was invented as a technological 
artefact and cultural icon”; and thirdly, “how a historically specific construction called the human is 
giving way to the posthuman” Ibid., p.2.
94 Peter Harries-Jones, A Recursive Vision: Ecological Understanding and Gregory Bateson 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), p.104-05.
95 Ross Ashby, quoted by Ranolph Glanville, Lecture University of Greenwich 2009.
96 Klaus Krippendorff, ʻ A Second-order Cybernetics of Othernessʼ in Systems Research Vol. 13 No. 
3 (1996), pp. 311-328. 
97 Alan Watts, Psychotherapy East and West (New York: Vintage, 1961), p.88.
98 Gordon Paskʼs conversation theory suggests that we learn through interaction with others and 
the environment, and that these interactions can all be conceived of as conversations. In 
conversation with others we live through language, and for Pask our consciousness is distributed 
socially. When interacting with environments, we talk for both sides if necessary, through 
something like empathy. 
99 Although Gregory Bateson is no straightforward Whiteheadian, there are clear parallels, and this 
is not surprising: the Whiteheads and Batesons would regularly meet socially. (In fact apparently it 
was Mrs Whitehead who set up Gregory's parents on a date, so there would literally be no GB 
without Whitehead!) Whilst GB clearly shares much with Whitehead's process-based relational and 
organismic cosmology in general, it is also accurate to say that his own intellectual milieu was 
dominated by a number of others who were also Whitehead influenced thinkers. Notably GB was 
personally close to biologist Conrad Waddington (a Marxian Whiteheadian) going right back to his 
student days at Cambridge (GB edited Waddington's important 'Organisers and Genes'). Kurt 
Lewin, who developed Whitehead's field theory in psychology, was also very influential for Bateson, 
as was the Whiteheadian Alfred Korzybski.
100 In this thesis of evolution proceeding by leaps and jumps, and not simply the gradual mutation 
of the neo-Darwinists, the Batesons were very much against the orthodoxy of their times, but would 
be returned to by later research - of for example Stephen Jay Gould. Interestingly, Gould would 
need to use dialectics to describe this process.
101 Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, p.379.
102 Greg Lynn has developed this in some interesting ways in his paper on ʻThe Renewed Novelty 
of Symmetryʼ, originally published in Assemblage 26, (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1995) pp.11-23
103 See Gregory Bateson, ʻA Reconsideration of Batesonʼs Ruleʼ in Steps to an Ecology of Mind, 
pp.270-83.
104 For a theorisation of the way that they used photography and film in their anthropological 
research, see the chapter ʻNotes on photography and captionsʼ in Gregory Bateson and Margaret 
Mead, Balinese Character A Photographic Analysis (New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 
1942), pp. 49-54. This book opens with the statement that “the form of presentation used in this 
monograph is an experimental innovation” (p. xi). The first forty pages are an anthropological text 
on Balinese culture, largely by Mead. The majority of the book consists of photographs by Bateson, 
organised according to various themes. Bateson notes that he took 25000 Leica stills, and 22,000 
feet of 16mm film. There are 759 stills in the book, of which 8 were posed. 
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105 For example, writing in 1942 Margaret Mead noted that “those students who have devoted 
themselves to studying cultures as wholes, as systems of dynamic equilibrium, can make the 
following contributions ... by recognising the importance of including the social scientist within his 
experimental material.” Margaret Mead, ʻThe Comparative Study of Culture, and the Purposive 
Cultivation of Democratic Valuesʼ, in Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion and Their 
Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, Second Symposium (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1942) pp.55-69
106 It is in this respect interesting to consider Batesonʼs position in regard to the ʻcritical realistʼ 
reading of natural and social science proposed by Roy Bhaskar, and the dialectical naturalist 
reading of Marx proposed by John Bellamy Foster (as discussed all-too-briefly in previous 
chapters).
107 In 1951 Bateson published (with Jurgen Ruesch) the influential Communication: The Social 
Matrix of Psychiatry, which was a cybernetic theory of psychology.
108 The concept of “double-bind” describes a condition wherein an individual is placed in an 
insoluble dilemma, due to receiving contradictory signals. In the classic psychiatric treatment of the 
concept, the child receives contradictory signals from the parent - typically one verbally transmitted 
in words, and the other physically transmitted, through body language, tone of voice etc. 
# Through the concept of the double-bind, Bateson produces something which seems to me 
to be entirely analogous to Gödelʼs critical discovery of an irreducible self-reflexivity at the heart of 
Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whiteheadʼs Principia Mathematica (i.e. what Russell and 
Whitehead had specifically hoped to avoid!). Gödelʼs critique of Principia Mathematica has been 
foundational to Douglas Hofstadterʼs recursive ʻstrange loopʼ thesis of consciousness. See Douglas 
R. Hofstadter, Goedel, Escher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid - Twenty Year Edition, (London: 
Penguin, 1999)
109 Specifically, Bateson experimented with LSD on himself with the remit of exploring “the orders of 
aesthetics”. For a discussion see Gregory Bateson, A Sacred Unity: Further Steps to an Ecology of 
Mind (New York: Harper Collins, 1991) pp.
110 John Lilly was a friend of Bateson, and an important figure in the sixties counter-culture 
movement, and a general researcher into all aspects of consciousness. He invented the sensory 
deprivation isolation tank, and researched its effects, and pioneered research into inter-species 
communication – specifically with dolphins. Douglas Adamsʼ character Wonko the Sane, who 
Arthur Dent visits to find out what had happened to the dolphins, in the final “Hitchhikerʼs” book So 
long, and thanks for all the fish, was (a tribute to) John Lilly.
111 Some of this is documented in Gregory Bateson, ʻSocial Planning and the Concept of Deutero-
Learningʼ in Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, pp.127-37. 
112 Bateson has a particular definition of epistemology, which he has defined as “a branch of 
science combined with a branch of philosophy. As science, epistemology is the study of how 
particular organisms or aggregates of organisms ʻknowʼ, ʻthinkʼ and ʻdecideʼ. As philosophy, 
epistemology is the study of necessary limits and other characteristics of the processes of knowing, 
thinking and deciding.” Gregory Bateson and Mary Catherine Bateson, Angels Fear: Towards an 
Epistemology of the Sacred (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press and Institute for Intercultural Studies, 
2005), p.208. Elsewhere, Bateson stated that “my epistemology ... is a branch of natural history. It 
was McCulloch who, for me, pulled epistemology down out of the realms of abstract philosophy 
into the much more simple realm of natural history. This was dramatically done in the paper by 
McCulloch and his friends entitled ʻWhat the frogʼs eye told the frogʼs brain.ʼ In that paper he 
showed that the answer to the question ʻhow can a frog know anything?ʼ would be delimited by the 
sensory machinery of the frog; and that the sensory machinery of the frog could, indeed, be be 
investigated by experimental and other means” Gregory Bateson, ʻAfterwordʼ, in John Brockamn 
(ed.) About Bateson (London: Wildwood House, 1977), p.237.
Batesonʼs work in emphasising the informational character of living systems is today seen as an 
important anticipation of the field of biosemiotic research. See, for example, Jesper Hoffmeyer 
(ed.), A Legacy for Living Systems: Gregory Bateson as a Precursor to Biosemiotics (Copenhagen: 
Springer, 2008).
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113 In a great example of the productive and ʻnaturalʼ character of pathology, Bateson observes that 
“the older an automobile gets and the further it is from the engineer who designed it, the more 
complex it gets with multiple ʻpathologiesʼ and the more it takes on characteristics of a living thing - 
moods, caprice, etc. New cars are ʻitʼ but an old car is ʻsheʼ.” Gregory Bateson, letter to Philip 
Wylie, June 1967. Accessed online 1.8.08 at http://www.oikos.org/batesleten.htm
114 See, for example, Kaizen, ʻSteps to an Ecology of Communication: Radical Software, Dan 
Graham and the Legacy of Gregory Batesonʼ, pp.87-107
115 Bateson, ʻThe Cybernetics of Self: A Theory of Alcoholismʼ, p.319.
116 For an account of Gregory Batesonʼs death, see Mary Catherine Bateson, ʻSix Days of Dyingʼ, 
in CoEvolution Quarterly, 1980, Winter, No. 28, pp.4–11. Also located at: http://www.oikos.org/
batdeath.htm
117 Gregory Bateson and Mary Catherine Bateson, Angels Fear: Towards an Epistemology of the 
Sacred (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press and Institute for Intercultural Studies, 2005), pp.51-52.
118 Gregory Bateson, in speech at AUM conference held at Esalen in March 1973 organised by 
Alan Watts, G Spencer Brown and John Lilly, quoted in Brockamn (ed.), About Bateson, p.4.
119 Sergio Manghi, ʻForewordʼ, in Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity (Cresskill, 
NJ: Hampton Press, 2002), p.x.
120 Verena Andermatt Conley, Ecopolitics: The Environment in Poststructuralist Thought (London: 
Routledge, 1997), p.48.
121 Gregory Bateson, ʻAfterwordʼ, in Brockamn (ed.) About Bateson, p.247.
122 Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (London: 
Athlone, 1984), p.80.
123 Ibid., pp. 21-22.
124 Gregory Bateson, ʻTheory vs Empiricismʼ in Milton M Berger (Ed), Beyond the Double Bind: 
Communication and Family Systems, Theories and Techniques with Schizophrenics (NY: Brunner/
Mazel, 1978)
125 Batesonʼs conception of mind evolved over the course of several decades, and was first 
presented as a ʻtotalʼ theory when he selected a series of essays and published them as Steps to 
an Ecology of Mind in 1972. He then formalised this further in Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity 
in 1979.
126 Bateson states that “the difference between a set and a group being that the members of a 
group a generated one from another, whereas a set is a list. Group theory is a very elegant little 
subject. It has a math of meta-relations about permutation and combination. Most atomic physics 
and things like this depend upon it nowadays. The periodic table of elements is essentially group 
theoretical.” As quoted in Stewart Brand, II Cybernetic Frontiers (New York: Random House, 1974), 
p.37.
127 Bateson, Mind and Nature, p.188.
128 Bateson and Vrela first met at when they were both teaching at the Naropa Institute. In his 
calculas, Varela suggests that Hegelian dialectics is based upon an ʻA/not Aʼ distinction – i.e. both 
sides are at the same logical level. Varela proposes a dialectics based upon ʻwhole/parts 
constituting wholeʼ: “take any situation (domain, process, entity, notion) which is holistic (total, 
closed, complete, full, stable, self contained). Put it on the left side of the /. Put on the right side of 
it the corresponding processes [parts] (constituents, generators, dynamics).” Varela ʻNot one, Not 
twoʼ in Coevolution Quarterly (Fall 1976), pp. 62-7. For Varela whole and parts are 
ʻimbricatedʼ (overlapping), and he notes that “a whole decomposes into parts which generate 
processes integrating the whole.” He does not see this as a negation of Hegelian dialectics 
(Hegelian/non-Hegelian), but rather an enfolding of it.
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129 Bateson sets out his criteria of mental process, all of which he thought must be met for a system 
to be a mind. However, for Bateson his conception of mind “must stand or fall, not by the particular 
content of my list, but by the validity of the idea that some such structuring of epistemology, 
evolution and epigenesis is possible. I propose that the mind-body problem is soluble along lines 
similar to those outlined here … [:]
(1) Mind is an aggregate of interacting parts or components. 
(2) The interaction between parts of mind is triggered by difference, and difference is a 
nonsubstantial phenomenon not located in space or time; difference is related to negentropy and 
entropy rather than energy. 
(3) Mental process requires collateral energy. 
(4) Mental process requires circular (or more complex) chains of determination. 
(5) In mental process the effects of difference are to be regarded as transforms (i.e., coded 
versions) of the difference which preceded them. The rules of such transformations must be 
comparatively stable (i.e. more stable than the content) but are themselves subject to 
transformation.
(6) The description and classification of these processes of transformation discloses a hierarchy of 
logical types immanent in the phenomena.” 
Bateson, ʻCriteria of Mental Processʼ, pp.85-86.
130 Gregory Bateson, ʻCriteria of Mental Processʼ, p.85.
131 For a discussion of emergence in relation to Batesonʼs thought, see Thomas E Malloy, Carmen 
Bostic St Clair, and John Grinder ʻSteps to an Ecology of Emergenceʼ in Frederick Steier and Jane 
Jorgenson (eds), Cybernetics and Human Knowing - special issue entitled Gregory Bateson: 
Essays for an Ecology of Ideas (Vol. 12, 1 and 2, 2005), pp.102-19. 
132 The importance of a conception of logical type in Batesonʼs thinking has been emphasised by 
Mary Catherine Bateson. See Mary Catherine Bateson, With a Daughter's Eye: A Memoir of 
Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson (New York: Harper Perennial, 1994), pp.206-10.
133 Morphogenesis – the processes by which plants and animals develop and grow, and are 
informed – is fiendishly complex and difficult to fully explain. Sheldrake at least makes visible the 
problem by proposing the existence/emergence of real ontological fields of information. This seems 
unlikely in the manner he proposes, but is not any more clumsy than the hopes attached to the 
standard genetic account. Batesonʼs semiotic-cognitive relational method of reformulating the 
question of morphogenesis as a communicational system of differences, procedurally relating or 
networking an organism and its context, seems an altogether more sophisticated way of conceiving 
of the nature/culture of morphogenesis.
# In general, it is interesting to note Bruniʼs assertion that “it should not come as a surprise 
today to realise how the general ideas that Bateson was postulating for the study of communication 
systems in biology fit so well with the astounding findings of current molecular biology, for example 
in the field of cellular signal transduction networks. Once again he would be illustrating the 
fruitfulness of abduction, being as he was concerned with advancing the search for fundamental 
principles in communication processes in living systems at different hierarchical levels.” Luis Emilio 
Bruni, ʻGregory Batesonʼs Relevance to Current Molecular Biologyʼ in Hoffmeyer (ed.), A Legacy for 
Living Systems, p.95.
134 It is important to note here that Bateson was critical of some Darwinian conceptions of 
evolution. In particular, Bateson would emphasise (following Whitehead) that the fundamental unit 
of survival was not the organism, but was rather the organism plus its environment, which together 
must be considered to co-evolve. He emphasised that when an organism drifts into a state that 
starts to destroy its environment (i.e. its extended self), then it never survives.
135 Bateson, ʻCriteria of Mental Processʼ, p.85.
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136 And in fact, on the occasions Bateson does, he tends to be critical. For example, in Mind and 
Nature, he briefly discusses the Marxist account of history as primarily determined by class forces 
rather than individuals. For Bateson, this position in its most vulgar form (and we can imagine what 
this might have been like in discussions in the 1970s!) is an example of an error in logical type (in 
fact he uses this as an example of this kind of error). The “class” is of a different organisational and 
logical type to the “individual”. Bateson notes that it does matter in which way any ʻmovementʼ 
starts, as systems are sensitive to initial conditions. He goes on to suggest that whilst in a vulgar 
Marxist account it might just be said that a theory of evolution would be produced, Bateson notes 
that the insights of cybernetics might have developed much earlier had Wallace beaten Darwin to 
publication, as Wallace understood the importance of the self-regulating steam governor. See 
Bateson, ʻCriteria of Mental Processʼ, p.40.
137 Jesper Hoffmeyer, ʻFrom Thing to Relation: On Batesonʼs Bioanthropologyʼ in Hoffmeyer (ed.), 
A Legacy for Living Systems, p.42.
138 It is interesting in this regard to recall that in Eyal Weizmanʼs brilliant analysis of the way in 
which Deleuzian spatial tactics were being deployed by the Israeli military (see Eyal Weizman 
ʻWalking through Wallsʼ accessed 30.8.10 from http://eipcp.net/transversal/0507/weizman/en). The 
first academic that the Israeli general Shimon Naveh (until 2006 co-director of the Operational 
Theory Research Institute) referred to in an interview with Weizman was “Gregory Bateson”. I 
would imagine that they might have been particularly interested in Batesonʼs Palo Alto therapy 
work on individuals and social groups, which showed how disruptions, double binds, new feedback 
and other changes to messages and communication flows, could quickly lead to pathological 
breakdown in individuals and social groups – an analysis which might easily be turned to suit the 
needs of the war machine. 
139 Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (London: Athlone 
Press, 1984), p.236.
140 Harries-Jones, A Recursive Vision, pp.29-32.
141 Niklas Luhmann, quoted as preface in Hans-Georg Moeller, Luhmann Explained: from Souls to 
Systems (Chicago and Las Salle: Open Court, 2006). In the same volume, Moeller states: “Marxist 
attentiveness to production and thus to economy overstates this social system in regard to its 
constituting power for all of society ... the differentiation of the economy as a self-constructing 
social system does not prevent other systems from unfolding their own autopoeitic operations ... at 
the same time, however, the primary focus on the economy also underestimates this systemʼs 
capacity to continuously change itself, and enter into extremely complex couplings with other social 
systems such as law, politics, and the mass media.” Ibid., p.179. Of course, as is made clear by the 
terms used in this quote – Luhmann was indebted more to Maturana and Varela than Bateson.
142 This event was primarily organised by R.D. Laing and David Cooper. Bateson gave the paper 
on ʻConscious Purpose vs Natureʼ (which was later also published in Steps to an Ecology of Mind.) 
The proceedings were published as David Cooper (ed.), The Dialectics of Liberation 
(Harmondsworth and Baltimore: Penguin, 1968).
143 Noel G. Charlton, Understanding Gregory Bateson: Mind, Beauty, and the Sacred Earth (New 
York: SUNY Press, 2008), p.26.
144 Mary Catherine Bateson, Our Own Metaphor: Effects of Conscious Purpose on Human 
Adaptation (New York: Knopf, 1972), p.16.
145 Gregory Bateson, Box 6 Manuscripts ʻMind in Natureʼ, 17 November 1977 (unpublished), 
quoted in Peter Harries-Jones, “Gregory Batesonʼs ʻUncoveryʼ of Ecological Aesthetics” in 
Hoffmeyer (ed.), A Legacy for Living Systems, p.158. There is a published though slightly different 
version of this in Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature, p.10.
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146 I am broadly indebted to Peter Harries-Jones here, who has repeatedly emphasised that 
Batesonʼs “clear purpose” was in “establishing rapport between aesthetics and a reconstructed 
science” Peter Harries Jones, ʻUnderstanding Ecological Aestheticsʼ in Steier and Jorgenson (eds), 
CHK: Gregory Bateson: Essays for an Ecology of Ideas, p.66.
The ʻsecond visionʼ of Batesonʼs ʻecological aestheticsʼ of course refers to the William Blake letter 
to Thomas Butts, on 22 November 1802 (accessed online 23.2.11 at http://www.128path.org/
pathtimes/article4.html): 
“Now I a fourfold vision see,
And a fourfold vision is given to me;
ʻTis fourfold in my supreme delight
And threefold in soft Beulahʼs night
And twofold Always. May God us keep
From Single Vision & Newtonʼs sleep!”
147 James Lovelock, Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth (1979), p.10
148 Gordon Pask, ʻThe Architectural Relevance of Cyberneticsʼ in Architectural Design 1969, p.
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
151 Alan Colquhoun, ʻPlateau Beaubourgʼ, in Essays in Architectural Criticism: Modern Architecture 
and Historical Change (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1981), p.117.
152 Jonathan Crary quoted in Felicity D. Scott, Architecture or Techno-Utopia - Politics after 
Modernism (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2007) p.261.
153 Sanford Kwinter, Architecture of Time: Towards a Theory of the Event in Modernist Culture 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2002) p.8.
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MIT, 1995) p.
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1 Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972) p.200.
2 Alva Noë in interview with Ginger Campbell, June 5, 2009, Transcript of Brain Science Podcast 
No. 58, accessed on 1.7.09 at www.brainsciencepodcast.com
3 In fact, this is not only in relation to architectural thinking. The various strands of body/space 
research have not been brought together in one place as neurological and psychological research 
(as far as I am aware).
4 See footnote 64 in Chapter Five for a brief discussion of the emerging discourse of 
neuroaesthetics.
5 With the exception of sponges. However, sponges are better understood as a community of 
single cell organisms, that have a collective emergent behaviour.
6 See Carl Sagan, The Dragons of Eden - Speculations on the Evolution of Human Intelligence 
(NY: Ballantine Books, 1977), pp.62-63.
7 And in particular the so called limbic system is not really seen as a single coherent system any 
longer.
8 There has in the past been a lot of debate about whether to approach the brain and the mind 
through a modular understanding or an holistic approach. To some extent these reflect different 
disciplinary interests. AI researchers have tended to focus on certain kinds of functional modularity 
– for example. V.S. Ramachandran has argued that both approaches seem to be correct, for 
different sub-brain regions, or different processes; he suggests that the oldest parts of the brain, in 
evolutionary terms, are largely modular, whereas the newest parts of the brain, and in particular the 
frontal cortex, which is where most of the most distinctively human activity takes place, is largely 
massively cross-wired and a plastic whole.
9 V.S. Ramachandran and Sandra Blakeslee, Phantoms in the Brain - Human Nature and the 
Architecture of the Mind (London: Harper Perennial, 2005) p.177.
10 J.A. Armour and R. McCraty have been, in very different ways, amongst those who have  led 
research into neurocardiology, and their findings can be read as a provocative addition to 
embodied and extended mind (in McCatyʼs case) thinking.
11 Researchers suggest that there are neural connections from the heart to the brain running 
through the medulla into the amygdala, and into the spinal column through the vagus nerve.
12 Again, it is important to note that neural-net-type processes (i.e. a particular kind of relational 
organisation), are not only found constructed through actual neurons in the body. Other related 
forms of computation occur through all kinds of other chemical systems within the body, and 
between the body and its environment.
13 See, for example, J.A. Armour, Neurocardiology: Anatomical and Functional Principles (New 
York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1994), and J.A. Armour and Jeffrey L. Ardell (eds.), 
Neurocardiology (New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1994)
14 See McCraty R, Bradley RT, Tomasino D, ʻThe Resonant Heartʼ in Shift: At the Frontiers of 
Consciousness No. 5 (2004) pp.15-19.
15 For a (very “new age”) discussion of the cognitive role of the heart in relationship to external 
living environments, see Stephen Harold Buhner, The Secret Teachings of Plants -The Intelligence 
of the Heart in the Direct Perception of Nature (Rochester, Vermont: Bear and Co., 2004).
16 There appears to be remarkably little experimental research being done in this area, and it is 
difficult to tell whether this is because it is such a potentially career limiting area for scientists to be 
associated with, or because there is just nothing there to research.
17 Ramachandran and Blakeslee, Phantoms in the Brain, p.34.
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18 Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature - A Necessary Unity (New York: Bantam Books,1980), p.118.
19 The point is that if extant, whilst these ʻnewʼ senses might be considered to be in some way 
operating at a lower and more direct level, they are nonetheless ultimately just more mediated 
senses that need to be treated according to the general discussion of empathy, mental 
representation and cognitive mapping that follows. They amplify and intensify perhaps the extent of 
the mindʼs environmental extension and ecological immersion, but no more than that.
20 See E.C. Tolman, ʻCognitive Maps in Rats and Menʼ, in Psychological Review, 55 (1948), pp.
189-208.
21 See for example, Robert M. Kitchin, ʻCognitive Maps: What are they and why study them?ʼ, 
Journal of Environmental Psychology, 14 (1994), pp.1-19.
22 See for example Kevin Lynch, The Image of the City (Cambridge, MA, 1960).
23 See Wilder Penfield and Theodore Rasmussen , The Cerebral Cortex of Man (New York: 
Macmillan, 1950)
24 See Catherine Brahic ʻBirds can 'see' the Earth's magnetic fieldʼ in New Scientist 30 April 2008, 
accessed 1.7.09 from http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn13811-birds-can-see-the-earths-
magnetic-field.html
25 The somatic senses are the oldest evolutionary senses, and include touch, temperature, 
nocioception (pain), proprioception (the location and movement of body parts,) and balance.
26 Ramachandran and Blakeslee, Phantoms in the Brain, p.33.
27 See Sandra Blakeslee in conversation with Ginger Campbell in Brain Science Podcast no. 23 
(accessed on 1.5.09 at http://docartemis.com/brainsciencepodcast/previous-episodes/transcripts/, 
and  Sandra Blakeslee and Matthew Blakeslee, The Body Has a Mind of Its Own (NY: Random, 
2007), p.11.
28 Regarding the use of the body and emotions in cognition, see Antonio Damasio, The Feeling of 
What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness ( New York: Harcourt, 1999).
29 Ramachandran and Blakeslee, Phantoms in the Brain, p.77.
30 Sandra Blakeslee and Matthew Blakeslee, The Body Has a Mind of Its Own (NY: Random, 
2007), p.37.
31 This experiment is widely reported, but most famously perhaps in Richard L Gregory, Eye and 
Brain - The Psychology of Seeing (London: World University Library, 1966)
32 The extraordinary extent to which our vision is haptic and multisensory is, in my view. brought 
out by recent experiments with blind individuals where video cameras have been linked up to 
sensory patches on their arms. Initially these experiments did not work at all. However, apparently 
in frustration, one of the test subjects picked up the camera (it had been static on a tripod), and 
practically as soon as he did so, as soon as he could correlate body movement with the signals 
that he was feeling on his arm, his visual cortex was able to start to make sense of the information, 
and start to ʻconstruct an imageʼ. After a while it has been possible for individuals to engage in 
complex and fast feedback activities, such as catching a ball thrown to them, just on the basis on 
ʻimagesʻ formed on the basis of video to skin. Using similar methods, the US Navy SEALs are 
working with deep underwater cameras feed onto touch pads connected to the divers tongues, for 
conditions where it is too dark to see. In general it seems to me that this discussion reveals the 
problem of accusing contemporary culture of being too visual – it could not be visual without other 
senses. To see something as too visual in some way is to misunderstand how the senses are 
working. For a further discussion of seeing with the hand, see Giacomo Rizzolatti and Corrado 
Sinigaglia, Mirrors in the Brain: How our minds share actions and emotions (Oxford: OUP, 2006), p.
50. 
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33 It is I think extremely instructive to reflect upon the accuracy of the insights of the empathy 
theorists with regard to anticipations of recent neurological research. Consider for example now the 
following passage from August Schmarsow: “Psychologically, the intuited form of three-dimensional 
space arises through the experiences of our sense of sight, whether or not assisted by other 
physiological factors. All our visual perceptions and ideas are arranged, and ordered, and unfold in 
accordance with this intuited form ... The intuited form of space, which surrounds us wherever we 
may be and which we then always erect around ourselves and consider more necessary than the 
form of our own body, consists of the residues of sensory experience to which the muscular 
sensations of our body, the sensitivity of our skin, and the structure of our body all contribute. As 
soon as we have learned to experience ourselves and ourselves alone as the centre of this space, 
whose co-ordinates intersect in us, we have found the precious kernel, the initial capital investment 
so to speak, on which architectural creation is based.” (August Schmarsow, ʻThe Essence of 
Architectural Creationʼ, in Harry Mallgrave and Eleftherios Ikonomou (eds.), Empathy, Form, 
Space: Problems in German Aesthetics 1873-1893 (Santa Monica, CA: Getty Centre, 1994) p.286.) 
This statement is interesting because it is typical of the “accuracy” that can be found in many 
artistic and introspective first person accounts of first person processes, and indeed, as Varela, 
Thompson and Rosch noted (see previous chapter), in other traditions based upon rigorous first 
person interio-reflection. This is in fact a reason for some optimism concerning the possibility of 
new forms of what neurophenomenologists such as Francisco Varela, Shaun Gallagher and Evan 
Thompson have described as “first person science”.
34 Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, Mirrors in the Brain, p.xi.
35 V.S. Ramachandran and Sandra Blakeslee, Phantoms in the Brain - Human Nature and the 
Architecture of the Mind (London: Harper Perennial, 2005) p.70.
36 See Marvin Minski, The Society of Mind (New York, 1988). Jerry Fodor, has in ʻThe Modularity of 
Mindʼ, argued for a modular conception of the brain, that, whilst problematic for reasons discussed 
above more broadly, does have something useful to say regarding the conception of the mind as 
an assemblage, network or society of sub-brains. He has elsewhere stated: “if, in short, there is a 
community of computers living in my head, there had also better be somebody who is in charge; 
and, by God, it had better be me.” Jerry Fodor, In Critical Condition (Cambridge: MIT, 1998) p.207.





41 Charles Dickens, Hard Times (Leipzig, Elibron classics, 2006). See end of Chapter 9.
42 Although most typically found in cases of amputation, there are also phantom limb cases in 
people born without limbs. This suggests that the phenomenon has something to do with feedback 
problems in different maps, and that whilst most commonly these maps are constructed through 
practical activity, Ramachandran suggests that there are also some maps ʻhardwiredʼ into the brain. 
Other explanations would be in these cases that other ʻfull bodyʼ maps are imported through 
processes of empathy with other bodies via mirror neurons, or even perhaps through Sheldrakeʼs 
concept of “morphic resonance”?
43 Lord Nelson as quoted in Ramachandran and Blakeslee, Phantoms in the Brain, p.22.
44 Ibid., p.29.
45 It is worth noting that prior to Ramachndranʼs experiments on the role that body maps played in 
this condition, the mainstream response had been to work on the basis that there was a physical 
neurological failure, and would experiment with further amputations, try to severe nerve 
connections etc – which would often just make the problem worse.
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46 Although it is beyond the scope of this work here, I am now working on some future research 
projects exploring and theorising mirrors further. 
47 He further notes a case of a lower leg amputee who reported that his phantom limb took the form 
of a massively increased sense of “phantom arousal” and orgasm.
48 See, for example, the work of Bud Craig, whose research into interoception mapping in relation 
to other maps is increasingly widely seen as the first strong explanation in terms of western 
medicine of why some alternative and eastern medical practices work. Craig argues that many 
disorders arise from mapping problems in the autonomic nervous system (with bad maps literally 
producing physical illnesses), and that alternative medicine techniques such as acupuncture and 
meditation can be explained as driven by re-mapping. More broadly, this research discusses how 
experiences based in tai chi, yoga, energy therapy etc are too extensive to be dismissed, yet no 
actual detectable energy fields have been found. Perhaps then, these practices are working with 
cognitive maps, that is to say, with peripersonal, body and space maps, and their interrelations, 
thereby creating real changes and experiences. See for example AD (Bud) Craig, ʻInteroception: 
the sense of the physiological condition of the bodyʼ, Current Opinion in Neurobiology 2003, 13, pp.
500-505, and Hugo D Critchley, Stefan Weins, Pia Rotshtein, Arne Ohman, Raymond Dolan, 
ʻNeural systems supporting interoceptive awarenessʼ, Nature Neuroscience 7 (2004), pp.189-95.
49 I met Henrik Ehrsson at the ʻTowards a Science of Consciousnessʼ conference in Tucson, 
Arizona in April 2010. He – like some other neuropsychologists present – was interested in the 
architectural readings that I was making out of their material, and has agreed to support a joint 
funding bid for an installation proposal that I have developed, which is to explore a variation of the 
rubber hand illusion at the scale of a building!
50 Ramachandran and Blakeslee, Phantoms in the Brain, p.59.
51 Sandra Blakeslee in conversation with Ginger Campbell (Brain Science Podcast): “And so, you 
see this motion and you feel this motion, and then you leave your body. You move out of your body 
toward the virtual reality representation of your body. Itʼs a dissociation.” My thesis here is that this 
dissociation, or alienation, is closely related to the aesthetic experience of spatial empathy as a 
ʻdissociativeʼ experienceʼ.
52 Olaf Blanke is a neurologist at Ecole Polytechnique in Lausanne, Switzerland who also published 
with the team working on VR based out of body projection. 
53 See for example Michael M Persinger, ʻThe neuropsychiatry of paranormal experiencesʼ, 
Neuropsychiatric Practice and Opinion, Vol. 13, No. 4 (2001), pp.521–22.
54 Although apparently this failed on Richard Dawkins when tried!
55 See for example, Bigna Lenggenhager, Tej Tadi, Thomas Metzinger and Olaf Blanke, ʻVideo 
Ergo Sum: Manipulating Bodily Self-Consciousnessʼ in Science (vol. 317. no. 58414 August 2007), 
pp.1096-1099. Their synopsis states that: 
“Humans normally experience the conscious self as localized within their bodily borders. This 
spatial unity may break down in certain neurological conditions such as out-of-body experiences, 
leading to a striking disturbance of bodily self-consciousness. On the basis of these clinical data, 
we designed an experiment that uses conflicting visual-somatosensory input in virtual reality to 
disrupt the spatial unity between the self and the body. We found that during multisensory conflict, 
participants felt as if a virtual body seen in front of them was their own body and mislocalized 
themselves toward the virtual body, to a position outside their bodily borders. Our results indicate 
that spatial unity and bodily self-consciousness can be studied experimentally and are based on 
multisensory and cognitive processing of bodily information.” (p.1069)
56 Olaf Blanke and Shahar Arzy, ʻThe Out-of-Body Experience: Disturbed Self-Processing at the 
Temporo-Parietal Junctionʼ, in Neuroscientist, Vol 11 No.1 (2005) pp.16–24.
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57 There are numerous accounts of soldiers who have risen above the battlefield they are in, and 
see their positions and those of others, and claim that this saved their lives. There are many 
accounts of athletes who have had OBEs in Michael Murphy and Rhea A White, In the Zone - 
Transcendental Experience in Sport (NY NY: Penguin Arkana, 1995), such as the long-distance 
swimmer who claimed that whenever he was exhausted while swimming he would recharge by 
floating above his swimming body for a while! There are of course vast numbers of reported cases 
of OBEs from people in altered states of consciousness such as meditation and shamanism. 
Researchers scanning the brains of Buddhist Monks have shown that activity in their parietal lobes 
(normal body maps) decreases dramatically during meditation. OBEs are a frequent component of 
near-death experience, and have been documented by Pim van Lommel in The Lancet (van 
Lommel P, van Wees R, Meyers V, Elfferich I. ʻNear-Death Experience in Survivors of Cardiac 
Arrest: A prospective Study in the Netherlandsʼ, in Lancet, December 15, 2001,pp.2039–45.) It is 
probably the near-death experiences and OBEs in patients who are on record as having no brain 
activity, that is currently the biggest challenge to the thesis that consciousness requires a brain: 
“there is a well documented report of a patient with constant registration of the EEG during cerebral 
surgery for an gigantic cerebral aneurysm at the base of the brain, operated with a body 
temperature between 10 and 15 degrees, she was put on the heart-lung machine, with VF, with all 
blood drained from her head, with a flat line EEG, with clicking devices in both ears, with eyes 
taped shut, and this patient experienced an NDE with an out-of-body experience, and all details 
she perceived and heard could later be verified.” (Pim van Lommel, ʻA Reply to Shermer - Medical 
Evidence for NDEsʼ in Skeptical Investigations, accessed on 1.7.09 at http://
www.skepticalinvestigations.org/whoswho/vanLommel.htm) In this regard a three year 
experimental programme started in 2008 run by Dr Sam Parnia of the Human Consciousness 
Project. The experiment consists of a series of images that have been places at high level out of 
view in operating theatres and the like, in several university hospitals in Europe and the USA, 
which can only be seen from the ceiling.
58 Blankeʼs research suggest that in the case of his patients with electrically-induced out-of-body 
experiences, although their experiential account is of a coherent visual field from a position near 
the ceiling, when questioned about details, they do not seem to be able to clearly see anything that 
cannot be seen from their position in the hospital bed. This suggests that their feeling of being 
pressed against the ceiling might be a projection of the sensation of their back on the bed, and that 
the rest of the scene is filled in by their brain, using a combination of visual and non visual clues 
perhaps. In this sense, even the “battlefield” type projections (mentioned in footnote above) might 
be based upon the brain actually assimilating auditory or other clues as to “enemy locations” but 
which are typically unavailable to consciousness, but which in an emergency situation it organises 
into a useful holistic representation through the adoption of an out-of-body projection viewpoint. 
This suggests, in accordance with much current research, that an enormous amount of what we 
think of as “vision” is actually produced or imagined by the visual cortex. For a discussion of the 
construction of vision in this sense, see Ramachandran op. cit. pp 96-103. Particularly interesting is 
the account of the patient called Josh, who suffered from a large scotoma (hole) in his retina, but of 
which he was not normally aware. However, Ramachandran devised experiments whereby Josh 
was able to watch his visual cortex filling in patterns in real time. There is also much interesting 
work produced by Beau Lottoʼs LottoLab regarding the construction of visual experience.
59 Ramachandran and Blakeslee, Phantoms in the Brain, p.61-62.
60 Andy Clark, ʻSoft Selves and Ecological Controlʼ, in Don Ross, David Spurrett, Harold Kincaid 
and G. Lynn Stephens (eds.) Distributed Cognition and Will - Individual Volition and Social Context 
(Cambridge MA: MIT, 2007), p.114.
61 Some connectionist accounts of the extended mind thesis tend to oversimplify this, and devolve 
all cognitive faculties out in ways that do not seem to fully account for experience.
62 For Batesonʼs discussion of maps, difference and information, see Gregory Bateson, ʻForm, 
Substance and Differenceʼ in Steps to an Ecology of Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2000), p.454-71.

Footnotes to Chapter Six
299
63 It seems that it had been thought – in the sciences, if not in the humanities – that we mapped 
space as a single field. However, as Rizzolatti makes clear, “far from taking the form of a unitary 
map, the cortical representation of space in both humans and monkeys appears to be based on the 
activation of distinct sensory-motor circuits, each of which organises and controls motor acts (such 
as reaching) that require objects to be specifically located with respect to a given body part (hand, 
mouth, eyes etc.).. the presence in both neural circuits [f4-VIP and F5 -AIP] of visual responses 
connected to motor activation suggests that what is true for objects is equally true for space.” 
Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, Mirrors in the Brain, p.66.
64 Michael Grazino and Charles Gross at Princeton University, found that each part of the body has 
its own spatial map, with local co-ordinates of a bubble of potential action space attached. There 
are also similar maps for sounds around the body.
65 Rizzolatti notes that infants up to three months old can only see 20 cm in front of them, and 
refers to Jean Piaget observation that in this period infants spent much time watching their hands. 
He ascribes this to “calibrating peripersonal space in addition to that of measuring object sizes 
according to their graspability.” Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, Mirrors in the Brain, p.71.
66 According to Blakeslee, “your self does not end where your flesh ends, but suffuses and blends 
with the world, including other beings. Thus when you ride a horse with confidence and skill, your 
body maps and the horseʼs maps are blended in a shared space.” Blakeslee and Blakeslee, The 
Body Has a Mind of Its Own, p.3.
67 Ibid., p.5.
68 Ibid., p.136.
69 Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, Mirrors in the Brain, p.55.
70 There are three different types or ʻmodalitiesʼ of neurons involved in these proceses. Basic 
somatosensory neurons, somatosensory and visual neurons (bimodal), and somatosensory and 
visual and auditory neurons (trimodal.) For Rizzolatti, “the most interesting functional aspect of f4 
bimodal neurons is that they respond to visual stimuli only when these appear in the vicinity of their 
tactile receptive field; more precisely, within that specific space portion which represents their visual 
receptive field and appears to constitute an extension of their somasensory receptive field.” 
Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, Mirrors in the Brain, p.54-5.
71 Eric R. Kandel , Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis, and the New Biology of Mind (Washington, D.C.: 
American Psychiatric Publishing, 2005) p.296.
72 Theodore Adorno, ʻFunctionalism Todayʼ in Neil Leach (ed.), Rethinking Architecture - A reader in 
cultural theory (London: Routledge, 1997), p.17.
73 See http://www.brain.riken.jp/en/a_iriki.html
74 Increasingly, it seems that there is agreement with the thesis first proposed by Engels in his 
essay on ʻThe Part played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man,ʼ Stephen Jay Gould has 
stated that had Engelsʼ essay been more favourably disseminated, a century of work might have 
been advanced.
75 Clark, ʻSoft Selves and Ecological Controlʼ, p.101.
76 Ibid., p.111.
77 See Marqand Smith, ʻThe Uncertainty of Placing: Prosthetic Bodies, Sculptural Design, and 
Unhomely Dwelling in Marc Quinn, James Gillingham, and Sigmund Freudʼ, in Phantom Limb: A 
Neurobiological Diagnosis with Aesthetic, Cultural and Philosophical Implications (2004), published 
online at http://www.artbrain.org/category/journal-neuro-aesthetic-theory/phantom-limb/
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78 At least, not at the classical level – it is certainly not completely implausible that macrocosmic 
systems produce real fields at a quantum scale, supported by non-local quantum effects (of the 
kind suggested by the work associated with Stuart Hameroff for example) or a more basic 
fundamental interconnectedness of matter-field processes in the way proposed by David Bohm for 
example, but that does not concern us here directly.
79 There are all kinds of results that claim to challenge that. See, for example, Rupert 
Sheldrake,The Sense of Being Stared At, and other aspects of the Extended Mind (London: Arrow, 
2003).
80 For a discussion of this see Blakeslee and Blakeslee, The Body Has a Mind of Its Own, p.
120-21.
81 Ibid., p.134.
82 According to Peter Harries-Jones, A Recursive Vision: Ecological Understanding and Gregory 
Bateson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), p.49.
83 One exception to this is Reyner Banhamʼs ʻwell-tempered environmentʼ proposal with Francois 
Dallegret, where we do find a larger collective bubble, containing a group of individuals and with 
some media technology.
84 Referred to in Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, Mirrors in the Brain, pp.62-74.
85 Ibid., p.67 (contains a quote from Ernst Machʼs 1905 paper, ʻKnowledge and Errorʼ).
86 J.J. Gibson, cited in Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, Mirrors in the Brain, p.34.
87 Ramachandran tells of a patient whose phantom hand would automatically respond to nearby 
affordances, and reach out and “hold” cups etc. He even felt pain if a cup was picked up by 
someone else, as if it was snatched from his hand! See Ramachandran and Blakeslee, Phantoms 
in the Brain, p.43.
88 Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, Mirrors in the Brain, p.34.
89  Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social - An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (Oxford: OUP, 
2007) p.72
90 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (1945) p.162, as cited in Rizzolatti and 
Sinigaglia, Mirrors in the Brain, p.52.
91 Ibid., p.51.
92 Of course, many natural environments too would have provided highly complex spatial 
structures, and in many ways human construction would have provided a somewhat abstracted 
and simplified foil to the complexity of natural environments. Again, one wonders if there is a 
relative simplicity to the spatial morphology of the desert that might allow an experience of 
peripersonal space fields to come to the fore in Himba consciousness. Equally, I wonder whether 
our assumptions that the metropolitan condition is one of intensified nervous stimulation is always 
the case. Even when taking into account the wildness of modern media, for many inhabitants the 
city might still represent a form of sensory deprivation, compared to the spatial richness that a life 
more engaged with a living landscape might offer.
93 I think that my insight here that a development of Gibsonʼs concept of affordance offers a way to 
re-theorise architectural pattern and decoration is important, and I plan to explore this further in 
future research.
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94 The quote is as follows: “the [motor] system is composed of a mosaic of frontal and parietal 
areas that are very closely linked to the visual, auditory and tactile areas... [and] is also endowed 
with functional properties that are much more complex than was previously thought... there are 
neurons that become active in response to goal-directed motor acts (such as grasping, holding, 
manipulating, etc.) and not just to simple movements; not only, they also respond selectively to the 
shapes and sizes of objects both when we interact with them and also when we just observe them. 
These neurons appear to be able to discriminate sensorial information, coding it on the basis of the 
range of potential acts offered, independently of whether they subsequently evolve into a concrete 
action.” Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, Mirrors in the Brain, p.x-xi.
95 Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, Mirrors in the Brain, p.xii.
96 Ibid., p.xiii.
97 See Edvard I. Moser, Emilio Kropff, and May-Britt Moser, ʻPlace Cells, Grid Cells, and the Brain's 
Spatial Representation Systemʼ in Annual Review of Neuroscience, Vol. 31, 2008: pp. 69-89. For a 
broad seminal survey of the role that the hippocampus plays in spatial awareness and cognitive 
mapping, see John O'Keefe and Lynn Nadel, The Hippocampus as a Cognitive Map (Oxford: OUP, 
1978). This is available online at http://www.cognitivemap.net
98 Discovered in 1971 by John OʼKeefe and John Dostrovsky. See also recent work at UCL by 
Hugo Spiers (http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spierslab/).
99 See Kathryn J. Jeffery, ʻIntegration of the Sensory Inputs to Place Cells: What, Where, Why, and 
How?ʼ, in Hippocampus No.17 (2007) p.777.
100 It is presumed that the geometry of grid cells is based upon the mathematics of hexagonal close 
packing (a geometry that occurs frequently in both the brain and natural organisation). It is easy to 
derive an orthogonal grid from a hexagonal grid, by just joining every other row/column.
101 For a discussion of the relations between place, grid and head direction cells see Kathryn J. 
Jeffery, ʻIntegration of the Sensory Inputs to Place Cells: What, Where, Why, and How?ʼ, in 
Hippocampus, No.17, (2007) p.775-85.
102 See Eleanor A. Maguire, David G. Gadian, Ingrid S. Johnsrude, Catriona D. Good, John 
Ashburner, Richard S. J. Frackowiak, and Christopher D. Frith, ʻNavigation-related structural 
change in the hippocampi of taxi driversʼ in PNAS (Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences) Vol. 97, No. 8 (2000) pp.4398–403.
103 See Eichenbaum H, Dudchenko P, Wood E, Shapiro M, Tanila H, ʻThe hippocampus, memory, 
and place cells: is it spatial memory or a memory space?ʼ, Neuron, No. 23 (1999), pp.209 –26.
104 Dharshan Kumaran and Eleanor A. Maguire, ʻThe Human Hippocampus: Cognitive Maps or
Relational Memory?ʼ, The Journal of Neuroscience, No. 25, Vol. 31 (2005)   pp.7254 –259.
105 Humberto Maturana and Fransisco J. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition (Dordrecht, Holland: D. 
Reidel, 1980), p.34.
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106 This argument was first advanced in J.D Lewis-Williams and T.A. Dowson, ʻThe signs of all 
times: Entoptic Phenomena in Upper Palaeolithic Artʼ, Current Anthropology 29 (1988), pp.201-45. 
Lewis-Williams makes two moves in this direction. Firstly, drawing upon work by cognitive 
psychologist Colin Martindale (See Colin Martindale, Cognition and Consciousness (Homewood, 
Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1981)), Lewis-Williams argues that “need to think of consciousness not as a 
state, but as a continuum or spectrum.” (David Lewis-Williams The Mind in the Cave - 
Consciousness and the Origins of Art (London: Thames and Hudson, 2002). p.122.) Secondly, he 
argues that the range of human conscious experience was extended and intensified through 
psychoactive plant ingestion.
# For Martindale, the spectrum of consciousness ranges through waking (various problem 
oriented thought levels), realistic fantasy, autistic fantasy, reverie, hypnagogic (falling asleep 
states), dreaming (various states), and finally a total absence of consciousness. 
# Consciousness, is indeed, as Charles Laughlin notes, a “fragmented” phenomenon. During 
day we typically shift between inward and outward oriented consciousness, normally based upon 
90-120 min cycles (See C. Laughlin, D. McManus and E.G. dʼAquili, Brain, Symbol and 
Experience: Towards a Neurophenomenology of Human Consciousness (New York: Columbia 
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Commodity consumption relies upon high levels of non rational consciousness, and equally, at 
certain moments, the embracing of altered forms of consciousness has had political importance for 
certain groups. As William James has noted (quoted by Lewis-Williams), fully rational waking 
consciousness is just one form, “whilst all about it, parted by the flimsiest of screens, there lie the 
potential forms of consciousness, entirely different.” 
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of the theories advanced by evolutionary psychology. In particular he criticises Mithenʼs work (see 
Stephen Mithen, The Prehistory of the Mind, A Search for the Origins of Art, Religion and Science 
(London/New York: Thames and Hudson,1996)). In this work, Mithen draws upon modularity based 
models of mind (especially Jerry Fodorʼs account, and Nicholas Humphreyʼs “reflexive 
consciousness” theory of mind.) Lewis-Williams argues that what for Mithen et al is a “social 
intelligence module” is actually an emergent socio-systemic effect: “what today constitutes 
acceptable human consciousness - ʻthe consciousness of rationalityʼ - is an historically situated 
notion constructed within a specific social context... it is not simply a function of interacting 
intelligences” (Lewis-Williams, The Mind in the Cave, p.121.) He argues that evolutionary 
psychology is based on an assumptions that intelligence is primarily rational, and that evolution is a 
process leading “people to become more and more like western scientists!” (Lewis-Williams, The 
Mind in the Cave, p.111).
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the University of East London in 2005, and a version was then published as an essay in the book 
that followed of the same name, edited by Katie Lloyd Thomas, as ʻMarx Mattersʼ. The text here, 
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that the ʻMaterial Mattersʼ chapter, and in that respect is closer to the original lecture. The main 
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emphasis that was given in the original text to the influence of German Orientalism. In the original, I 
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Goodbun, ʻMarx Matters, or Aesthetics, Technology, and the Spirit of Matterʼ, in Katie Lloyd Thomas 
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Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature, p.10.
3 Collins English Dictionary, accessed on 1.7.08 at http://www.collinslanguage.com/
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but I feel 
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term as a rendering of Einfühlung.“ Edward B. Titchener, Lectures on the Experimental Psychology 
of Thought Processes (New York: Macmillan, 1909), pp.21–22.
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appeared almost simultaneously – and apparently independently of each other – in the year 1893.” 
Adrian Forty, Words and Buildings: A Vocabulary of Modern Architecture (London: Thames and 
Hudson, 2000), p. 259. The other two authors were Adolf Hilderbrand and August Schmarsow. 
Each of these essays synthesised in new ways the ideas of empathy, form and space. 
6 “The term emerged in roughly its current sense during the seventeenth century in English, 
French, and German. Initially, its meaning was wider, referring to some kind of affinity between not 
only people but also things. The latter related chiefly to a medical context, such as the “sympathy” 
regarded as linking a medicament with a specific disease (e.g., Digby, 1669), or different parts of 
the body, or people when illnesses were said to be passed on “sympathetically” (Whytt, 1765). The 
psychological meaning of sharing the feelings of another person or being affected by their suffering 
existed in parallel. An early example is cited in the Oxford English Dictionary: “Out of faithful and 
true simpathy [sic] and fellow-feeling with you” (1662).” 
Gustav Jahoda, ‘Theodor Lipps and the shift from “sympathy” to “empathy”’, Journal of the History 
of the Behavioural Sciences Vol. 41, No. 2 (2005), p.152. 
7 See Joseph Rykvert, ‘Organic and Mechanical’, in Wiliam W. Braham and Jonathan Hale with 
John Stanislav Sadar (eds.) Rethinking Technology - A Reader in Architectural Theory (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2007), pp.337-49.
8 Quoted by Melvin M Rader, A Modern Book of Esthetics (New York: Henry Holt, 1935), p.287.
9 Goetheʼs posthumous editor, Rudolf Steiner, set out in books such as Goethean Science (1897) 
and The Theory of Knowledge Implicit in Goetheʼs World Conception (1886), what remain some of 
the clearest instructions about how to consciously empathise with objects – however problematic 
Steinerʼs thought might be in some other regards. More recently, there has been a revival of 
interest in the possibility of a Goethean Science, largely in relation to Gaia Theory, with scientists 
such as Stephan Harding, Stephen Harold Buhner and Henri Bortoft using and describing 
empathy-like methods as a way of holistically describing natural systems. Hardingʼs work is 
particularly useful I think – see Stephan Harding, Animate Earth: Science, Intuition and Gaia (White 
River Jct., Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing, 2007). There is no small relation between 
Batesonʼs ecological aesthetic project and Goetheʼs holistic science, and this has been explored to 
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Beauty and Sacred Earth (New York: State University of New York Press, 2008).
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10 G.W. Pigman, ‘Freud And The History Of Empathy’, International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 76 
(1995), pp. 237-56. Pigman notes that in the English Standard Edition of Freud’s work, however, 
Einfühlung is not consistently translated as empathy.
11 The correspondence between the concepts of empathy and mimesis is made clear by Lakoff and 
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of another ... cognitively simulating the movements of the other ... which results in the ʻfeelʼ of 
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2005), pp. 93-104; and Neil Leach, Forget Heidegger (Bucharest: Paideia, 2006). In the latter, 
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alienation of conceptual thought, and offers an alternative, more empathetic model of human 
interaction” (p.80). An extension of empathy into mimesis offers more clearly a way to conceive of 
what in Chapter Five was noted as the difference between kinaesthetic and iconographic, or 
connectivist (emergent) and computational (symbolic) meaning: “mimesis … allows one to forge a 
symbolic relationship with oneʼs environment. Mimesis may help to explain how we identify 
progressively with our surroundings in general. We read ourselves into our surroundings ... The 
subject creatively identifies with the object, so that the object ... is appropriated as part of the 
symbolic background through which individuals constitute their identity” (pp.82-83).
14 Pigman, ‘Freud And The History Of Empathy,’ pp.237-256.
15 Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology and the Sciences of Mind (Cambridge, 
MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), p.382.
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18 Mitchell W. Schwarzer, ʻThe Emergence of Architectural Space: August Schmarsowʼs Theory of 
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Anthony Vidler for example notes that: “The return to Simmel has been paralleled in art and 
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Wölfflin, Riegl, Schmarsow, Hildebrand, Göller – as part of a new critical historiography of the 
discipline. Margaret Iverson on Riegl, Mitchell Schwarzer on Schmarsow, and the anthology of 
texts assembled and introduced by Harry Mallgrave and Eleftherios Ikonomou have contributed to 
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Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians Vol. 58, No. 3 (Sep., 1999), pp.482-86.
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Adrian Forty, Words and Buildings: A Vocabulary of Modern Architecture (London: Thames and 
Hudson, 2000), p.172.
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2002). See also my own teaching-based research on ‘Dancing with the Machines’ in Chapter 
Three.
22 Le Corbusier, Engineers Aesthetic and Architecture, in Braham and Hale with Sadar (eds.) 
Rethinking Technology, p.33.
23 Beyond the panpsychist ingredients that I propose here, van der Ven suggests all kinds of other 
references that further support such an interpretation. For example, his first chapter notes the 
resonance between space and Lao-Tzuʼs Taoist philosophy, and more broadly he shares Max 
Jammerʼs suggestion that since the middle ages, via cabalistic thought, there has been an 
association between god and space. See Max Jammer, Concepts of Space (New York: Dover, 
1993; originally published 1954). 
24 Forty, Words and Buildings, p.256.
25 Both published their initial papers on space in 1893, and both of which are in the Mallgrave and 
Ikonomou collection.
26 August Schmarsow, ʻThe Essence of Architectural Creationʼ, in Harry Mallgrave and Eleftherios 
Ikonomou (eds.), Empathy, Form, Space: Problems in German Aesthetics 1873-1893 (Santa 
Monica, CA: Getty Centre, 1994), p.296.
27 van der Ven, Space in Architecture, p. xiv.
28 This aspect of Adolf Loosʼ essay on ʻOrnament and Crimeʼ is often overlooked. He is not simply 
saying that ornament is wrong, as much as he is saying meaningful symbolic public ornament is 
impossible in a multicultural metropolitan condition, where there is no ʻorganicʼ shared language, in 
the way in which there is in a vernacular or classical condition. Whether we accept that statement 
is another matter of course, and advertising certainly seems to be able to find common public 
languages, as Venturi has frequently observed (even if he himself is less able to successfully prove 
it is possible still in architecture!). Perhaps a more compelling route out of this dilemma, certainly 
from a modern spatial empathy position, is a possibility that emerges from Kracauerʼs conception 
of The Mass Ornament. See Sigfried Kracauer, The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays, trans 
Thomas Y Levin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). Here, it is suggested that it is 
possible to trace ʻpatterns that connectʼ between in this instance a kind of rhythm-analysis of the 
spatial practices of the Tiller Girlsʼ dance group and repetitive mechanised factory labour. In a 
closely related sense, Charlotte Klonk has suggested that “the art of ornamentation was promoted 
by many members of European reform movements, from the Belgian Henry van de Velde to Josef 
Hoffmann in Austria and August Endell in Germany, precisely in order to reach the modern soul 
directly and effectively. Attention to the principles of abstract pattern-making was intended to attune 
the sensations of city dwellers in a way that would be appropriate to the pace of modern urban life.”  
Charlotte Klonk, ʻPatterns of Attention: from shop windows to gallery rooms in early twentieth 
century Berlinʼ, Art History, Vol 28 No 4 (September 2005), p.469.
29 This aspect of its origins has not been written about on the whole. The classic treatment of 
empathy describes this discourse as being based in Kantian aesthetics (which is no doubt in part 
accurate). However, other contemporary researchers in this area have reacted favourably to my 
position in this regard. Notably, Susan Lanzoni (Visiting Scholar on the Science Technology and 
Society Program at MIT) in correspondence wrote: “although I haven't focused on the Hegelian 
connection to empathy, I always thought there was something in the objectification of spirit that 
seems consonant with an understanding of empathy. I ... see that there is certainly a fruitful 
resonance between Marx's notion of commodity and Einfühlung theory as put forth by Vischer and 
Schmarsow ... I like the emphasis on the continuing presence of the theological, or the pantheistic 
in your paper. The question of presence or projection is key, I think.” (email correspondence with 
author 28th January 2009). Lanzoni was one of the organisers of an invited workshop ʻVarieties of 
Empathy in Science, Art and Cultureʻ held at the University of British Columbia, in October 2008, 
which brought together cognitive science theorists such as Shaun Gallagher and Evan Thompson 
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30 Harry Mallgrave and Eleftherios Ikonomou have in particular promoted this interpretation, stating 
for example that “it was Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) who provided the paradigm for the German 
philosophical treatment of form and space in the nineteenth century.” Harry Mallgrave and 
Eleftherios Ikonomou, ʻIntroductionʼ, in Mallgrave and Ikonomou (eds.), Empathy, Form, Space, p.
5.
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42 Robert Vischer, ʻOn the Optical Sense of Form: A Contribution to Aestheticsʼ in Mallgrave and 
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'Perspectiva Communisʼ of 1270 (which was quoted by both Alberti and da Vinci). Later, Abbot 
Suger of St Denis would unite building and metaphysics, in his own essay on light. Otto von 
Simson similarly suggested that the Gothic cathedral is a direct response to, or expression of, 
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75 We might ask, what does that mean? How the does the metropolis – today a global entity – map 
onto the individual in any meaningful way. The answer to that is of course that, in this Batesonian 
sense, the “individual” mind really is the extended into the “metropolis”, and co-extensive with it.
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84 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (London: Routledge, 2001 
(originally 1964)), pp. 133-34.
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